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 ABSTRACT 
 
After joining the WTO in 2001, China’s total exports grew by 19.3% 
per annum up to 2013 and the country emerged as the world’s 
biggest exporter of manufactured electronics. China’s rise has had an 
impact on developing countries such as Malaysia, a major exporter of 
electronic and electrical (E&E) goods. Malaysia aims to be a high-
income economy by 2020, and upgrading its E&E value chain is 
critical to this goal. Malaysia is part of the East Asian production 
network and China imports intermediate inputs from Malaysia’s E&E 
for its final exports while simultaneously expanding in similar product 
spaces. This means the effect on Malaysia of China’s rise is complex.  
 
Contemporary literature divides the impact of China’s rise into 
competitive and complementary effects, and this research aims to 
further understand the effect of China’s rise on Malaysia’s E&E trade 
and investment channels, using a mixed methodology approach. The 
research analyses the bilateral E&E trade patterns, the extent of 
trade competition at the destination markets, with the trade 
structure disaggregated by sophistication and by type of goods 1 
analysis. Subsequently it examines China’s impact on the 
semiconductor machinery segment, a backward linkage of the IC 
industry. Finally, the influence of China’s rise on investments aspects 
of Malaysia’s E&E industry is also explored. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Types of goods category such as final goods, parts and accessories or durables. 
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The research finds that while imports from China compete with 
imports from Malaysia in the US and Japanese markets (the EU 
market is different), China’s competition in trade is also spurring 
Malaysia to upgrade its exports’ sophistication. China also creates 
new demand for Malaysia’s semiconductor machinery. Finally, while 
resulting in short-term job losses, China’s diversion of E&E 
investment from Malaysia provide opportunities for Malaysians to 
start new firms, and for MNCs based in Malaysia to upgrade their 
production.  
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1.0 Introduction  
 
China’s emergence as a global economic powerhouse is seen as an 
economic miracle of the 21st century. Achieving on average 10.0 percent 
annual economic growth, China has lifted 500 million of its citizen out of 
poverty in the last 30 years (The World Bank and Development Research 
Center of the State Council of the P. R. of China, 2013). China is the current 
world’s number one exporter of electronic and electrical goods, overtaking 
the US, the EU, and Japan.  
 
For the rest of the world this is a mixed blessing. While consumers at 
exports market are happy with Chinese cheap clothing and electronics, 
industries in other countries have been affected to different degrees. In 
one country, news headlines include a factory shutting down after being 
out-competed by China or factories moving to China with workers being 
laid off concern policymakers, commentators, and ordinary citizens, while 
in another, big corporations are celebrating the fact that the Chinese, 
richer than their parents, are now the biggest consumers of their high-end 
cars and other luxury goods.  
 
While developed countries’ benefit from high-technology exports to China 
is less likely to be negatively affected by the rise of China in the medium 
term, the effect of China on developing countries with mid-technology and 
middle-incomes such as Malaysia is less clear-cut. China imports 
intermediate inputs from Malaysia for its final exports, but at the same 
time competes with Malaysia in labour-intensive assembly industries. This 
research seeks to better understand the effect of China on Malaysia in a 
high-technology industry, namely the electronic and electrical industry. 
Furthermore, Malaysia is keen to avoid the middle-income trap and aims to 
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become a high-income economy, with the upgrading of its industry a 
crucial development goal (Economic Planning Unit (Malaysia), 2010). Given 
the rise of China, this represents both a challenge and an opportunity for 
Malaysia.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows; the next section presents the 
background to the problem of China’s emergence in the global economy, 
followed by a sectoral view of China’s emergence from Malaysia’s E&E 
sector. Then I present the study’s problem statement followed by a 
discussion of current research gaps, which inform the aims, and research 
questions of this study. The outline of the thesis is presented in the final 
section.  
 
1.1  The Global Economy and China’s Emergence  
 
Globally, most observers concur that China’s rise as an economic power is 
irreversible. China’s share of world GDP is estimated to increase from 4.7% 
in 2005 to 7.6% by 2020 (Winters and Yusuf, 2007, p. 6). The Asian Drivers2 
literature stresses that due to the size of its economy and its combined 
foreign exchange reserve of more than US$700 billion, China (and to a 
lesser extent India) will have an increasing impact on the developing world 
and developing world’s strategy for development moving forward 
(Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008). The Asian Drivers literature discusses wide-
ranging impacts including on production and trade flows, financial flows, 
environmental spillovers and global governance. This study focuses on 
production and trade flows. 
 
                                                 
2 The Asian Drivers include China and India, but I confine my interest to China in this 
research. 
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The rise of China within the globalization heralded a new era with China’s 
entry into the WTO in 2001. Since then its exports have been expanding at 
a rate of 19.3% per annum up to 2013, signalling its greater integration into 
the global production network. Likewise, inflows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) into China rose 17-fold from US$3.5 billion in 1990 to 
US$60.6 billion in 2004, while ASEAN’s share of FDI in Asia fell from 30.2% 
in 1992 to 4.2% in 2004 (Salike, 2010). Feeling the heat from China, the 
Prime Minister of Malaysia at the time, Mahathir Mohamad, remarked: 
‘Everyone is feeling the pinch because the amount of FDI has shrunk and 
then, a lot of that is going to China’ (New Straits Times, 21 September 2002 
in McKibbin and Woo (2003, p.14.). 
 
The rapid rise of China raises questions about its impact on the developing 
world (IDS, 2006). While there is fear that China’s growth will displace 
exports from developing countries, there is also a positive side: the 
creation of new investment by China and higher demand for imports of 
inputs into China’s final exports. Furthermore, as China’s population grows 
wealthier the demand for imported final goods also increases. At the 
macroeconomic level, while Malaysia is benefitting from the rising prices of 
commodity exports to China such as crude oil and agricultural products 
such as palm oil, the deeper question raised is the long-term 
competitiveness of the Malaysian manufacturing industry. These two sides 
of China’s impact on its neighbours, widely termed as competitive or 
complementary effects, are central to the discussion in this study. 
 
Malaysia aims to advance from a middle-income to a high-income 
economy by 2020, with a growth target of 6.0% per year from 2011-2015. 
A key strategy towards this goal is to upgrade its industry to high-value-
added activities (EPU, 2010). As the E&E sector contributes around 40% of 
the total manufactured exports of Malaysia and represents 26.1% of total 
manufacturing output (EPU, 2010, p. 131), upgrading the E&E value chain is 
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crucial to reaching this goal. Apart from the size of its contribution, the 
electronics sector is described by Hirschman ‘as a propulsive sector’ in the 
economy that reinvents itself and is essential for the diffusion of 
technology (Sturgeon and Kawakami, 2010). 3 
 
However, structural issues within Malaysian industry and the challenges 
posed by China do not help with the upgrading of the value chain. Firstly, 
the manufacturing industry’s contribution to Malaysian GDP has declined 
from its peak of 34.4% in 2000 to 24.3% in 2012. Secondly, Malaysia’s FDI-
based export model mainly concentrates on assembly and testing (Ernst, 
2004), and weak linkages between its export-oriented industry and 
domestic economy hamper the upgrading to higher-value-added activity 
(Alavi, 2002). This is alarming, as the manufacturing industry is crucial to 
promoting linkages between different sectors within the economy and 
upgrading the value chain (Naudé and Szirmai, 2012). 
 
1.2 China’s Emergence and Malaysia’s Electronic and Electrical 
Industry  
 
The case for research to evaluate China’s impact on a neighbouring 
developing country has never been stronger, as in 2009 it emerged as 
Malaysia’s top trading partner, overtaking traditional trade partners such 
as the US and Japan. Malaysia’s exports and imports of electronic and 
electrical products rose from US$0.03 billion and US$0.07 billion in 1992 to 
US$ 12.9 billion and US$ 15.1 billion in 2013 respectively.4 
 
                                                 
3 By ‘propulsive sector’ Hirschman meant a  rapidly changing sector with a positive 
technology spillover in the economy. 
4 The electronics and electrical sector is defined in this study as the sum of 338 products at 
the 6 digit-level under HS 1998/92 Nomenclature.  
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While the increasing volume of trade with China should be celebrated, 
some, such as Fong Chan Onn, the then Malaysian Human Resources 
Minister, cautioned: ‘China is a threat. Malaysia must learn to cope with 
this emerging trend and rectify weaknesses to remain competitive in 
critical industries such as electronics’ (Malaysiakini.com, 9 April 2002). 
Understandably, this sentiment is due to the loss of manufacturing jobs 
associated with factories shifting from Malaysia to China early in the 2000s, 
and as the minister in charge of manpower he was rightfully concerned.  
 
Secondly, Malaysia is also concerned that its household electrical industry 
is increasingly being flooded with imports of radios, televisions and small 
electrical items from China, which will impact on the local manufacture of 
electrical items. Durables goods, which consist mostly of household 
electrical products under Broad Economic Categories (BEC) (see Chapter 5) 
show Malaysia’s widening deficit in the balance of its bilateral trade with 
China year after year, from US$1.9 million in 1992 to US$263.2 million in 
2013.  
 
On the other hand, Malaysia exports more semiconductors to China as a 
result of the rise in the processing trade in which components are sourced 
from overseas to assemble into final goods in China. Malaysian IC exports 
to China rose from US$611,570 in 1992 to US$8.4 billion in 2013. While 
Malaysia benefits from this, its IC exports to third-destination markets such 
as the US, European Union and Japan compete with semiconductors 
produced in China. It is also speculated that China will upgrade its  export 
sophistication and that medium-technology countries such as Malaysia will 
be increasingly vulnerable to China’s export threat (Lall and Albaladejo, 
2004).  
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1.3 Problem Statement 
 
China’s rapid expansion in E&E production is benefiting Malaysia, which is 
exporting more intermediate parts and components to China to feed into 
its production networks, but at the same time Malaysia faces competition 
from China in E&E exports in third markets and import penetration of 
domestic markets. The positive side of China’s rise is characterized in terms 
of complementary effects, and the negative side as competitive impacts. 
Apart from the trade aspect of China’s impact, Malaysia is also affected 
through the investment channel. The issue is currently framed more as a 
case of the diversion of FDI from Malaysia to China in the current 
literature, and needs to be weighed against China’s FDI into Malaysia’s E&E 
industry. As investment in Malaysia’s E&E industry is generally linked to 
trade, it is important to see whether China compensates for displacing 
finished electrical goods exports from Malaysia, which predominantly 
consists of exports by foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) such as 
Japanese MNC plants based in Malaysia.  
 
1.4 Research Gaps  
 
The globalisation literature on China’s impact on developing countries 
discussed above reveals that China’s impact on Malaysian trade and 
investments is not clear-cut and remains a rich area for further research. 
The following facts support further research to understand the impact of 
China’s rise on Malaysia’s E&E sector: 
 World Bank and IMF impact studies based on model simulations are 
dependent on highly aggregated data and do not take into account 
the heterogeneity of the traded goods (see Chapter 2).  
 The effect of China’s export competition on Malaysia’s industries is 
not uniform across different players in the E&E sector. China’s 
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impacts on a multinational corporation and a subcontract supplier 
are different, and their response could be different as well.  
 The behaviour of China’s FDI outflows and its motivation and 
impact on a middle-income country such as Malaysia are less well 
documented at the firm level. Moreover, given the trade-
investment nexus in the Malaysian electronics industry, the 
discussion linking both trade and the investment sector with China 
needs to keep up with recent trends. 
 Current literature, especially that with a Malaysian origin, casts 
China in the role of a competitor for trade. This needs to be 
weighed against China’s recent demand for semiconductor 
machinery equipment from Malaysia’s semiconductor machinery 
sector. 
 While Malaysian-based literature on the electronic sector such as 
Rasiah et al. (2010) and Rasiah and Shan (2012) is useful to 
understand the development path of each country in East Asia, it 
has not specifically focused on the impact on these developing 
countries of China’s rise.  
 
1.5 Research Aims and Objectives 
 
The broader research aims here are to examine the impact of the re-
emergence of China on Malaysia’s E&E sector and to look at Malaysia’s E&E 
firms and government’s responses to China’s rise. 
  
The main objective of the research is to investigate the impact of China’s 
rise on Malaysia’s E&E sector through the trade and investment channels. 
The E&E sector is the focus of the research followed by global value chain 
(GVC)/ global production network (GPN) studies of the integrated circuits 
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(IC)5 industry and the small household appliance industry based in 
Malaysia.  
Specifically, this study intends to find out:  
 whether China’s rise complements or competes with Malaysia’s 
E&E sector 
 whether disaggregation by level of sophistication of Malaysian E&E 
imports at destination markets can reveal whether Malaysia’s E&E 
industry has upgraded in response to China’s rise.  
 The complementary aspects of the East Asian regional production 
network including backward linkages to the E&E industry and 
especially in the semiconductor industry between Malaysia and 
China.  
 
1.6 Research Question  
 
Based on the research aims above, the main research question is: 
What is the effect of China’s rise on Malaysia’s electronics and electrical 
industry?  
The above main research question is further divided as follows: 
A.  Is the rise of China complementary or competitive with Malaysia’s 
E&E? 
 Trade Channel 
1. Does the bilateral trade structure reflect a complementary type of 
specialisation within the E&E value chain between Malaysia and 
China?  
2. To what extent do China and Malaysia’s E&E exports compete in 
their destination markets? 
                                                 
5 Integrated circuits are also referred to as semiconductors. Semiconductor materials are 
fabricated into integrated circuits and IC is the most important sector within 
semiconductor industry.  
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3. Based on the disaggregation of imports from Malaysia at 
destination markets by level of sophistication, is Malaysia’s export 
structure consistent with the upgrading of its E&E industry?  
 Investment Channel 
4. At the bilateral level, does the investment flow reflect 
complementarity in sub-sector investment, and what are the 
drivers of Chinese FDI in Malaysia? Which sub-sector are 
Malaysian E&E firms entering in China?  
5. Which sub-sector within Malaysian E&E is affected by the 
diversion of investment to China, and what is the effect on the 
E&E sector?  
B. How is Malaysia responding to China’s rise at the government and 
firm levels?  
6. How are Malaysia’s firms responding to the rise in China’s E&E 
trade and investment? 
7. How are Malaysian government agencies responding to China’s 
rise in for trade and investment?  
C. How China affects Malaysia’s efforts to upgrade its E&E value chain? 
 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
 
The thesis consists of nine chapters. The first chapter introduces the 
research problem and provides an overview of the thesis. Chapter 2 
elaborates on the theoretical framework underlying the methodology 
(Chapter 3) used to analyse the data. Chapter 4 sets the scene by 
discussing the evolution of the E&E industry in both Malaysia and China.  
 
The thesis then goes on to the results, with Chapter 5 presenting some 
preliminary data on bilateral trade at total trade and E&E level. Chapter 6 
takes the trade analysis further, analysing the rise and fall of imports share 
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from Malaysia and China’s E&E for trade in destination markets. Chapter 7 
expands the analysis of China’s impact on Malaysia in a backward linkage 
industry, namely the semiconductor equipment machinery industry. 
Chapter 8 presents the analysis of China’s impact on Malaysia in 
investment channel and, Chapter 9 concludes the findings of this thesis and 
offers suggestions for future research.  
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2.0 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter first reviews studies related to China’s impact on its 
neighbours and then presents the theoretical framework for the study. The 
literature review reinforces the problem statement in Chapter 1: studies of 
China’s effect on its neighbours are not clear-cut on whether China’s re-
emergence is a complementary or competitive force. The literature review 
also elaborates on the research gaps mentioned in Chapter 1.  
 
The chapter is organised in the following order: a discussion of 
globalisation literature such as that on the impact of the Asian Drivers on 
the global economy is followed by econometric-based studies, 
competitiveness literature, spin-off theory, and the global value chain 
(GVC) and global production network (GPN) frameworks. Elements of these 
frameworks are then incorporated into the theoretical framework to 
discuss the impact of China on Malaysia’s E&E industry.  
 
2.1.1 The Globalisation and Asian Drivers Literature 
 
At a global level, the Asian Drivers literature predicts that China will have 
an increasing impact on global trade and investment flows. This is because 
of the sheer size of the Chinese economy (Chinese exports grew from 
US$50 billion to US$798 billion from 1985-2005), the high level of state 
ownership of enterprises and the active intervention of the state in the 
marketplace and importantly, the combination of low price and high 
innovation potential presents a great challenge to other developing-
country exports (Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008). The Asian Drivers literature 
considers other aspects of China’s impact such as the environmental 
aspects, financial markets and global governance of multilateral 
institutions, but this study focuses on its impacts on trade and investment.  
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Kaplinsky and Messner (2008) note that growth in the trade of 
manufactured goods was coming from the East & Southeast Asia block in 
the 1970s and 1980s, predominantly from Japan and the Asian Tigers. 
However, in the last decade of the 20th century China (together with India) 
began to drive the growth of the East Asia region. Malaysia and China are 
part of the production network in this region; this reinforces the problem 
statement (see Chapter 1), with China’s rise having both complementary 
and competitive effects on Malaysia’s economy.  
 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2009) look at the trade impact of the Asian Drivers 
and the prospects for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)’s export-oriented textile 
industry following the removal of preferential import quotas into the US 
and EU market on 31 December 2004 under the Multifibre 
Arrangement⁄Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which previously 
granted SSA countries preferential access to export markets. The results  of 
the withdrawal of preferential treatment are that SSA exports are being 
squeezed out by Chinese and Vietnamese textile exports. The textile 
industry, as a lower-technology industry, is regarded as a stepping stone 
into industrialization for many countries developing their economy. In 
contrast, this research looks into the impact of China on a developing 
country’s high-technology and exports-oriented E&E industry.  
 
Altenburg et al. (2006) look at the effect of China on the developing world 
as it climbs the technology ladder. China can provide more appropriate 
technology solutions to the developing world compared to the developed 
world, given its lower costs. However, the ‘flying geese’ theory that 
predicts China will leave the lower-cost production segment to other 
developing countries, as Japan did in Asia, is dismissed as China has a huge 
reserves of labour ready to replace lower production segment vacated 
domestically by industries that are climbing the technology ladder. 
Altenburg et al. (2006) predict that China’s rise in technology will result in 
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higher barriers to entry for newcomers to technology via competition in 
exports.  
 
Apart from the trade effect, Kaplinsky and Messner (2008) note the impact 
of the Asian Drivers on developing countries through the investment 
channel. Although China and Hong Kong attract about 40% of the total 
world inward FDI destined for the developing world (UNCTAD, 2005 in 
Kaplinsky and Messner, 2008), China itself is increasingly becoming a 
source of outward FDI in its search for resources and markets (Kaplinsky 
and Messner, 2008).  
 
The Asian Drivers literature provides a systematic framework with which I 
analyse China’s direct and indirect, complementary and competitive 
impacts on its neighbours. This framework is proposed to launch an 
investigation into the impact of China as an Asian Driver; ‘What we do not 
know is how these processes of change in trade flows and terms of trade 
are affecting other developing countries’ (IDS, 2006). 
 
Table 2.1 Direct and Indirect Effects of Asian Drivers Framework 
Channel Impact Direct Indirect 
Trade Complementary 
 
China’s final exports 
contain parts from 
imported from 
Malaysia 
China’s demand for 
commodities increases 
the price of oil  
 Competitive Imports from China 
displace local 
producers 
Chinese exports 
compete in third 
markets and 
displaced 
Malaysian exports 
FDI Complementary Inflows of FDI from 
China 
US/EU/Japan invest in 
Malaysia with a view to 
supplying China 
 Competitive  Crowding out of 
local producers 
 
Diversion/relocation of 
US/European/Japanese 
FDI to China 
Source: Adapted from Kaplinsky and Messner (2008) 
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Table 2.1 summarizes the Asian Drivers theoretical framework that groups 
types of effect, which guides this research on China’s direct and indirect 
impacts on trade with and investment in the Malaysian E&E sector. The 
direct effects are caused by bilateral trade and investment and the indirect 
effects come about due to non-bilateral relationships. The impacts are 
further categorised into two types of effects: competitive and 
complementary. For an export-oriented industry such as E&E, indirect 
impacts such as export competition for third markets must be weighed 
against direct impacts such as Malaysia’s export of intermediate product to 
China.  
 
2.1.2 Simulation Models and Econometric studies 
 
Another group of the literature studying the macroeconomic impact of 
China on different geographical regions are the simulation models and 
gravity models studies. Simulation models are popular with international 
multilateral agencies for predicting China’s  impact on different regions 
within the global economy. A number of World Bank studies are based on 
results generated from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), a variant 
of computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling. Briefly, model 
simulations are based on systems of equations and mimic the behaviour of 
households, governments, the labour market and businesses, with market-
clearing assumptions built into the model. CGE modelling simulates the 
different impacts on overall GDP growth on different areas and sectors of 
the global economy. Normally they compare a baseline scenario with 
another scenario to which shocks or intervention are applied to the model. 
These CGE models are generally used for predictive studies.  
 
CGE-based studies such as that of Winters and Yusuf (2007) believe that 
China’s rise benefits East and South-east Asia due to the existence of the 
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production network in the region, and that the effect on Latin America is 
neutral because Latin America’s export basket is different from China’s.6 
International multilateral agencies take a similar view: that China’s effect 
on other Asian exporters is positive at a regional level. Ianchovichina et al. 
(2003, p.78) of the World Bank sums up the impact of China’s WTO 
accession:  
Because trade intensity with China is high for all emerging East Asian 
economies, they stand to benefit from this dynamic growth. Growth 
in the region’s exports will also be fuelled by the increased demand 
from China’s major trading partners that benefit directly from China’s 
accession.  
Similarly, (Yang, 2003) of the IMF finds no long-term negative effects of 
China’s entry into the WTO on developing countries.  
 
Multilateral agencies’ optimistic view of the effects of China’s rise is 
dismissed by Eichengreen and Tong (2007) as ‘…blanket statements 
concerning China’s impact are not particularly supportable. The country’s 
emergence is a mixed blessing requiring a nuanced analysis’.7 Furthermore, 
Yang (2003) model simulations unrealistically assume adjustment costs to 
China’s rise  for the developing country to be zero when in reality shifting 
labour across different sectors of industry, as a result of loss of certain 
exports sectors by developing countries to China will not be costless.  
 
The above criticism of CGE models brings us to the next group of studies, 
econometric-based gravity model studies. A gravity model is basically a 
regression model, and these are generally divided into trade and 
investment models. A gravity model is premised on the idea that the size of 
a country’s trade is related to its trade partners based on distance, 
                                                 
6 High-technology sectors in OECD countries are not easily affected. However, South Asia 
is already being negatively affected, with its textile exports facing competition in third 
markets (Winters and Yusuf, 2007). 
7 For a full  critical view of China ’s impact, refer to Kaplinsky (2005).   
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whether they share borders, size of trading-partners’ economies, and 
income level of the trade partners. Although variations exist in different 
authors’ gravity models, most test the relationship between neighbours’ 
exports and Chinese exports (as the independent variable). Investment 
gravity models test the relationship between China’s neighbours’ and 
China’s inward FDI.  
 
Interestingly, Winters and Yusuf (2007) believe that China’s rise poses the 
biggest challenge to Asian and Latin American middle-income countries 
compared to low or high income countries because China is likely to 
expand into the same product space. As part of the MNC production 
network, these countries will be affected if China moves into component 
manufacturing (Winters and Yusuf, 2007). However, Winters and Yusuf 
(2007, p.40) admit that ‘the situation is less clear’ for electronic 
components, a major East and Southeast Asian export, because China is 
expanding its exports while simultaneously the centre of production in East 
Asia, increasing the interdependence of trade in the area.  
 
The conflicting findings of gravity model studies make it difficult to 
determine whether China is a competitive threat or a complementary force 
to its neighbours’ exports. Eichengreen et al. (2007) and Greenaway et al. 
(2008) trade gravity models find that China’s exports have an overall 
displacement effect on other Asian exporters. Conversely, Athukorala 
(2009) finds that China plays a complementary role in the region by 
separating exports into parts and components and final goods. Devadason 
(2010) also concludes that China’s exports are not displacing those of other 
East Asian exporters. 8 Kong and Kneller (2015, p. 4.) review previous 
                                                 
8 Devadason’s  (2010) study focuses on ASEAN (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam), while Athukorala (2009) includes 
Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Vietnam.  
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studies and report that the gravity models of Eichengreen et al. (2007), 
Greenaway et al. (2008) and Athukorala (2009) show sensitivity to both the 
time period and the methodology used.  
 
Investigating China’s effect on aspects of its neighbours’ FDI inflows, an 
early study by McKibbin and Woo (2003) simulates the impact of China’s 
ascension to the WTO on its neighbours using a modified general 
equilibrium model, and predicts that FDI will be diverted from ASEAN-4, 
which includes Malaysia, resulting in lower economic growth there. Hence 
the ASEAN-4 countries must improve their technology diffusion capability 
in their industry to avoid these negative effects from China. Weiss (2006) 
argues that McKibbin and Woo (2003) assume the diversion of FDI in their 
model simulation; this is contestable as the amount of FDI into China also 
corresponds with the size of the economy and population.  
 
Investment-based gravity model studies examining whether China has 
diverted FDI away from its neighbours have also produced inconclusive 
findings. Chantasasawat et al. (2004) and Eichengreen and Tong (2007) find 
that China’s FDI inflows are complementary to the total FDI inflows of its 
East Asian neighbours.9 Narrowing it down to Japanese outward FDI to the 
East and Southeast Asia region, Eichengreen and Tong (2007) find that 
Japanese FDI to China correlates positively to Japanese FDI inflows  of 
neighbouring Asian countries. Conversely, Salike (2010) finds that Japanese 
FDI outflow to the region has been diverted away from its Asian 
neighbours.10  When FDI inflows are disaggregated by industry, 
Eichengreen and Tong (2007) find that Japanese FDI into China is 
complementary to the regional FDI for the electrical industry. In contrast, 
                                                 
9 Chantasasawat et.al (2004) refer to the Asian region as the East and South Asia region, 
while Eichengreen and Tong (2007) define the Asian region as including East, Southeast, 
and South Asian countries. 
10 The Asian region comprises Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. 
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Salike (2010) finds that China’s total inward FDI from Japan competes with 
that of its neighbours in the E&E industry. Details of the gravity models of 
regional trade and investment studies are shown in Table 2.2 below.  
 
Table 2.2 Main findings of various gravity models  
Authors Model  Results 
Trade   
Eichengreen et al. (2007) 1990-2003 OLS and 
instrumental variable 
estimator (IV) 
comparison 
Competitive 
Greenaway et al. (2008) 1990-2003 (IV)  Competitive 
Athukorala (2009) 1992-2005 IV based on 
the generalised method 
of momentum (GMM-IV) 
Complementary 
Devadason (2010) 1995-2006 OLS Complementary 
Kong and Kneller (2015)  1994-2008 two-stage IV 
model 
Complementary to 
human capital at 
destination market 
Investment   
Chantasasawat et al. 
(2004) 
1985-2001, two-stage 
simultaneous equations 
Complementary 
Eichengreen and Tong 
(2007) 
1988-2000, IV and OLS 
comparison 
Complementary 
Salike (2010) 1990-2004, GMM Chinese inward FDI 
competes with its 
neighbours for Japanese 
FDI 
IV= instrumental variables, GMM=Generalised Method of Moments, OLS=Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Source: Adapted from Paniagua (2014) 
 
It is important to note that gravity model studies focus on China’s regional 
effects at an aggregated level. According to Weiss (2006) in Humphrey and 
Schmitz (2007, p. 29.) ‘they assess whether total FDI to the region is 
influenced positively or negatively by FDI to China, rather than looking at 
individual country effects.’ Although some gravity model studies still divide 
effect at country level the findings are nevertheless for the electronics 
industry on the whole, and this hides the effect at a disaggregated level, 
where China has different effects depending on the technological level of 
the export.  
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The data input for investment gravity model studies is more prone to 
measurement error, as investment data is less standardised than trade 
data because different countries have different definitions of investment. 
For example, some countries might recognize reinvestment as investment 
but others may not and therefore, reinvestment is not captured by the 
investment statistics. In view of this Weiss (2006) in Humphrey and Schmitz 
(2007, p. 29) concludes that ‘FDI diversion, whilst it may exist, has not been 
found conclusively in recent studies.’ 
 
Other studies considered here (Mercereau, 2005, Zhou and Lall, 2005); 
(Wang et al., 2007) do not specifically mention the gravity model term, but 
the regression model works on the same principles. These studies find that 
China FDI inflow effects on its neighbours FDI inflows are largely neutral or 
even complementary. Mercereau (2005) model design regards only a 
portion of total inward FDI into China as diverted rather than treating the 
whole of its inward FDI as a diversion. This point is reinforced by Zhou and 
Lall (2005), who dismiss their own conclusion citing the absence of credible 
ways of discerning inward FDI into substitutable investment, typically in 
export-oriented sectors, compared to resource-seeking or market-seeking 
investment in China.11 Finally Wang et al. (2007) find that China’s effect on 
investment flow could be complementary for its neighbours at the 
aggregate level but at disaggregated levels  their model finds that Chinese 
inward FDI investment competes with that of Malaysia, Taiwan, and South 
Korea while it complements that of India and the Philippines. Again, these 
studies of investment are inconclusive about China’s effect on its 
neighbours; however the point to note is that there is a need to distinguish 
between different types of investment data for the models to be credible.  
  
                                                 
11 Zhou and Lall (2005) mentioned that some industry is more ‘substitutable’ than others by 
location. For example, heavy chemical industries are less substitutable compared with 
electronics, because the industrial process itself.   
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Reverting to CGE model studies, Ianchovichina et al. (2010) simulate 
China’s impact on Malaysian trade from 2005-2020 at the macroeconomic 
level. The results show that Malaysia benefits from rising prices in 
commodity exports but its manufacturing sector will suffer 
disproportionately with a 7.0% decline. Ianchovichina et al. (2010) propose 
future work on China’s impact at a sectoral level because their findings are 
based on highly-aggregated data and therefore cannot account for 
heterogeneity in exported goods. The present study aims to address this 
limitation. 
 
From the discussion above, gravity models are known to be sensitive to 
data periods and model specification and are therefore inconclusive about 
China’s effect on its neighbours. Likewise, the CGE model-based study is 
more of a predictive tool and is sometimes based on the unrealistic 
assumption that adjustments in the regional economy will be costless with 
China’s rise. Winters and Yusuf (2007, p.22) comment ‘Modelling exercises 
are parables, not predictions. One should not take the precise numbers 
literally, and within each of our aggregates (say, electronics) there will be a 
wide range of effects across different products’, precisely pointing out why 
CGE-based studies are not suitable for use in my study. This sectoral study 
requires more disaggregated detail of the impact on Malaysia’s E&E 
industry by sub-sector. I now turn to the next area of literature, the 
competitiveness studies.  
 
2.1.3 Competitiveness studies 
 
The term ‘competitiveness studies’ is used here to refer to studies that 
measure market share to draw conclusions about the competitiveness of a 
nation in the export sector. There are variations in the formulas across 
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different authors but the basic building blocks are export market shares.12 
Some competitiveness study findings are contrasted with the CGE and 
gravity models discussed in the earlier section. The main strength of the 
competitiveness-based studies is that exports can be analysed at a 
disaggregated level, which is suitable for this sectoral study.  
 
In contrast to World Bank and IMF studies based on CGE models, models 
such as those of Yang (2003) and Weiss and Gao (2003), using a derivative 
market share methods called constant market share, find that ASEAN is 
losing market share in the US and Japan export market to China despite 
rising ASEAN-5 export figures13 from 1995-2000 by product category.14 In 
the Latin America region and contrary to Winters and Yusuf (2007), Jenkins 
and De Freitas Barbosa (2012) find that Chinese exports not only compete 
with traditional Brazilian industries including footwear and garments, but 
with increased import penetration in the electronics industry. This form of 
disaggregated analysis by sub-sector shows the strength of 
competitiveness analysis.  
 
Another strength of competitive analysis is the ability to disaggregate the 
export structure into different levels of sophistication. Lall and Albaladejo 
(2004), pioneers in this, discern the effects of China’s growth the exports of 
other Asian exporters based on high, medium and low technology 
segments. Based on rising or falling world export shares, Lall and 
Albaladejo (2004) find that China’s toy exports compete with those of 
lower-technology exporters such as Indonesia. For high technology 
electronics industry exporters such as Japan the effect is complementary, 
                                                 
12 See Appendix 2.1for more detail. 
13 Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. 
14 Weiss and Gao (2003) find a consistent loss of ASEAN’s  E&E market share in US and 
Japan market. The derivative market share includes regressing the Competitiveness of 
ASEAN countries with in-built independent variables that compares China’s market share 
in export market with ASEAN’s market share. This l ink between the idea of 
Competitiveness and market share is established.  
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because Japan exports intermediate components that are used in China’s 
final exports. As China further upgrades its technology, Malaysia is singled 
out by Lall and Albaladejo (2004) as vulnerable to China’s export threat in 
the electronics sector.  
 
Disagreeing with Lall and Albaladejo (2004), Shafaeddin (2004) argues 
China’s exports do not threaten Malaysia’s high-technology exports in the 
short and medium term, as China requires time to upgrade. Similar to Lall 
and Albaladejo (2004) disaggregation of the export structure into high, 
medium and low technology but presented instead in terms of 
specialisation, Coxhead and Jayasuriya (2010) provide another reason for 
why countries such as Malaysia and Thailand, which have slightly higher-
skilled labour, can cope better than Indonesia with the rise of China. 
Malaysia and Thailand will be able to offset their loss of low-skill export 
segments with higher-skill exports and benefit from China’s rise, compared 
to Indonesia.  
 
Nevertheless, Shafaeddin (2004) admits that in the long term the 
competitive threat of China’s exports to Malaysia’s  high-technology 
segment may increase when China upgrades its technology. To check 
whether China’s complementary role as the regional production centre is 
indeed diminishing, Cui and Syed (2007) analyse its export and import 
structure and find that the technology gap between these segments is 
narrowing over time, implying that China will import fewer intermediate 
parts as it develops greater technological capability. Conversely, Park and 
Shin (2011) argue that China’s diminishing share of intermediate imports 
counter-intuitively shows that it is increasingly a complementary force. As 
China’s overall imports from East Asia increase any decrease in the import 
share of components means that more finished goods are imported into 
China. This indicates a switch from being a processing trade centre to the 
role of final consumer.  
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Going further on the issue of trade competition as China upgrades the 
technology of its exports, Rodrik (2006) and Schott (2008) measure China’s 
level of export sophistication against that of other countries to examine 
export competition based on level of  sophistication. They conclude that 
China’s exports basket is more similar to high income OECD countries than 
to those of developing countries, given its level of development as 
indicated by its per capita income of a developing country. This increases 
the prospects of China’s competition in high-technology segments such as 
the E&E industry. However, Xu (2010) casts doubt on Rodrik (2006) and 
Schott (2008) conclusion that China’s export composition is ‘special’ 
because the use of national per capita income (a major component in 
generating PRODY) in their metrics does not account for disparities 
between provinces in China and the lower quality of Chinese exports with 
the same export product code. For example, although a Dyson vacuum 
cleaner has the same export code and PRODY index as a generic brand, 
Dyson is priced in a higher end segment of the vacuum cleaner market, its 
quality is much higher and it has more features.  
 
Competitiveness studies on Chinese exports do not however separate out 
the use of high-technology intermediate imports embedded within Chinese 
exports due to the current method of measuring trade at the final output 
level. This points to the limitation of competitiveness studies and to one of 
the strengths of GVC and GPN studies, which are gaining acceptance in 
studies of trade and production. Further details are provided in section 
2.1.4 on GVC and section 2.1.5 on GPN.  
 
A final note: although competitiveness studies are unable to claim direct 
causality (as econometrics models would) on China’s effects on its 
neighbours, they do show that China’s rise affects different countries 
differently based on their specialisation in international trade. To 
understand China’s medium-term threat to its neighbours some studies 
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analyse the structure of its exports and imports while others measure the 
product sophistication of its exports over time. Although Lall and 
Albaladejo (2004) discern China’s impact on its neighbours based on its 
high, medium and low technology exports, classing the entire E&E industry 
as high-technology can be a weakness. This study divides the export 
structure by sophistication, using the PRODY index (Hausmann et al., 2007). 
Table 2.3 below, presents a summary of the competitiveness studies 
discussed here.  
 
Table 2.3 Summary of Competitiveness Studies 
Authors Method Findings 
Trade   
Lall and 
Albaladejo 
(2004) 
World market share China is a threat to its 
neighbours based on its exports 
segment. Discernible by level of 
technology. Among the 
developing countries, Malaysia 
is most vulnerable to Chinese 
export competition.  
Shafaeddin 
(2004) 
Revealed comparative 
advantage 
Rank correlation of RCA 
China is unlikely to threaten 
mid-tech countries such as 
Malaysia in the immediate 
term, but may become a threat 
if China upgrades its technology 
and moves into components 
manufacturing. This would take 
some time.  
Roland-Holst 
and Weiss 
(2004) 
Measures competitiveness of 
China exports effect on ASEAN 
imports into the US and Japan 
market. Competitiveness is 
decomposed into changes in 
market share based on changes 
in Chinese import share at 
destination market, and relative 
to China’s world exports. 
China is competing with ASEAN 
in ASEAN’s most specialized 
areas.  
Rodrik 
(2006) 
PRODY and EXPY index China’s export basket closely 
resembles the sophistication of 
the OECD’s despite China being 
a developing country. 
Schott 
(2008) 
Import penetration, exports 
similarities index, regression of 
within product sophistication, 
log of unit value ratios of China 
over OECD unit values 
China has an export product 
mix that increasingly overlaps 
those of OECD countries and 
competes for the US market as 
a destination market.  
25 
 
Authors Method Findings 
Xu (2010) Regression with adjusted EXPY 
index and adjusted per capita 
GDP of China.  
Accounting for income 
disparities between provinces 
in China and the lower quality 
of Chinese products compared 
to equivalent products 
manufactured elsewhere (same 
PRODY index), the 
sophistication of Chinese 
exports is close to that of 
developing countries.  
Investment   
Roland-Holst 
and Weiss 
(2005) 
Simultaneous equations – China 
inward FDI as a predictive 
variable of ASEAN country 
inward FDI, and vice versa in 
the second equation.  
China inward FDI is 
complementary to FDI flow into 
the ASEAN region due to 
production network trade.  
Ravenhill 
(2006) 
Descriptive data of FDI stocks in 
ASEAN and China and some 
export figures 
China’s diversion of investment 
away from its neighbours is 
overstated in the literature. 
Note: Roland-Holst and Weiss (2004), Roland-Holst and Weiss (2005) use market share 
methods together with some econometrics, but the main idea is sti l l about the 
competitiveness of industries. Detailed formulae are available in Appendix 2.1. 
Source: Own Elaboration 
 
Malaysia-based literature discusses the China effect in trade, but indirectly. 
Abidin and Loke (2008) find that the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 
index for Malaysia’s E&E export has declined since the late 1990s and 
attribute this to the challenged posed by China’s rise. They recommend 
that Malaysia should export more resource-based products whose RCA is 
improving over time, resonating with the ‘primarisation’ theme, which 
expresses a common fear in Latin American economies following China’s 
rise (Jenkins and De Freitas Barbosa, 2012).15 
 
The Malaysian studies also discuss internal structural issues in Malaysian 
industry. Rasiah (2010) argues that Malaysian industrial structures have not 
                                                 
15 Primarisation’ of industry means that a nation becomes more reliant on its natural 
resource-based industry, roll ing back from high technology and sophisticated industry 
such as manufacturing. 
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switched to higher-value-added activities. 16 Rasiah (2003) also finds that 
foreign firms operating in Malaysia use far better technology than local 
firms. Similarly, Alavi (2002) observes that Malaysia’s industrial linkages 
between export-oriented industries (EOI) and import substitution 
industries (ISI) are weak, supporting the view that Malaysia’s trade is 
vulnerable to export competition from China. Moreover, the Malaysia-
based literature links the decline in export shares and the diversion of 
inward FDI by multinationals away from Malaysia to the competition from 
China (Siew-Yean, 2001) (Yusof, 2003).  
 
Kam (2013) contributes to the competitiveness literature by linking total 
factor productivity with the international production network. Using trade 
and productivity data from 2000-2008, Kam’s findings point to the 
productivity gains that Malaysia is experiencing by hosting the 
international production network, but note that technology spillover only 
occurs with MNCs with certain characteristics. This finding confirms that 
some form of upgrading is finally occurring due to the presence of the 
international production network in Malaysia. Kam’s econometric model 
was mainly tested on similar industries grouped by Malaysia’s Standard 
Industrial Classification (MSIC) code. Qualitative interviews investigating 
links between the E&E industry and its backward linkage industry (see 
Chapter 7) deepen the analysis of upgrading. 
 
As the trade and investment nexus is prevalent in the East and Southeast 
Asian region, I now explore the discourse on China’s effect on its 
neighbours via the investment channel. The regional investment trend 
                                                 
16 While some of Rasiah and Kam’s  studies are not wholly based on export share but on 
output or productivity, the basic idea is sti ll comparing industrial competitiveness in the 
same industry in different countries. 
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profoundly affects Malaysia’s trade performance in electronics.17 PY Lai, 
then President of Motorola (China) Electronics, underscored Malaysia’s 
concerns about China’s diversion of FDI: ‘In 2000, 61 percent of foreign 
investment in Asia went to China while only 18 percent went to Southeast 
Asia. The situation was the reverse in the early 1990s’ (Malaysiakini.com, 9 
April 2002). 18 
 
However, Ravenhill (2006) argues that China’s threat to ASEAN based on its 
share of the flow of investment is overstated due to failure to distinguish 
between new investment creation and China’s FDI diversion effect.19 This 
means that when China is growing, capital accumulation occurs within the 
economy and FDI increases anyway to profit from the booming population 
and high economic growth in China.  The inflow of FDI into China is further 
overstated due to ‘round-tripping’ investment through Hong Kong by 
China’s domestic investors vying for private property protection and access 
to the generous tax concessions accorded to foreign investors (Xiao, 2004). 
Ravenhill (2006) argues for a more nuanced analysis of the market share of 
FDI into China compared to ASEAN, acknowledging that factories are 
indeed moving out of Penang in Malaysia to China, as discussed in Chapter 
8. 
  
The competitiveness-based studies of the China effect on both trade and 
investment have the strength of being able to disaggregate exports into 
product levels for an industrial study, which is suitable for detail analysis of 
a sectoral level study of E&E industry. They also allow for more nuanced 
                                                 
17 There is Granger bi -directional causality between inward FDI and the top five Malaysian 
electronics products, albeit with a short-term effect, meaning that trade and investment 
are reinforcing each other (Wong and Tang, 2007).   
18 Anecdotally, Malaysian ethnic Chinese were tapped by North American MNCs when 
they first ventured into China, especially in the 1990s and 2000s decade.  
19 Ravenhill  (2006) rejects the zero-sum assumption in the investment case, but the 
literature is located within the competitiveness l iterature due to its use of market share. 
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analysis of the investment channel rather than drawing conclusions from 
highly aggregated data such as that used in CGE and gravity model studies.  
 
2.1.4 Global Value Chains  
 
GVC studies are qualitative studies describing the chain of production of a 
product or a group of products and the power relationships between the 
firms participating in the chain. The origin of the global value chain 
literature is attributed largely to Gereffi (1994), who coined the term 
‘global commodity chain’. It transcends traditional economic analysis based 
on national statistical frameworks. Sturgeon (2001) critiques studies based 
on national trade statistics as ‘[unable to avoid rendering] invisible the 
detailed contours of the world economy’ as international production 
arrangements increasingly fragmented across geographical region. This 
underlines a key weakness that the GVC framework aims to overcome. The 
‘fragmentation of the stages of production’ refers to the breaking up and 
segmentation of the various stages of production of a single or related 
goods in different locations. Predominantly a qualitative study, the GVC is 
defined as ‘input output analysis … where a chain maps the vertical 
sequence of events leading to the delivery, consumption and maintenance 
of goods and services’ (Sturgeon, 2001, p.10).  
 
More importantly, the GVC points to the weakness of double counting in 
international trade statistics, which can misinform the debate at policy 
level. As an illustration, double counting occurs when a component 
exported from Malaysia to China is booked twice in trade statistics, first 
when a component is exported from Malaysia and then as part of China’s 
final product exports. This results in the paradox of China being the top 
global E&E manufacturer according to trade statistics while the actual 
value added that it captures from export products may be miniscule. As a 
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case in point, only approximately US$25 or 8.5% out of the US$299 
wholesale price of an Apple 30 gigabyte iPod player is captured by its 
assembly in China (Dedrick et al., 2010). According to the Director General 
of WTO, this dichotomy impacts on trade policy and debates (OECD-WTO, 
2012).20 
 
GVC demonstrates the importance of the stage of production in which a 
firm is involved, and this demonstrates the value of a qualitative study. 
Although Kaplinsky (2010) case study on Thai cassava exports is unrelated 
to electronics, it shows that China’s impact on world trade is not 
straightforward. China’s increased demand for imports of Thai cassava 
pushes up the trade value, but because the demand is for the primary 
stages of production this has resulted in the downgrading of the Thai 
cassava value chain. This study demonstrates China’s wider primarisation 
effect and suggests that studies of its impact should go beyond trade data.  
 
Another important contribution of the GVC literature has been the 
discussion on upgrading. Firms that participate in a GVC can upgrade as 
they acquire knowledge by producing and interacting with other firms 
within the value chain. Related to upgrading, GVC provide a clear typology 
of various forms of upgrading at firm level within a value chain by  
Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) in Table 2.4 below.  
 
Table 2.4 Types of Upgrading 
Types of upgrading  Description  
Process upgrading Transforming inputs into output more efficiently by 
reorganizing the production system 
Product upgrading Moving into more sophisticated product lines  
Functional upgrading Acquiring new functions (or abandoning existing 
functions) to increase the overall skill content of 
activities.  
Inter-sectoral upgrading Firms of clusters move into new productive activities. 
Source: Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) 
                                                 
20 One of the biggest debates includes the US huge trade deficits with China .  
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Cattaneo et al. (2013) provide updates on the GVC literature, especially in 
the area of quantitative measurement in the GVCs toolbox. This was 
previously a weak point in the GVC literature, but GVC has developed a few 
metrics including value-added trade by country, although this is achieved 
through estimation based on the merging of various input-output tables 
from various countries. 21  In 2008 the estimated value added by Malaysia 
incorporated into China’s total exports was about 7%, but China’s 
contribution to Malaysia’s final exports was zero, based on the OECD-WTO 
Trade in Value Added Database (Cattaneo et al., 2013, p. 16). This estimate 
is a preliminary indication of Malaysia’s participation in the components 
trade that feeds into China’s final goods exports.   
 
In the electronics hardware industry, the platform leaders applying the 
GVC framework to the computer industry are Microsoft and Intel, while the 
leading firms that build computers based on their platform technology, 
firms such as HP and Toshiba, in turn have a group of subcontractors that 
supply different components or make them under license from HP and 
Toshiba. Under this power relationship within the computer value chain 
platform leaders followed by lead firms are the most powerful, as they own 
the technology and brand name, while subcontracting manufacturers are 
the least powerful as they own neither. 
 
GVC studies explain comprehensively how production know-how spreads 
from North America and Japan and later to the East Asian region. 
Observing the evolution of players in the East Asian regional electronics 
value chain, Sturgeon and Kawakami (2011) sketch how the Taiwanese 
electronics manufacturing firms started as subcontractors to North 
                                                 
21 Other metrics presented including the participation index, which measures how 
integrated a country is within the GVC and the distance of production centre to the final 
consumer index, which is a measure of the fragmentation of production by different 
industries. The electrical industry is one of the most fragmented industries measured by 
this index. 
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American and Japanese computer manufacturer move up the value chain  
to become brand owners themselves. In GVC terms, the Taiwanese firms 
have upgraded their industry from captive suppliers in the initial period to 
lead firms themselves. From there, Taiwanese firms became early movers 
to China, setting up plants to benefit from China’s low labour costs. As a 
result, technology and production know-how in electronics hardware 
spreads from Taiwan to China.  
 
Chuang (2016) however argues that the present GVC literature 
overemphasizes the role of exports in understanding upgrading for 
indigenous firms in developing country, and considers that not enough 
research is done on how firms upgrade in response to domestic factors 
such as how they acquire knowledge of production and respond to local 
demand. Chuang (2016) cites how the Thin-film-transistor-Liquid-crystal 
display (TFT-LCD) industry in Taiwan grew from fulfilling domestic demand 
first before firms stepped up to exporting as an example of domestic 
demand driving upgrading.22 
 
The GVC framework is effective in explaining how production know-how 
spreads from lead firms to other firms and describes various forms of 
upgrading. Within the GVC literature, Kaplinsky (2010) case study of Thai 
cassava shows how China’s demand for cassava that has passed through 
only the primary stage of production resulted in the downgrading of the 
cassava value chain in Thailand. As a useful contrast, this sectoral study of 
China’s impact in trade and investment in a middle-income country such as 
Malaysia in a high technology industry (E&E) could inform the broader 
globalisation literature.  
 
                                                 
22 TFT-LCD refers to computer monitor flat screen display. 
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2.1.5 The Global Production Network 
 
Ernst (2004) describes how the North American electronics industry used 
East Asian locations such as Malaysia to outsource labour-intensive 
operations such as semiconductor packaging and testing. As a result the 
technology and production network spread from North America to, 
predominantly, Southeast Asia in the 1970s. A paper by Ernst and Kim 
(2001) on how international business organisations like MNCs organise 
production provides an early template of the GPN framework  which is 
further developed into its current form by Henderson et al. (2002).  
 
GPN scholars believe that the reality of the fragmentation of international 
production arrangements is better reflected in a more multi-layered 
network form such as the GPN than by the GVC in vertical or linear form 
(Henderson et al., 2002) that connect firms involved in increasingly 
fragmented production in international trade. Secondly, the GVC focuses 
on governance within the chain and emphasizes either a producer-driven 
or a buyer-driven chain, while the reality is more complex than this bi-
modal mode (Henderson et al., 2002). However, the GVC has since 
improved to a model featuring five types of governance in the value chain 
based on the degree of coordination and power asymmetry among the 
players (Gereffi et al., 2005). As the E&E industry has a fragmented 
production structure, the GPN theoretical framework is suitable for use as 
a component of the theoretical framework for this study.  
 
Described as a transnational production network (Parrilli et al., 2013), the 
GPN is said to provide a more flexible framework than the GVC. The 
scholars who coined the term ‘GPN’ were Ernst and Kim (2001). They 
define it as ‘combin[ing] concentrated dispersion of the value chain across 
firm and national boundaries, with a parallel process of integration of 
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hierarchical layers of network participants‘ (Ernst and Kim, 2001)in 
(Henderson et al., 2002).  
 
Following Ernst and Kim (2001) work, Henderson et al. (2002)  defines 
Global Production Network:  
Production networks – the nexus of interconnected functions and 
operations through which goods and services are produced, 
distributed and consumed – have become both organizationally more 
complex and also increasingly global in their geographic extent. Such 
networks not only integrate firms (and parts of firms) into structures 
which blur traditional organizational boundaries – through the 
development of diverse forms of equity and non-equity relationships 
– but also integrate national economies (or parts of such economies) 
in ways which have enormous implications for their well-being. At 
the same time, the precise nature and articulation of firm-centred 
production networks are deeply influenced by the concrete socio-
political contexts within which they are embedded. (Henderson et al., 
2002, pp. 445-446.) 
 
The GPN theoretical framework is explained using categories of elements 
and dimensions or types of actors within the network. Actors within the 
system interact with the underlying elements to create coordination in the 
production and delivery of the goods, and this leads to the development of 
the GPN. A schematic diagram of GPN is provided in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 Schematic Diagram of Global Production Network 
 
Source: Henderson et al. (2002, p. 448) 
 
Value, power, and embeddedness are three principal elements that 
underlie the functioning of actors such as firms and public sector agencies 
and networks within the GPN. Value is tangible and can be created, 
enhanced, and captured. Values are created by firms and can be further 
enhanced via the transfer of technology between firms, and finally can be 
captured by the geographical location if it truly benefits the production 
location. In some cases values created in a particular location might not 
benefit fully from that location due to ownership structures and tax 
administration matters.  
 
Next, power includes corporate power, institutional power and collective 
power. Corporate power refers to firm power, and this can be 
asymmetrical among the different firms that participate in the network. 
Institutional power refers to the power of the governing institutions that 
regulate the trade and production of goods within the network. Examples 
are trade agreements that govern the rules of the production and trade of 
goods across borders. Collective power refers to the power of NGOs or 
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related civil movements that can affect the production and distribution 
network where the network is situated.  
 
The third and final element of GPN is embeddedness. The coordination of 
production takes place in a geographical region and this is referred to as 
territorial embeddedness. The second type of embeddedness is network 
embeddedness, which Henderson et al. (2002) call a process of ‘trust-
building among [the] network agents’ of different producers at different 
stages of a product.  
 
Dimensions or structure or forms are behind are the second aspect of GPN. 
Various structures such as firms, sectors, institutions and networks 
cooperate at different levels Firms are actors that networks together to 
produce, and different firms occupy different functions within the 
networks of production with different suppliers. Firms rarely work in 
isolation and are exposed to sectoral rules such as the labour rules, legal 
requirements and institutional norms in their area of operation.  
 
Yeung and Coe (2015) update the GPN framework by proposing that the 
GPN shifts from the concepts of value, embeddedness and power, which 
are important in GPN 1.0 based on Henderson et al. (2002), to GPN 2.0, 
which is about cost-capability, markets and finance. Essentially, they try to 
offer a dynamic model of the GPN based on the driving forces of cost-
capability, markets and finance. As the model is dynamic, it discusses the 
various types of risk faced by the industry. To manage these risks, firms 
employ various strategies such as intra-firm coordination, inter-firm 
control, inter-firm partnership and extra-firm bargaining. These different 
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types of strategies have similarities to Gereffi’s typology of global chain 
governance.23  
 
Dieter Ernst feels that the Chinese effect on Malaysia’s electronics is 
increased competition, because Malaysia concentrates on low-end 
assembly and volume-type manufacturing (Ernst, 2004). However, 
Malaysia’s competitive relationship with China may turn out beneficial for 
Malaysia if China’s challenge encourages Malaysia to upgrade. This 
upgrading of the E&E production network is a major aspect to be explored 
in this study.  
 
Table 2.5 below summarises the studies discussing China’s impact on its 
neighbours discussed in this chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Gereffi’s types of governance in GVC are market, modular, relational, captive and 
hierarchy. Details are available in Appendix 2.2. 
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Table 2.5 Type of Studies Discussing the Effect of China  
Conceptual 
Framework 
Competitive 
Analysis 
Equilibrium  Equilibrium-
Market 
Clearing 
Global Value 
Chain & GPN 
Method-
ology 
World Market 
Share 
Gravity Models  CGE Models  Qualitative 
Key features Disaggregate 
total exports 
into product 
level analysis. 
 
Discern export 
threat by level 
of technology. 
Quantify China’s 
export impact 
on countries 
and the 
directions of 
relationship. 
Quantify China’s 
diversion of FDI 
from traditional 
partners to 
neighbours. 
Estimate 
China’s effect 
on economic 
growth of 
neighbours in 
the future 
based on 
circular flow 
modelling. 
Reveal 
relationship 
of firms 
within the 
stages of 
production 
across 
borders. 
Firm or 
network of 
firms 
positionality 
within 
different 
stages of 
production 
matters. 
Source Lall and 
Albaladejo 
(2004), 
Jenkins 
(2008), 
Jenkins (2010)  
 
Trade: 
Greenaway et 
al. (2008), 
Athukorala 
(2009) 
Investment: 
Chantasasawat 
et al. (2004), 
Eichengreen et 
al. (2007), Salike 
(2010)  
Yang (2003), 
Winters and 
Yusuf (2007), 
Ianchovichina 
et al. (2010) 
GVC:  
Gereffi et al. 
(2005), 
Sturgeon and 
Kawakami 
(2011)  
GPN: Ernst 
(2004) 
Malaysia-
based 
Studies 
Siew-Yean 
(2001) 
  Rasiah and 
Shan (2012) 
Note: Only the most relevant works are l isted in the table above.  
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2.2 Theoretical Framework  
 
The theoretical framework of this study draws on different concepts of 
competitiveness, spin-off, GVC and GPN to discuss the impact of China 
using the Asian Drivers framework as its overarching guide. A recent study 
by Athukorala and Kophaiboon (2014) illustrates this approach: they use 
market share in conjunction with qualitative discussion about production 
networks in Southeast Asia. The export data is disaggregated into parts and 
components, and final goods exports. This export data analysis is then 
linked with discussion of the functional role shifts in of firms in the 
production network trade and the FDI pattern in the region. However, 
Athukorala and Kophaiboon (2014) use the term ‘global production 
sharing’ and avoided the GVC and GPN terminology.  
 
The rest of this section specifies the elements in each group of literature 
such as Asian Drivers, industrial competitiveness, spin-offs, GVC and GPN 
that are incorporated into the theoretical framework for this study.  
2.2.1 Asian Drivers Literature 
 
The Asian Drivers provide the overarching theoretical framework as subject 
matter and the systematic framework for analysing the impact of China on 
Malaysia’s E&E sector. This includes the direct and indirect impacts of the 
Asian Drivers, subdividing the type of impact into complementary and 
competitive. This is the starting point for this analysis. 
 
2.2.2 Industrial Competitiveness  
 
Traditionally, development economists regard the manufacturing industry 
as a key sector in relation to national competitiveness (Jenkins, 2016). 
Borrowing from the competitiveness literature discussed earlier, I take a 
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sectoral approach to industrial competitiveness. The basic assumption is 
that trade in this sectoral perspective is zero-sum among the participants 
or countries within an exports market This is opposed to viewing 
international trade at the macro-level of the national economy as a non-
zero sum effect. At the national economy level, different sectors react to 
China’s rise and adjust via labour or capital reallocation between different 
sectors of production. Sectors that will be viable when faced with an influx 
of cheap imports from China will survive, while sectors that cannot survive 
will see firms exit and labours being layoff. For example Malaysia can shed 
labour in the local production of DVD players when faced with an influx of 
cheap DVD players from China and move to another sector such as 
automotive production. Conversely, in an industry-based study, job losses 
and the loss of market share are considered zero sum: China’s  gain is 
Malaysia’s loss (of jobs and exports market share, as in the DVD example).  
 
However in reality, due to the sheer size of China’s market and population, 
the increase in the production of electronics is inevitable and will most 
likely surpass Malays ia’s production figures anyway. This means that while 
the elements of non-zero sum assumptions in international trade cannot 
be totally ruled out, the current structure of international trade and 
investment in which oligopoly, interactions between various industrial 
policies and labour market imperfections exist means that there remain 
valid reasons and space for a sectoral study based on competitiveness 
assumptions.  
 
Lall and Weiss (2005, pp.4.) provides a detailed explanation of the 
importance of sectoral analysis of the competitiveness of exports: 
[The] structure of activities and composition of trade matters 
[because] … there remain benefits from specialization and trade 
remains a non-zero sum game, but the realisation of the benefits 
depends on the ability of each economy to create (or attract) 
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competitive capabilities and to move into activities that offer the best 
opportunities for growth, technological development and beneficial 
spillovers. (Lall and Weiss (2005, pp.4.)). 
 
Jenkins (2016) goes further to say that industrial competitiveness ‘can be 
best indicated by changes in the world market share’. This study adopts a 
market share analysis for internationally-traded products, with a higher 
share implying higher competitiveness of the nation’s industrial sector in 
the international arena, and vice-versa. As pointed out earlier, there are 
some weaknesses associated with studies based on national trade 
statistics, and my theoretical framework also uses other frameworks such 
as GVC and GPN to strengthen the analysis.  
 
2.2.3 Spin-off Theory 
 
Spin-offs are an important process in the diffusion of technology from lead 
firms to new start-ups. Spin-off theory is associated with Klepper (2002) 
and is used to explain the differences in the pace of innovation of US 
automobile makers based on mode of entry of a firm into an industry. The 
paper argues that after learning about the technology it uses, employees of 
a high-performing firm such as an automobile or semiconductor company 
leave to form new companies. These new companies may produce the 
same goods or branch out into something related and new; this is a spin-
off. The classic example given to illustrate this point is the fact that most 
semiconductor companies in the US are spin-offs from Fairchild 
Semiconductor led by ex-employees such as the founders of Intel, Gordon 
Moore and Robert Noyce, who left to form their own company.  
 
This spin-off theory is extended to look at the innovations of new entrants 
compared to ‘diversifiers’, companies previously involved in activities 
related to the new branch into which they are now moving. For example in 
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the electronics industry a diversifier is a firm that is already supplying metal 
precision parts for consumer electronics such as TVs and mobile phones 
and decides to use its current knowledge to start producing semiconductor 
testing and inspection machines. Spin-off theory is useful to complement 
existing explanations about firms upgrading their functions and products 
within the production network.  
 
Since Malaysia followed the FDI-led model of development, especially in 
the E&E sector from the 1970s onwards this theory is useful to explain how 
technology spreads from MNCs to local Malaysian firms. Spin-off 
technology also complements the GVC and GPN framework in explaining 
how new clusters of industry are formed, based on participation in the 
production network.  
 
2.2.4 Global Value Chains  
 
Gereffi (2014, pp.28.) summarises the need for GVCs studies as ‘the 
emergence of GVCs cautions against an overreliance on simple export 
measures of competitiveness’. The GVC framework also stressed that an 
industry should be studied beyond trade studies based on traditional 
national statistics. Secondly, incorporation of the GVC framework furthers 
the analysis by locating the positions of firms participating in the GVC 
stages of production. Finally, participation along the GVC is also an 
important tool for developing countries to get on the development ladder.  
  
The theoretical framework used in this study includes the GVC framework, 
which is especially useful for discussing different forms of upgrading by 
firms within the E&E GVC.  
 
 
42 
 
2.2.5 Global Production Network 
 
Despite proponents of the GPN claiming its difference from the GVC, the 
reality is that these two frameworks are interrelated and share similarities. 
According to Parrilli et al. (2013) the GPN is more inclusive and 
encompasses a whole sector. Ernst (2004) widens the approach to GPN to 
include backward linkages industry of the national economy such as 
supporting industries, arguing that `improved specialization generates 
pressures to create dense forward and backward linkages within the 
district or the national economy’. Meanwhile the GVC framework has its 
own strength in its differentiation of various forms of industry upgrading, 
although its unit of analysis is confined to firms. Kaplinsky (2016), p.189, 
quoting Parrilli et al. (2013) sums up the relationship between the GVC and 
GPN: ‘… in reality, good GPN research also focuses on the vertical chain 
relationship, and good GVC research also addresses the embeddedness of 
local actors and the importance of national and regional innovation 
systems’. (Kaplinsky, 2016, pp.189.) As such both GVC and GPN are drawn 
upon together with the other theories discussed earlier to form the 
theoretical framework for this study.  
 
The study incorporates elements of the GPN framework’s embeddedness 
into the theoretical framework. The concept of embeddedness is very 
suitable for discussing an industry cluster and how different firms are 
networked in a sector or geographical location.24 The concept of 
embeddedness is also useful to describe how the E&E industry is exposed 
to various industrial policies and programmes and to institutions where the 
industry operates.  
                                                 
24 Schmitz and Nadvi (1999) define clusters “as sectoral and spatial concentrations of 
firms”.  
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2.3 Conclusion and Integrated Theoretical Framework  
 
The theoretical framework of this research is primarily based on the Asian 
Drivers literature. It also incorporates frameworks developed from the 
industrial competitiveness, global value chain and global production 
network and spin-off frameworks. Figure 2.2 presents a simplified version 
of the theoretical framework used, although in reality the three 
frameworks interact. 25 The theoretical framework presents the three 
major underlying theoretical stances used to view the direct and indirect 
impacts of China on Malaysia’s E&E sector.  
 
Figure 2.2 Theoretical Framework: Links between Major Theories 
 
Source: Own Elaboration 
 
In conclusion, the theoretical framework adapted for this study is drawn 
from Asian Drivers, the competitiveness literature, spin-offs, the GVC and 
the GPN. This framework allows for a multi-perspective investigation into 
the research subject at a sectoral level and a comprehensive examination 
                                                 
25 For example, high impact spin-offs can create new branches  of nodes along the 
GVC/GPN, and this can also have an impact on the competitiveness of the industry as a 
whole.   
Direct and 
indirect 
impacts of 
China on 
Asian Drivers
Global 
Production 
Network/Value 
Chain
Industrial 
Competitiveness 
Spin-offs
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of China’s impact, moving the focus from the meso to the micro level to 
understand how linkages of production arrangements in E&E are changing 
with the rise of China, from a mainly Malaysian point of view. 
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3.0 Research Methods and Data 
 
The methodology of the study is both quantitative and qualitative. The 
quantitative methods are primarily based on the adapted market share 
methods of Lall and Albaladejo (2004), other indexes derived from market 
share in exports, and some combining both export and import data. The 
results from the quantitative data indicate which specific E&E products to 
probe deeper with qualitative interviews. The qualitative method is 
primarily based on the GPN and GVC frameworks that guide the semi-
structured interviews with firms in the E&E sector at field sites.  
 
3.1 Quantitative Methods 
 
The main building block of quantitative methods for this study is the 
market share method, followed by other trade indexes. According to 
Jenkins (2016, p.261), competitiveness, an element of the theoretical 
framework (see Chapter 2), can be linked to the ‘composition of exports 
and in particular to a notion of technological upgrading’.  
 
The market share method is operationalised using a modified Lall and 
Albaladejo (2004) framework to study trade relationship outcomes at 
product level based on Malaysia’s and China’s rising or falling import share 
at destination markets to understand the effect of China’s rise on 
Malaysia’s E&E sector. There are five possible outcomes:  
 
A) Competitive: imports share of Malaysia is  falling and China’s is 
rising. Malaysia is losing market share while China has been 
increasing its market share for the same product line. 
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B) Mutual Expansion: Import shares of Malaysia and China are rising 
together, which means they are gaining market share in the same 
product line. This is positive for both countries. 
C) Reversed Competition: Malaysia’s share of imports is rising while 
China’s is falling. In this case Malaysia is gaining market share over 
China and the competition has tilted in favour of Malaysia.  
D) Mutual Withdrawal: Import shares of both Malaysia and China are 
falling as both countries withdraw from the same product line.  
E) N.A.: Either Malaysia or China has zero imports in the product line 
at the beginning and end of the period of analysis.  
 
A summary representation of the possible combinations for outcomes of 
rising and falling import shares of Malaysia and China at destination market 
is shown in Figure 3.1: 
 
Figure 3.1 List of outcomes based on rising and falling import share from Malaysia 
and China at destination market 
 Imports share from 
China rising 
Imports share from China 
falling 
Import share from 
Malaysia rising 
B) Mutual Expansion – 
Imports from Malaysia is 
expanding together with 
imports from China. 
Competitive threat is 
unlikely 
C) Reversed Competition 
Imports from Malaysia is 
winning the competition 
against imports from 
China  
Import share from 
Malaysia falling 
A) Competitive 
Imports from Malaysia 
face competition from 
imports from China 
D) Mutual Withdrawal 
Malaysia and China both 
face declining 
competitiveness 
Source: Adaptation from Lall  and Albaladejo (2004) 
 
An important point here is that the movement between the market shares 
of China and Malaysia does not claim causality and therefore their mutual 
expansion is an indirect reference to some form of complementarity, 
without implying that imports from China to destination markets are 
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causing Malaysia’s share of imports to rise or fall. The exercise here shows 
the relative movements of market shares with directional changes and is 
henceforth called ‘competitiveness analysis’. 
 
The competitiveness analysis calculation covers the period from 1992-
2012, evenly split into 1992-2002 and 2002-2012 to show the period prior 
to and post China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. This provides a form of 
counterfactual of China’s impact on Malaysia’s industry sectors, comparing 
situation where China has yet to join WTO with the situation where China 
is in the WTO.   
 
To discern China’s export threat to Malaysia’s E&E exports by level of 
sophistication, a PRODY index based on Hausmann et al. (2007) is used to 
segment E&E exports by the classification of outcomes based on rising and 
falling import shares. Next, the classification of outcomes is then 
regrouped into BEC codes using a concordance table from the World Bank 
Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) website. This regrouping by BEC 
classification allows identification of the different outcomes based on parts 
and components compared to final goods exports in E&E.  
 
Other than the import share analysis (which I am calling competitiveness 
analysis), the study uses other indicators and indices to measure 
competitive and complementary aspects of China’s rise on Malaysia’s 
through trade, namely the Balance of Trade, Rate of Import Penetration, 
Trade Complementary Index (TCI), Index of Competitive Threat  (ICT), 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) Index, PRODY Index and EXPY 
Index.  
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3.1.1 Balance of Trade  
 
In the bilateral trade between Malaysia and China both the balance of 
trade and the rate of import penetration are based on the comparison of 
the competitiveness of the imported goods to the competitiveness of the 
local firms producing the equivalent goods.  
 
The Balance of Trade is given as below:  
 
Balance of Trade = export – import 
 
Source: United Kingdom Office for National Statistics (2010) 
 
The balance of trade is a measurement of bilateral trade between two 
countries. The flow of goods between Malaysia and China is either a 
surplus or a deficit. A deficit in a country’s balance of trade can signal a 
decline in the competitiveness of the economy and a surplus can mean 
increased competitiveness, subject to further analysis. For this study, as 
well as the total trade balance I also look at the balance of trade for 
specific groups of E&E products to get a preliminary grasp of the 
competition between Malaysian and Chinese producers for the same group 
of E&E products.  
 
A point to note is that the balance of trade is only a preliminary indicator, 
as a deficit in certain products is not totally negative for a particular 
country. For example, if a country experiences a trade deficit in the 
machinery segment because it is adding new production capacity to 
produce more exports in the long term, a short term deficit should not be 
viewed as totally negative. In short, the balance of trade should be viewed 
in tandem with other indicators over the longer term and within a wider 
context. In this study, the balance of trade is disaggregated using the BEC 
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to provide a snapshot of the different types of E&E goods traded between 
Malaysia and China.  
 
3.1.2 Rate of Import Penetration 
 
The next step is to calculate the rate of penetration of Chinese imports into 
Malaysia’s E&E sector to measure the extent to which Chinese exports are 
affecting Malaysia’s E&E firms by industry. The OECD (2010) states that 
embedded in this rate of import penetration is a comparison of the 
competitiveness of imported goods to the competitiveness of the local 
firms endeavouring to maintain their market share. China’s import 
penetration is measured as a percentage of total apparent consumption for 
products aggregated in a sub-industry within the E&E sector. Apparent 
consumption is defined as production plus imports minus exports. 
Production data is obtained from the Monthly Manufacturing Survey of 
Malaysia’s Department of Statistics, while trade data is sourced from 
UNComtrade through the World Bank’s WITS website. The formula for 
apparent consumption and import penetration is as follows:  
D = P-X+M 
where D=apparent consumption, P=production, X=exports and M=imports. 
 
MPijc= Mijc/(Pij-Xij+Mij) 
 
where MPijc=rate of import penetration from China 
Mijc=value of imports for product i in country j 
Pij=production for product i in country j 
Xij=exports of product i in country j  
Mij=imports of product i in country j 
 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2010) 
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The rate of import penetration will show Malaysia’s domestic firms’ 
competitiveness compared to the Chinese firms that produce the imports 
for Malaysia. This method is related to competitiveness theory. By 
measuring the rate of import penetration of China products into Malaysia I 
can infer the degree of China’s impact on Malaysia’s  domestic market over 
time, especially for household electrical products.  
 
3.1.3 The Trade Complementarity Index 
 
The TCI for Malaysia-China bilateral trade gives a sense of the 
complementarity between the two countries based on the similarity 
between the structure of one country’s exports and the other’s imports. 
TCI is calculated at total trade level and at E&E level for the 1992-2013 
period.  
 
The TCI is computed based on: 
 
Cij = 1 - ∑ (|Mik – Xij| ÷ 2) 
where Mik is the import share of product i in total imports of country k and 
  Xij is the export share of product i from total imports of country j 
 
Source: Adapted from Ng and Yeats (2003) 
 
The TCI produces results between 0 and 1, with 0 when the export of a 
product from one country is not imported at all by the other country and 1 
where the import of country k exactly matches the export from country j. 
The TCI uses China’s import and Malaysia’s export data.  
 
The TCI is indirectly linked to competitiveness theory as it is a measure of 
complementarity (the counterfactual of competitive) between two trade 
partners, based on their import and export profiles. It is a forward-looking 
51 
 
index, specifically looking at the potential of a trade agreement between 
two countries to see if the imports of one country match the other 
country’s exports. For example if a country exports good i and good i is 
imported by a potential trade partner, a trade agreement is deemed 
potentially beneficial to both trade partners.  
 
3.1.4 The Index of Competitive Threat 
 
Moving from bilateral analysis to world market share approach, in this case 
Jenkins (2010) Index of Competitive Threat (ICT) measures: 
 
[t]he extent to which a country faces a competitive threat from China 
[and] depends … on the proportion of its total exports accounted for 
by products in which China is globally competitive. A country that has 
a high share of its exports in such products is threatened by Chinese 
competition even if the products concerned account for a relatively 
small share of China’s total exports… (Jenkins, 2008, pp. 1358.)  
 
Jenkins’ ICT is used here to measure the scale of the China’s threat to 
Malaysia’s E&E exports in 6-digit HS codes. Linked to the competitiveness 
theory, the ICT captures the interactions between China’s share of a 
particular product in the world export market and the importance of the 
same product in Malaysia’s export basket. 
 
In this research the formula for the ICT is slightly adapted to calculate it in 
the destination markets using import share. This specific interaction at the 
product level reveals the level of threat over time on E&E imports from 
Malaysia by imports from China.  
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The ICT index at the destination market is given as follows: 
ICT = 100 ∗ ∑ (
X𝑖𝑚
∑ X𝑖𝑚
∗
X𝑖𝑐
X𝑖𝑤
) 
where Xim is the import of product i from Malaysia at the 
destination market 
∑ X𝑖𝑚 is the sum of all imports from Malaysia at the destination 
market 
X𝑖𝑐 is the import of product i from China at the destination market 
X𝑖𝑤  is the total import of product i at the destination market 
 
Source: Adapted from Jenkins (2010) 
 
The ICT produces a single index, with a higher index number indicating a 
greater threat from China’s to Malaysia’s imports at the destination market 
and a lower index indicating a lesser threat. The theoretical limits of the 
index are 0 and 100; 0 indicates that either China or Malaysia does not 
produce or has a zero market share in product i. The value of 100 requires 
both that product i is Malaysia’s sole product of exports and China has 
100% share of the product i in the world export market. The theoretical 
value of 100 is therefore impossible, given that the conditions for fulfilling 
it are contradictory. In reality the ICT value will have value of less than 100 
as a product of multiplication of decimals into decimals. The indexes for i 
products are then aggregated to produce the ICT index for the E&E 
industry. The ICT is useful to measure the level of threat that Malaysian 
exports face from the positionality of China’s export share at the 
destination market.  
 
However, the ICT does not gives us the direction of movement of the 
market share, whether a product’s market share has declined or gained 
over time, and to overcome this the adapted Lall and Albaladejo (2004) 
method described in the initial part of this chapter is used.  
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3.1.5 Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA)  
 
Next, the RCA measures the relative importance of the product within the 
country’s export basket compared to the typical ratio of the product to the 
world export basket, and infers if a country has the comparative advantage 
to produce a particular product relative to the world exports average. The 
RCA is calculated for semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SEM) in 
Malaysia at product level to identify which type of SEM machines Malaysia 
is having an advantage in producing.   
The RCA is given as:  
𝑅𝐶𝐴 =  
𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝜀𝑋𝑗
𝑋𝑖𝑤
𝜀𝑋𝑤
⁄  
where  
Xij = export of product i from country j, 𝜀𝑋𝑗= total export of country j 
𝑋𝑖𝑤= world export of product i, 𝜀𝑋𝑤= total world export 
Source: Balassa (1965) 
 
If the result of the index is equal to or above 1 the country has a 
comparative advantage in producing that particular product relative to 
other countries. If the index is below 1, the country is said to produce 
relatively less of that particular product relative to the world exports level 
and does not have a comparative advantage.  
 
Finally, the RCA index is used to measure the competition between 
Malaysia and China for the same product. For example, if China’s RCA score 
for television products is 3.0 while Malaysia’s is 1.1 this means that relative 
to the respective countries’ exports baskets China has 3 times the average 
share of television products in world exports while Malaysia has 1.1 times 
the world average, it still lags behind China’s comparative advantage. This 
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indirectly reflects the relative importance of the nations as exporters of a 
specific product. 
The RCA is often criticized for not reflecting the true comparative 
advantage because exports pattern can be often distorted by government 
subsidies or taxation either to encourage or discourage the export of 
certain targeted products. However, the RCA is taken as a preliminary 
indicator that paves the way for more detailed qualitative discussion in this 
research.  
 
3.1.6 The PRODY index  
 
This study disaggregates the trade structure of China and Malaysia by level 
of sophistication using the PRODY index. The PRODY index is calculated at 
the 6-digit level of HS 1998/92 Nomenclature for all E&E products by the 
researcher.  
 
Based on Hausmann et al. (2007), the PRODY index is a ‘weighted average 
of the per capita GDPs of exporting country’ earned from a specific 
product. PRODY for product k for as follows: 
PRODY𝑘 = ∑
(𝑥𝑗𝑘 𝑋𝑗⁄ )
∑𝑗 (𝑥𝑗𝑘
𝑋𝑗)⁄
 𝑌𝑗
𝑗
 
where (𝑥𝑗𝑘 𝑋𝑗⁄ ) is the value share of product k in country j’s total exports  
∑𝑗 (𝑥𝑗𝑘
𝑋𝑗)⁄  is the sum of all value shares of all countries exporting product 
k  
Yj is the per capita income of country j 
 
Source: Hausmann et al. (2007) 
 
The PRODY index captures the associated income behind a specific product 
being exported. For the weight, the numerator (𝑥𝑗𝑘 𝑋𝑗⁄ ) captures the share 
55 
 
of the product in the total national export, while the denominator 
∑𝑗 (𝑥𝑗𝑘
𝑋𝑗)⁄  captures the value share of the same exported product of all 
countries to world exports. The weight is then multiplied by the per capita 
income of the country, Yj. The PRODY index produces absolute figures, with 
higher per-capita income countries and higher market share expected to 
produce higher figures, indicating greater sophistication of exports. In the 
case of lower value shares of the export of a developing country, a lower 
PRODY index is expected. Finally, all PRODY indexes for each country j are 
summed up to produce a single PRODY index for each product k. Some 
manual adjustments are made to the PRODY index to reduce bias, such as 
dropping island nations that do not have any real manufacturing facilities 
but usually serve as offshore financial centres for book-entry transactions.  
 
The PRODY index is used to rank the measure of sophistication of each 
export product in the E&E sector. A higher PRODY index indicates higher 
and a lower PRODY index indicates lower sophistication of the product. The 
PRODY indexes for each product for every year are aggregated and then 
averaged to produce the PRODY value for the period of 1992-2012. Based 
on the average PRODY index, the 338 products in the E&E sector are 
ranked and then divided into four quartiles, with Quartile 1 the most and 
Quartile 4 the least sophisticated. Next, a product code with its 
corresponding type of outcome (competitive, mutual expansion, reverse 
competition, mutual withdrawal) is grouped into quartiles of 
sophistication. The import share of each product in the same outcome 
category, within its specific quartiles, is then summed up. The purpose of 
disaggregating the competitiveness analysis with PRODY index is to 
observe the different outcomes categories of Malaysia’s E&E exports, 
based on level of sophistication, for the periods 1992-2002 and 2002-2012.  
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The segmentation of E&E exports by PRODY index allows me to ‘thin slice’ 
the export structure by level of sophistication, in contrast to Lall and 
Albaladejo (2004) methods of disaggregation export structure into low, 
medium and high technology, the whole electronics sector is classified as 
high technology. By separating the products according to their 
sophistication the export data helps us to understand the changes in 
Malaysia and China’s E&E exports shares by level of sophistication, which 
then allows inference of the product’s upgrading over time. This links the 
competitiveness theoretical framework with the GVC framework explained 
in Chapter 2.  
 
3.1.7 The EXPY” Index  
 
Developed by Hausmann et al. (2007), the EXPY index is the weighted sum 
of the PRODY index of each product exported by a country, using the share 
of each product in the country’s total exports as weight. The EXPY index 
gauges the level of productivity linked with a country’s exports basket. The 
EXPY index formula for country i is as below:  
EXPY𝑖 = ∑
𝑥𝑖𝑘
𝑋𝑖
 PRODY𝑘
𝑘
 
Source: Hausmann et al. (2007) and McCann (2007) 
 
The EXPY index for country i is the sum of all PRODY index k weighted by 
the simple share of product k in the exports of country i. The higher the 
EXPY index indicates the higher the sophistication of a country’s exports.26  
 
                                                 
26 The EXPY index may underestimate the sophistication of a country’s exports basket if a 
very high-technology product is passed on for assembly in a low GDP per-capita income 
country. This is because one of the main components of PRODY is GDP per capita income. 
However, this problem is mitigated when comparing two developing countries such as 
China and Malaysia, which happen to have a comparable GDP per capita income. 
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The EXPY index is adapted to measure the sophistication of Malaysian and 
Chinese imports to their respective destination markets. The adapted EXPY 
index is denoted as EXPY” gauges the level of productivity linked with a 
country’s imports basket at E&E level for 338 products. The main 
difference is that the weight denominator is total E&E rather than the usual 
total exports. The EXPY”‘ index formula for country i is provided below:  
EXPY"‘𝑖 = ∑
𝑥𝑖𝑘
∑𝑥𝑖𝑘
 PRODY𝑘
𝑘
 
Source: Adapted from Hausmann et al. (2007) and McCann (2007) 
 
The EXPY”‘ index for country i is the sum of all PRODY indexes k weighted 
by simple share of product k in the total E&E imports from country i in a 
particular destination market. Therefore, the EXPY”‘ is the sum of weighted 
PRODY of each E&E product to total E&E imports in a destination market. A 
higher EXPY”‘ index indicates a higher E&E import sophistication from a 
particular country in the destination market.  
 
3.2 Data sources  
 
The analysis, based on an adaptation of Lall and Albaladejo (2004) WMS 
method, is divided into two periods, 1992-2002 and 2002-2012; 2002 is the 
strategic mid-point in the period of analysis as it covers periods of equal 
length before and after China’s accession to the WTO. The data is analysed 
at the 6-digit level of HS 1988/92 product codes for E&E, which consists of 
338 products out of 5,038 product lines of the total trade. For the full list of 
E&E products see Appendix 3.1.  
 
The main data sources used in the analysis are trade data and GDP per 
capita. Trade data, which is used to construct the weights, is sourced from 
UNComtrade through the World Bank WITS website, while real GDP per 
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capita data is sourced from the World Bank Development Indicators 
website. Foreign exchange rates for Malaysian ringgit and US dollar are 
based on the Central Bank of Malaysia’s website. Production data is based 
on the monthly manufacturing survey compiled by Malaysia’s Department 
of Statistics. For a list of Malaysia Standard industrial Classification codes 
cover under this study, please refer to Appendix 3.2. Approved 
manufacturing investment data was collected from Malaysia’s Investment 
Development Authority (MIDA) via personal interview. 
 
For E&E products, the data coverage for products includes the conversion 
from SITC Rev.3 codes to HS 1988/92 Nomenclature was made using the 
conversion table provided by the World Bank WITS website. This is because 
HS1988/92 allows a longer series of data to be examined than other 
revised Nomenclatures; for example HS 2007 Nomenclature only contains 
trade data from 2007 onwards. Items listed under the SITC Rev.3 Codes in 
Chapters 75, 76 and 77 are co-opted into the E&E industry category using 
the HS codes of 1988/92 to ensure proper coverage of E&E products. This 
is because Malaysia’s Department of Statistics defines E&E exports as the 
sum of the products listed under Chapters 75, 76 and 77 of SITC Rev.3 
Nomenclature. There are some limitations to converting the HS Codes to 
SITC Rev. 3, as indicated on the UNComtrade website, but it is the best 
conversion table available. 
 
HS codes at the 6-digit level are selected for better data precision than HS 
codes at 4-digit level, which generally lump the final products with their 
parts and components.  
 
The TCI is calculated at the E&E level with a total of 54 product lines using 
HS codes at the 4-digit level. For a detailed list see Appendix 3.3. The E&E 
sector in the TCI differs slightly from the E&E category in the 
competitiveness analysis that uses HS Codes at 6-digit level. HS codes at 
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the 4 digit level were used for TCI instead of the 6 digit level because the 
index obtained at the latter became biased as some products reported zero 
in export data due to discontinuity at the end of the period. Calculating the 
index using more aggregated data at the 4-digit level minimises the 
problem of the missing data biasing the index. However, the 
interchangeability between some 6-digit HS codes and 4 digit HS codes is 
not seamless, as some 6-digit HS codes do not add up to the HS Codes at 
the 4-digit category at group level. Effort has been made to ensure that the 
codes are as comparable as possible by retaining those where the sum of 
the 6-digit HS codes matches the aggregated 4-digit HS codes. On average, 
about 2.0 per cent of the total E&E export value of 338 products is 
excluded in the E&E category of the TCI. Exclusions include air-
conditioners, refrigerators, dryers and other items, due to the non-
interchangeability from 6 to 4-digit HS codes.  
 
Reports such as government policy documents and unpublished market 
analysis by trade associations were obtained through the Internet via an 
exploratory search or collected during fieldwork visits to interviewees’ 
organizations.  
 
3.3 Qualitative: Semi-structured interviews 
 
The quantitative analysis revealed the segments of the E&E industry to be 
focused on. For example, the quantitative analysis shows that IC is 
Malaysia’s most valuable export product and the ICT shows the threat from 
China increasing over the years.27 Therefore the IC industry offers an 
interesting GVC/GPN study with qualitative interviews. Related key works 
here are Ernst (2004) and Sturgeon and Kawakami (2011) on the 
electronics sector.  
                                                 
27 Refer to Chapter 6, Figure 1 and other results in Chapter 6.  
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Based on the theoretical GVC/GPN framework, a schematic representation 
of the qualitative methods is shown in Figure 3.2 below. The study 
encompasses the backward linkages of the semiconductor industry, the 
semiconductor industry itself and the semiconductor user industry, namely 
the household electrical products industry.  
 
 Figure 3.2 Malaysia’s Electronic and Electrical GPN at the sectoral level 
 
Note: SEM is Semiconductor Equipment Manufacturer 
Source: Based on Global Production Network 
 
From the quantitative works to identify important subsectors, the 
qualitative method of the research is deployed with semi-structured 
interviews based on the GVC framework related to works by Kaplinsky and 
Morris (2001), and Global Production Network related to works by Ernst 
(2004). These interviews targeted key actors in government departments, 
trade associations and firms, including lead firms and their suppliers. The 
GVC/GPN theoretical framework works by linking different actors along the 
chain, or in GPN language, understanding the links between the nodes. 
Therefore the interviews were used to reveal the type of relationship 
between suppliers with lead firms such as MNCs (Kaplinsky and Morris, 
2001). 
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The qualitative interviews take further the analysis in this study, for 
example by identifying market segmentation within the same product code 
under quantitative market share findings (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). For 
example, if two subsidiaries of an MNC operate in different locations but 
export ICs under the same trade codes, the way to find out or validate 
which plant is exporting the most sophisticated ICs can be confirmed 
through semi-structured interviews, which can also reveal the unwritten 
rules within the value chain. For functional upgrading, the qualitative 
interviews reveal detail role a subsidiary at different locations is providing 
within a global entity. Overall, the use of interviews is useful to generate 
more insight into the subject researched. Interview prompt sheets were 
used (see Appendix 3.4, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7). 
 
The data from the GVC/GPN qualitative interviews was then used in 
triangulation with the statistical analysis and official government 
documents to back the findings in relation to the research questions and 
check for consistency among the different sources of information.  
 
Interviewees in this study are from the IC, household electrical appliances 
industries and Semiconductor Equipment Manufacturer (SEM). These three 
sub-industries were selected because the IC is the most important export 
item in the E&E sector and the semiconductor has historically been the 
mainstay of Malaysia’s exports since the early 1970s. The household 
electrical appliances industry was selected because it includes a mixture of 
local Malaysian players and finally, for SEM, is where some of the most 
dynamic Malaysian-owned firms are growing and this is an under-
researched area. Interviewees included key actors in industries and the 
Malaysian government sector. 
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Fieldwork was conducted in two phases in Malaysia and China during 2014. 
As a start, a list of firms in Malaysia was obtained from Collaborative 
Research in Engineering, Science & Technology (CREST), the Electrical and 
Electronics Association of Malaysia (TEEAM) and Invest-in-Penang Bhd. 
(InvestPenang). Based on purposive sampling, a total of 38 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted, 34 in Malaysia and a further four in China. The 
breakdown of the respondents by category is shown in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 Respondents by Type  
 Academic Manager 
(firm) 
CEO 
(firm) 
Trade 
Assoc. 
Gov’t 
Official 
Consultant 
Malaysia 3 7 8 1 13 2 
China 0 2 1 0 1 0 
 
At the firm level in Malaysia the interviewees included 13 CEOs and 
managers in the IC industry, of which three were from the Electrical sub-
sector. At least two respondents were co-founders of their companies, 
providing insights into their start-up phases. While the interviewees in 
China were few, I compensated wherever possible by visiting areas such as 
the Shenzhen High-Tech Park, which is a hotbed of E&E innovation 
mentioned by senior MNC and start-up managers in Malaysia. The 
interviews conducted in China interestingly provide a reverse perspective 
on the competitive/complementary question in Malaysia, besides 
providing detailed information of industrial policies in China at the 
implementation level from the firms’ perspective.  
 
In the data-analysing phase, data from the semi-structured interviews, 
newspapers and official documents and statistical information obtained 
during the fieldwork were triangulated to draw inferences. Information 
expressed in the interviews was then validated with newspaper reports or 
government official documents or corporate annual reports. Secondary 
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data was searched based on purposive exploratory examination as per 
Hobday and Rush (2012), following the information trail based on the 
interviews and academic journals to explore further firm-level information 
through the Internet, mindful of the differing quality of different types of 
sources. Data collected from the semi-structured interviews was then 
triangulated with information available from company websites and 
further interviews with stakeholders such as government agencies and 
industry experts (Kubny and Voss, 2014). A list of the interviewees is 
available on the examiners’ request. Views expressed by Malaysia’s public 
sector interviewees with regard to industrial policy at programme level are 
also included.  
 
3.4 Limitations 
 
The quantitative methods used in the study have two limitations. Firstly, 
current trade data could only capture the value based on product 
identification because it is based on gross output or the value of the 
exports rather than value added. In other words, the trade data could not 
capture the associated value at each stage of the manufacturing process. 
This raises the possibility that in evaluating China’s impact on Malaysia’s 
E&E industry China’s sophistication in the exports baskets can be 
overstated if China only captures a small share of the value added to its 
high technology exports. Finally, as this study adapts the Lall and 
Albaladejo (2004) method of rising and falling export shares from Malaysia 
and China it is unable to claim the causality of China’s effect on the rise or 
fall of imports share from Malaysia, but presents the relative movements 
of market share linked to industrial competitiveness.  
 
The qualitative interview faces constraints such as access to key actors and 
non-disclosure agreements (NDA) between firms in the GPN. Access was 
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difficult, as the interview targets were senior managers who are highly 
selective about granting interviews to researchers. Access for interviews 
was even more critical in China after labour issues cropped up at 
Taiwanese-owned factories based in China that are contracted to 
manufacture goods for a famous US-based MNC came under the spotlight 
not long ago. Secondly, NDAs signed between firms who supply major 
MNCs make GVC or GPN studies more difficult because firms cannot 
disclose that they are supplying components to a specific company. This 
limits the conversation, as the respondents make conscious decisions not 
to discuss the names of suppliers and clients during the interview. To 
overcome this I performed a search for a tear-down (disassembling the 
mobile phones to reveal the parts and components) of the mobile devices 
from computer magazines and technology gadget websites to trace the 
GVC/GPN using triangulation with the data obtained from interviews. 
 
3.5 Study Location  
 
The primary locations of the fieldwork in February to May 2014 were the 
state of Penang and the Kuala Lumpur/Selangor area, where the E&E 
industry is predominantly based in Malaysia. The second phase of 
fieldwork was carried out in the second half of 2014 in the Guangzhou-
Shenzhen area in southern China. The main locations of the fieldwork were 
in Malaysia and China; an electronics and machinery trade fair in the UK 
was also attended to understand the various machineries used in the 
production of electronic devices via discussion with exhibitors. Figure 3.3 
below, shows a map of the field research sites.  
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 Figure 3.3 Fieldwork Research Sites  
 
 
 
Summing up, the study deployed both quantitative and qualitative 
methods to answer the research questions. Initially the quantitative 
findings identified the segment of products to target for qualitative 
interviews at the firm level in Malaysia and China. The findings from the 
quantitative study were triangulated with qualitative interviews, policy 
documents and other secondary sources for consistency. 
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4.0 Evolution of Malaysian and Chinese E&E Industries 
 
This chapter describes the development paths taken by Malaysia and China 
in developing their respective E&E industries, as background information to 
inform the discussion in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8.  Towards the end of the 
chapter the contrasting of Malaysia and China’s different strategies for 
developing their industries also informs the industrial policy area within 
the economic development literature.  
 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the development of Malaysia’s E&E 
industry from the 1970s to the present day, followed by that of China’s 
E&E industry since the opening up of China in the early 1980s to the 
present day. Product-wise, semiconductors and small household domestic 
appliances are discussed for both countries. The chapter also briefly 
touches on the computer industry in the electronics sector and on the 
television industry. Malaysia and China followed different paths to develop 
their E&E industries and ended up very differently in terms of outcomes.  
 
Malaysia and China are both developing countries but their E&E industries 
are at different levels of development. China is already the world’s top 
electronic and electrical goods exporter, as indicated by its export figures 
for semiconductors, PCs and TV market. China has a large population and is 
more heterogeneous in terms of development than Malaysia which, 
despite lower GDP and export figures, has higher per capita GDP at 
US$10,628.0 compared to China’s US$6,991.9. Table 4.1 below, presents 
the details. 
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Table 4.1 Malaysia-China Comparison Indicators 
2013 
General Indicators Malaysia China 
GDP (current US$ Bn) 313.2 9,490.6 
GDP per capita (current US$) 10,628.0 6,991.9 
Population (millions) 29.5 1,357.4 
E&E industry  
  
E&E exports* (US$ Bn) 77.0 796.3 
IC exports (billion units) 0.3 4.5 
PC Shipment (million units) 1.8 338.7 
TV production (million) 17.1 127.7 
Note: * based on 338 products. Ful l  l ist of products available in Appendix 3.1. 
Source: Based on data from World Bank, UNComtrade, Central Bank of Malaysia, China’s 
Statistical Yearbook  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Malaysia and China’s World Exports of E&E Products 
 
Source: UNComtrade 
 
Figure 4.1 above presents world E&E exports by Malaysia and China. As a 
general observation, Malaysia’s and China’s value of E&E exports were 
rising together in 1992-2013 period. The rise of Malaysia’s E&E exports is 
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not obvious as the scale of the vertical axis in the graph is dwarfed by the 
exponential increase in Chinese E&E exports, but Malaysia’s E&E exports 
are still increasing, albeit at a lower rate. Secondly, Malaysia and China 
almost have an equal starting point in 2000, but China’s E&E export growth 
diverges from Malaysia’s after China joined the WTO in 2001. China’s E&E 
exports are worth US$796.3 billion in 2013 compared to Malaysia’s at 
US$77.0 billion.  
 
4.1 Malaysia’s and China’s role in the Electronics Global Production 
Network 
 
Malaysia’s regional role in the production of E&E products shifted from 
being a location for labour-intensive production for North American, 
European and Japanese MNCs since the early 1970s to focusing on 
manufacturing parts and components in the decade of 2000. In the 1990s, 
Malaysia also had a sizeable finished goods industry, making electronic 
equipment such as computers and other household electrical goods, 
particularly through the presence of Japanese FDI from companies such as 
Panasonic, Sanyo and Sharp. However, Malaysia’s finished goods segment 
has been contracting since the middle of the 2000s due to China’s 
increasing role as a final assemblers in the regional production network, of 
which more details are provided in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
Regionally, Malaysia supplies E&E components to China for final assembly. 
Today, Malaysia continues to play the role of an assembly and packaging 
centre for North American electronics in the IC industry, but is increasingly 
automating its production lines, making Malaysia increasingly specialised in 
semiconductor exports. This specialisation shows early signs that the E&E 
value chain in Malaysia is upgrading.  
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In the 1980s, China started as a processing trade centre or mainly assembly 
operations for E&E industry, similar to Malaysia’s role in the early 1970s, 
with the opening of the Export Processing Zones. Currently China is still the 
centre for E&E assembly in the East Asia region (Athukorala and 
Kophaiboon, 2014). It has the greatest capacity in the world for the 
production of electronic products such as mobile phones, computers, 
colour TVs and digital cameras. As shown in Table 4.2 below, global 
production capacity for electronic products continues to shift into China 
This also makes China the world’s main consumer of semiconductors as ICs 
are a main component in electronics. As an unintended consequence, 
China is facing a bigger trade deficit in ICs than in oil.  
 
Table 4.2 China’s share of production capacity for selected electronic products 
worldwide, 2008-2013  
 % 
Products 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Mobile Phone 44.7 49.9 62.7 63.8 67.7 80.6 
Computer/ PC 47.0 60.9 73.4 74.0 70.8 62.8 
Colour TV 43.9 48.3 47.8 48.6 53.8 56.7 
Digital Camera - 62.3 64.9 - - - 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (January 2015, p. 11.) 
 
Although China was initially dependent on foreign investors to drive its 
exports, it is showing signs - based on falling shares of foreign value added 
in gross exports, as shown in Figure 4.2 below - that it has localised its 
backward linkages and its supporting industry. Its share of foreign value 
added in gross exports in electrical and optical equipment) falls from 70.0 
per cent in 1995-2000 period to below 60.0 per cent from 2008 onwards. 
However, caveats apply to the results based on the OECD-WTO Trade in 
Value-added Database: this is an estimation based on the merging of 
different countries’ input-output tables, and as such does not distinguish 
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between production by foreign MNCs based in China and production by 
indigenous Chinese firms in China.  
 
Figure 4.2 Share of Foreign Value Added in Gross Exports (electrical and optical 
equipment) (%) 
 
Source: OECD-WTO Trade in Value-added Database 
 
While China has been more successful in localising the backward linkages 
of its electrical industry, Malaysia’s role in the production network is to 
supply more sophisticated IC chips than China’s based on unit value 
analysis. IC chips, or monolithic integrated circuits, digital (HS 854211), are 
the most important exports from Malaysia’s E&E industry. Based on 
interviews with an MNC based in Penang (referred to here as Corporation 
A) that manufactures microprocessors, Malaysia specialises in the assembly 
and testing of higher-end chips while lower-end chips are tested and 
assembled in China and Vietnam. Penang is exporting microprocessors of 
higher value and specifications, which are priced higher and are destined 
for end use in computer servers. China and Vietnam on the other hand 
focus on manufacturing IC chips for the company for lower segment 
markets. As a rule of thumb, the electronics industry generally refers to the 
lower segment of the electronic devices where IC chips are made for 
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tablets priced at US$100 or less. Although Corporation A has a fabrication 
plant in China and fabrication is technically a higher function than testing 
and assembly, the fabrication plant produces ICs for the company that 
using manufacturing technology that are considered two generations 
earlier than the current industry-wide specification. (Corporation A, 
corporation brochure).  
 
A unit value analysis was carried out to validate the qualitative information 
that Malaysia is exporting higher-value IC chips than China, which indirectly 
infers the upgrading of Malaysia within the IC industry. If it is true, IC 
exports from Malaysia should have a higher unit value than China’s, as 
alluded during the interview with Corporation A (interviewee 1). 
Admittedly, this is a crude exercise because the prices of ICs will have to be 
based on a geometric mean, but a detailed breakdown by type of IC is not 
available in the UNComtrade database. Therefore an indirect way to check 
whether Malaysia’s IC exports have a higher price than a ICs exported from 
China is to use the unit value. The unit value for digital ICs is used here as a 
proxy for the price as shown in Table 4.3 below. 
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Table 4.3 Unit Values in US$ of Malaysian and Chinese Monolithic Digital 
Integrated Circuits (HS 854211) 
Year Malaysia 
Unit Value 
China 
Unit Value 
Difference 
1992 0.10 0.64 -0.53 
1993 0.11 0.27 -0.16 
1994 0.13 0.45 -0.32 
1995 0.61 0.96 -0.34 
1996 1.07 0.36 0.71 
1997 0.84 0.28 0.56 
1998 0.72 0.26 0.46 
1999 1.13 0.26 0.87 
2000 1.04 0.33 0.72 
2001 1.43 0.25 1.18 
2002 1.29 0.77 0.52 
2003 1.08 0.88 0.20 
2004 0.96 0.98 -0.02 
2005 0.99 0.96 0.03 
2006 0.74 0.88 -0.14 
2007 1.03 0.81 0.22 
2008 0.68 0.71 -0.02 
2009 0.70 0.60 0.10 
2010 0.67 0.52 0.15 
2011 0.95 0.56 0.40 
2012 0.83 0.22 0.61 
2013 n.a. 0.22 n.a. 
Note: The quantity for of Malaysia’s export of monolithic digital integrated circuits (HS 
854211) in 2013 is not available.  
Source: Based on UNComtrade data 
 
Barring the transfer pricing issues, based on a statistical t-test for one-
tailed two mean at 0.01 significance level, the average unit value of 
Malaysia’s monolithic integrated circuits, digital (HS 854211) from 1992-
2012 is higher than the average unit value of Chinese exports of the same 
product. HS 854211 is the trade code for digital microprocessors. Similarly, 
the results at 0.01 significance level of two means t-tests for monolithic 
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digital circuits, non-digital (HS 854219) also confirms that the average unit 
values from 1992-2012 of Malaysia’s IC chips is higher than that of China’s 
exports.28 Examples of HS 854219 are analogue chips such as radio-
frequency chips or sensor chips. However, for parts of electronic integrated 
circuits (HS 854290), China actually has higher an average unit value than 
Malaysia’s for most of the years. The hypothesis test result, at 0.01 
significance level, cannot allow us to conclude that the unit value of China 
exports is higher than Malaysian unit values for parts of electronic 
integrated circuits.29 Details of the share of contribution of 6-digit HS codes 
in the IC Chips category (HS 8542) are provided in Appendix 4.4.  
 
4.2 Evolution of Malaysia’s E&E industry 
 
In the regional context Malaysia industrialised late with Thailand and 
Singapore in the 1970s after Japan, Korea, and Taiwan had industrialised 
much earlier in East Asia. Malaysia’s economic structure was transformed 
as a result of its industrialisation, beginning in the 1970s, when 
manufacturing only made up of 13% of total value added in the country’s 
GDP, and peaking in 2000 at 31% of GDP before declining to around 23% of 
total GDP in 2013. Details are presented in Table 4.4 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Unit value for HS 854219 available in Appendix 4.1 and unit value for HS 854290 as 
shown in Appendix 4.2. Detailed statistical results of hypothesis testing are available in 
Appendix 4.3. 
29 It is noteworthy that the variance in the unit values in Malaysia’s export data is h igh on 
yearly basis for Parts of electronic integrated circuits (HS854290), and therefore the results 
of statistical test for HS854290 must be read with caution.  
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Table 4.4 Share of Malaysia’s GDP by Activity (%)  
 % 
Year  Manufacturing  Agriculture  Other Total 
1955 8 40 52 100 
1960 9 38 53 100 
1965 10 32 58 100 
1967 12 31 57 100 
1969 12 33 54 99 
1970 13 31 56 100 
1975 16 28 56 100 
1980 20 23 57 100 
1985 20 21 59 100 
1990 27 19 54 100 
1995 26 13 61 100 
2000 31 9 61 100 
2005 30 8 62 100 
2010 26 11 63 100 
2011 26 12 62 100 
2012 23 10 67 100 
2013(e) 23 9 68 100 
Note: (e) = estimated.  
Source: Data from 1955-1990 based on Alavi (2002, pp. 30.), the rest based on 
data from Department of Statistics of Malaysia 
 
When Malaysia industrialised in the 1970s, the E&E sector was the main 
manufacturing activity driving the industrialisation. Based on Table 4.5 
below, when industrialisation began in 1970 E&E only represented 5% of 
total value added in manufacturing. E&E experienced high growth in the 
1970s and ’80s, with its share of total value added in manufacturing 
peaking at 30% in 2000, and thereafter its contribution to the share in 
value added in the manufacturing sector declined, falling to 22% in 2012.  
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Table 4.5 Share of Value Added in Malaysia’s Manufacturing Sector (%) 1960-2012 
Industry 1960 1970 1981 1990 2000 2005 2010 2012 
Processing-off 
estates 
37 11 n.a.  5 3 4 6 7 
Food 12 16 9 6 4 4 5 5 
Beverages  3 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 
Tobacco 3 7 3 1 1 0 1 0 
Textiles & 
Apparel 
1 2 5 3 2 1 1 1 
Footwear - 0 0 3 2 1 1 1 
Leather & 
Leather 
Products 
1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Wood Products 8 10 9 6 4 3 3 2 
Furniture & 
Fixtures 
2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 
Paper & 
printing 
products 
0 7 5 5 4 4 3 3 
Chemical & 
Products 
10 9 5 11 8 13 12 10 
Petroleum & 
Coal Products 
- 4 6 3 7 14 18 20 
Rubber & 
Plastic Products 
4 4 14 5 3 2 3 3 
NMMP 4 7 5 5 3 3 3 3 
Basic Metal  2 3 3 4 2 2 4 4 
Metal Products 9 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 
Electrical & 
Electronics 
- 5 17 21 30 26 17 22 
Transport - 3 5 5 4 4 6 6 
Machinery 
except 
electrical 
machinery 
- - - 4 9 3 3 3 
Other 7 2 4 6 8 7 6 5 
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 97 100 
RM Bn in 
Current Prices 0.4 1.2 8.7 24.5 88.2 118.2 170.7 204.2 
n.a. = not available, NMMP = non-metallic mineral products  
Source: BNM Monthly Statistical Bulletin, July 2015 
 
Apart from being an important sector for its share of total value added in 
manufacturing, the E&E sector is responsible for about 40% of total 
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manufacturing jobs (EPU, 2010, p. 131).30 In 2014 it also contributed 
around 49% of total manufactured exports or 32.9% of total Malaysian 
exports (MATRADE Malaysia, 2015).31 Since 1970, based on its share of 
value added in manufacturing, manufactured exports and employment, 
Malaysia’s E&E industry become a very important industry in terms of both 
size and employment. Table 4.6 below, further illustrates the components 
and goods produced by Malaysia’s E&E industry in 1988-2013.  
 
Table 4.6 Output of Selected Electronics and Electrical by Unit, 1988-2013 
 E&E Products 1988 1990 2000 2010 2012 2013 
Integrated circuits 
(million units) 
            
4,709  
            
6,084  
            
21,424  
            
38,007  
            
39,391  
            
35,686  
Semiconductors 
(million units) 
            
2,182  
            
2,565  
            
16,373  
            
17,997  
            
19,765  
            
19,281  
Electronic transistors 
(million units) 
            
5,545  
            
5,956  
            
17,519  
            
34,184  
            
36,119  
            
35,362  
Telephone and telegraph 
cables (tonnes)* 
            
4,667  
          
10,757  
            
22,524   n.a.   n.a.   n.a.  
Insulated wires and 
cables (tonnes) 
          
16,936  
          
33,623  
            
73,673  
            
61,046  
            
69,610  
            
86,384  
Television sets 
(million units) 
               
1.2  
               
3.2  
                
10.6  
                
13.2  
                
13.1  
                
17.1  
Room air-conditioners 
(million units) 
               
0.7  
               
1.0  
                 
1.9  
                 
2.6  
                 
2.7  
                 
2.6  
Radio (thousand units) 
          
21,070 
          
37,019 
            
36,348 
            
57,350 
            
28,365 
            
18,954 
Note: * Cable reports discontinued by Department of Statistics in 2010  
Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, January 1998 and July 2015, Central Bank of Malaysia 
 
This section discusses first the electronics industry and then the electrical 
industry. In terms of manufactured exports structure, the electronics 
industry contributes much more than the electrical industry (household 
electrical items). For example, based on Table 4.7 below, exports of 
                                                 
30 Based on the latest Manufacturing Survey 2013 from DOSM, using 2012 as a reference 
year. 
31 Manufactured exports is the sum of sections 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic manufactures), 7 
(machinery and transport equipment), and 8 (miscellaneous manufactured goods), 
excluding division 68 (non-ferrous metals) under Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) by United Nations Statistics Division. Total exports refer to the 
summation of all  sections within the SITC classification.  
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semiconductors in 2013 totalled 42% and the electrical sector totalled 21% 
of total E&E manufactured exports. The electrical sector is made up of 
mainly audio-visual consumer electrical products (7% of total 
manufactured exports), mainly air-conditioned electrical industrial 
machinery and equipment (12%) and small electrical appliances (2%).  
 
Table 4.7 Share of Sub-industries in Total E&E Industry and Total Manufactured 
Exports 
Year 1975 1980 1990 2000 2010 2012 2013 
Electronics            
Semi- conductors 0 76 44 31 36 40 42 
Electrical machinery 
& appliances* 
           
Electronic equipment 
& parts 
0 9 14 42 36 30 29 
Consumer electrical 
products 
0 4 21 11 10 7 7 
Industrial & 
commercial electrical 
products 
0 4 13 10 8 10 9 
Electrical industrial 
machinery & 
equipment 
0 8 8 5 9 11 12 
Household electrical 
appliances 
0 0 0 0 1 2 2 
Total E&E 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
E&E as % of total 
manufactured exports 
25 48 57 72 56 49 48 
Total Manufactured 
Exports (RM Bn) 
-  6.3 46.8 317.9 486.9 519.9 549.3 
Note: The table above cannot be directly compared to the monthly external trade 
statistics published by Malaysia’s Department of Statistics due to differences in 
classification.  
* Since 1990 data have been reclassified into ‘electronics’ and ‘electrical machinery and 
appliances’. The electronics sub-sector comprises semiconductors and electronic 
equipment and parts (mainly automatic data processing machines), electrical machinery 
and appliances refers to consumer electrical products (mainly audio-visual products), 
industrial and commercial electrical products (mainly telecommunications equipment), 
electrical industrial machinery and equipment (mainly air -conditioners), and household 
electrical appliances (mainly rice cookers, washing machines, refrigerators , etc.). 
Previously electronic equipment and parts were classified under other electrical 
machinery. 
Source:  Central Bank of Malaysia, July 2015, Monthly Statistical Bulletin.  
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Finally, Figure 4.3 below illustrates the E&E industry by geographical region 
in Malaysia. Penang has the most concentrated E&E firms compared to 
other states in Malaysia. Apart from Penang, the State of Kedah, Selangor, 
and Johor have a substantial E&E industry presence. The back-end segment 
of the semiconductor industry is mainly found in Penang, while wafer 
fabrication operations are located in Kulim High-Tech Park, Kedah the state 
adjacent to Penang. The presence of the E&E industry in the state of 
Sarawak is quite limited, despite having a wafer fabrication operation in 
Sarawak called X-Fab.32 Details of IC fabrication front-end players in 
Malaysia are provided in Appendix 4.5. The states of Johor and Selangor 
have a bigger mix of electrical industry players, with Dyson in the state of 
Johor and Panasonic and Sony manufacturing household electrical goods 
such as TVs and air-conditioners in Selangor. 
 
                                                 
32 Previously known as First Sil icon, owned by Sarawak State Government, operational in 
2001 with capacity of 30,000 wafers per month, 200 mm wafer facil ity with 0.25um to 
0.15um geometries. The Sarawak State Government merged First Sil icon plant with X-Fab 
from Germany in 2007, while retaining undisclosed stakes in renamed X-Fab Sarawak.    
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                          Figure 4.3 Map of Malaysia’s Major Electronics Companies  
 
              Source: Adapted from MIDA in CREST Penang (2013) 
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Measured by share of value added by state, in 2013 Penang made the 
highest contribution at 32.5% of total value added in the E&E sector, 
followed by Selangor at 25.6%, Johor at 14.6%, Negeri Sembilan at 11.1%, 
Melaka at 4.7%, Kedah at 3.3% and Sarawak at 1.4%. Therefore Penang is 
the most important state in terms of Malaysia’s E&E industry.  
 
4.2.1 The electronics clusters in Penang 
 
As Penang has an important place in Malaysia’s electronics industry, this 
section elaborates on its development path within the industry. According 
to Athukorala (2012), Penang accounts for approximately 35.0%-38.0% of 
Malaysia’s manufacturing exports,33 of which E&E has a major share. 
Penang’s electronics industry is mainly dominated by foreign MNCs, with 
85.6% of sales value generated by 22.9% of all firms and 72.3% of 
employment in the manufacturing sector in Penang. Local firms only 
generate around 14.4% of sales value and 27.7% of all manufacturing jobs 
in Penang, even though more than two-thirds of the firms in Penang are 
local.34 For details see Appendix 4.6 and Appendix 4.7.  
 
Malaysia’s electronics industry developed in the early 1970s when eight 
foreign companies invested in Penang’s Free Trade Zone. The original eight 
companies, some of which have been restructured and renamed, are 
Advanced Micro Devices Products (AMD), Hewlett Packard (now Agilent 
Technologies), Clarion, National Semiconductor (now Fairchild 
Semiconductor), Hitachi Semiconductor (now Renesas), Intel (Malaysia), 
Litronix (now Osram Opto Semiconductors) and Robert Bosch (Wong, July 
2013). With the exception of Fairchild Semiconductor, which has recently 
                                                 
33 Based on 1990-2009 period, Athukorala computed the share of Penang in the 
manufactured exports based on the Socio-Economic Research Institute (SERI), Penang 
database. 
34 Based on Penang Industrial Survey 2007 by InvestPenang in Athukorala (2012).  
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announced the sale of its factory near Bayan Lepas, Penang, the rest of the 
original eight companies remain in Penang.  See Appendix 4.8 for a list of 
the top 25 electronics companies in Penang. 
 
In the 1970s, low labour costs was one of the attractions to the MNCs 
setting up semiconductor testing and assembly operations in Penang and 
this electronics cluster thrived, but the industry is mainly confined to IC 
packaging at the end of the IC production stage.  
 
Later the computer peripheral industry also arrived in Malaysia. The hard 
disk drive industry started in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Penang 
(Athukorala, 2012) when more North American and Japanese companies 
such as Seagate, Maxtor and Hitachi Metals located plants in Penang 
(McKendrick, Doner and Haggard 2000, Chapter 9 in Athukorala, 2012). 
This was followed by the printed circuit board (PCB) industry between 1989 
and 1991 (Athukorala, 2012), with Singaporean companies such as 
Solectron (US-owned, later sold to Singapore) also relocating. The arrival of 
the hard disk drive industry created backward linkages with Malaysian-
owned SMEs to serve the demand for high-precision parts for the 
production of hard disk drives. One such company is Eng Teknologi, 
founded in 1974 as a hardware electrical shop, which expanded its capacity 
to cater for high precision components for semiconductor companies in 
1979 and ventured into producing hard disk drive actuators in 1988.35 
Today EngTek Group is a multinational itself, with plants in Thailand and 
China, and in 2007 the group’s revenue surpassed RM500 million 
(US$145.5 million). 36  
 
                                                 
35 An actuator is an electronic device controlled by a motor that moves the hard drive 
head arm (Computer Hope, 2015).  
36 US$1=RM3.4376 based on the average exchange rates provided by Central Bank of 
Malaysia for 2007. 
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According to Rasiah (2009), external factors in the 1980s such as the 
appreciation of the Japanese Yen as a result of the Plaza Accord in 1985 
encouraged FDI flows to Malaysia’s electronics sector. Malaysia and other 
Southeast Asian countries including Thailand and Singapore benefited from 
the relocation of production capacity by Japanese firms to Southeast Asia 
to protect their exports competitiveness because of the high Yen. 
Internally, Malaysia had already developed some key firms and a trained 
workforce in the semiconductor industry since the 1970s to cater for the 
inflow of investment in the late 1980s and early 1990s to other form of 
electronics such as computer peripherals industry.  
 
By the 1990s there was a labour shortage in Malaysia, with the supply of 
labour unable to cope with the demand from the manufacturing sector, 
and the expansion of the E&E industry began to slow towards the end of 
the 1990s. By the 2000s Malaysia had started to feel the pinch from China, 
with more MNCs located in Malaysia moving to China and MNCs generally 
preferring China over Malaysia as an FDI location. 
 
By the early decade 2000s simple assembly operations such as PCBs were 
among the firms leaving Malaysia. Malaysia responded by starting to bring 
in solar module manufacturers and LED lighting-related industry into the 
country. At around this time newspaper headlines reported that firms were 
moving to China or Vietnam from Malaysia, and with each firm that left, 
manufacturing jobs were lost, as explored in Chapter 8.  
 
Realising that the missing linkages within the domestic E&E value chain, the 
Malaysian government sets up a front-end player called Silterra to 
complete the linkage within the semiconductor industry, which until then 
had concentrated on back-end operations for MNCs. Silterra is a state-
owned wafer fabrication facility located in Kulim Hi-Tech Park, Kedah state 
and it started production in 2000. Silterra specialised in producing display 
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chips embedded in mobile devices and exported to the US, Taiwan and 
China (Leong, 7 Jun 2014). However, it has accumulated losses of RM1.7 
billion since 2011 and was almost sold off to a Chinese buyer in 2014 
(Bloomberg Business, 2014). 
 
The Malaysian government undertook to improve public research 
institutions’ ability to support upgrading in the E&E value chain and in 1985 
The Malaysian Institute of Microelectronics Malaysia (MIMOS) was setup 
under the Ministry of Science Technology and Innovation (MOSTI) to 
spearhead Research and Development (R&D) to help Malaysia to move up 
the electronics industry value chain. MIMOS was supposed to function like 
Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) of Taiwan, which 
created two major spin-off companies, the Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and the United Microelectronics 
Corporation (UMC). TSMC and UMC are now top world players in IC 
foundries.  
 
In 1996 the Malaysian government launched the Multimedia Super 
Corridor (MSC) and provided generous incentives for companies that 
participated in this initiative. The idea was to emulate Silicon Valley in 
California as a launch pad for Malaysia to develop Information Technology 
hardware and software. The Malaysian government also created a high-
level scientific advisory body called Malaysian Industry Government for 
High Technology (MiGHT) in 1993 to gather input from the scientific 
community for Malaysia’s industrial policies.  
 
However, Rasiah (2011) describes these public sector efforts as suffering 
from a lack of coordination among agencies and deficiency in performance 
standards, this affected the agencies’ ability to help Malaysia’s E&E 
industry move up the value chain. Rasiah (2011) further cites Mohamad 
Ariff (1991) and Rasiah (1995) comments that ethnic preference policies 
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contradict the industrial policy framework and this constrains the 
upgrading capacity of Malaysia’s E&E industry.  
 
In conclusion, although commendable for its initial success, Malaysia’s path 
to E&E industry development is also ironic. The irony is summed up by the 
Chairman of Malaysian-American Electronics Industry, Wong (July 2013) a 
veteran of Intel Penang, who concluded ‘Even though Malaysia has had 
more than 40 years of experience in the E&E industry, we have missed 
building the ecosystem for the semiconductor sector‘ (Wong, July 2013, p. 
9.). The IC industry can be divided into IC design, IC manufacturing and IC 
assembly and packaging segment. Malaysia has had a long presence in 
assembly and packaging, limited involvement in IC manufacturing, but IC 
design in very much in its infancy. Despite this setback in Penang there are 
other benefits of FDI-led development, especially once the backward 
linkages are considered. The details of the backward linkages are explored 
in Chapter 7.  
 
Going forward, Malaysia needs to build its own brands of electronics 
products in the international market, which are lacking despite the 
country’s being decades in the electronics industry. Malaysia also needs to 
reduce its dependence on the FDI model to reduce dependency on foreign 
technology, uncertainty when FDI relocates away from Malaysia. The FDI 
model has been very effective in creating jobs when Malaysia, and 
especially Penang in the early 1970s, was reeling from high unemployment 
(15% against the national 9%) when the status as a free port was revoked.  
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4.2.2  Electrical Industry  
 
While the success of the establishment of the E&E industry in the Free 
Industrial Zone in Penang is well researched (see Athukorala (2012), 
Grunsven (2006), White (2012) the spread of production networks from 
Japan into places such as Shah Alam in Selangor (adjacent to Kuala Lumpur) 
is less well known. Matsushita Electrical Company, later renamed 
Panasonic, had already set up dry cell battery factory in 1967, followed by 
TV and refrigerator manufacturing facilities in Shah Alam four years before 
National Semiconductor invested in Bayan Lepas, Penang.  
 
The electrical product segment of this thesis is confined to household 
electrical goods such as televisions, washing machines, radios, and 
microwave ovens. The industry refers to items within this group of 
products either as ‘brown goods’ or ‘white goods’. The terms came from 
the main colour of their outer casing. In the 1960s and 1970s, the ovens 
and washing machines normally came with a white enamel paint casing 
and thus the term ‘white goods’ was given. In contrast, the televisions and 
radios were often encased in wood panels or wood-like materials, leading 
to the name ‘brown goods’ (interviewee 2). A more precise definition is 
given in Chapter 5 and 6 based on groups of trade product codes for the 
E&E industry as a whole.  
 
Japanese companies in Malaysia dominate the manufacturing of electrical 
products with brand names such as Sharp, Panasonic, Sony and Sanyo. 
These companies set up plants in Malaysia mainly for exports, but a 
minority share of the goods is also sold in Malaysia. In this section I 
combine works by economic geographers, notably Edgington and Hayter 
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(2013) with retail market reports and interview data to describe the 
evolution of the electrical industry in Malaysia.37 
 
In the 1980s and early 1990s Japanese electrical retail goods displaced 
many European brands such as Elba, Zanussi and Electrolux in the local 
Malaysian market. However, the Japanese brands later faced fierce 
competition from the Korean LG and Samsung brands and finally lost their 
market leadership in the audiovisual industry (brown goods) in the 2000s.38 
Although they lost their market leader status Japanese brands maintain a 
substantial share of the domestic market for audio-visual products. 
Panasonic retains its market leader status in the white goods category in 
Malaysia. Malaysian companies’ market share remains negligible in white 
and brown goods except for small electrical appliances, with Pensonic no. 3 
in terms of market share (at 12.6% in 2012), just a step behind the 
European brand Phillips (at 14.0% in 2013).39 In the late 2000s Chinese 
brands such as Haier and Midea started to make their presence felt in 
Malaysia’s electrical sector.  
 
To give an idea of the size of these companies, Panasonic Malaysia had a 
revenue of US$571.26 million (RM1.8 billion) in the 2013 financial year 
(Lim, 19 July 2013), while that of the biggest Malaysian-owned electrical 
brand Pensonic was RM 351.43 million (US$111.53 million) 40 (Pensonic 
Malaysia Bhd, 2014).41 The Malaysian-owned players started as trading 
companies in the 1970s and 1980s before venturing into manufacturing 
their own products. Some companies such as Milux and Pensonic offer 
                                                 
37 Retail  market reports are Euromonitor International (April  2003) and Euromonitor 
International (February 2014).   
38 Audiovisual product examples are TVs, video/DVD players, and audio players such as 
radios, cd players.  
39 Examples of small electrical appliances are blenders and rice cookers.  
40 Converted US$1=RM3.1509 using Malaysian Central Bank average annual exchange 
rates. 
41 Panasonic Malaysia refers to the group of companies. The revenue of the manufacturing 
arm, Panasonic Manufacturing Malaysia was RM864.7 mill ion in 2013. 
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non-electrical households item as well such as household water filters and 
gas stoves. A list of major Malaysian electrical players is available in 
Appendix 4.9.  
  
The development of Malaysia’s electrical industry was closely intertwined 
with Japanese FDI in the 1980s and 1990s, and to a lesser extent to the 
arrival of Korean Samsung electronics at the beginning from 2000s. 
Edgington and Hayter (2013) summarise the development of Japanese FDI 
in Malaysia in five stages as shown in Table 4.8:  
 
Table 4.8 Stages of Development of Japanese FDI in Malaysia 
Stages (Year)  Description of Japanese FDI in Malaysia 
First stage  
(1960-1985) 
Initial growth in factory development, with low-wage 
labour. The industry grows rapidly and some local linkages 
with supply companies grow. 
Second stage  
(1986-1995) 
The beginning of factory automation in Japanese factories 
in Malaysia, more hiring of design engineers. Some MNC 
branches in Malaysia gain Regional Headquarters (RHQ) 
and logistics functions 
Third stage  
(1996-2001) 
Crisis era with reduction in workforce by the Japanese 
MNCs 
Fourth stage  
(2001-2005) 
The number of new Japanese factories being built in 
Malaysia declines and some Japanese companies exit 
Malaysia. 
Fifth stage  
(2006-2010) 
The firms upgrade existing plants to manufacture higher-
end products and some plants gain R&D responsibility. 
Sharp gains R&D function in Shah Alam, Selangor in 2009 
(MIDA Malaysia, 2015). 42 
Source: Adapted from Edgington and Hayter (2012) 
 
Some Japanese subsidiaries in Malaysia have added other functions 
beyond production after 2000. Sharp established its RHQ in Shah Alam, 
Selangor in 2000 although Edgington and Hayter (2012) believe that most 
                                                 
42 For example, manufacture air-conditioned with more advanced features such as energy-
saving type, or higher specification such as 3 horse-power (hp) air-conditioned rather than 
the common 1hp air-conditioned.  
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Japanese branch firms in Malaysia gained logistics functions for the 
Southeast Asian region much earlier. Post 2010, Japanese FDI in electrical 
goods continues to exit with Panasonic announcing the closure of its TV 
plant in Shah Alam and JVC shutting down its Shah Alam video camcorder 
factory in 2015. A final point is that most Japanese plants in Malaysia are 
still reliant on Japan for important parts.  
 
Panasonic (formerly Matsushita) is important as a manufacturer, with air-
conditioning, TV and kitchen appliances manufactured in Malaysia. In 
Malaysia’s retail market for electrical products Panasonic is the most 
important company in white goods followed by Toshiba, Sharp and Sony.43 
In the audio-visual industry, South Korean companies such as Samsung and 
LG edged past the Japanese in the early 2000s. While LG products are 
imported into Malaysia, certain Samsung TV models are made at the 
Negeri Sembilan plant in Malaysia, (Asia Monitor Resource Centre, 2014) 
and in Shenzhen, China. (Samsung SDI, 2015).  
 
As Malaysia’s electrical industry is dominated by foreign MNCs, in 1997 the 
Malaysian government, under the premiership of Mahathir Mohamad, 
risked the idea of creating a Malaysia-owned household brand of electrical 
products to substitute for Malaysian purchases of foreign brands, and 
eventually to penetrate the international market. The Malaysia Electrical 
Corporation (MEC) project is a failed experiment and it serves as an 
important cautionary lesson about the direct state ownership of a 
company supposed to spearhead Malaysia’s foray into electrical industry. 
Box 4.1 below elaborates on the development of the MEC.  
 
 
                                                 
43 White goods here cover both major appliances and small appliances. Major appliances 
in white goods are washing machines, hob ovens, while minor appliances are such as 
kitchen blenders, shavers, and juicers.  
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Box 4.1 A State Experiment: Malaysia Electrical Corporation 
Malaysia Electrical Corporation (MEC) was launched in 1997 with an ambitious 
plan to develop a Malaysian equivalent of Japanese conglomerates such as 
Matsushita/Panasonic for the household electrical goods. The equity ownership of 
MEC in 1997, estimated at US$266.61 million (RM750 million), is divided among 
Kuala Lumpur Industries Holdings (60%), a Malaysian state-owned sovereign fund 
Khazanah Nasional (30%) and Pahang State Government (10%). MEC was given 
land in Gambang Pahang and financial incentives. The plan was to grow it into a 
conglomerate to help to replace imports and products manufactured under 
foreign brands in Malaysia, with a long-term plan of exporting to the international 
market.  
 
The then Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad revealed that MEC 
would have a huge R&D department to drive its development on 1,200 acres land 
dubbed MEC City in Gambang Pahang. Mahathir Mohamad argued that while the 
MEC project involved its own risks the Malaysian government would go ahead 
with it, as not doing anything would be untenable (Mahathir Mohamad, 1997). 
Apart from being given state support in the form of land, the project is also 
located close to a planned highway and next to the University of Malaysia Pahang, 
to give it a research advantage over its competitors. Pahang state government 
was given a 10% stake of MEC in return. This ownership of a key conglomerate by 
the state government in which it operates is similar to the 20% stake of 
Volkswagen AG owned by the government of Lower Saxony in Germany. Despite 
the country’s ethnic preference policy, the sales and marketing arm of MEC has an 
ethnic Chinese as the pioneer Chief Executive Officer, which is unusual for 
Malaysia. 
 
This project mimics its cousin in the automotive industry, Proton City, which itself 
was modelled on Japan’s Toyota City, but this where the similarities between 
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Proton and MEC end. In fact MEC stood at the other end of the development 
spectrum. It was not granted tariff protection.44 The project matches Baldwin 
(1969, p. 304) prescription of not granting tariff protection to infant industries, 
but instead ‘what is needed is a direct subsidy of knowledge acquisition‘, as 
reflected in the R&D allocation for MEC.  MEC even invented a time-
programmable rice cooker in 1998 (Utusan Malaysia, 1998). Despite this 
invention, the MEC did not survive the competition from products imported from 
Japan, China and South Korea or local-made products by other, private 
companies.  
Despite the state support and the unorthodox approach of appointing a non-
Bumiputra CEO, the project failed and finally went into receivership and was 
taken over by a state asset restructuring company, Danaharta, in 1999, which 
finally sold off the MEC.45 The MEC’s marketing arm was sold to Fiamma Group in 
2004. While the MEC brand still exists in Malaysia its market share in the domestic 
retail market is negligible and many Malaysians today have never heard of MEC.  
Source: Own Elaboration based on multiple sources  
 
While Malaysia’s experiment of direct state-ownership of MEC in the 
electrical sector has been a failure, private companies such as Malaysian-
owned Pensonic Malaysia, Khind and Milux, although commanding a 
relatively small market share, operate on a more sustainable basis. The 
most important lesson for industry policy based Malaysia’s experience is 
direct state ownership in corporations to spearhead domestic industrial 
development such as the MEC case has failed to develop the local 
household electrical industry.46  
 
                                                 
44 While import tariffs for electrical items are officially not yet zero in 1997, tariff 
protection for electrical items are relatively minimal  compared to the national car project, 
automobile tariff can range from 150% -300% depending on models.  
45 Bumiputra: l iteral translation, “son of the soil”, refers to the indigenous segment of the 
population in Malaysia. 
46 The direct ownership of firms in the case of China works. Hisense is a household name 
and has had a sizeable presence in Malaysia’s TV and refrigerator markets since the 2010s, 
is owned by the Chinese government. Therefore, there is no hard and fast rule on how to 
develop an industry.  
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The household electrical sector in Malaysia remains very much dominated 
by foreign brands, whether they are manufactured in Malaysia or not, 
except for small electrical appliances with which Malaysian companies such 
as Pensonic, Khind, Alpha and Joven is having some success. Pensonic is 
also expanding regionally into ASEAN markets. On the public sector side, 
the Malaysian government did well in the first phase of encouraging 
foreign investment especially Japanese FDI, into Malaysia to manufacture 
electrical goods in the 1970s and 1980s. However, when the government 
moved into direct ownership mode in the 1990s as part of a brand building 
attempt and reduce its foreign dependence for the manufacturing of 
electrical goods the project failed. Malaysia’s final hope of achieving a 
breakthrough in electrical goods now rests with private companies, but 
progress is slow. Moreover, household electrical products are finished 
goods and competition from China for this sector would be fierce, as 
explained later in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
4.2.3 Conclusion Regarding Electronics and Electrical Industry in 
Malaysia 
 
Malaysia’s E&E sector developed with FDI-friendly policies such as 
dedicated free industrial zones since the 1970s attracted MNCs from North 
America and Japan to set up factories in Penang and marked the first phase 
of the development of the electronic industry with success. Similarly, FDI-
friendly policies also attracted the setting up of the electrical industry in 
free industrial zones in other states such as Selangor and later Negeri 
Sembilan and Johor, with Japanese FDI having a strong presence in 
Selangor’s electrical appliances industry.  
 
While Malaysia was successful in attracting FDI in the first phase of the 
development of E&E industry in the 1970s and 1980s, the upgrading of its 
E&E value chain remains an uphill task, especially since Malaysia is still 
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dependent on foreign MNCs in the semiconductor industry. Its efforts to 
upgrade the backward linkages in semiconductor machinery are discussed 
in Chapter 7. Foreign brands still dominate the electrical goods sector. The 
dominance of Japanese MNCs in electrical goods in Malaysia was affected 
by the imports of electrical items from Korea in the late 1990s. This, 
coupled with the influx of Chinese imports, especially in the late 2000s, has 
eroded the Japanese firms’ market leader positions for domestic retail 
market of electrical goods in Malaysia. This is discussed in Chapter 5 under 
the Import penetration results section.  
 
In the electrical sector, the state experiment with MEC failed and MEC 
were sold off in 2004.  The MEC case informs the development strategies 
literature that for a smaller country such as Malaysia with a relatively small 
population, direct ownership of the state enterprise is not the best choice 
as a path-breaking development tool. Instead, privately held Malaysian 
companies are sustainable in the long run, though with more limited 
success compared to foreign brands. As a finished goods sector, the 
prospects of fierce competition from China present a great challenge.  
 
4.3 Evolution of the Chinese E&E industry 
 
The macro-level structure of China’s economy has changed, with the 
contribution of Primary Industry in GDP falling while the share of Industry 
increases over 1978-2011. Figure 4.4 below shows that the manufacturing 
sector, a subcategory under Industry including mining and quarrying, 
manufacturing, production and supply of electricity, water and gas 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015), has been resilient throughout 
the entire period, with average 40.3% contribution to GDP.  
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Figure 4.4 China GDP by Activity (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Data from National Bureau of Statistics China 
 
China began to develop today’s success in its E&E industry in the early 
1980s when it opened its door to the world through its special economic 
zone (SEZ) in Shenzhen City in Southern China in 1979. The success of the  
SEZ in Shenzhen was then replicated in 14 other coastal cities, which 
among others include Shanghai (Fu and Gao, 2007), with multiple exports 
processing zones (EPZ) in each SEZ. China’s E&E industry then developed 
rapidly, and the share of E&E in China’s total manufactured exports rose 
from 14.1% in 1992 to a peak of 41.4% in 2005 before descending slowly to 
37.9% in 2013, as shown in Figure 4.5 below.  
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Figure 4.5 China: E&E as Share of Total Manufactured Exports  
 
Source: Based on UNComtrade data 
 
Although China started by offering an EPZ similar to Malaysia’s FIZ zone in 
China’s initial phase of development, it did not follow the FDI model in 
entirely the same way as Malaysia or Singapore in developing its 
electronics industry. China had a different strategy, and started to import 
production lines from Japan to learn about the industry in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Clearly, China has import substitutions aims by developing its 
own industry by importing the production lines, while simultaneously 
encouraging FDI from foreign sources. For example, other than purchasing 
TV production lines from overseas, China also acquired technology through 
a licensing arrangement with Panasonic of Japan to build plants in China 
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manufacturing TVs as a joint-venture mode in 1987 (Panasonic 
Corporation, 2015).47  
 
China’s industrial policy gave high priority to the semiconductor and 
electronics industry. China created a superstructure called the Ministry of 
Information Industries (MII) in March 1998 to develop its electronics 
industry by merging the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications with the 
Ministry of Electronics and Information (Pecht, 2006).  The Ministry of Post 
and Telecommunications was responsible for telecommunications 
standards and access and the Ministry of Electronics and Information was 
responsible for developing computer hardware and software. The merger 
ensured that the regulatory environment supports and does not impede 
the growth of China’s hardware and software industry.  
 
In addition, China funds the development of its own IC industry to wean it 
from dependence on foreign semiconductor companies for IC chips. In June 
2014, MII and the National Development and Reform Commission of China 
announced an approximately US$100 billion fund (Davis, 2015) under the 
National Guidelines for Development and Promotion of the IC Industry for 
the next ten years supporting various initiatives to develop the 
semiconductor industry in China.48 Initial funding of RMB120 billion 
(approximately US$20 billion) is already secured for spending between 
2014 and 2017. The fund stakeholders include national and municipal 
governments and private equity players.    
 
                                                 
47 However, Panasonic announced they would exit TV manufacturing in China by closing 
down a factory in Shanghai, and make its facil ities in Shandong the main producer of LCD 
TV in 2015.  
48 Various figures have been quoted on the online news portal. The Bloomberg report 
quoting a RMB 1 tril l ion or US$161 bill ion Semiconductor Industry Development Fund to 
develop Chinese semiconductor industry over the next 10 years is at the high end of the 
figures (King, 2015) whatever the figure is, it is certainly huge even by semiconductor 
industry standards.  
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Among the stated goals of the national guidelines are closing the 
technology gap between China domestic IC firms and international players 
by 2020, China’s semiconductor fund is mainly targeted at IC 
manufacturing within the IC industry, with 60% of the US$100 billion to be 
spent on the manufacturing segment. Although China already has some 
achievements in the IC design segment, its manufacturing technology still 
lags behind that of Taiwanese firms.  
 
The large size of China’s semiconductor fund surprised the global 
semiconductor industry. As a comparison, it currently costs about US$5 
billion to build a state-of-art wafer fabrication plant. China has US$6.67 
billion per year under the fund and therefore can add a state-of-art wafer 
plant every year with some money to spare. At this rate, China will change 
the international semiconductor industry landscape.  
 
China is successful in creating brand names and building sizeable players in 
the semiconductor industry that are able to compete internationally, such 
as HiSilicon and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation 
(SMIC). This success is also replicated with developing overseas sales 
channels for its final goods such as computer industry. Its Legend 
Computer, renamed Lenovo in 2001, acquired IBM’s personal computer 
line of business in 2004 and is currently the top PC maker in the world by 
value of shipment.  
 
One of China’s strategies for development, although not officially 
acknowledged is informally known as ‘shanzai’. Box 4.2 elaborates further 
on shanzai as a development strategy.  
 
Box 4.2 Shanzai: an informal strategy of development in China 
China has come a long way in developing its electronics industry since it was a 
shanzai model. The word ‘shanzai’ literally means fortress. Foreigners believe this 
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refers to the cluster of companies that copied and produced mobile phones but 
sold them at rock bottom prices. For example, a week prior to the launch of the 
iPhone 6s in September 2015, models physically identical to the iPhone 6s but 
based on the android operating system were already on sale in stores in 
Shenzhen, China (Lee, 2015). Some thirty stores bearing an Apple logo were 
taking orders for iPhone 6s even though Apple only had one store and five 
authorised dealers in Shenzhen, China. (Lee, 2015) However, this strategy is not 
confined to E&E: Chinese companies are also known to have copied automotive 
models based on Toyota and Land Rover. But beyond the literal translation of 
shanzai as fortress, the word connotes a highwayman lair (interviewee 3). This 
shanzai concept transcends the usual understanding of simply copying of the 
latest products to include the brutality of the market. Competition in terms of 
pricing in China is not only stiff, it is cut-throat. To survive in this harsh 
environment Chinese players may make temporary alliances of convenience but 
fight for market share when their strategy requires them to. 
 
From originally referring to companies that shanzai (copy) phones, China has built 
successful companies that have survived the brutal competition with some brands  
such as Xiaomi recently recruit an ex-Google Android executive to help to build its 
international market.  
 
Shanzai as an informal development strategy has its own limitations. For a start, 
foreign MNCs, wary of their Intellectual Property (IP) being copied in China, might 
not want to locate a state-of-the-art facility in China, slowing the pace of 
technology transfer from foreign players to China. Secondly, from China’s point of 
view, extreme competition means that profit margins become so thin that beyond 
a certain point there is no way to support quality aftersales service, and brand-
building becomes difficult in a disorderly market. In China big brands such as 
Lenovo computers and Hi-sense TVs have to constantly battle grey-market players 
selling breakdown or semi-breakdown units in China that can assembled at a 
fraction of the official retail price. Going back to the iPhone 6s, the price of an 
Android-based shanzai iPhone 6s is between RMB580 (US$91) and RMB 630 
(US$99) retailing in the mega retail avenue dubbed as ‘electronics city’ of 
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Huaqiangbei in Shenzhen. On the other hand, at the online Apple Store in China 
(http://www.apple.com/cn/shop/buy-iphone/iphone6s, accessed September 28, 
2015) the iPhone 6s retailed for RMB 5,288 and the iPhone 6s Plus for RMB 6,288. 
(Lee, 2015) 
Source: Interview data and secondary sources  
 
 
4.3.1  Electronics: The semiconductor industry 
 
This section discusses the evolution of China’s electronics industry based 
on the semiconductor industry. The semiconductor industry consists of ICs 
and discrete devices. The section begins with a brief history of China’s 
semiconductor history before going into the current position of its 
semiconductors in the world market. Three segments of the IC industry in 
China – IC design, manufacturing, and test and assembly – are discussed. 
The conclusion is that China will move forward in the semiconductor 
industry, despite the challenges.  
 
China’s electronics industry began to develop rapidly in the early 1980s 
with its Open Door policy. From the beginning, China aimed to be 
independent in its consumption of ICs. Specifically, China’s company called 
Hua Jing acquired 3-inch wafer technology from Toshiba in 1982 (Pecht, 
2006).  
 
In the 1990s, China’s semiconductor industry development strategy 
included encouraging the transfer of technology through FDI. In 1995, it 
launched the Pudong Microelectronics Centre in the Pudong New Area of 
Shanghai to encourage domestic production of IC and reduce reliance on IC 
imports, which were increasing as more electronic and electrical items 
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were being assembled in China. Under Project 908,49 Huajing further set up 
a 6-inch wafer productions line with technology from Lucent.50 It also 
sought help from companies such as Motorola, NEC, Mitsubishi, 
STMicroelectronics, Phillips, Siemens and Toshiba in building its IC industry 
(Pecht, 2006). Later in the decade, NEC established joint ventures with a 
Chinese partner, Hua Hong-NEC, under Project 909 for two wafer 
fabrication plants to produce Dynamic random-access memory (DRAM) IC 
for export back to Japan (Pecht, 2006). 51 
 
In the decade 2000-2010, China continued to seek foreign technology to 
develop its semiconductor industry. During this time, Taiwanese companies 
such as TSMC and UMC invested in manufacturing ICs in China. Intel also 
invested in assembly and testing at Shanghai in 2003, followed by an R&D 
centre, also in Shanghai, a year later.  
 
The case of Motorola’s exit from the wafer fabrication business in 2003 
exemplifies the transfer of technology from foreign firms to China (Pecht, 
2006). Motorola build a fabrication facility in Tianjin city in 1995 with plans 
to double its size in 1998 with cumulative investment of US$3.4 billion. In 
2003 it sold the wafer fabrication business to a contract manufacturer, 
SMIC. SMIC was founded in 2000 by a Taiwanese-American Richard Chang, 
who was recruited by the People’s Republic of China’s Government to help 
them to bring its semiconductor foundry industry to the next level. It 
helped China to launch its first 300 mm wafer fabrication plant with 0.11 to 
0.10 µm process technology in 2004, marking China’s entry into the IC 
industry at a very sophisticated level. SMIC is headquartered in Shanghai 
                                                 
49 National Project 908 and National Project 909 are projects launched by the State Council 
and the Ministry of Electronics Industry in Beijing.  
50 In IC industry, 6-inch refers to the sil icon wafer size that is used in fabrication process, 
the bigger the wafer, requires higher technology development costs but offers lower unit 
costs in the long run.  
51 DRAM is the IC chips that hold the data that is needed to be accessed by the Central 
Processing Unit (CPU) of the computer quickly, the DRAM is dynamic memory because it is 
volatile and once power is cut-off, the memory held by DRAM is lost. (The PC Guide, 2001)  
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and is one of the top semiconductor companies in China by revenue. It is 
state-owned, although its stock is listed on both the Hong Kong and the 
Shanghai stock exchange.52 China’s strategy for development includes 
acquiring foreign technology when required, as in the case of Motorola exit 
from China. This exit from China is part of Motorola’s global business and 
part of it involves spins off its IC fabrication business as Freescale 
Semiconductor in 2004.   
Despite SMIC’s achievements, Taiwanese foundries still lead in 
manufacturing process technology. As a comparison, TSMC of Taiwan has 
wafer plants for 300 mm wafers for 0.13 μm to 90 nm, 65 nm, 40 nm and 
28 nm process technologies. TSMC also has R&D under way to churn out 
450mm wafers for cutting edge 10 nm process technologies (Lisa Wang, 
2012) compared to SMIC’s processing technology capacity of 0.35 μm to 28 
nm.53 
 
Figure 4.6 China’s Semiconductor Industry by Sector, 2003-2013 
                                                 
52 The biggest shareholder of SMIC is the investment arm of the Shanghai Municipal 
Council. (Chu, M.-C. M., 2013) 
53 For semiconductor productions, the lower the figure, the better and more powerful 
processor is produced as more transistors can be fitted into a processor of the same area. 
The figures are referring to the area between the ’field-gates’ of the transistors implanted 
within the processor.  
101 
 
 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (January 2015, pp. 23.) 
 
Referring to Figure 4.6 above, the share of revenue based on the 
semiconductor industry segment reflects the structural changes in the IC 
industry. Total revenue in the China semiconductor industry grew on 
average by 23.0% per year from US$8.3 billion in 2003 to US$65.8 billion by 
2013. The IC design segment’s share of total revenue in the semiconductor 
industry rose from 6.5% in 2003 to 20.0% in 2013, and IC manufacturing 
from 9.1% in 2003 to 14.9% in 2013. Shares of total revenue in the 
semiconductor industry in the IC packaging and testing and 
optoelectronics, sensors and discrete devices segment fell from 2003 to 
2013.  China’s increased share in semiconductor design and the 
manufacturing segment, both of which are more skills-intense and require 
complex production facilities, shows that it has developed its capability 
over the last ten years.  
 
The design segment is the strength of China’s semiconductor industry. In 
1990 China had only 15 design enterprises in this segment, and this grew to 
463 in 2003 and to 583 by 2013.  Secondly, China has created economies of 
scale to help the domestic semiconductor company to thrive. In 2011, 
China achieved another milestone with its first RMB1-billion-revenue 
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domestic semiconductor company, HiSilicon Technologies. HiSilicon 
Technologies is a fabless, or design-based semiconductor player, and most 
of the top semiconductor companies in China are in the design segment, as 
shown in Table 4.9 below.   
 
Table 4.9  Top 10 Chinese Semiconductor Company in China 
  Segment Rank 
 
Sales Revenue 
(US$ Mil) 
Company   2012 2013 2012 2013 Change 
(%) 
HiSilicon Technologies  Design 1 1 1,178 2,120 80.0 
Spreadtrum Comm.  Design 2 2 696 1,013 45.6 
RDA Microelectronics Design 3 3 392 455 16.2 
Datang Semiconductor 
Design 
Design 
  4 300 390 29.9 
Beijing Nari Smart Chip 
Microelectronics  
Design 
  5 
 
350   
Sanan Optoelectronics Discrete  5 6 260 348 33.7 
No. 55 Research Inst. of 
China Electronics Tech. 
IDM 
4 7 313 326 4.3 
MLS Co. Ltd. Discrete 16 8 149 319 113.6 
Hangzhou Silan 
Microelectronics 
Design 
6 9 201 293 45.9 
Galaxycore Inc. Design 7 10 187 273 45.8 
Note: PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) ranked, based on ‘indigenous’ company. SMIC is 
ranked 3rd largest manufacturer by revenue in 2013 by PWC, but is not technically 
indigenous as it is l isted on both the Hong Kong and the New York stock exchange. 
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (January 2015, pp. 36.) 
China has increased the capacity and technology level of its IC 
manufacturing segment. It had 15 foundries in 1990; by 2003, this had 
grown to 56 and by 2013, to 160, and their capacity grew from 5.7% of 
world capacity in 2003 to 10.9%, or 2.3 million 8-inch-equivalent wafers per 
month in 2013 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, January 2015).54 The top five 
major foundries in ranked capacity are S.K. Hynix (13% of China’s total 
capacity), SMIC (13%), Hua Hong Grace (6%), Intel (5%) and TSMC (5%) 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, January 2015). However, in the manufacturing 
segment capacity is not the only measure, with processing technology in 
                                                 
54 An 8-inch wafer is equivalent to 200mm wafers.  
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nanometres (nm) representing closeness to the chip fabrication frontier. 
TSMC’s 20 nm manufacturing process is ahead of SMIC’s 28 nm in 2015. In 
2010, SMIC’s 65 nm process was about 3 generations from the 
manufacturing process frontier.  Part of the constraint in the development 
of China’s IC manufacturing segment lies in export control on the part of 
the FDI country of origin such as the US, as explained in Chapter 8 (Section 
8.3.1).  
 
China’s production capacity in the semiconductor packaging and testing 
segment has increased from 10.5% of world capacity in 2003 to 27.4% in 
2013, based on floor space, with an increase from 77 production facilities 
in 2003 to 116 facilities in 2013 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, January 2015). 
Most of the largest and most advanced packaging and testing facilities 
were foreign-owned in 2003 but this changed in 2013, marking a structural 
shift in this segment. The top 5 players in packaging in China in 2003, 
representing 22% of China’s total capacity, were ASE, followed by Intel, 
SDI, STATS ChipPAC and Integrated Microelectronics 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, January 2015). In 2013, 3 of the top 5 
semiconductor packaging companies, listed here in order of capacity, were 
indigenous Chinese companies: Jiangsu Changjiang Electronics Technology 
Co., Ltd. (9.5% of China’s total capacity), Tanshui Huatian Technology 
(8.3%), ASE (7.0%), Chipmore (4.7%), and STATS ChipPAC (3.5%). ASE is 
headquartered in Taiwan, while STATS ChipPAC is a Singapore-based 
company. (PricewaterhouseCoopers, January 2015) 
 
Despite adding semiconductor IC production capacity for since the 1990s 
and early 2000s, China’s local production of ICs could only supply 30% of 
demand in the decade 2000-2010s, with the rest imported (Pecht, 2006). 
China’s dependence on imported IC semiconductors continues today. 
Based on 2013 figures, it now produces 12% of the world’s semiconductors 
but consumes 55.6% of global capacity or US$169.9 billion (RMB 1,111.7 
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billion) of worldwide consumption of US$305.6 billion 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, January 2015), making it the world’s biggest 
consumer of semiconductors.55 Interestingly, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(January 2015, pp. 2.) expected China’s production of semiconductors to 
grow faster than its consumption ten years ago, but it turns out that 
consumption has outstripped production. At this point it is useful to recall 
the Asian Drivers literature (IDS, 2006), which discusses China’s threat to 
other developing countries’ exports while at the same time creating new 
demand for goods. Based on the semiconductor segment alone, it seems 
that the story fits the latter rather than former.  
 
Although China has been more successful in developing its semiconductor 
design segment, it is still reliant on foreign MNCs for manufacturing 
technology. The top 10 semiconductor suppliers in China are all foreign 
companies and account for 42.9% of total revenue earned by all 
semiconductor producers in China in 2013.56 However, China has 
developed some of its manufacturing capability through companies such as 
SMIC.  The top semiconductor suppliers are shown in Table 4.10 below:  
 
Table 4.10 Top 10 Semiconductor Suppliers in China 2012-2013 
  Rank   Revenue in US$ Bn   
Company 2012 2013 2012 2013 change 
% Market 
share 
Intel 1 1 25.1 24.9 -0.5% 13.8% 
Samsung 2 2 11.5 13.7 19.9% 7.6% 
                                                 
55 China’s production figure by revenue actually puts it at 17% of total global production, 
based on data provided by the China Semiconductor Association, according to PWC. PWC 
however thinks the figure is influenced by the Integrated Device Manufacturer (IDM) 
model, where foreign MNC dominates production in China.  Therefore PWC re-estimates 
Chinese production to be around 12% of global semiconductor production. Malaysia on 
the other hand is a net exporter of IC semiconductors, with consumption estimated by the 
researcher to be around 3.6% of total world consumption and production close to 5.8% in 
2013, based on the world production figure of US$315.4 bil l ion provided by Gartner. 
(Gartner, 2014).  
56 Suppliers inclusive of all  type of players, IC Design, Manufacturing, Assembly and Tests, 
and IDMs.  
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SK Hynix 5 3 5.1 7.2 41.5% 4.0% 
Toshiba 4 4 5.2 5.9 14.2% 3.3% 
TI 3 5 5.4 5.6 3.8% 3.1% 
Qualcomm 10 6 3.2 4.7 46.9% 2.6% 
ST 6 7 4.4 4.5 4.3% 2.5% 
AMD 7 8 4.2 4.1 -4.0% 2.2% 
Freescale 8 9 3.6 4.0 11.1% 2.2% 
Renesas 9 10 3.3 3.0 -7.7% 1.7% 
Total Top 10     70.8 77.6 9.7% 42.9% 
Total Top 10 (% 
of market) 
    43.0% 42.9% -0.2%   
Source: CCID, IC Market China 2013 & 2014 Conference -March 2013 & March 2014 in 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (January 2015, pp.15.) 
 
Despite recent progress in building its semiconductor industry, challenges 
remain: China’s industry development is still dependent on government 
funding and lacks a sustainable business model and a strategy for 
competing in ways other than pricing (Allen Lu, 2015).  
 
Regionally, the semiconductor industry begins in the coastal area 
concentrated in the Yangtze River Delta, the Bohai Area and the Pearl River 
Delta before spreading to the interior of China (most notably in the Sichuan 
area). 57  Provinces around the Yangtze River Delta such as Jiangsu, Anhui 
and Zhejiang account for 65.7% of wafer fabrication capacity, followed by 
Bohai, the region associated with Beijing; Tianjin and Shandong in Northern 
China with 9.4% of total wafer fabrication capacity; and in the south of 
China around the Pearl River Delta, 6.7% of wafer fabrication capacity. For 
test and assembly segment, Guangdong area, which includes the Pearl 
River Delta has 16.4% of total China’s capacity, second only to Yangtze area 
with 65% of China’s total capacity. To illustrate the movement from coastal 
area into inner China, Intel moved its manufacturing plant westward into 
Chengdu, in Sichuan province, when labour costs increased in Shanghai, 
                                                 
57 Yangtze River Delta area is associated with Shanghai area. Bohai area is associated with 
Shandong, China. Pearl River Delta is associated with Hong Kong and Guangdong Area. 
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but kept an R&D centre in Shanghai. Figure 4.7 below, shows a detailed 
map of the semiconductor industry in China.  
  
107 
 
                                               Figure 4.7 Map of China’s Semiconductor Industry  
 
   Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (January 2015, pp. 52.) 
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China’s huge consumption of semiconductors is due to the increasing shift 
of global production of electronic and electrical products such as mobile 
phones, tablets and computers into China.  The IC demanded from China 
feeds into the production of final electronic goods and household electrical 
items. The production of an estimated 35.1% of worldwide electronic 
equipment is located in China, and this will continue to increase to 38.0% 
by 2017 according to the Gartner forecast cited in PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(January 2015). The report (ibid.) estimates the top 10 Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) companies such as Huawei, Lenovo, Haier, TCL and 
Changhong consume about US$55 billion or 30% of total semiconductor 
consumption in China. Haier, TCL, and Changhong are household electrical 
brands in China, and are discussed in the next section of the chapter.  
 
In conclusion, China’s electronics industry has grown rapidly in terms of 
both revenue and capacity, especially in the last decade. If we include SMIC 
in the analysis of the manufacturing segment, China is a step closer to 
frontier technology with 28nm wafer process technology. Finally, China 
also faces challenges in the electronics industry such as the fear of lack of  
IP protection, and the Chinese government strategy of influencing the 
direction of foreign-owned enterprises in China (Pecht, 2006). These issues 
can slow the pace of technology transfers as foreign firms are reluctant to 
locate their cutting edge plants in China. Still, China, with its generous 
semiconductor fund and dynamic workforce, can only move upwards in the 
world market for semiconductors. 
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4.3.2 Electrical Industry  
 
Interestingly, the TV industry in China created demand for ICs, bringing 
about the rise of the semiconductor industry in China. The Huajing Group,  
imported the Toshiba production line of IC to manufacture the components 
that feed into TV production in China (Pecht, 2006). This section discusses 
China’s electrical industry based on the TV segment, briefly touching on 
parts played by the computer and small appliances segments in the 
development of the industry.  
 
According to National Bureau of Statistics of China (2014), TV production in 
China reached 127.7 million units in 2013. Based on IHSGlobal’s estimation 
about 43.5 million TVs are consumed locally, leaving about 65.9% of 
China’s TVs to be exported worldwide. 58 The TV manufacturing business is 
described as cut-throat domestically, with all six of the top 6 TV makers in 
China experiencing losses in 2012. (IHSGlobal Technology, 2012). Chinese 
companies have had to turn to international markets for better profit 
margins. This is an achievement considering the humble beginnings of 
Chinese TV manufacturing companies about three decades ago.  
 
According to Pecht (2006), the first TV in China was made in Tianjin in 
1958. The present TV industry started in 1979, when Shanghai Gold Star TV 
factory bought the TV production line from Hitachi of Japan, followed by 
factories based in Tianjin and Beijing purchase of production line from 
Toshiba and Panasonic respectively (Pecht, 2006). By 1985, Pecht (2006) 
reports, Shenzhen-based Konka had imported a 147th line of TV production 
into China from a Hong Kong company. The major players in the TV 
industry in China are listed in Table 4.11 below: 
 
                                                 
58 Figures on based on IHSGlobal Technology (2012).  
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Table 4.11 Major TV manufacturers in China by Capacity in the 1990s 
Name of 
company  
Market 
entry 
(year) 
Reported 
production 
capacity 
(incl. black 
& white TV) 
Ownership 
Changhong 1979 12,000,000 State-owned 
Konka 1984 7,000,000 Former Hong Kong joint-venture 
acquired by mainland interest in 1997 
Panda 1982 4,000,000 State-owned 
TCL 1992 3,600,000 State-owned 
Qingdao 
Hisense 
1983 1,300,000 State-owned 
Haier 1997 1,000,000 State-owned white goods maker 
diversified into CTV market by 
acquisition 
West Lake 1982 1,000,000 State-owned 
Hitachi 1981 800,000 50%-owned joint venture (Japan) 
Sanyo 1992 1,200,000 50%-owned joint venture (Japan) 
Skyworth 1990 2,000,000 Private firm, Hong-Kong controlled 
Philips 1992 800,000 51%-owned joint venture, Netherlands 
controlled 
Samsung 1994 800,000 50%-owned joint venture (S.Korea) 
Sony 1996 3,000,000 70%-owned joint venture (Japan) 
Matsushita 1996 500,000 50%-owned joint venture (Japan) 
Sharp 1996 1,000,000 70%-owned joint venture (Japan) 
Toshiba 1996 1,000,000 70%-owned joint venture (Japan) 
Source:White and Linden (2000) and Xie (2001) in Xie and Wu (2003, pp. 1468.)  
 
Xie and Wu (2003) divide the development of China’s TV industry into 
three stages. The first stage is 1980-89, when China’s players were exposed 
to TV imports from Japan which were more sophisticated, far more reliable 
and had more product offerings. China’s TV-makers were in learning mode 
in 1980-1985 and producing low-quality sets compared to the imports. In 
1989-2000, during the deregulation period, China’s TV industry started to 
become competitive. This was because before 1989 the central 
government set TV prices and therefore there was no cost competition 
among domestic TV makers. In 1989 Changhong disregarded the 
government rules by reducing its TV price unilaterally, unleashing the 
111 
 
market mechanism, and domestic TV makers started to face cost pressure 
and had to innovate to survive in the industry.  
 
The Chinese government was pragmatic about the developing industry. In 
the beginning, tariff protection was given to domestic TV makers and the 
reduction of import duties was carried out gradually in 1992, 1996, and 
1999. This gradual removal of tariff protection was paced with the 
domestic industry player’s development. By 1997, China’s domestic players 
had already increased their share of the domestic market to 81.0% from 
15% in 1983 (Shaojia, 2001, pp. 23.). And from 2000 onwards, China’s TV 
manufacturers have continued upgrading the technology and reducing 
costs, although they are still dependent on foreign firms for key 
components.  
 
China is currently the biggest exporter of TVs in the world, overtaking the 
Japanese and the South Koreans. In 2013, China’s TV exports were worth 
US$26.2 billion, 26.1% of the world exports market. This is a major 
achievement given that twenty years ago China only contributed 4.2% of 
total world exports in 1993. By 2013 approximately one in four of the TVs 
on the world exports market were made in China.59 China continued to 
accelerate its TV industry development and in 2010, overtook Mexico 
(20.3% of world’s export) as the biggest exporters of televisions in the 
world with 22.2% of world exports.   
 
China achieved top exporter status while developing its own brands such as 
Changhong, Hisense, and Haier, which become significant international 
players by the end 2000s. China’s top TV exporters are now brand owners 
                                                 
59 The figures based in this paragraph are based on UNComtrade, therefore, some of the 
exports could include Japanese companies based in China exports. However, the 
discussion that follows will  show China has indeed been becoming more dominant a nd 
presents great challenges to the Japanese and South Korean TV manufacturers.  
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and lead firms themselves in the TV market to the extent that China now 
outsources 40 million TV units, worth about US$4.5 billion, to Taiwanese 
firms to meet demand (Xinhua, 2012).  As further testament to the success 
of China’s firms, in the third quarter of 2014 for the most sophisticated TV 
market segment to date called Ultra High Definition (HD) TV, Hisense 
shipped 10% of global Ultra HD TVs, in third place, ahead of Sony (7%) and 
behind South Korea’s Samsung  (36%) and LG at 15% of global Ultra HD TVs 
(Wheatly, 2014). The success of Chinese firms such as Hisense was 
predicted in the Asian Drivers literature (IDS, 2006), but what is astonishing 
is the pace: Hisense only entered the TV market in 1983 and is now already 
one of the top players, not only in China but also globally.  
 
The computer industry began in 1955,60 but its development started 
rapidly after the opening up of China from the 1980s onwards. This section 
will refer to the Lenovo group and its origin, to illustrate China’s path 
developing its computer industry. In 1985 China marked the rebirth of its 
computer industry with Great Wall 0520CH, the first PC to process 
information in Chinese (Pecht, 2006). The Great Wall 0520CH was built by 
the State Computer Industrial Administration and understandably was used 
by China’s government administration offices such as Customs 
Administration (Pecht, 2006).  In 1986-1990 China began to develop the 
computer industry based on market needs and by 2000 it had taken off 
with an average of 20% annual growth based on PC shipments from 2000-
2005 (Pecht, 2006).  
 
Interestingly, within the span of 30 years from 1982 to 2012, Lenovo, a 
Beijing-based company founded in 1984, overtook US based Hewlett-
Packard (HP) to become the biggest global PC maker by volume in the 
second quarter of 2012 (Gartner Inc., 2012). Not only did Lenovo leapfrog 
                                                 
60 China’s first computer was codenamed 901, build in 1955 in the University of Harbin, 
with Soviet Union aid for scientific research (Pecht, 2006).  
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over Taiwanese giants such as Acer and Asus but it also overtook HP as the 
world’s number one PC supplier. The success of Lenovo was hailed by The 
Economist: ‘From guard shack to a global giant’, referring to the premises 
where the founder of Legend Group first started. (The Economist, 2013).  
 
The path of Lenovo’s success was not an easy one, from its humble 
beginnings as part of China’s Academy of Sciences in Beijing before the 
Legend Group, Lenovo’s predecessor, was founded in 1984. The Legend 
group grew out of the strong competition in China’s PC market, where PC 
units are called as ‘white boxes’, with garage industries buying different PC 
components and assembling and selling them at a significantly lower price 
than branded Legend computers. Legend overcame these domestic 
challenges and changed its name to Lenovo in 2003, targeting overseas 
markets to overcome the low margins on the domestic market. It made the 
strategic decision to acquired IBM’s personal computing business in 2005. 
From there it grew very rapidly to achieve its status as the top PC vendor in 
the world in the third quarter of 2012.  
 
The important lessons on China’s path to development here include 
acquiring brand names and technology at opportune times to kick-start 
itself into the global competition. This is in stark contrast to the strategy of 
the FDI-led model in other developing countries that continuously focus on 
FDI inflows from traditional sources such as the US, Europe and Japan to 
upgrade their industry structure. China, in contrast, has used outward 
investment at strategic moments to upgrade its industry and seize the 
international market, as demonstrated by Lenovo.  
 
The next section discusses the electrical appliances industry as part of 
China’s development in the E&E sector. The electrical retail market, which 
covers both major electrical appliances such as refrigerators and washing 
machines and minor appliances such as blenders and dehumidifiers etc., 
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was worth RMB547.5 billion (US$89.04 billion) in China in 2013.  61 As a 
quick comparison, the consumption of semiconductors in China is worth 
slightly over three times the retail value of the household electrical 
industry. 
 
Some players are similar to the TV industry players such as Haier, which is 
both an audio-visual manufacturer and has diversified into white goods. 
However, this section discusses another company, China White Goods Co. 
(CWG – name changed for anonymity).  CWG is headquartered in 
Guangdong Province and started as an OEM company for foreign air-
conditioner brands such as Carrier, etc. Learning from the foreign 
technology, CWG then channelled its surplus production capacity into  
products such as air-conditioners, washing machines, and kettles that bear 
its own brand name to become a RMB 92.6 billion (US$15.1 billion) 
company by revenue in 2013. 62 CWG continues to do OEM for North 
American brands for exported into advanced markets, but manufactures its 
own products for domestic markets such as in Guangdong, Anhui and 
Hubei provinces. It manufactures its own products in Vietnam and markets 
its own brand name in developing countries such as Vietnam and India. 
CWG entered Malaysia’s market in 2003 through a Joint-Venture (JV) with 
a Malaysian companies, DRB-Hicom.  
 
China’s success in the E&E industry is not confined to acting as a 
production base for MNCs: it has developed its own international brand 
names. It is not possible to capture all aspects of its success as a relatively 
latecomer in the industry that grew to become market leader, so this 
section focuses on certain cases such as Lenovo. Other upcoming brand 
names include Beijing-based Xiaomi, which surprised the Asian mobile 
                                                 
61 Figures are based on Euromonitor International (March 2014).  
62 RMB converted using US$1= RMB6.1488  
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phone market in 2013 and posed a serious challenge to Samsung of Korea 
in the Asian mobile phone market.  
 
This section on China’s development of electrical goods has shown the 
China’s development choices and policies, illustrated with some specific 
goods such as TV, and companies such as Lenovo in the computer industry 
and CWG in the household electrical industry. The TV industry developed 
with timely use of policy tools such as staggered tariff reductions, and in 
the case of Lenovo China penetrated the international market by acquiring 
the IBM’s PC unit, while CWG, based in Guangdong Province, started with 
OEM strategy, learning new technology from foreign companies before 
itself growing into a big global player in white goods.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
Malaysia and China have followed different paths in developing their E&E 
industry. Given the relatively lower population of Malaysia and the size of 
the country, comparing it with China is not entirely practical. Nevertheless, 
it helps to explain how they ended up differently within the regional 
production network. Malaysia started earlier than China and took the FDI-
led model in the 1970s, and in the 1980s was ahead in terms of technology, 
with Penang clusters in the semiconductor and electrical industry and 
Japanese MNC production based in Malaysia. The growth of its  E&E 
clusters slowed once other centres around the world also started to offer 
low labour costs to MNCs, as reflected in E&E industry’s lower contribution 
to Malaysia’s GDP from 2000 onwards. More importantly, much of 
Malaysia’s E&E industry remains centred on foreign MNCs based in 
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Malaysia, which has a ‘footloose’63 problem, although the country is 
increasingly specialising in parts and components.  
 
China only began to develop its E&E industry when it opened its doors to 
world trade in the 1980s. China has an import-substitution goal to reduce 
its dependence on foreign suppliers of E&E goods. It has imported 
semiconductor and television production lines in order to learn the 
production techniques and develop its own E&E industry. Simultaneously, 
China allows MNCs to invest in its E&E sector while promoting a transfer of 
technology from the MNCs to domestic enterprises. Chinese firms have 
strategically acquired semiconductor plants from foreign MNCs operating 
in China to obtain the technology. In some instances it has acquired foreign 
businesses outright, as in the Lenovo case, to accelerate entry into the 
international market for Chinese PCs.  
 
Finally, China’s electrical goods industry has developed white goods 
production, and Chinese companies such as CWG show that firms 
commonly start by manufacturing goods for MNCs (OEM strategy) before 
manufacturing their own brands. In short, China already has a stable of 
Chinese firms, which are international market players for finished goods 
such as computers, TV, and household electrical goods, but is playing 
catch-up in the semiconductor industry with major players from the US and 
Taiwan.  
 
In spite of China being the world’s biggest exporter of E&E products it is 
ambitiously building its own semiconductor industry, believing this to be a 
strategic industry for the future. Conversely, Malaysia is still reliant on FDI 
for its E&E industry, despite having had a head start in the E&E industry. It 
has tried and failed to indigenise the industry and build an international 
                                                 
63 ‘Footloose’ refers to MNCs shifting location once the incentives run out at a location, 
shopping around for incentives in other regions or countries.  
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brand. While Malaysia is unable to break away from the FDI model of 
development, some private companies offer a potential starting point on 
which it can build. On the other hand, China has managed to indigenise 
household electrical goods and own international brands. While Malaysia’s 
role in the MNCs’ E&E value chain remains important, China is on a 
different trajectory towards its very own E&E industry.  
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5.0  Interactions between Malaysia and China in Electronic and 
Electrical Trade 
 
In the Asian Drivers framework (see Chapter 2), China impacts on its 
neighbours through bilateral trade are regarded as the direct impact. The 
focus of Chapter 5 is on the interaction between Malaysia and China’s 
bilateral trade.64 This chapter discusses the bilateral trade patterns to 
identify the effect of China on Malaysia’s E&E trade by examining their 
bilateral E&E trade structure disaggregated by sophistication and secondly, 
by type of goods, broadly reflecting complementary trade specialisation 
between the two countries.  
 
Following Chapter 4, which discussed the evolution of Malaysia and China’s 
E&E production network, this chapter examines China’s impact on 
Malaysia’s E&E industry. It begins with an overview of their total bilateral 
trade, based on a trade balance analysis for 1992-2013 and the major 
goods traded, with a discussion of the Malaysian export and import 
structure to and from China. Then the bilateral E&E trade structure and the 
E&E parts and components trade are disaggregated using the PRODY index 
as a measure of sophistication to evaluate signs of upgrading. Next, the 
chapter analyses E&E bilateral trade in terms of the balance of trade both 
at aggregate and disaggregated levels by type of goods, using the BEC 
classification to assess whether the structure of trade supports 
complementary specialisation. After that, I gauge the extent of penetration 
of China’s imports into Malaysia, which are especially relevant for 
household electrical goods. The chapter also looks at the degree of 
integration between Malaysia’s exports and China’s imports before 
concluding that different segments of the E&E industry are affected 
                                                 
64 Total bilateral trade here refers to total merchandise trade, including manufactured, 
mining and agricultural products, and excluding services.  
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differently in Malaysia’s bilateral trade with China, although Malaysia 
benefits from specialising in exporting IC chips to China.   
 
As background, China is currently Malaysia’s number one trading partner 
by trade value. Table 5.1 below illustrates the rapid rise of the volume of 
China’s trade with Malaysia in 1992, 2002 and 2013. 65 China has overtaken 
Malaysia’s traditional trade partners such as Japan, USA, and Singapore to 
emerge as its top trading partner since 2009.  
 
Table 5.1 China’s position as Malaysia’s Trading Partner – selected years 
Trade Partner 1992 
US$ bn 
Trade Partner 2002 
US$ bn 
Trade Partner 2013 
US$ bn 
Japan 15.8 US 32.6 China  64.6 
Singapore 15.7 Singapore 25.5 Singapore  57.3 
US 13.9 Japan 24.6 Japan  43.2 
Other Asia* 3.5 China 11.4 US 34.7 
Germany 3.3 Other Asia* 7.9 Thailand  25.0 
U. Kingdom 3.0 Hong Kong 7.7 Indonesia  19.4 
Korea, Rep. 2.6 Korea, Rep. 7.3 Korea, Rep.  18.1 
Thailand 2.5 Thailand 7.1 Other Asia*  16.7 
Hong Kong 2.5 Germany 5.0 Australia  14.5 
China 1.8 Indonesia 4.3 India  13.4 
Other 15.9 Other 38.9 Other 128.0 
Note: ‘Other Asia’ refers mainly to Taiwan.                    
Source: Based on UNComtrade data 
 
5.1 Bilateral Trade Between Malaysia and China at Total 
Merchandise Trade Level 
 
Bilateral trade between Malaysia and China at the total merchandise trade 
level is discussed in this section to provide an overview.  Bilateral trade 
between Malaysia and China grew rapidly from 1992-2013, as shown in 
Figure 5.1. In 1992-2013 Malaysia’s exports to China grew by 19.2% p.a., 
                                                 
65 ‘Trade’ in this paragraph includes both exports and imports.  
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from US$0.8 billion in 1992 to US$30.8 billion in 2013, slightly faster than 
its imports from China, which increased at 18.4% p.a. from US$1.0 billion in 
1992 to US$ 33.8 billion by 2013.  By 2009 China had emerged as 
Malaysia’s top trading partner. Overall, the increase in Malaysia’s imports 
from China was followed with an increase in its exports into China, 
suggesting that China’s bilateral trade with Malaysia generally avoided big 
trade imbalances.  
 
Figure 5.1 Malaysia and China’s Total Trade Balance (Malaysia as reporter 
country) 
 
Source: UNComtrade 
 
The trade balance between Malaysia and China from 1992-2013, shown in 
Figure 5.1 above, is evenly balanced from 1992-1999, with small deficits or 
surplus. However, from 2002, a year after China joined the WTO, 
Malaysia’s trade deficit with China widened until 2008 before reverting to a 
surplus from 2009 -2011 and then falling back to a deficit again by 2012. 
Overall, Malaysia has experienced 13 years of trade deficit out of the 21 
years. The size of the deficit never exceeded 18.0% of total bilateral trade 
or US$5 billion in any one year throughout the period 1992-2012, and in 16 
of the 21 years it was less than 10% of total trade.  Malaysia’s trade surplus 
in the period starting from 2011 fell, due to commodity exports from 
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Malaysia to China decreasing both in price and quantity (MATRADE 
Malaysia, 2012).66 Based on rising import and export volume coupled with 
the absence of a large trade deficit, Malaysia’s experienced with China 
suggests that the overall trade relationship is mutually beneficial at the 
aggregate level.  
 
Next, I tabulate the bilateral export and import structure by major HS 
chapters (at 2-digit level) to reveal major goods traded between Malaysia 
and China at product-level. There are 99 chapters of goods classified by HS 
Nomenclature at group level, but only top 10 products are listed.  
 
Based on Table 5.2 below, Malaysia’s exports to China confirm the 
centrality of E&E equipment (HS Chapter 85) as Malaysia’s most important 
commodity over time. Malaysia’s exports of electrical, electronic 
equipment (HS Chapter 85) to China are worth US$ 1.5 billion or 29.2% of 
total exports in 2002, rising to US$10.5 billion or 34.1% of total exports by 
2013. As the E&E has the largest share to total exports, the E&E industry is 
the natural choice for my investigation of the effect of China’s rise on 
Malaysia’s manufacturing sector.  
 
 
 
                                                 
66 Based on China as reporter, the trade data shows export and imports to Malaysia also 
grew rapidly from 1992 to 2013, and this is consistent with Malaysia-sourced data. 
However, based on China as reporter, the trade balance between Malaysia and China has 
been quite even except in the period beginning from 2000, when bilatera l trade begins to 
grow rapidly. China consistently has a trade deficit with Malaysia, which widens after 
2009, but the trade deficit narrows again by 2012. Inconsistency in the trade figures 
between exports from Malaysia to China (Malaysia as reporter) compared with mirror 
imports data from Malaysia (China as reporter) is about US$30 bill ion. As the International 
Trade Centre ranks the reliability of Chinese trade data for HS Chapter 85 products, 
Machinery & Electronics as low 
(http://legacy.intracen.org/appli1/TradeCom/RS_TP_IC.aspx?IN=85&YR=2012&IL=85%20
%20Electrical,%20electronic%20equipment accessed 6 May 2015), Malaysian data is used 
throughout this chapter.  
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Table 5.2 Malaysian Exports to China by Major Products (HS Chapter)  
(Malaysia as Reporter) 
HS  Description 1992 
US$  
bn 
HS  Description 2002 
US$  
bn 
HS Description 2013 
44 Wood and 
articles of 
wood, 
charcoal  
0.3 85 Electrical, 
electronic 
equipment 
1.5 85 Electrical, 
electronic 
equipment 
10.5 
15 Animal, 
vegetable 
fats & oils, 
cleavage 
products 
0.3 84 Nuclear 
reactors, 
boilers, 
machinery 
0.9 15 Animal, 
vegetable 
fats & oils, 
cleavage 
products 
3.3 
27 Mineral fuels, 
oils, 
distil lation 
products 
0.1 15 Animal, 
vegetable fats 
& oils, 
cleavage  
0.8 27 Mineral 
fuels, oils, 
distil lation 
products 
3.3 
84 Nuclear 
reactors, 
boilers, 
machinery 
0.03 27 Mineral fuels, 
oils, 
distil lation 
products 
0.6 84 Nuclear 
reactors, 
boilers, 
machinery 
2.9 
40 Rubber & 
articles 
0.03 29 Organic 
chemicals 
0.3 40 Rubber & 
articles 
2.7 
18 Cocoa & 
cocoa prep. 
0.02 39 Plastics & 
articles 
0.2 74 Copper & 
articles  
2.0 
85 Electrical, 
electronic 
equipment 
0.01 44 Wood & 
articles of 
wood 
0.2 29 Organic 
chemicals 
1.4 
55 Manmade 
staple fibres 
0.01 40 Rubber & 
articles 
thereof 
0.1 39 Plastics & 
articles 
thereof 
1.1 
29 Organic 
chemicals 
0.01 72 Iron & steel  0.1 26 Ores, slag 
and ash 
0.6 
99 Commodity 
not specified 
0.004 70 Glass & 
glassware 
0.1 90 Optical, 
photo, 
technical, 
medical app 
0.5 
 Others 0.04  Others 0.5  Others 2.5 
 Total 0.8  Total 5.3  Total 30.8 
Note: HS = HS chapter             
Source: Data from UNComtrade   
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Table 5.3 Malaysian Imports from China by Major Products (HS chapter) (Malaysia 
as Reporter) 
HS Description  1992 
US$ 
bn 
HS 
 
Description  2002 
US$ 
bn 
HS Description 2013 
US$ 
bn 
10 Cereals 0.2 85 Electrical, 
electronic 
equipment 
2.0 85 Electrical, 
electronic 
equipment 
12.2 
12 Oil seed, 
oleagic fruits, 
grain, seed 
0.1 84 Nuclear 
reactors, 
boilers, 
machinery 
1.9 84 Nuclear 
reactors, 
boilers, 
machinery 
6.6 
84 Nuclear 
reactors, 
boilers, 
machinery 
0.1 10 Cereals 0.3 72 Iron & steel  1.3 
85 Electrical, 
electronic 
equipment 
0.1 99 Commodities 
not specified  
0.2 74 Copper & 
articles 
thereof 
1.1 
28 Inorganic 
chemicals, 
precious 
metal com. 
0.04 27 Mineral fuels, 
oils, distillation 
products 
0.1 90 Optical, 
photo, 
technical, 
med. app. 
1.0 
7 Edible 
vegetables & 
certain roots 
0.04 39 Plastics and 
articles thereof 
0.1 73 Articles of 
iron & steel  
1.0 
52 Cotton 0.04 90 Optical, photo, 
technical, 
medical ap. 
0.1 39 Plastics & 
articles 
thereof 
1.0 
55 Manmade 
staple fibres 
0.04 7 Edible 
vegetables & 
certain roots 
0.1 76 Aluminium & 
articles 
thereof 
0.7 
72 Iron & steel  0.03 73 Articles of iron 
or steel 
0.1 27 Mineral fuels, 
oils, 
distil lation 
0.7 
26 Ores, slag and 
ash 
0.03 28 Inorganic 
chemicals, 
precious metal 
com. 
0.1 87 Vehicles 
other than 
railway, 
tramway 
0.7 
 Others 0.4  Others 1.3  Others 7.6 
 Total 1.0  Total 6.1  Total 33.8 
Note: HS = HS Chapter           
Source: Data from UNComtrade   
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Based on  
Table 5.3 above, which compares 1992, 2002 and 2013, the structure of 
Malaysia’s imports from China shows signs of upgrading. The top item 
imported from China to Malaysia has shifted from cereals in 1992 to E&E 
products. Furthermore, Malaysian imports of primary products imported 
from China in 1992 ranging from Cereals to Ores, Slag and Ash have not 
been in the top 10 items imported from China since 2002. On the other 
hand, Malaysia’s top exports items to China shifted from exporting mainly 
Wood and articles of wood, charcoal in 1992 to E&E products in 2013.   
 
Contrasting both the export (Table 5.2) and the import structure ( 
Table 5.3), China shows signs of upgrading its export structure to Malaysia, 
while Malaysia’s exports to China remains centred on E&E over time. This is 
based on a comparison of the second top exported and imported items in 
2013: Malaysia’s imports include more machinery (HS Chapter 84) from 
China both in 2002 and 2013. In contrast, Malaysia increasingly exports 
Animal, vegetable fats & oils, cleavage products (HS Chapter 15), which 
replaces machinery (HS Chapter 84) in the no. 2 spot in 2013. The slip in 
the ranks of Malaysian machinery (HS Chapter 84) exports to China is a 
concern, although this does not deny the benefits from increasingly 
Malaysian specialisation in E&E exports.   
 
Malaysia’s increased exports to China in Animal, vegetable fats & oils and 
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products (the third most valuable export 
chapter) in 2013 in Table 5.2 above brings us back to the concern of the 
rising primarisation. This resonates with Ianchovichina et al.’s (2010) 
prediction that Malaysia will benefit from rising primary commodity prices 
but suffer in the manufacturing sector as China rise and competes for 
trade. Scholars such as Jenkins and De Freitas Barbosa (2012) have raised 
similar concerns about the primarisation of the economy, especially in 
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Latin America. However, Thoburn (2011) notes that Malaysia had largely 
escaped the primarisation effect by developing its manufacture exports. 
 
To conclude this section, China’s effect on Malaysia in their total bilateral 
trade is generally positive. At the total trade level, China’s trade with 
Malaysia is largely beneficial, with a rising volume of trade between the 
two. There are no huge trade imbalances such as that experienced 
between the US and China. In addition, rising share of E&E trade against 
total trade between Malaysia and China is a preliminary indication of 
complementary trade within the regional production network. However, 
given the Malaysian concern about the primarisation of Malaysia’s 
economy this research examines E&E manufacture exports in the next 
section. 
 
5.2 Malaysia and China’s E&E trade  
 
I focus on the bilateral E&E trade between Malaysia and China in this 
section. Specifically, the E&E sector consists of 338 product lines based on 
HS codes at 6-digit level, covering both electronics, such as the 
semiconductors industry, and the electrical sector, which consists of 
household electrical goods. A full list of E&E goods is provided in Appendix 
3.1. 
 
The objective of this section is to understand the structure of the E&E trade 
between Malaysia and China. The trade structure is disaggregated by 
measure of sophistication to better understand the goods traded both at 
total E&E level (338 products) and at the E&E parts and components level 
(81 products of the 338 products). Towards the end of the section the 
trade balance is disaggregated by BEC classification to reveal Malaysia’s 
areas of specialisation. I conclude the section by discussing how far 
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Malaysia and China’s bilateral E&E trade structures support the 
complementary view of the regional production network. 
 
At the aggregate level, Malaysia’s exports and imports from China in their 
E&E bilateral trade increases over the years from 1992-2013, especially 
after 2000 (see Figure 5.2 below). E&E exports from Malaysia to China 
grow on average by 33.0% per annum from US$0.03 billion in 1992 to 
US$12.9 billion by 2013. As a share of total Malaysian exports to China, 
E&E rose from 4.2% in 1992 to 41.9% in 2013, while Malaysia’s E&E 
imports from China rise from US$0.07 billion in 1992 to US$15.14 billion by 
2013, with an annual growth rate of 29.2%. The share of total E&E imports 
from China to Malaysia is only 7.2% in 1992, rising to 45.1% by 2013. The 
high proportion of Malaysia’s E&E exports and imports in its total trade 
with China confirms E&E as its most important manufacturing sector. 
 
Figure 5.2 E&E Trade Balance (Malaysia as Reporter) 
 
Note: Exports from China to Malaysia are include 327 products, while imports from China 
to Malaysia include 338 products: Malaysia does not export 11 of the 338 products to 
China.   
Source: UNComtrade 
 
 
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
U
S 
B
il
Export Import Trade Balance
127 
 
When the E&E bilateral trade is analysed, the trade balance is found to be 
in favour of China because Malaysia records a deficit for most of the years 
except for 1999, 2009, 2010, and 2011, as shown in Figure 5.2 above. The 
trade deficit also noticeably widens year after year from the year China 
joins the WTO in 2001 until 2008. 
 
Next, the bilateral trade in E&E is analysed at product level in Table 5.4 and  
Table 5.5 below, which tabulate the top ten products by value in the HS Code. The 
tables reveal that parts and components for the computer industry have been 
actively traded both ways from 2002 onwards. This is consistent with the earlier 
findings of scholars such as Cui and Syed (2007) that China is not merely a centre 
for the assembly trade but is also capable of producing and exporting parts and 
components, in this case to Malaysia. For example, Malaysia exported Monolithic 
integrated circuits, except digital, under semiconductor industry to the value of 
US$ 8.1 billion (see Table 5.4), and while it imports Parts and accessories of data 
processing equipment to the value of US$4.1 billion in 2013 (see  
Table 5.5). Data processing equipment primarily includes the computer industry, 
and these parts and components are more sophisticated than Filament lamps, 
except ultraviolet or infra-red and Colour cathode-ray television picture tubes, 
monitors, formerly the top imports from China in 1992 and in 2002 respectively.  
respectively. While the tabulation of top imported items from China in  
Table 5.5 cannot immediately conclude that China has upgraded its export 
structure, China has stepped up its export of parts and components to 
Malaysia; contrary to expectations, it is at the receiving end of parts and 
components and assembles them into final products under a regional 
production framework (Athukorala and Kophaiboon, 2014).   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4 Malaysia’s Major E&E Exports to China, Malaysia as Reporter 
HS code Description 1992 US$ bn 
841510 Air conditioners window/wall types, self-contained 0.014 
852990 Parts for radio/tv transmit/receive equipment, nes  0.004 
852520 Transmit-receive apparatus for radio, TV, etc. 0.002 
900691 Parts and accessories for photographic cameras  0.001 
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847330 Parts and accessories of data processing equipment ne 0.001 
852810 Colour television receivers/monitors/projectors 0.001 
853710 Electrical control and distribution boards, < 1kV 0.001 
852790 Radio reception apparatus nes  0.001 
847199 Automatic data processing machines and units, nes  0.001 
854449 Electric conductors, nes < 80 volts, no connectors  0.001 
  Others 0.006 
  Total  0.032 
HS code Description 2002 US$ bn 
847330 Parts and accessories of data processing equipment nes  0.6 
854211 Monolithic integrated circuits, digital 0.6 
854290 Parts of electronic integrated circuits etc. 0.2 
853400 Electronic printed circuits 0.2 
854219 Monolithic integrated circuits, except digital  0.1 
847199 Automatic data processing machines and units, nes 0.1 
852990 Parts for radio/tv transmit/receive equipment, nes  0.1 
854011 Colour cathode-ray television picture tubes, monitors  0.1 
852520 Transmit-receive apparatus for radio, TV, etc. 0.0 
851782 Telegraphic apparatus, nes  0.0 
  Others 0.3 
  Total  2.3 
HS code Description 2013 US$ bn 
854219 Monolithic integrated circuits, except digital  8.1 
847193 Computer data storage units  1.5 
847330 Parts and accessories of data processing equipment nes  0.4 
854290 Parts of electronic integrated circuits etc. 0.4 
847199 Automatic data processing machines and units, nes  0.3 
853400 Electronic printed circuits 0.3 
854140 Photosensitive/photovoltaic/LED semiconductor dev. 0.3 
850780 Electric accumulators, nes  0.1 
854129 Transistors, except photosensitive, > 1 watt 0.1 
851790 Parts of l ine telephone/telegraph equipment, nes  0.1 
  Others 1.3 
  Total  12.9 
Source: UNComtrade  
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Table 5.5 Major E&E Product Imports from China, Malaysia as Reporter 
HS code Description 
1992 
US bn 
853929 Filament lamps, except ultraviolet or infra-red, nes 0.011 
850110 Electric motors of an output < 37.5 watts  0.007 
854020 Television camera tubes and other photo-cathode tube 0.003 
852711 Radio receivers, portable, with sound reproduce/ recording 0.003 
851610 Electric instant, storage and immersion water heaters  0.002 
850161 AC generators, of an output < 75 kVA 0.002 
850431 Transformers electric, power capacity < 1 KVA, nes  0.002 
853225 Electric capacitors, fixed, paper/plastic dielectric 0.002 
854011 Colour cathode-ray television picture tubes, monitors  0.002 
854449 Electric conductors, nes < 80 volts, no connectors  0.002 
  Others 0.036 
  Total  0.07 
HS code Description 
2002 
US bn  
854011 Colour cathode-ray television picture tubes, monitors  1.1 
852990 Parts for radio/tv transmit/receive equipment, nes  0.3 
850423 Liquid dielectric transformers > 10,000 KVA 0.2 
850110 Electric motors of an output < 37.5 watts  0.2 
854460 Electric conductors, for over 1,000 volts, nes 0.2 
852731 Radio-telephony receiver, with sound reproduce/ recording 0.1 
850140 AC motors, single-phase, nes 0.1 
852711 Radio receivers, portable, with sound reproduce/ recording 0.1 
847330 Parts and accessories of data processing equipment nes  0.1 
853340 Variable resistors, rheostats and potentiometers, nes  0.1 
  Others 1.1 
  Total  3.6 
HS code Description 
2013 
US bn  
847330 Parts and accessories of data processing equipment nes  4.1 
852731 Radio-telephony receiver, with sound reproduce/ recording 1.0 
854460 Electric conductors, for over 1,000 volts, nes  1.0 
854011 Colour cathode-ray television picture tubes, monitors  1.0 
850110 Electric motors of an output < 37.5 watts  1.0 
851829 Loudspeakers, nes 0.7 
854219 Monolithic integrated circuits, except digital  0.7 
850140 AC motors, single-phase, nes 0.6 
850434 Transformers electric, power capacity > 500 KVA, nes  0.4 
853661 Electrical lamp-holders, for < 1,000 volts  0.3 
  Others 4.6 
  Total  15.1 
Source: UNComtrade   
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5.2.1 E&E Trade by Disaggregated by Sophistication 
 
As E&E is actively traded both ways between Malaysia and China, the next 
question is whether they export different E&E products to each other, 
distinguished by level of sophistication using the PRODY index, which is 
used to divide the 338 products in E&E into 4 quartiles. Products listed in 
Quartile 1 are the most sophisticated, while products listed under Quartile 
4 are the least sophisticated.  Based on Hausmann et al. (2007), the PRODY 
index is a ‘weighted average of the per capita GDPs of exporting countries’ 
earned from a specific product. Detail formula of the PRODY index is 
available in Chapter 3.  
 
Based on Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, the share of the most sophisticated 
(represented by Quartile 1) and the least sophisticated goods (Quartile 4) 
in the E&E trade between Malaysia and China is disaggregated. The 
disaggregation divides the bilateral trade structure over time based on 
sophistication. The revealed structure of E&E trade disaggregated by 
sophistication will show whether Malaysia is feeding China with more 
sophisticated parts and components in the regional production framework.  
 
The main finding reveals that Malaysia has gradually exported more 
sophisticated goods such as ICs to China, especially in 2008-2013, while 
receiving less sophisticated goods, e.g. portable audio products such as 
MP3 players, as imports. Cascading the analysis to the level of trade in E&E 
parts and components, the picture is consistent with overall E&E trade, 
with Malaysia exporting more sophisticated parts and components while 
importing less sophisticated parts and components.  
 
Malaysia exports more sophisticated E&E products to China over time 
based on the rising proportion of more sophisticated E&E exports to total 
exports. Figure 5.3 shows that Malaysia is exporting more E&E items from 
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Quartiles 1 and 2 over time, while the contribution of Quartiles 3 and 4 to 
total E&E exports drops. For example, the share of E&E products under 
Quartile 4 fell from above 50.0% of total E&E exports in 1992 to less than 
10.0% in 2002. In 2013, Quartile 4’s contribution to E&E exports is less than 
3.0%. Conversely, the share of products in Quartiles 1 and 2 rose from 
20.9% in 1992 to 85.7% of total E&E exports in 2013.67  
 
Figure 5.3 Malaysia’s E&E Export to China Disaggregated by Level of Sophistication 
 
Source: Based on UNComtrade data  
 
 
 
                                                 
67 The export data is mostly discussed as a combination of Quartile 1 and Quartile 2 
because HS 854211 is in PRODY Quartile 2 and HS 854219 is in Quartile 1. The data are 
becoming distorted for 2013 as the value of export HS 854211 for trade suddenly falls 
from US$5.5 bil l ion down to US$0.007 bil l ion, but the value of product code 854219 
jumped from US$ 2.3 bil l ion to US$8.1 bil l ion from 2012 to 2013. This distortionary effect 
can be seen in Quartile 1’s sudden rapid climb from 2012 in Figure 7. The data are l ikely to 
be affected by the reclassification rather than actual product movement. This is evident 
when we add HS 854211 and HS 854219 together for which the value of trade in 2012 is  
US$7.7 bil l ion and in 2013 is US$ 8.1 bil l ion. 
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Figure 5.4 Malaysia’s E&E Import from China Disaggregated by Level of 
Sophistication 
 
Source: Based on UNComtrade data 
 
The structure of Malaysia’s imports from China also shows signs of product 
upgrading in its E&E sector, albeit at a slower pace than Malaysia’s export 
upgrading. Based on Figure 5.4 above, the share of Quartile 1 and 2 
imports from China is growing over the years with 17.5% of Malaysia’s 
imports of E&E from China in 1992 from goods in Quartiles 1 and 2, rising 
to 29.6% by 2013. However, the combined share from Quartiles 3 and 4 
remains equal at above 50.0% of total imports of E&E products throughout 
1992-2013, except in 2012, at 47.2%. This shows that Malaysia is receiving 
less sophisticated E&E imports from China than its E&E exports to China.  
 
To illustrate the pace of export upgrading by Malaysia more clearly, Table 
5.6 divides the average share of exports and imports from China in 1992-
2013 into four sub-periods: 1992-1996, 1997-2001, 2002-2007 and 2008-
2013. Two thousand and one was a significant year, as China joined the 
WTO, signalling its entry into international trade in a huge way. The 
average share of Quartile 2 jumps from 22.9% in 1997-2001 to 44.6% of 
total E&E exports in 2002-2007, and Quartile 4’s average share 
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correspondingly drops from 23.2% to 6.1% of total E&E exports. Moreover, 
the share of the combined average of Quartiles 1 and 2 in total E&E exports 
rises rapidly from 54.9% in 2002-2007 to 75.7% in 2008-2013. 
Correspondingly, the average combined share of Quartiles 3 and 4 falls 
from 45.1% in 2002-2007 to 24.3% in 2008-2013. Malaysia’s E&E export 
structure displays signs of upgrading to greater sophistication over time 
during 1992-2013, with the immediate period of China’s entry into the 
WTO (2002-2007) increasing the proportion of more sophisticated export 
goods at the expense of less sophisticated E&E exports. This points to 
Malaysia’s adjustment to international trade as China entered the WTO by 
upgrading its exports.  
 
Table 5.6 Average Share of Malaysia’s Export and Import of E&E to/from China by 
PRODY Quartile 
Export Average share of E&E exports 
Quartile 1992-2013 1992-1996 1997-2001 2002-2007 2008-2013 
Quartile 1 15.3% 13.4% 8.5% 10.3% 27.7% 
Quartile 2 32.2% 7.8% 22.9% 44.6% 48.0% 
Quartile 3 31.4% 19.9% 45.5% 39.0% 21.6% 
Quartile 4 21.1% 59.0% 23.2% 6.1% 2.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
  Import Average share of E&E imports 
Quartile 1992-2013 1992-1996 1997-2001 2002-2007 2008-2013 
Quartile 1 13.5% 5.5% 15.3% 10.3% 21.9% 
Quartile 2 16.2% 16.3% 13.7% 13.0% 21.2% 
Quartile 3 53.0% 42.9% 49.5% 68.0% 49.5% 
Quartile 4 17.3% 35.3% 21.5% 8.7% 7.5% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Based on UNComtrade  
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In the imports segment of Table 5.6 above, although Malaysia’s E&E 
imports from China increasingly come from Quartiles 1 and 2, the majority 
are still products of lower sophistication from Quartiles 3 and 4. This is not 
much different from the conclusion that can be drawn from the 
contribution averages for the entire 1992-2013 period with the average 
share of imports disaggregated by sophistication and divided into four sub-
periods, except for 2008-2013, following the global financial crisis, when 
China stepped up its more sophisticated E&E exports to Malaysia. The 
average share of Quartile 1 jumps from 10.3% in 2002-2007 to 21.9% of 
total E&E imports in 2008-2013 and likewise for Quartile 2, which jumps 
from 13.0% in 2002-2007 to 21.2% in 2008-2013. Overall, Malaysia receives 
less sophisticated E&E product imports from China but the increased 
sophistication of its imports since 2008 should concern Malaysia, especially 
regarding Chinese exports of E&E parts and components, Malaysia’s area 
of specialisation. This is discussed next. 
 
The analysis of Malaysia’s E&E exports and imports from China 
disaggregated by sophistication is repeated for parts and components. 
Parts and components here are the HS codes concorded to the BEC 
Classification Code Chapter 42 Parts and Accessories. The results mirror the 
findings for total E&E: Malaysia is sending out more sophisticated exports 
while receiving less sophisticated E&E imports from China. A point to note 
in Table 5.7 below, is that Malaysia’s exports of parts and components to 
China as a share of total E&E exports is more important than its imports 
from China.68 Average export value is US$3.4 billion from 1992-2013, or 
67.2% of total E&E exports, while average imports from 1992-2013 is 
                                                 
68 As the years progress from 1992-2013, capital goods as a share of Malaysia’s total E&E 
exports to China decline while the share of parts and accessories increases. For Malaysia, 
capital goods retain a sizeable share of 24.7-37.2% of total E&E imports from China in 
1992-2013.  
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US$3.3 billion, or 57.8% of total E&E imports. Table 5.7 presents the 
details.  
Table 5.7 Average Share of Contribution of Malaysia’s Export and Imports of Parts 
and Components to/from China by PRODY Quartile (Sophistication) 
Exports Average Share of Parts & Components of E&E 
Quartile 1992-2013 1992-1996 1997-2001 2002-2007 2008-2013 
Quartile 1 16.5% 16.7% 3.8% 9.9% 33.5% 
Quartile 2 29.2% 10.9% 19.9% 44.0% 37.4% 
Quartile 3 39.4% 41.3% 50.0% 41.5% 26.9% 
Quartile 4 14.9% 31.0% 26.3% 4.7% 2.2% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
      
Imports Average Share of Parts & Components of E&E 
Quartile 1992-2013 1992-1996 1997-2001 2002-2007 2008-2013 
Quartile 1 10.8% 6.1% 6.8% 8.6% 20.2% 
Quartile 2 13.2% 12.9% 11.2% 8.0% 20.2% 
Quartile 3 59.3% 38.3% 61.2% 78.1% 56.6% 
Quartile 4 16.7% 42.8% 20.8% 5.3% 3.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: Based on UNComtrade  
 
Based on Table 5.7 above, imports from China grow in sophistication 
significantly during 2008-2013 compared to other earlier sub-periods. 
Quartiles 1 and 2 accelerate their contribution in 2008-2013, with their 
collective average share more than doubling from 16.6% of total parts and 
components exported in 2002-2007 to 40.4% of total parts and component 
exports in 2008-2013.  The growing sophistication of China’s parts and 
components imports into Malaysia is mostly driven by rising semiconductor 
imports.  
 
Stepping back from the trade balance frame of analysis, the increase in 
China’s parts and components exports to Malaysia cannot be interpreted 
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as completely negative.  As Malaysia’s strength is semiconductor testing 
and assembly, the increase in imports (in particular of fabricated wafers) 
feeds into Malaysia’s exports of semiconductors as long as the trade 
balance remains positive. The balance of the bilateral trade in 
semiconductors between Malaysia and China is positive for all years except 
2008, which has a small deficit of US$0.18 billion. Details of the trade 
balance for semiconductors are provided in Appendix 5.1.  
 
In conclusion, based on analysis of the sophistication of Malaysia and 
China’s bilateral E&E trade Malaysia exports more sophisticated goods to 
China while receiving less sophisticated goods as imports. This pattern is 
consistent in the E&E parts and components trade as well. However, 
Malaysia should note that post-2008 China steps up its export 
sophistication, mainly due to the increase in its exports of semiconductors 
to Malaysia.   
   
5.2.2 Balance of E&E Trade Analysed by Broad Economic Category 
(BEC) 
 
This section considers the bilateral E&E trade balance disaggregated by BEC 
classification. The objective here is to disaggregate the export and import 
structure by type of goods to see if E&E trade is broadly consistent with the 
regional production network’s complementary trade, which states 
Malaysia specialises in exporting parts and components and importing final 
goods from China. The main finding here is that Malaysia’s E&E exports are 
in a trade deficit except in 1999 and 2009-2011, as shown in Figure 5.5. 
Malaysia has a reversal of trends from deficit back into surplus from 2009 
to 2011 aided by the Parts and Accessories (except transport equipment) 
category in its bilateral E&E trade with China, although the surplus is not 
sustainable beyond 2012. Malaysia also loses its competitiveness in the 
Consumption Goods category, which covers most household electrical 
137 
 
items. Although this may be due to regional production arrangements, with 
Malaysia receiving finished goods in exchange for its parts and 
components, Malaysia’s overall E&E deficit (except for 1999 and 2009-
2011) means its export of parts and components cannot offset the total 
bilateral E&E trade deficit. Details of the export and import structure by 
type of goods are available in Appendix 5.2.   
 
Figure 5.5 E&E Balance of Trade Disaggregated by BEC classification 
 
Source: UNComtrade 
 
The bilateral trade balance analysis based on the type of goods extends 
from the regional E&E industry picture where China’s neighbours such as 
Malaysia generally feed parts and components into China’s final assembly 
arrangement. While Athukorala (2009) finds that the trade of parts and 
components for machinery in general fits China, as a centre for the final 
assembly of finished goods while importing parts and components from 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
U
S$
 B
n
Industrial supplies nes, processed
Capital goods (except transport equipment)
Parts and accessories of capital goods (except transport equipment)
Parts and accessories of transport equipment
Consumption goods nes, durable
Consumption goods nes, semi-durable
Consumption goods nes, non-durable
Total
138 
 
predominantly East Asian countries including Malaysia, the E&E trade 
balance data dissected here by BEC classification extends our 
understanding. Malaysia imports more E&E products from China than it 
exports to China for most of the years. Apart from 1999-2001 and 2009-
2013, Malaysia is not a net exporter of E&E Parts and Accessories (except 
transport equipment) under BEC Code 42 to China.  
 
Based on further disaggregation of Parts and Accessories (except transport 
equipment) at product level (see Figure 5.6), Malaysia is a net importer of 
parts and components (excluding Monolithic Digital Integrated Circuits-HS 
8542 products), especially after China joined the WTO in 2001. A sharp 
reversal from trade deficit to trade surplus in 2009 in Parts and Accessories 
(except transport equipment) was aided by the surge in export demand for 
Monolithic Digital Integrated Circuits (HS 854211 and HS 854219). This 
trade surplus continues to rise in 2010, driven by sharp increase in exports 
of Parts and accessories of the machines of heading No. 84.71 (HS 847330) 
– which are basically computer parts – and Photosensitive/photovoltaic/ 
LED semiconductor devices (HS 854140) in 2010.69 However, the surge is 
not sustainable, and Parts and accessories of the machines of heading No. 
84.71 (HS 847330) revert to a trade deficit by 2011, while the 
Photosensitive/photovoltaic/LED semiconductor devices (HS854140) trade 
surplus narrows significantly. Malaysia consistently experiences a trade 
deficit in Parts for radio/tv transmit/receive equipment, nes (HS 852990) 
throughout 1992-2013, which notably increases after 2001, and the 
Electronic printed circuits (HS 853400) deficit also increases from 2003 
onwards.70  
 
                                                 
69 Parts for automatic data processing machines; for example network cards or display 
cards for computer assembly.  
70 Chapter 8’s section on firms’ entry into and exit from in Penang par tially explains why 
HS 853400 deficit is widening.  
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Figure 5.6 Balance of Trade in Parts and Components BEC42 for Selected Products 
 
Note: total in the figure 14 above refers to sum of HS codes l isted in concordance with BEC 
42. For details, refer to Appendix 5.2 and Appendix 5.4. 
Source: UNComtrade 
 
However, counter-intuitively, photosensitive semiconductor devices, 
including photovoltaic cells whether or not assembled in modules or made 
up into panels, light emitting diodes (HS 854140) is in trade surplus despite 
it being well known that China is a global player in the solar industry. 
However, the size of the surplus is insignificant at less than US$300 million 
at its peak in 2010. The data at 6-digit level, however, includes both LED 
devices and solar photovoltaic modules and it is therefore hard to conclude 
that either one of the products could be in surplus. This is interesting, given 
that Malaysia also hosts many North American and Japanese solar 
photovoltaic manufacturers.  At the combined level of solar photovoltaic 
modules and LED products, Malaysia exports more to China than it receives 
from it as imports. 
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In short, Malaysia continues to experience a trade surplus with China in 
E&E parts and components, mainly due to its ICs exports ((HS 854211 and 
HS 854219) and the insignificant surplus in photovoltaic/LED products. The 
rest of the parts and components industry is in favour of China. This part 
and components segment excluding ICs is inconsistent with previous 
writers’ generalisation,  such as that of Athukorala (2009), of the machinery 
sector as part of global production sharing arrangements. Instead, the part 
and components analysis at bilateral trade level lends credence to Lall and 
Albaladejo (2004) argument that middle-technology Malaysian exports are 
under threat. However, it is premature to conclude this before the results 
of the analysis of the share of imports at destination markets are 
considered in Chapter 6.  
 
When the Consumption Goods category is further disaggregated into sub-
categories, as shown in Figure 5.7 below, the trade balance is in favour of 
China. The Durable Goods sub-category of Consumption Goods, which 
contains mostly household electrical goods, faces a widening deficit with 
China since 1992, and this widened significantly once China joined the WTO 
in 2001. In 1992 the deficit in durables goods is US$1.9 million, rising to 
US$68.8 million in 2002, and by 2013 it reaches US$263.2 million. These 
finished products are the direct opposite of Monolithic Digital Circuits, 
which has fared positively as a result of China’s rise in the region.  
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Figure 5.7 E&E Balance of Trade in Consumption Goods by BEC classification 
 
Source: UNComtrade 
 
While Malaysia and China both benefit from the rising volume of E&E trade 
over time, Malaysia experiences a trade deficit in most years. This deficit 
notably widens after China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 until 2008, before 
swinging back into a Malaysian trade surplus in 2009-2011, aided by the 
rise in demand for ICs. Malaysia’s E&E trade balance for had slipped back 
into a deficit by 2012 with E&E parts and components unable to offset 
imports of E&E goods in other categories. Details of the trade balance are 
available in Appendix 5.5. 
 
While the regional production network literature, infers that China’s 
neighbour such as Malaysia feeds parts and components into China for the 
assembly of final goods is broadly reflective of the complementary E&E 
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Malaysia exports more sophisticated E&E (in total and as parts and 
components) while receiving less sophisticated imports from China.    
A final note: although Malaysia’s bilateral E&E trade with China is mostly in 
deficit (except in 1999 and 2009-2011), while it imports more from China, it 
processes these parts and components and ships them it to third 
destinations as discussed in Section 6.5 under Chapter 6 that refers to 
Malaysia’s response in the colour television market. The import 
penetration of Chinese goods into Malaysia’s E&E sector in the next section 
further examines the effect on Malaysian E&E players in the household 
electrical sector.   
 
 
5.3 Import Penetration of Chinese Imports into Malaysia’s E&E 
sector  
 
The balance of trade analysis disaggregated by BEC classification finds that 
different types of E&E products fare differently in the trade balance 
between Malaysia and China. The objective here is to gauge the proportion 
of Chinese imports in Malaysia’s apparent consumption of E&E products. 
The OECD (2010) says that embedded in this rate of import penetration is 
comparison of the competitiveness of imported goods with that of local 
firms endeavouring to keep their market share. A higher percentage of 
import penetration from China means that increased competitiveness of 
Chinese exports in Malaysia’s domestic market, while a lower import 
penetration rate in Malaysia over time means that Chinese exports in 
Malaysia are losing their competitiveness. 
 
Import penetration of China is measured as a percentage of total apparent 
consumption of products aggregated in a sub-industry within the E&E 
sector. Apparent consumption is defined as production plus imports minus 
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exports. The detailed formula for apparent consumption and import 
penetration is given in Section 3.1.2 under Chapter 3.  
While some percentages in the results (Table 5.8 and Table 5.9) are high, 
this is expected in a small open economy such as Malaysia (OECD, 2010). 
The openness is reflected in Malaysia’s export/GDP ratio, which exceeds 
100% in some years, as shown in Figure 5.8 below. This apparently 
impossible percentage – with the country appearing to export more than it 
produces in aggregate - reflects the substantial import content of 
Malaysian exports, since exports are measured gross while GDP is a value-
added concept.  
 
Figure 5.8 Malaysia Exports/GDP Ratio 
 
Source: Data from World Bank World Development Indicators 
 
This exercise gauges China’s impact on different sub-industries within the 
E&E sector based on whether the trend of Chinese import penetration is 
increasing or decreasing, by type of product over time. The import 
penetration results are more useful for gauging China’s impact on the 
household electrical sector than on semiconductors, because 
semiconductors may cross the border several times before becoming 
finished goods. Monolithic Integrated Circuits can cross the border in wafer 
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form for further processing to be re-exported once they are packaged into 
a complete IC. In contrast, final goods such as household electrical goods 
usually cross the border from China into Malaysia for consumption.  
 
I used two concordance table for the data on apparent consumption and 
share of Chinese imports in Malaysia’s E&E. The first concordance table 
from HS1998/92 to HS 2002, to convert trade codes denominated in 
HS2002 back into HS1998/92 codes. Next, E&E codes based on HS1998/92 
codes were matched to their 5-digit Malaysia Standard Industrial 
Classification 2000 (MSIC) codes using the second concordance table from 
HS1998/92 to International Standard for Industrial Classification Rev. 3 
(ISIC Rev.3).71  I also used the ISIC Rev. 3 codes as a ‘cross-walk’ between 
HS and MSIC codes, because MISC codes are based on ISIC Rev. 3 codes.72 
The use of the MSIC 2000 codes limits the data period to 2002 onwards, as 
the closest revision of HS nomenclature to the year 2000 is the HS2002. In 
some product codes, judgement had to be exercised because the ISIC Rev.3 
codes only have up to 4 digits, while the MSIC codes can sub-divide into 5 
digits, but this is not a major issue as most 5-digit MSIC codes are obtained 
by adding a zero on the end of the 4 digit ISIC codes. All concordance tables 
were obtained from the World Bank WITS website.73 The results for 
apparent consumption are shown in Table 5.8 and the percentages of 
China’s import penetration of the E&E sector is presented in Table 5.9. 
 
There are limitations to this exercise. Firstly, crossing from production data 
to trade data is not a straightforward exercise. The main issue is that 
Malaysia’s Standard Industrial Classification (MSIC) codes are a coding of 
                                                 
71 Five codes out of the 338 are not available when converting them from HS 1998/92 to 
HS 2002. As a result these codes had to be dropped. HS 846929, 850620, 850890, 851781, 
and 900721 are however not significant items in the E&E sector, and have generally been 
discontinued due to changes in the industry.  
72 The term ‘cross-walk’ is used by Muendler and this refers to process of matching the 
trade codes with the production codes (Muendler, 2009). 
73 Source of concordance tables: http://wits.worldbank.org/product_concordance.html  
145 
 
industrial activity in production, while exports and imports are based on HS 
codes, which are a coding of goods. Therefore some of the MSIC codes 
used to produce Malaysia’s Monthly Manufacturing Survey contain both 
electronic and non-electronic items. The apparent consumption results 
tabled in this section, however, do not include non-electronic items in the 
trade variables, allowing the conclusion to be based precisely on the E&E 
sector.   
 
Secondly, while the data on imports includes re-imports, the data from the 
UNComtrade database on Malaysian exports does not exclude re-exports. 
This means that the exports are most probably overstated, and as a result 
apparent consumption is understated. Consequently, this can overstate 
China’s import penetration due to the lower denominator in each 
industry’s MSIC codes. Some cells in Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 are shaded 
grey; these observations have been dropped because apparent 
consumption goes into the negative due to underestimation of apparent 
consumption. A special note on the results for Automatic Data Processing-
Computers (MSIC 30002), which show negatives for three years due to 
confidentiality of information on Office and accounting machinery (MSIC 
30001) in compliance with Malaysia’s Statistics Act 1965. As such there is 
no way of aggregating codes 30001 and 30002 to 4 digits to check for 
miscoding of trade codes in that sector at industry level. Apart from these 
few product lines (MSIC 29300, 30002, 31200, 32300), the results for 
Malaysia’s apparent consumption (Table 5.8) are stable, especially for data 
from 2008 onwards.  
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Table 5.8 Malaysia’s Apparent Consumption of E&E Goods  
  US$ bn 
MSIC  
5 digit 
Description  
Manufacturing 
2002 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
25206 
Plastic injection moulded 
components 
0.9 2.3 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.9 
26100 Glass & glass products 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 
26910 
Non-structural non-
refractory ceramic ware 
0.05 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
29191 
Air-conditioning, 
refrigerating & ventilating 
machinery 
0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 
29220 
Metal-forming machinery 
& machine tools 
  0.4 0.4 0.6 1.1 1.0 1.0 
29290 
Other special-purpose 
machinery n.e.c. 
  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.1 0.2 0.2 
29300 Domestic appliances nec 0.03 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.7 
30002 
Computers & computer 
peripherals 
 1.4   0.7 1.3 0.5 
31100 
Electric motors, 
generators & transformer 
2.5 1.8 1.5 1.9 1.6 1.5 2.1 
31200 
Electricity distribution & 
control apparatus 
  0.3 0.1  0.2 0.2 0.3 
31301 
Telecommunication 
cables & wires 
0.03 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 
27320 
Other electronic & 
electric wires and cables 
1.0 2.4 2.2 3.0 3.2 3.6 3.3 
31400 Batteries & accumulators    0.3 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.1 
31500 Lamps & lighting equip.   0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
31900 Other electrical equip.nec   1.7 1.4 1.3 0.6 1.4 1.4 
32101 Semi-conductor devices* 12.7 22.0 9.2 15.0 10.5 14.3 10.9 
32102 
Electronic valves & tubes 
& printed circuit boards* 
7.2 9.2 7.3 8.7 8.1 7.6 7.7 
32200 
TV & radio transmitters & 
apparatus for l ine 
telephony & telegraphy 
0.4 2.4 3.0 2.9 2.7 3.1 3.7 
32300 
TV & radio receivers 
sound/video 
record/reproduce 
 2.5 2.4 4.3 4.3 3.2 4.1 
33110 
Medical & surgical 
equipment orthopaedic  
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 
33120 
Instruments & app. for 
measuring, checking, 
testing, navigating   
0.2 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 
33202 Photographic equipment 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 
Note: Cells highlighted in grey mean figures are negative and have been dropped from the 
observation. Blank cells mean that the Department of Statistics does not provide 
production data for that year. Details on manual matching of MSIC code 32101 and 32102  
are available in Appendix 5.6. 
Source: Based on UNComtrade and Department of Statistics, Malaysia  
147 
 
Table 5.9 Rate of Import Penetration from China in Malaysia’s E&E Consumption  
MSIC 
5 digit 
Description  
Manufacturing 
2002 
% 
2008 
% 
2009 
% 
2010 
% 
2011 
% 
2012 
% 
2013 
% 
25206 
Plastic injection moulded 
components 
0.02 0.04 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 
26100 Glass & glass products  0.0 0.0 0.01 0.01 0.0 0.01 0.1 
26910 
Non-structural non-
refractory ceramic ware 
2.1 0.9 3.3 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.3 
29191 
Air-conditioning, 
refrigerating & ventilating 
mach. 
1.7 28.9 13.5 12.7 17.0 27.9 24.6 
29220 
Metal-forming mach. & 
mach. Tools 
0.0 4.5 6.3 4.5 3.2 3.2 3.5 
29290 
Other special-purpose 
machinery n.e.c. 
0.0 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.2 
29300 Domestic appliances n.e.c. 127.4 47.9 63.5 77.6 44.4 48.8 39.6 
30002 
Computers and computer 
peripherals. 
 268.9   402.3 216.0 584.5 
31100 
Electric motors, gen & 
transformer 
10.5 31.1 29.0 31.1 41.1 49.1 38.3 
31200 
Electricity distribution. & 
control app. 
0.0 141.7 261.4  343.0 418.5 217.0 
31301 
Telecommunication cables 
& wires 
32.4 57.8 55.6 52.5 61.7 65.5 50.3 
27320 Other E&E wires & cables 3.4 2.7 3.3 3.2 4.9 4.1 5.5 
31400 Batteries & accumulators  0.0 98.4 234.8 283.8 53.2 32.8 92.8 
31500 Lamps & lighting equipment 0.0 21.3 20.0 16.3 30.4 29.0 29.0 
31900 
Other electrical equipment 
n.e.c. 
0.0 19.6 17.7 25.5 59.1 57.1 65.4 
32101 Semi-conductor 4.6 6.1 24.7 13.4 22.9 31.2 48.8 
32102 
Electronic valves & tubes & 
PCB 
3.2 5.3 4.2 4.1 5.4 7.0 7.8 
32200 
TV & radio transmitters & 
app. for l ine telephony & 
telegraphy 
46.3 22.4 28.5 36.9 43.4 42.7 42.8 
32300 
TV & radio receivers sound 
or video recording/ 
reproducing app, & assoc. 
goods 
 36.4 32.5 31.3 34.3 42.2 33.4 
33110 
Medical & surgical 
equipment orthopaedic 
0.1 2.2 1.0 2.4 2.4 4.2 4.7 
33120 
Inst. & app. for measuring, 
checking, testing, 
navigation 
1.1 4.4 3.3 1.8 3.2 6.8 2.7 
33202 Photographic equipment 12.3 16.4 17.3 4.4 9.4 14.1 7.8 
Note: Cells highlighted in grey means results are in negatives and dropped from the 
observation. Cells left blank means there is no result for that particular year because the 
Department of Statistics of Malaysia does not have the production data for that year.  
Source: Based on UNComtrade and Department of Statistics, Malaysia
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Despite some weaknesses in Malaysia’s data it is important to understand 
whether import penetration from China has increased or decreased over 
time. As shown in Table 5.9, data on Semiconductor devices (MSIC 32101) 
fluctuates as it is heavily exported and imported, meaning that the effect of 
international trade cannot be precisely segregated here because Malaysia’s 
export data does not distinguish between re-exports and total exports. 
Results for Batteries & accumulators (MSIC 31400), and Computers and 
computer peripherals (MSIC 30002), Domestic Appliances n.e.c. (MSIC 
29300), and TV & radio receivers sound or video recording/ reproducing 
app, & assoc. goods (MSIC 32300) are too unstable to form any conclusion 
on these products.  
 
Nonetheless, the result of Malaysia’s apparent consumption of E&E is 
increasing across all industries, especially Air-conditioning, Refrigerating & 
Ventilating Machinery (MSIC 29191) and Electric motors, Generator & 
Transformers (MSIC 31100). Table 5.9 above confirms that China’s import 
penetration has been rising across all products associated with the MSIC 
industry codes except Metal-forming Machine and Machining Tools (MSIC 
29220), which sees a falling share of China’s imports in apparent 
consumption. Some apparent consumption results for industries such as 
Air-conditioning and Refrigerating (MSIC 29191) and Lamp and Lighting 
Equipment (MSIC 31500) illustrate the increasing penetration of Chinese 
import into the Malaysian domestic market. For example, China’s share of 
imports of products grouped under Air-conditioning and Refrigerating 
industries (MSIC 29191), is only 1.7% of apparent consumption in 2002, but 
this rises to 24.6% of apparent consumption by 2013. This represents an 
average annual growth rate of 27.5% over 11 years, signalling the rise of 
China’s electrical appliances industries such as air-conditioning since 
entering the WTO.  
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The rising import penetration of Chinese products has an effect on local 
players in Malaysia’s electrical industry. Field interviews with Midea Scott 
& English Electronics, the local distributor of Midea China products, 
confirmed that they have been experiencing double-digit growth of their 
Midea air-conditioning products annually since 2008. The impact on 
Malaysian local firms is limited, as Malaysia’s electrical appliances industry 
is not dominated by local players, although they exist, commanding a 
relatively low market share. The majority of the market share for 
household electrical products is commanded by Japanese and Korean 
MNCs. Therefore although China’s imports into Malaysia’s markets are 
steadily increasing they are mainly eroding the Korean and Japanese MNCs’ 
market shares in products such as air-conditioners, TVs and audio 
equipment.  
 
Despite field interviews suggesting that Korean and Japanese companies 
are mainly affected by China’s import penetration, it also has an impact on 
local firms.  Although competition from China was not cited as a direct 
cause of the selling-off of Malaysian air-conditioning manufacturing plants, 
a newspaper reports that OYL Berhad, the biggest Malaysian-owned air-
conditioner manufacturer by volume, has sold up to Daikin of Japan and 
exited the industry because:  
 
Competition [has] led to the commoditisation of air-conditioning 
products, which resulted in a decline in profit margins, especially in 
residential air-conditioning products. OYL was faced with a choice of 
either having to focus as an equipment manufacturer or become a 
solutions-based group. We decided to drive its growth as a solutions-
based group.  (The Star Malaysia, 2006) 
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Two factors ease Malaysian industrialists’ anxiety associated with the surge 
in Chinese imports. Firstly, China’s imports to Malaysia’s air-conditioning 
industry products, in the case of Midea China, is through a joint-venture 
model which means the local partner, Scott & English Electronics, benefits 
from some of the revenue stream from these imports.  
 
Secondly, a Malaysian-owned multinational company Pen1 (name 
changed) imports air-conditioners from China but sells them as a Malaysian 
brand. The limitation of analysis relying purely on import data manifests in 
Pen1’s arrangement with a manufacturer in China. This Malaysian company 
controls its own value chain, including sales, marketing and brand name, 
and has outsourced manufacturing to China. However, Pen1’s impact on 
the overall trade figure is limited, as it is not the market leader in 
household electrical products. Nevertheless, field interviews showed that 
the rate of import penetration based on import data is most likely 
overstated due special arrangements such as joint ventures between 
Malaysian and Chinese partners and because the outsourcing of 
manufacturing to China by Malaysian original brand owners (OBM) is not 
reflected in the trade data.  
 
In short, China’s import penetration of electrical goods has been rising in 
Malaysia’s domestic market, signalling Chinese firms’ increasing 
competitiveness in the electrical sector. Although the effects of the import 
penetration are limited as local Malaysian firms command a smaller market 
share than Japanese and Korean MNCs, they are nevertheless affected. 
However, the effects are mitigated through joint venture arrangements for 
China’s entry into Malaysia’s market and Malaysia’s OBM tapping China’s 
manufacturing facilities.  
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5.4 Comparing integration of exports and imports between 
Malaysia and China relative with other trade partners 
 
As a form of forward-looking measure, this section measures the extent to 
which China’s imports are integrated with Malaysia’s exports compared to 
other major destination markets.  The TCI gauges the complementarity of 
one country’s trade with another relative to other countries by measuring 
how closely one country’s exports match the other’s imports. A close 
match with a high TCI score means that both countries have a better 
prospect for regional economic grouping and integration compared to 
where their trade structure is less compatible (Michaely, 1996). The TCI is 
calculated here for total trade and at the E&E level from 1992-2013, using 
4-digit HS 1988/92 nomenclature.74  The formula for the TCI is available in 
Section 3.1.3 of Chapter 3.  
 
Figure 5.9 TCI Malaysia’s Total Exports to Selected Countries 
 
Source: Based on UNComtrade 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10 TCI Malaysia’s E&E exports with Selected Countries’ E&E Imports  
                                                 
74 Full  l ist of HS code at 4 level digits at E&E Level is available in Appendix 3.3. 
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Source: Based on UNComtrade 
 
The TCI reveals that Chinese imports are more closely matched with 
Malaysian exports in 2013 than they were in 1992 at both total export and 
E&E level. In Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10, the TCI rises from 0.30 in 1992 to 
0.46 for total exports in 2012 and from 0.51 in 1992 to 0.69 for E&E exports 
in 2013. At total exports level in Figure 5.9, China climbs from least 
compatible import market among the major markets for Malaysian exports 
in 1992 to the second most closely-matched import market in 2013 at 0.46, 
after Japan at 0.47.  
  
For E&E exports, China rises from the least-matched import market in 1992 
to the most closely-matched, surpassing all other markets (Figure 5.10). 
The TCI for the E&E industries of various countries in 1992-2013 shows that 
Malaysia-China TCI is increasing overall compared to the US, EU and Japan, 
which rose during the first decade (1992-2001), The TCI shows that the US 
and EU peaked in 2001, and Japan peaked in 2006, before declining.  For 
example, for the US, the TCI for E&E was 0.59 in 1992, peaking at 0.70 in 
2001 but dropping to 0.56 in 2013. In short, the compatibility of Malaysia’s 
E&E exports with the US, EU, and Japanese imports have decreased, 
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compensated by the overall increase in E&E export compatibility with 
Chinese imports.  
 
Contrasting Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10, the differences between the trends 
in the TCI for total exports compared to E&E stands out. This is due to the 
divergence in 2001-2007. The TCI for China’s total exports rose 
continuously from 2001-2007 before declining in 2008 while the TCI for the 
E&E sector begin to descend in 2004-2008 before recovering and ascending 
again from 2009 onwards.  The compatibility of China’s imports with 
Malaysia’s exports therefore diverges between total exports and the E&E 
sector.  
 
E&E exports from Malaysia become less compatible with Chinese imports 
starting from 2004 onwards. This may be because Malaysia is withdrawing, 
resulting in the share of individual E&E products dropping as a share of 
total E&E exports, or China is importing less E&E products, or both. A 
preliminary check shows a decline in the computer goods and electrical 
sub-sectors in Malaysian exports as a major factor in the decline in the TCI 
from 2004 onwards. This is further explored in the next chapter, which 
discusses competition in the trade channel between Malaysia and China. 
Although the TCI for E&E with China recovers from 2009 onwards, its 
recovery is based on a surge in import demand, mainly for Monolithic 
Digital Circuits (HS8542) from China. 
 
Overall, the TCI findings are consistent with the shifting importance of 
Malaysia’s trading partners over time. The TCI for E&E also shows that 
Chinese imports are the closest match to Malaysia’s exports from 2011 
onwards with the US, EU and Japanese match to Malaysia’s exports 
declining. Malaysia would be concern that the Malaysia-China TCI for E&E 
also notably falls from 2004-2008 but recovers again from 2009 onwards. 
Therefore while Chinese imports of Malaysia’s E&E exports were more 
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integrated in the immediate years China joins WTO in 2001, compatibility 
between Chinese imports and Malaysian exports in finished goods sub-
sectors such as the computer industry and household electrical industry 
declined during 2004-2008, and this is captured by the TCI.75 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that China has both positive as well as negative 
effects on Malaysia through their bilateral trade. Their total bilateral trade 
volume rose rapidly in 1992-2013. China is indeed Malaysia’s number-one 
trading partner, and trade data affirms the E&E sector (in both HS code 
Chapter 84 and 85) as the top sector traded between Malaysia and China. 
The preliminary trade analysis lends credence to the observation by 
Athukorala and Kophaiboon (2014) that the East Asian regional production 
network is indeed benefiting countries such as Malaysia.   
 
While Malaysia’s bilateral trade balance with China is reasonably balanced, 
China is increasingly exporting consumer goods to Malaysia, especially 
since joining the WTO in 2001. This coupled with fuel and lubricants being 
top three items exported from Malaysia to China, the rise of commodity 
based exports raises the fear of the primarisation of Malaysia’s economy.  
 
The volume of E&E exports and imports steadily increased during 1992-
2013, suggesting a complementary relationship between Malaysia and 
China. Moreover, based on types of goods exchanged, computer goods and 
                                                 
75 Computer manufacturer Dell shifted its desktop PC manufacturing from Penang to 
Xiamen, China. Top three items measured by decline in TCI points in 2004-2007 are 
Automatic data processing machines (computers) (HS8471), Parts, accessories, except 
covers, for office machine (HS8473), and Radio and TV transmitters, television cameras 
(HS8525). The period 2004-2007 is taken rather than 2004-2008 because 2008 saw the 
beginning of the global financial crisis.  
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parts and components dominate the bilateral trade. While this is consistent 
with East Asian production network literature (Athukorala and Kophaiboon, 
2014), some of the results reported in this chapter also diverge. 
 
The divergence includes, first, the fact that Malaysia’s E&E trade balance 
widens notably after China joined the WTO in 2001, with the volume of 
parts and components exported unable to offset the deficit in total E&E 
level due to the steady increase in imports of E&E final goods, and the E&E 
trade balance slips back into deficit from 2012 onwards after a brief 
interval with a trade surplus in 2009-2011. Nevertheless, the deficit in E&E 
parts and components in the years immediately after China joined the 
WTO can reflect global production arrangements, with China producing 
less sophisticated parts and components and Malaysia importing them for 
production purposes. This is discussed in Section 6.5 in the next chapter, 
which considers the colour TV market.  
 
Secondly, the results of the E&E trade disaggregated by sophistication 
reflect the shifting of the functionality of China’s export structure within 
the E&E regional production network. China is showing signs of moving 
from being just a centre for the assembly of final goods for the region to 
manufacturing higher-value parts and components, as shown in the data 
on its exports to Malaysia. China has stepped into the product space of 
Malaysia’s specialisation, notably in the semiconductor industry, since 
2008, although Malaysia still exports more sophisticated E&E goods to and 
receives less sophisticated E&E goods from China.  
 
Based on the import penetration analysis, China’s E&E goods import 
penetration of Malaysian market has increased for the majority of industry 
categories, especially in electrical appliances such as lighting products and 
air-conditioners from 2008 onwards. Field interviews, however, suggested 
that China’s effect is mitigated by its mode of entry: i.e. as a joint venture 
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with a local company or when Malaysian-owned companies utilise Chinese 
electrical goods production capacity to sell under a Malaysian brand name.   
 
The TCI results suggest that the bilateral trade is complementary between 
Malaysia and China. China’s import structure is increasingly compatible 
with Malaysia’s export structure compared to other traditional partners, 
both at the total trade and the E&E level. However, Malaysia’s exports of  
computer goods and decline in electrical good are captured by lower TCI 
scores in 2004-2008. Finally, Malaysia’s TCI with China at the E&E level 
recovers from 2009 onwards, mainly driven by China’s demand for IC 
imports.  
 
Overall, the bilateral trade between Malaysia and China in the E&E sector 
has been positive for both countries. Malaysia fares better in parts and 
components, and specifically in the semiconductor industry. On the other 
hand, its household electrical industry faces the competitive force of 
China’s rise as it increasingly imports consumer goods from China. After 
2008 China stepped into product space previously occupied by Malaysian 
semiconductors, notwithstanding that Malaysia currently still sends more 
high-value semiconductor to China than it receives from it.  The next 
chapter investigates whether the relationship between the exports from 
both countries is in competitive or mutual expansion.   
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6.0 How much can trade data tell us about competition for 
Malaysian E&E from China at Destination Markets? 
 
Based on the Asian Drivers framework, export competition in third markets 
between Malaysia and China is an indirect effect of China’s rise. This 
chapter examines whether China’s rise has been complementary to, or 
competes with, Malaysia’s E&E sector in the trade channel by comparing 
the share of E&E imports from Malaysia with the share of E&E imports 
from China at their destination markets (see Figure 3.1 in p.46). 
 
The main research question here is to what extent Chinese and Malaysian 
E&E exports compete in their destination markets. The second main 
research question is whether Malaysia’s E&E imports structure, 
disaggregated by level of sophistication, shows evidence of being 
upgraded? For this second question, a competitiveness analysis, 
disaggregated by sophistication, reveals whether Malaysia displays 
upgrading in response to China’s competition for destination markets for 
its exports, and relates to a key question in the GPN literature: whether the 
challenge posed by China induces Malaysia to upgrade its E&E value chain 
(Ernst (2004).  
 
Based on the main research questions, the following sub-questions guide 
the discussion in this section: 
 Is Malaysia losing market share to China, and if so, in which types of 
product at the destination markets? 
 What proportion of E&E imports from Malaysia, disaggregated by level 
of sophistication, faces competition from China at their destination 
markets, and what proportion is in a relationship of mutual expansion 
with Chinese imports to their destination markets?  
 Does the disaggregation of exports of E&E by sophistication reveal signs 
of upgrading on the part of Malaysia’s E&E industry? 
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 Does the disaggregation of exports of E&E by sophistication reveal signs 
of upgrading on the part of Malaysia’s E&E industry? 
 What do the E&E trade data at destination markets analysed by types 
of goods reveal about Malaysia’s changing role within the GVC/GPN 
production network? 
 
This chapter presents the findings from the competitiveness analysis based 
on the movement of Malaysia’s share of E&E product imports at the 
destination markets, namely the US, EU and Japan, in relation to China’s 
using mirror-trade data.76 Secondly, it examines whether the structure of 
imports from Malaysia disaggregated by sophistication shows that 
Malaysia’s exports to destination markets have been upgraded. The 
chapter discusses the results from the most sophisticated goods to the 
least sophisticated segment of E&E products.  
 
The import share calculations are limited firstly by the national trade 
statistics that capture the value based on gross output of the exports. The 
trade data could not capture the associated value-added at each stage of 
the manufacturing process, which is important as E&E is an industry that is 
highly fragmented across borders. This means that when evaluating the 
impact of China on Malaysia’s E&E industry, China’s sophistication in the 
exports basket can be overstated if it captures a small share of value-added 
in a high-technology export item. Secondly, as with the competitiveness 
analysis associated with the Lall and Albaladejo (2004) framework, this 
chapter is unable to claim causality with respect to China’s effect on the 
rise or fall of Malaysia’s import share. Nevertheless , competitiveness 
                                                 
76 In this study ‘EU’ refers to EU-27 although currently the EU has 28 members, since the 
latest member, Croatia joined in 2014. Based on the World Bank WITS manual, the 
UNCOMTRADE database only provides data based on EU-27 for the EU category. Mirror 
trade data using the US, EU and Japan as reporter in the data. According to the World 
Bank WITS manual, countries with better statistical service such as OECD countries 
provide better-quality data.  
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analysis provides detailed results of the relative movement of product 
shares compared to highly aggregated ‘reductionist’ results.  
 
Moreover, a competitive analysis at the destination markets is more 
reflective of real-world interactions than an analysis of total exports, and 
further improves Lall and Albaladejo (2004)’s World Market Share (WMS) 
analysis. This chapter also validates the findings from the competitiveness 
analysis at destination markets through field interviews and adds layers of 
perspective to the findings where applicable.   
 
The chapter is structured in the following manner: first the volume of E&E 
product imports from Malaysia and China and the level of threat to E&E 
imports from Malaysia posed by Chinese imports using Jenkins’ index of 
competitive threat (ICT) are presented, and this is followed by a 
competitive analysis of E&E imports from Malaysia and China into the US, 
EU and Japanese markets in 1992-2002 and 2002-2012. The competitive 
analyses for each destination include the degree to which China competes 
to export the same E&E products as Malaysia, competitive analysis 
disaggregated by level of sophistication to see if imports from Malaysia 
display upgrading, and type of goods analysis to examine the shifting role 
of Malaysia in the regional production network by comparing Malaysia and 
China’s import shares under BEC classification. Subsequently, qualitative 
field interviews further inform the impact of China on Malaysian players in 
specific markets and Malaysia’s response to China’s rise. The chapter 
concludes that the relationship between China and Malaysia’s E&E imports 
differs according to the destination markets, and that Malaysia has 
upgraded its imports structure.  
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6.1 Volumes of Malaysia and China’s E&E Product Export and 
Import in US, EU, and Japan Markets and Level of Threat to 
Malaysia’s E&E 
 
This section provides descriptive data and a preliminary analysis of China’s 
threat to Malaysia’s E&E exports based on ICT index. The export data in 
Figure 6.1 reveals major destination markets for Malaysia’s E&E exports. 
Malaysia’s most important E&E exports destinations by value are the US 
followed by the EU and Japan.  Malaysia’s exports to China have been 
discussed in Chapter 5 regarding their bilateral trade, while Singapore and 
Hong Kong are predominantly entrepôt destinations and are therefore not 
included in the analysis.  
 
Figure 6.1 Major Destinations of Malaysia’s E&E Exports  
 
Source: UNComtrade 
 
From this point onwards in this chapter, I switch over to import data at 
destination markets.  Figure 6.2,  
Figure 6.4, Figure 6.6 and presents descriptive statistics on E&E imports 
from Malaysia and China into the US, EU, and Japan market as below. To 
put things into perspective, the US market is the biggest destination 
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market by value, followed by the EU and finally, Japan. E&E imports from 
Malaysia into the US market were worth US$17.5 billion, into the EU 
market were worth US$14.0 billion and into the Japanese market were 
worth US$5.1 billion in 2013.  
 
Collectively, these three markets represent 28.6% of total world imports of 
E&E from Malaysia in 2013, a drop from 48.4% in 2002 that is attributed to 
the rise in China’s imports of Malaysia E&E products.77  
Figure 6.2 US Total Imports of Malaysian and Chinese E&E 
 
Source: UNComtrade 
Figure 6.3 Malaysia and China Market Share in the US E&E Imports 
                                                 
77 China’s share of total world E&E imports into Malaysia grew from 7.7% in 2002 to 30.7% 
in 2013.  
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Source: UNComtrade 
 
 
Figure 6.4 EU Imports of E&E Products from Malaysia and China 
 
Source: UNComtrade 
 
Figure 6.5 Malaysia and China market share of E&E imports to the EU 
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Source: UNComtrade 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Japan Imports of E&E Products from Malaysia and China 
 
Source: UNComtrade 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Malaysia and China Market Share in Japan E&E Imports 
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
China Malaysia
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
U
S 
B
n
China Malaysia
164 
 
 
Source: UNComtrade 
 
Figure 6.2,  
Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.6 show the common trends with the divergence of 
the value of Malaysia and China’s imports  to the major destination 
markets. Imports from China into the destination markets grew rapidly, 
while Malaysia’s growth, especially from 2001 onwards, is relatively flat. 
Moreover, imports of E&E products from Malaysia clearly decline in the US 
market from 2006 onwards from a peak of US$29.8 billion in 2006 to 
US$15.7 billion in 2009, but gradually recover to US$17.5 billion in 2013. 
Imports of E&E from Malaysia to the EU are maintained at US$12.0-16.0 
billion per year in 2006 -2013. Finally, Malaysian imports in Japan also 
declined from a peak in 2000 of US$ 7.2 billion to US$4.2 billion, before 
recovering to US$5.1 billion in 2013.  
 
Based on market share at the destination markets, imports from Malaysia 
are clearly declining in the US and Japan, while in the EU they are holding 
their ground against rising imports from China in 1992-2013, as shown in 
Figure 6.3, Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.7. Malaysia and China’s market share of 
total E&E imports into the US (Figure 6.3) are 5.4% and 3.9% respectively in 
1992. In 1997, China’s market share of total E&E imports in the US market 
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(8.3%), overtook Malaysia’s (6.9%) for the first time. China continues its 
upward trend, while Malaysia peaks at 8.6% of total E&E imports in 2005 
after gaining market share during the initial years of China joining the WTO 
in 2001, and thereafter declines to 4.0% while China shares reaches 43.6% 
in 2013.  
 
In the EU, imports from Malaysia comprise 2.7% of total E&E imports 1992 
against China’s 2.8%. Imports from China overtook those from Malaysia in 
1994, at 4.3% and 3.6% of total imports respectively. Imports from 
Malaysia peaked in 2003 at 5.7% before going into a general downtrend to 
4.3% of total imports into the EU market in 2013. Conversely, China’s 
market share rose from 14.2% to stabilise at more than 40.0% of total E&E 
imports into the EU after 2009.  
 
Malaysia’s market share of the Japanese market is 5.6% and China’s 4.4% 
in 1992. Malaysia’s market share peaks in 2000 at 9.0% of total Japanese 
E&E imports before starting in long-term decline to 4.0% in 2013. 
Conversely, China is on the uptrend in 1992-2013 from 14.8% in 2000 to 
55.6% of total Japanese E&E imports in 2013.  
 
Generally E&E imports from Malaysia into the destination markets 
increases its market share slightly in the initial years after China joins the 
WTO, except for Japan, which peaks in 2000 but declines thereafter. China 
on the other hand increases its market share in destination markets by no 
less than 40.0% of the E&E imports in each market. Malaysia’s long -term 
decline suggests that the relationship between imports from Malaysia and 
China is competitive, Malaysia’s loss of market share in the EU is the 
smallest in terms of magnitude.  
 
Based on the descriptive data, the value of Malaysian E&E imports into the 
US and Japan is going in the opposite directions to its E&E world exports as 
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shown in Chapter 4. Contrasting Figure 4.1 (p.67) with Figure 6.2 showing 
that Malaysia’s total world exports of E&E products continues to grow even 
in 2003-2013 from US$57.0 billion to US$77.0 billion. Conversely, the value 
of its imports of E&E products to the US decline from US$21.1 billion in 
2000 to US$17.5 billion in 2013 and in Japan from US$7.2 billion in 2000 to 
US$5.1 billion in 2013. This opposing trend between Malaysia’s world E&E 
exports and imports from Malaysia in destination markets is partly 
explained by a worldwide shift of E&E production to China, as explained in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Table 6.1 below compares imports from Malaysia and China into specific 
markets and shows that China’s exports are growing exponentially while 
Malaysia’s growth slows after 2003. For example the US market, as the 
biggest in the three main destinations, sees the average annual growth rate 
of Malaysian E&E imports from 2003-2013 dropping to -1.9% from a robust 
12.8% growth per year in 1992-2002 while conversely, China records 
double-digit growth every year in both periods.  
Table 6.1 Growth Rate of Imports from Malaysia and China to Destination Markets 
    CAGR (%) 
Destination 
Market 
Import from  1992-2002 2003-
2013 
1992-
2013 
US China 26.3 12.7 19.9 
  Malaysia 12.8 -1.9 5.3 
EU China  36.2 11.1 24.1 
  Malaysia 21.1 0.8 11.2 
Japan China  34.9 11.9 23.4 
  Malaysia 15.5 0.4 7.6 
Source: Based on UNComtrade data 
 
Next, the ICT measures the level of the threat of China’s E&E imports to 
those from Malaysia at the market destinations.  
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Figure 6.8 China Exports Threat on Malaysian E&E Imports at Destination Markets 
 
Source: Based on UNComtrade data 
 
The result of the ICT illustrated in Figure 6.8 shows that the level of threat 
has increased for Malaysian E&E imports to all destination markets. The 
highest increase is recorded in Japan, followed by the US and then the EU. 
At all three destinations the ICT increases were driven mainly by the 
growth of China’s share of total imports to the destination markets rather 
than as a result of a rise in Malaysia’s E&E exports. This higher imports 
share of China shows China is gaining exports competitiveness in these 
markets. From 2008 onwards the ICT for the US, the epicentre of the global 
financial crisis, exhibits a downward trend due to a drop in the volume of 
household electrical goods items imported from China. As a result, China’s 
share of US imports at product level of durables declined, as indicated by a 
steep drop from the highest ICT at 45.2 in 2008 to 36.1 in 2010.78 China’s 
export threat to E&E imports from Malaysia increases in all three 
destination market in 1992-2013.  
                                                 
78 Interestingly, HS841720, the HS code for tablets such as the iPad, increases during the 
same period for Chinese imports to the US while Malaysia’s share of US imports of 
HS841720 declined significantly during the same period.  
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Table 6.2 Share of E&E sector in Total Imports from Malaysia by Destination 
Market 
   2002   2012 
Destination 
Markets 
No. of 
Product 
US$ bn % of Imports US$ bn % of Imports 
US 338 20.0 82.7 16.5 64.0 
EU-27 338 10.1 67.4 14.0 52.7 
Japan 338 4.7 41.8 5.4 17.3 
Source: Based on UNComtrade data  
 
Table 6.2 shows a decline in Malaysia’s share of total E&E sector imports to 
all three markets. Its imports to the US declined from 82.7% in 2002 to 
64.0% in 2012, those to the EU fell from 67.4% in 2002 to 52.7% in 2012, 
and most drastically, imports to Japan dropped from 41.8% in 2002 to 
17.3% in 2012.  The decline of E&E as a share of total imports from 
Malaysia to the destination markets, coupled with the rising threat from 
the ICT index, does not augur well for Malaysia’s E&E export 
competitiveness, but this is subject to further to competitive analysis 
below.  
 
The rest of the chapter discusses the findings of the competitive analysis 
for the US, EU and Japan markets. For each market, the sequence is the 
main competitive analysis, reverse tracking of the competitive analysis to 
show changes across categories from 2002 to 2012, the competitive 
analysis disaggregated by sophistication and then by type of goods. Finally, 
a separate section discusses Malaysia’s response to the loss of its durables 
exports to the US and EU.  
 
6.2 Competitive Analysis: The US Market 
 
169 
 
This section finds E&E imports from Malaysia in the US market face 
competition from China, which induces Malaysia to offer more 
sophisticated imports to the US.  For regional production network roles, 
comparing 1992-2002 with 2002-2012 shows that China has replaced 
Malaysia as the supplier of finished goods such as computers and electrical 
goods, including televisions. Malaysia is increasingly specialising in more 
sophisticated parts and accessories imports such as ICs. The structure of US 
imports from Malaysia is upgrading over time, based on a higher EXPY” 
index than China’s EXPY” and disaggregation of the import structure by 
PRODY index quartiles in this section.  
 
China is competitive towards Malaysian E&E imports in the US market, as 
shown in Table 6.3, below.79 For example, the 85.2% of total E&E imports 
from Malaysia to the US categorised under Mutual Expansion (i.e. both 
Malaysia and China’s shares of US imports rising together) in 2002 falls to 
23.6% in 2012. Conversely, in the Competitive category (Malaysia’s share of 
US imports falling while China’s rises) increases sharply from 14.8% of total 
E&E imports in 2002 to 75.0% in 2012. A miniscule share of E&E imports 
under the Reverse Category (Malaysia’s share of US imports rising, China’s 
falling) shows that faced with Chinese competition, Malaysia lacks winning 
products.  
 
Table 6.3 Competitiveness Analysis of E&E in the US market 
 2002 2012 Difference 
Category 
No. of US$ % of No. of US$ % of No. of US$ % of 
                                                 
79 Results tables in Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4, total number of E&E products is 336 rather 
than 338, due to manual adjustment of 4 HS codes to 2 HS codes with the combination of 
digital and non-digital ICs (HS 854211 + HS 854219). The second combination is  Network 
switchboards and other telegraphic (HS 851730 + HS 851782). Codes are combined 
because of the unusual data movement in the series, with values in HS 854219 growing 
exponentially in 2012, while the HS 854211 contracts severely and similarly in the case of 
HS 851730 and HS 851782.  
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Prod bn E&E Prod bn E&E Prod bn E&E 
Competitive  81 3.0 14.8 127 12.4 75.0 46 9.5 60.2 
M. Expansion 154 17.0 85.2 106 3.9 23.6 -48 -13.1 -61.6 
R. Competition  8 0.0 0.0 6 0.2 1.4 -2 0.2 1.4 
M. Withdrawal  9 0.0 0.0 21 0.0 0.0 12 0.0 0.0 
N.A.  84 0.0 0.0 76 0.0 0.0 -8 0.0 0.0 
Total 336 20.0 100.0 336 16.5 100.0 - -3.4 - 
Note: M.=Mutual, R.=Reverse  
Source: Based on UNComtrade data  
 
Next, the competitiveness analysis category such as Competitive, Mutual 
Expansion and Reverse Category of E&E imports from Malaysia at the 
destination market in 2012 is matched backwards to its various categories 
in 2002. This gives a sense of the relative size of the movement across 
categories of the same goods over time.  
 
 
 
Table 6.4 Distribution of Competitive Analysis Outcomes in 2012 to 2002 
according to E&E Product Codes (US Market) 
Results in 2002 
No. of 
Products 
US$ bn % of E&E Results in 2012 
No. of 
Products 
US$ 
bn 
% of 
E&E 
Competitive 32 2.37 11.8 Competitive 127 12.4 75.0 
M. Expansion 88 16.21 81.1 
   
  
R. Competition 5 0.00 0.0 
   
  
M. Withdrawal  2 0.00 0.0 
   
  
Total 127 18.57 93.0         
        Competitive 30 0.5 2.3 M. Expansion 106 3.9 23.6 
M. Expansion 52 0.4 2.2 
   
  
R. Competition 2 0.0 0.0 
   
  
M. Withdrawal  1 0.0 0.0 
   
  
N.A. 21 0.0 0.0 
   
  
  106 0.9 4.5         
        Competitive 1 0.0 0.0 R. Competition 6 0.2 1.4 
M. Expansion 3 0.3 1.3 
   
  
N.A. 2 0.0 0.0 
   
  
  6 0.3 1.3         
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        Competitive 12 0.12 0.6 M. Withdrawal  21 0.0 0.0 
M. Expansion 9 0.10 0.5 
   
  
  21 0.22 1.1         
        Competitive 6 0.0 0.0 N.A. 76 0.0 0.0 
No Threat 2 0.0 0.1 
   
  
R. Competition 1 0.0 0.0 
   
  
M. Withdrawal  6 0.0 0.0 
   
  
N.A. 61 0.0 0.0 
   
  
  76 0.0 0.1         
        Grand Total  336 20.0 100.0 Grand Total  336 16.5 100.0 
Note: M.=Mutual, R.=Reverse  
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade data  
 
 
The overall relationship between Malaysian and Chinese E&E in the US 
market is overwhelmingly competitive, based on the trade data. Table 6.4 
above, shows that 93.0% of Malaysian E&E imported to the US in 2002 face 
competition from Chinese E&E imports in 2012. The computer industry and 
computer related-parts are declining in the face of China’s rising imports. 
In 2002, US imports from Malaysia of Digital computers with cpu and input-
output units (HS841720) are worth US$ 2.9 billion, but by 2012 they are 
worth only US$0.3 billion. Interestingly, in the US market even Integrated 
Circuits (HS 854211 and HS 854219) have switched from the Mutual 
Expansion category in 2002 to Competitive in 2012. Conversely, Malaysia’s 
Mutual Expansion relationship with Chinese exports is largely based on its 
exports to the US of Photosensitive semiconductor devices (HS 854140) 
growing from US$0.1 billion in 2002 to US$1.8 billion in 2012. In the 
Reverse Competition category, Malaysia lacks winning products to 
withstand the competition from China. Detailed product-level tables are 
available in Appendix 6.1. 
 
Next, I examine whether the structure of imports from Malaysia to the US 
displays signs of upgrading of the E&E value chain over time. The EXPY” 
index is used to compare the sophistication of Malaysia and China’s 
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imports into the US, followed by a detailed analysis of competitive analysis 
based on PRODY index quartiles.  
 
Based on the EXPY” index, the sophistication of Malaysian E&E imports is 
generally greater than that of China’s. The EXPY” index is the sum of the 
weighted PRODY index of E&E imports from a particular country to the 
destination market. It thus provides an indicator of the level of productivity 
associated with that country’s exports to the destination market.  
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Figure 6.9 Imports from Malaysia and China EXPY” in the US Market 
 
Source: Based on UNComtrade data  
 
The EXPY” index shows that the sophistication of Malaysian imports in the 
US market is higher than that of imports from China, except in 2005, when 
China’s EXPY” index is slightly higher than Malaysia’s (see Figure 6.9 
above). The EXPY” of 17921.0 for imports from Malaysia in 2005 is slightly 
below China’s at 18231.9, the surge in China’s EXPY” in 2005 mainly caused 
by gains from its colour televisions (HS 852520) exports and audio 
recording without reproduction (HS 852090). However, after 2006 Malaysia 
clearly increases the sophistication of its E&E imports in the US market 
compared to China.  
 
Next, the competitive analysis is disaggregated by level of sophistication 
with each E&E product ranked using the PRODY index, which is divided into 
four quartiles. The first quartile contains the most sophisticated products 
and the fourth, the least sophisticated products. Products listed in each 
specific quartile are summed up to show the market share of total E&E 
imports at each level of sophistication.   
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Table 6.5 Competitive Analysis of US E&E Imports from Malaysia and China based 
on Sophistication 
 
2002 2012 
  
No. of 
prod. 
% of 
total 
exports 
% of E&E 
No. of 
prod. 
% of 
total 
exports 
% of E&E  
1st Quartile             
Competitive 12 5.0 6.0 27 18.7 29.3 
M. Expansion 41 4.4 5.3 35 9.5 14.9 
R. Competition 2 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.1 
M. Withdrawal  3 0.0 0.0 4 0.0 0.0 
N.A. 26 0.0 0.0 17 0.0 0.0 
Total 84 9.4 11.4 84 28.3 44.2 
2nd Quartile             
Competitive 15 0.7 0.8 35 20.3 31.8 
M. Expansion 46 26.6 32.2 31 0.9 1.4 
R. Competition 4 0.0 0.0 2 0.0 0.0 
M. Withdrawal  1 0.0 0.0 2 0.0 0.0 
N.A. 18 0.0 0.0 14 0.0 0.0 
Total 84 27.3 33.0 84 21.3 33.3 
3rd Quartile   
 
    
 
  
Competitive 27 4.8 5.9 36 7.9 12.3 
M. Expansion 37 31.4 37.9 25 3.9 6.1 
R. Competition 2 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 
M. Withdrawal  0 0.0 0.0 7 0.0 0.0 
N.A. 18 0.0 0.0 15 0.0 0.0 
Total 84 36.2 43.8 84 11.8 18.5 
4th Quartile             
Competitive 27 1.7 2.1 28 1.0 1.6 
M. Expansion 30 8.1 9.8 15 0.7 1.1 
R. Competition 0 0.0 0.0 2 0.8 1.3 
M. Withdrawal  5 0.0 0.0 9 0.0 0.0 
N.A. 22 0.0 0.0 30 0.0 0.0 
Total 84 9.8 11.9 84 2.6 4.0 
Grand Total  336 82.7 100.0 336 64.0 100.0 
Note: M.=Mutual, R.=Reverse 
Source: Based on UNComtrade data  
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Overall, the drop in the share of least sophisticated goods in total E&E 
imports at destination markets, coupled with a rise in the contribution of 
the most sophisticated goods in 2012 compared to 2002, confirms 
Malaysia has upgraded its exports to the US market.80 As shown in Table 
6.5 above, its share of total E&E imports in the first quartile jump from 
11.4% in 2002 to 44.2% in 2012 for the US market. 81 In the second quartile, 
the share remains roughly the same from 2002 to 2012, at 33.0%. The first 
and second quartiles collectively represent 77.5% of total imports in 2012. 
Conversely, the share of US imports in the third and fourth quartiles falls 
from 2002 to 2012, with a contraction in the third quartile from 43.8% in 
2002 to 18.5%.  
 
In the US market, competition against Malaysia’s imports is mostly 
concentrated in the first and second quartiles by 2012. In 2012, the 29.3% 
of total E&E imports from Malaysia in the first quartile and the 31.8% in the 
second are losing their market share compared to China’s rising imports 
share in the US market.  The competition in the second quartile is mainly 
over telegraphic apparatus and products (combining HS 851730 and HS 
851782), while competition in the second quartile is in IC (HS 854211 and 
HS 854219). The situation in 2002 is different, with the majority of imports 
from Malaysia in mutual expansion with E&E imports from China in the 
second quartile at 32.2% of total E&E imports and 37.9% in the third 
quartile.  
 
                                                 
80 In absolute values, the value of Malaysian E&E imports dropped from US$20.0 bil l ion in 
2002 to US$16.6 bil l ion in 2012.   
81 While the most sophisticated quartile’s share of total Malaysian imports, especially into 
the US, rise from 13.8% to 48.9%, the volume of exports declines from US$20.0 bil l ion in 
2002 to US$16.6 in 2012. However, overall, in absolute numbers the value of imports from 
Malaysia in Quartile 1 rises in the US market, thus it is sti l l considered an upgrade overall. 
The volume of exports to the EU and Japan in 2012 is higher in absolute figures than in 
2002. 
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Secondly, in the Mutual Expansion and Reverse Competition categories the 
majority shares of the combined shares for this two categories across 
different quartiles are found in Quartiles 1 and 2, with 16.4% out of 25.0% 
of total imports from Malaysia.  This pattern of distribution of Mutual 
Expansion + Reverse Competition category disaggregated by PRODY 
quartiles reinforces the finding that imports from Malaysia into the US 
have been upgraded.  
 
Overall, the imports from Malaysia switch from Mutual Expansion to 
Competitive from 2002 to 2012, the competitive analysis revealing that the 
competition is mainly for the first and second most sophisticated levels of 
E&E products. The import structure reveals that Malaysia has upgraded the 
sophistication of its E&E products.  
 
Next, based on type of goods analysis, the structure of imports from 
Malaysia in the US market is found to be changing, with the majority 
comprising Capital Goods, shifting to Parts and Accessories from 2002 to 
2012.  Only three types of goods are considered in the BEC categorisation 
in Table 6.6 below, namely Capital Goods, Parts and Accessories and 
Durables, as the other unlisted categories make up a negligible share of the 
imports from Malaysia.   
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Table 6.6 Competitive Analysis by BEC Categorisation: US Market 
      2002   2012 
Product Code Results 
No. of 
Prod.  
% of 
Total 
Import 
% of 
E&E 
No. of 
Prod. 
% of 
Total  
Import 
% of 
E&E 
41 Capital  Competitive 29 8.5 10.3 44 25.0 39.1 
 Goods M. Expansion 65 33.0 39.9 44 2.2 3.4 
 (except for R. Competition 1 0.0 0.0 4 0.9 1.4 
 transport M. Withdrawal  2 0.0 0.0 9 0.0 0.0 
 equipment) N.A. 34 0.0 0.0 30 0.0 0.0 
  Total 131 41.5 50.2 131 28.1 44.0 
42 Parts & Competitive 19 1.9 2.2 42 21.7 33.9 
 accessories M. Expansion 41 28.9 35.0 24 9.8 15.3 
  R. Competition 5 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 
  M. Withdrawal  4 0.0 0.0 4 0.0 0.0 
  N.A. 12 0.0 0.0 10 0.0 0.0 
  Total 81 30.8 37.2 81 31.5 49.2 
61 Durable Competitive 18 1.8 2.1 21 1.0 1.6 
  M. Expansion 19 8.3 10.0 15 2.8 4.4 
  R. Competition 0 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 
  M. Withdrawal  3 0.0 0.0 4 0.0 0.0 
  N.A. 26 0.0 0.0 25 0.0 0.0 
  Total 66 10.0 12.1 66 3.8 6.0 
  Grand Total  278 82.2 99.5 278 63.4 99.2 
Note: M.=Mutual, R.=Reverse  
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
 
As shown in Table 6.6, under Capital goods the relationship between 
Malaysian and Chinese E&E imports changes from Mutual Expansion in 
2002 to competing for the US market in 2012. In 2002, 39.9% of total 
Malaysian E&E imports to the US under Capital Goods is in the Mutual 
Expansion category, but by 2012 the Competitive category overtakes 
Mutual Expansion with 39.1% of total E&E imports. Comparing the share of 
each product in Malaysia’s total E&E imports into the US between 2002 
and 2012, the main item under Capital Goods to decline is Digital 
computers with cpu and input-output units (HS 847120). The item to gain 
the most in Capital Goods is telegraphic products and apparatus (HS 
851730 and HS 851782), which include modems and phone and data 
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network switches. This is in line with the analysis of the upgrading of the 
sophistication of Malaysia’s E&E products (see Chapter 8), with Dell 
Computer shifting its PC manufacturing from Malaysia while companies 
such as Solectron (later bought and renamed Flextronics) brought the 
manufacturing of the latest network switches into Malaysia. The shifts 
‘refocused on server and networking products after 2003, following the 
almost a complete loss of printed circuit board assembly for PCs and hard 
disk drives’, including bringing the most sophisticated network routers to 
Penang (Lüthje et al., 2013). Apart from Flextronics, other network switch 
manufacturers that have plants in Malaysia include Plexus and Jabil 
Circuits. These manufacturers do not own the brands but manufacture 
them for famous American network switch and router companies.   
 
In the Parts and Accessories category, Malaysia’s key exports items are 
Monolithic integrated circuits, digital (HS 854211), Monolithic integrated 
circuits non digital (HS 854219) and Parts and accessories of automatic 
data process (HS 847330). Comparing 2002 with 2012 in terms of share of 
imports of Malaysian E&E to the US market, the top growth item is 
Photosensitive semiconductor devices, photovoltaic  (HS 854140), which 
includes solar panel modules and LED lighting devices and rose from 0.7% 
in 2002 to 10.8% in 2012. Integrated circuits remain the most important 
item for Malaysia E&E imports into US, and from Mutual Expansion in 2002 
they are in competition with imports from China in 2012. The combined 
share of total US E&E imports from Malaysia of ICs represented by HS 
854211 and HS 854219 is 18.7% in 2002 and 22.4% in 2012.  Conversely, 
computer parts (HS 847330) exports to the US fell the most in line with 
Malaysia shifting away from supplying the PC market.82 The rise of 
photovoltaic devices can be attributed to the presence of the US MNC First 
                                                 
82 Computer Parts classified under (HS847330) drop from 11.03% in 2002 to 6.15% in 2012 
of total E&E imports from Malaysia into the US.  
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Solar, which has one of its biggest manufacturing facilities located in Kulim 
Hi-Tech Park in Kedah, the state next to Penang.  
 
As shown in Table 6.6, the Durable goods contribution to total US E&E 
imports from Malaysia drops from 12.1% to 6.0%, reflecting Malaysia’s 
withdrawal from supplying finished goods to the US, to be increasingly 
replaced by Chinese imports. Malaysia top loss product is colour television 
(HS 852810), which contracted from 6.6% in 2002 to 0.1% of Malaysia’s 
E&E imports into the US. Conversely, domestic vacuum cleaners (HS 
850910) increases its contribution to total US E&E imports from Malaysia 
from 0.03% in 2002 to 1.7% in 2012, becoming an important exports and 
this is related to the presence of the UK’s Dyson in the state of Johor.  
 
Imports from Malaysia were facing intense competitive pressure in the US 
market from Chinese imports by 2012. The structure of Malaysia’s imports 
into the US market, divided by level of sophistication and the EXPY” index 
show that it is upgrading its imports. Imports of the more sophisticated 
E&E products from Malaysia face competition. Finally, Malaysian imports 
structure disaggregated by type of goods confirms Malaysia’s withdrawal 
from the PC market in the capital goods segment, while increasing focus on 
high-value network switch and router products. In the Parts and 
Accessories segment, where the majority of imports from Malaysia are 
found, US-imported ICs now face competition from China, but photovoltaic 
and LED products are growing rapidly. Finally in the finished goods segment 
Malaysia loses in the television market but gains shares in the domestic 
vacuum cleaner market.  The changes in Malaysia’s E&E exports to the US 
from 1992 and 2012 at product level are broadly reflective of FDI presence 
in Malaysia.   
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6.3 Competitive Analysis: The European Union Market  
 
The majority of E&E products imported into the EU from Malaysia remain 
in a relationship of mutual expansion with China’s. Malaysia is offering 
more sophisticated imports to the EU based on the higher EXPY” index 
score compared to China, and the disaggregated import structure by level 
of sophistication analysis. A rising share of imports from Malaysia and 
China in the EU market for capital goods such as network and telegraphic 
products, and parts and accessories such as computer parts, maintains the 
overall Mutual Expansion relationship to EU markets over time. Despite 
this mutual expansion mode, Malaysia’s withdrawal from the PC market is 
still reflected in the type of goods analysis.  
 
Table 6.7 Competitive Analysis of EU markets 
  2002 2012 Difference 
Category No. of 
Prod. 
US$ bn % of 
E&E 
No. of 
Prod. 
US$ 
bn 
% of 
E&E 
No. of 
Prod. 
US$ 
bn 
% of 
E&E 
Competitive  65 0.6 6.3 122 2.9 20.5 57 2.2 14.2 
M. Expansion 234 9.4 92.6 131 11.0 78.3 -103 1.6 -14.4 
R. Competition  1 0.0 0.0 7 0.0 0.1 6 0.0 0.1 
M. Withdrawal  5 0.1 1.1 51 0.2 1.2 46 0.1 0.1 
N.A.  31 0.0 0.0 25 0.0 0.0 -6 0.0 0.0 
Total 336 10.1 100.0 336 14.0 100.0 - 3.9 - 
Source: Based on UNComtrade data  
 
The majority of China’s imports and Malaysia’s imports to the EU market 
are in the Mutual Expansion category, as shown in Table 6.7, which, 
despite falling from 92.6% of total E&E imports from Malaysia in 2002 to 
78.3% in 2012, remains well above the majority of E&E products. In the 
Competitive category, shares to total imports from Malaysia in the EU 
increase from 6.3% to 20.5%, also reflecting China’s increasing competition 
for imports into EU markets. Malaysia lacks clear winning products in the 
face of China’s competition, as represented by the miniscule share of its 
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imports in the EU categorised as Reverse Competition (imports share from 
Malaysia rising while imports share from China falling).   
 
At the products level, the combined codes Telegraphic apparatus (HS 
851730 and HS 851782) and Parts and accessories of automatic data 
process (HS 847330) are the two main items contributing to the Mutual 
Expansion relationship with China’s E&E imports to the EU. The value of 
Telegraphic apparatus (HS 851730 and HS 851782) imports from Malaysia 
rose from US$0.1 billion in 2002 to US$2.3 billion in 2012. Similarly, Parts 
and accessories of automatic data process (HS 847330) rose from US$ 1.0 
to 2.3 billion in the same period in strong contrast to the US market, where 
they fell from US$2.2 to 1.0 billion. A detailed table is available in Appendix 
6.2. Tracking the product codes backwards through the 2012 categories, 
Malaysian’ imports remain in mutual expansion with Chinese imports to EU 
markets. A detailed table is available in Appendix 6.3.  
 
E&E Imports from Malaysia to EU markets shows upgrading of the 
Malaysian E&E value chain. The EXPY” index was used to compare the 
sophistication of Malaysia and China’s imports at their destination markets. 
The competitiveness analysis of the E&E imports in the EU market from 
Malaysia disaggregated by PRODY index quartiles is presented next.  
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Figure 6.10 EXPY” of E&E Imports from Malaysia and China to EU Markets 
 
Source: Based on UNComtrade data 
 
The EXPY” index of Malaysia is generally above the EXPY” index of imports  
from China to EU markets except in 1998 and 1999, where China’s EXPY” 
briefly rises above Malaysia’s, which is 13918.2 in 1998 compared to 
China’s at 14920.2, and 13972.0 in 1999 with China’s at 15108.1. Although 
Malaysia’s EXPY” index is below China’s for these two years it should be 
noted that 1998 is an unusual year for Malaysia with the Asian Financial 
Crisis in full swing in Southeast Asia.  
 
Next, the competitive analysis disaggregated by sophistication level is 
presented in Table 6.8 below. By segregating E&E imports from Malaysia to 
the EU by level of sophistication the changes in import share of each 
quartile to total imports over time reveal whether Malaysia has upgraded 
its E&E value chain by offering higher sophistication exports to the EU. The 
other aim here is to examine whether the relationship between imports 
from Malaysia and those from China can be discerned by level of 
sophistication.  
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Table 6.8 Competitive Analysis of Malaysia and China in EU Imports Based on 
Sophistication 
  2002   2012 
  
No. of 
prod. 
% of 
total 
imports 
% of E&E 
No. of 
prod. 
% of 
total 
imports 
% of E&E 
export 
1st Quartile             
Competitive 14 1.7 2.5 27 4.1 7.7 
M. Expansion 61 7.0 10.3 41 12.1 23.0 
R. Competition 0 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 
M. Withdrawal  0 0.0 0.0 6 0.0 0.0 
N.A. 9 0.0 0.0 9 0.0 0.0 
Total 84 8.7 12.9 84 16.2 30.7 
2nd  Quartile   
 
        
Competitive 16 0.1 0.2 32 1.5 2.8 
M. Expansion 64 29.9 44.4 37 16.0 30.4 
R. Competition 0 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 
M. Withdrawal  0 0.0 0.0 12 0.07 0.1 
N.A. 4 0.0 0.0 2 0.0 0.0 
Total 84 30.1 44.6 84 17.6 33.4 
3rd Quartile   
 
        
Competitive 14 0.9 1.4 38 4.1 7.7 
M. Expansion 61 22.5 33.4 32 11.5 21.9 
M. Withdrawal  1 0.0 0.0 9 0.07 0.1 
N.A. 8 0.0 0.0 5 0.0 0.0 
Total 84 23.4 34.7 84 15.7 29.7 
4th Quartile             
Competitive 21 1.5 2.2 26 1.1 2.1 
M. Expansion 48 3.0 4.5 20 1.7 3.1 
R. Competition 1 0.0 0.0 5 0.03 0.1 
M. Withdrawal  4 0.7 1.1 24 0.5 0.9 
N.A. 10 0.0 0.0 9 0.0 0.0 
Total 84 5.2 7.8 84 3.3 6.2 
Grand Total  336 67.4 100.0 336 52.7 100.0 
Note: M. = Mutual, R. = Reverse  
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
 
 
Consistent with the US market experience, the import structure of 
Malaysia’s EU market is upgrading. Malaysia’s most sophisticated imports 
to the EU rose from 12.9% in 2002 to 30.7% of total E&E goods in 2012, as 
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shown in Table 6.8. Although in the second quartile from 2002 to 2012 
Malaysia’s share of total E&E imports to the EU fell from 44.6% to 33.4%, 
the share in the combined first and second quartile rises to 64.1% in 2012 
from 57.5% in 2002. Results in the third quartile see its shares fall from 
34.7% in 2002 to 29.7%, while shares in the fourth quartile barely change 
during the same period.  
 
Overall, the drop in the share of less sophisticated import goods in total 
E&E imports at destination markets and rise in the share of most 
sophisticated goods in 2012 compared to 2002 is a sign of Malaysia’s 
upgrading of its imports to the EU. Finally, majority shares of imports of 
Malaysia’s E&E into the EU within each PRODY quartile itself fall into the  
mutual expansion category.  
 
Next, the competitiveness analysis disaggregated by type of goods reveals  
that Malaysia’s E&E imports to the EU remain mainly in mutual expansion 
mode across Capital Goods, Parts and Accessories  and Durables. Parts and 
Accessories retains its position as the most important type of goods  
imported from Malaysia to the EU in 2012. This is similar to the US market, 
where Parts and Accessories become the most important imports from 
Malaysia and Capital Goods and Durable declined, although the degree of 
the decline is much lesser. The discussion at product level that follows 
reveals changes in Malaysia’s exports to the EU, despite Table 6.9 below 
not showing any notable changes between the shares of the different types 
of goods.  
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Table 6.9 Competitive Analysis by BEC Categorisation: EU Market 
      2002   2012 
Product Code Results 
No. of 
Prod. 
% of 
total 
Import 
% of 
E&E 
No. of 
Prod. 
% of  
total 
Import 
% of 
E&E 
41 Capital  Competitive 19 0.8 1.1 48 5.1 9.6 
 goods M. Expansion 96 27.7 41.2 46 15.8 30.0 
 (except for R. Competition 1 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 
 transport M. Withdrawal  1 0.0 0.0 24 0.6 1.1 
 equipment) N.A. 14 0.0 0.0 12 0.0 0.0 
  Total 131 28.5 42.3 131 21.4 40.7 
42 Parts & Competitive 18 2.4 3.6 33 4.6 8.6 
Accessories M. Expansion 56 30.3 45.0 38 22.9 43.5 
  R. Competition 0 0.0 0.0 2 0.0 0.0 
  M. Withdrawal  2 0.0 0.0 5 0.0 0.0 
  N.A. 5 0.0 0.0 3 0.0 0.0 
  Total 81 32.7 48.5 81 27.5 52.1 
61 Durable Competitive 19 1.0 1.5 19 0.9 1.6 
  M. Expansion 37 3.9 5.7 20 2.0 3.7 
  R. Competition 0 0.0 0.0 2 0.0 0.1 
  M. Withdrawal  2 0.7 1.1 18 0.1 0.1 
  N.A. 8 0.0 0.0 7 0.0 0.0 
  Total 66 5.6 8.3 66 2.9 5.5 
  Grand Total  278 66.8 99.1 278 51.8 98.3 
Note: M.=Mutual, R.= Reverse  
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
 
The top capital goods gaining shares of total Malaysian imports to the EU 
market in 2002-2012 are similar to those to the US, namely telegraphic 
products and apparatus (HS 851730 and HS 851782); the top decline in 
terms of share are computers industry related such as Computer input or 
output units (HS 847192) and Computer data storage units (HS 847193) 
(hard disk drives), despite Computer data storage remain as the second 
most important import in the capital goods category in 2012. The change 
reflects Malaysia’s loss of the PC manufacturing segment, as discussed in 
Chapter 8.  
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Parts and accessories remains the major type of products imported from 
Malaysia to the EU. The top import item is the IC (HS854211 and 
HS854219) at 22.9% of E&E imports in 2002, falling slightly to 19.3% in 
2012, but ICs are also the product with the largest loss in terms of share. 
Conversely, shares of Parts and accessories of automatic data process (HS 
847330) increase from 10.2% in 2002 to 16.5% in 2012, and this is the 
fastest growing import category, opposing the declining trend in the US 
and Japan markets. Computer parts here relate to network adapter cards 
for PCs, and are mostly manufactured by the Electronic Manufacturing 
Services (EMS) segment. Second, Photosensitive semiconductor devices, 
photovoltaic (HS 854140) have become important, increasing from 2.4% of 
Malaysia’s E&E exports to the EU in 2002 to 4.8% in 2012. This is reflective 
of the presence of FDI in Malaysia. Formerly known as Q-Cells, a German 
based solar module manufacturer has a plant in Selangor, Malaysia, and 
Osram Opto-semiconductors, which is increasingly shifting to 
manufacturing LED lighting products, has a long history in Penang.  83  
 
Malaysia’s imports of Durables to the EU fell from 8.3% in 2002 to 5.5% of 
in 2012 and lost importance as an import category. Consistent with the US 
market, the highest growth of durable products between 2002 and 2012 is 
in Domestic Vacuum Cleaners (HS 850910), while Malaysia’s share of the 
EU market for audio products such as sound reproduction apparatus and 
radio receivers goes into further decline.  Again, this is due to changing FDI 
patterns (see Chapter 8).  
 
In conclusion, the majority of Malaysian E&E imports to the EU are largely 
in mutual expansion with Chinese E&E imports. The competitive analysis 
disaggregated by sophistication level reveals that Malaysia’s imports 
structure in the EU has upgraded from 2002 to 2012. Finally, the type of 
                                                 
83 Q-Cells has been restructured as Hanwha-Q-Cells, with the South Korean company 
taking over the company in 2012.  
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goods analysis finds that parts and accessories remain the most important 
types of goods imported from Malaysia to the EU. Malaysia’s imports to 
the EU are different from those to the US, with computer parts gaining in 
the EU market.  However, Malaysia is withdrawing from exporting PC and 
audiovisual products such as televisions, similar to the US market. Again, 
the trade patterns are influenced by the presence of FDI in Malaysia.  
 
6.4 Competitive Analysis: The Japanese Market 
 
In the Japanese market, close to 90.0% of products imported from 
Malaysia in various categories in 2002 were facing competition from 
imports from China by 2012. Competitive analysis of E&E Imports from 
Malaysia into Japan disaggregated by PRODY quartiles again displays 
upgrading, based on the higher share of products in the first and second 
levels of sophistication. Secondly, Malaysia and China compete in the 
imports of sophisticated E&E goods, including ICs, to the Japanese market. 
The type of goods analysis shows that Japan is structurally different in that 
about a fifth of its imports from Malaysia are durable goods, in contrast to 
the US and EU markets, where durables are no longer a significant part of 
Malaysia’s imports by 2012.  
 
Table 6.10 Competitive Analysis: Japan 
  2002 2012 Difference 
Category No. of 
Prod. 
US$ 
bn 
% of 
E&E 
No. of 
Prod. 
US$ 
bn 
% of 
E&E 
No. of 
Prod. 
US$ 
bn 
% of 
E&E 
Competitive  79 0.7 14.3 127 3.3 60.8 48 2.6 46.5 
M. Expansion 136 3.9 83.3 70 1.7 31.0 -66 -2.2 -52.4 
R.  Competition  11 0.1 2.3 14 0.4 8.2 3 0.3 5.9 
M. Withdrawal  3 0.0 0.1 32 0.0 0.0 29 0.0 -0.1 
N.A.  107 0.0 0.0 93 0.0 0.0 -14 0.0 0.0 
Tota l  336 4.7 100.0 336 5.4 100.0 - 0.8 - 
Note: M.=Mutual, R.=Reverse Competition  
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
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China competes with Malaysia for Japan’s E&E, as shown in Table 6.10 
above. More Malaysian E&E products face competition with imports from 
China in 2012 than in 2002, as the Competitive category share of 
Malaysia’s total E&E imports rises by 46.5%, and the Mutual Expansion 
category falls by 52.2%. Interestingly, in 2012 in the Reverse Competition 
category the Japanese market’s share of E&E total imports rose from 2.3% 
in 2002 to 8.2%. This is discussed further under competitiveness analysis 
based on type of goods.  
 
Table 6.11 Distribution of Competitive Analysis Outcomes in 2012 to 2002  
According to E&E Product codes (Japan Market)  
Category 
No. 
Prod 
US$  
bn 
% of 
E&E 
Category 
No. 
Prod 
US$  
bn 
% of 
E&E 
Competitive 33 0.4 9.5 Competitive 127 3.3 60.8 
M. Expansion 85 3.6 77.0 
   
  
R. Competition 5 0.1 2.1 
   
  
M. Withdrawal 1 0.0 0.1 
   
  
N.A. 3 0.0 0.0 
   
  
Total 127 4.2 88.7         
 
       
Competitive 24 0.2 4.1 M. Expansion 71 1.7 31.0 
M. Expansion 30 0.2 3.2 
   
  
R. Competition 4 0.0 0.0 
   
  
N.A. 13 0.0 0.0 
   
  
Total 71 0.3 7.4         
 
       
Competitive 5 0.0 0.1 R. Competition 14 0.4 8.2 
M. Expansion 3 0.1 1.5 
   
  
N.A. 6 0.0 0.0 
   
  
Total 14 0.1 1.6         
        
Competitive 12 0.0 0.6 M. Withdrawal 31 0.0 0.0 
Mutual Expansion 17 0.0 0.8 
   
  
R. Competition 2 0.0 0.2 
   
  
Total 31 0.1 1.6         
 
       
Competitive 5 0.0 0.0 N.A. 93 0.0 0.0 
M. Expansion 1 0.0 0.8 
   
  
M. Withdrawal 2 0.0 0.0 
   
  
N.A. 85 0.0 0.0 
   
  
Total 93 0.0 0.8         
 
       
Total  336 4.7 100.0 Total 336 5.4 100.0 
Note: M. = Mutual, R. = Reverse  
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
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Malaysia competes with China for E&E imports to Japan; 88.7% of all of 
Malaysia’s E&E imports to Japan in 2002 faced a competitive relationship 
with Chinese E&E imports in 2012, as shown in Table 6.11 above.  
Malaysia’s greatest competition with China in the Japanese market is for 
Monolithic integrated circuits, digital & Non-Digital (HS854211 and 
HS854219): the former’s export value of which falls from US$1.0 billion in 
2002 to US$ 0.7 billion in 2012. The top gain product in terms of share to 
the total Malaysia E&E imports into the EU that falls into the 
Complementary category is Telegraphic apparatus (HS 851730 and 
851782), which rises from US$50.1 million in 2002 to US$672.9 million in 
2012. Malaysia competes with China to export E&E products to Japan. A 
detailed table of the top items in Competitive, Mutual Expansion and 
Reverse Competition is available in Appendix 6.4. 
 
Next I examine whether imports from Malaysia to Japan display upgrading 
based on the “EXPY” index of Malaysian and Chinese imports at their 
destination markets, followed by a detailed analysis of competitive analysis 
based on PRODY index quartiles. The “EXPY” index of Japan’s E&E imports 
from Malaysia are consistently above those from China. Imports from 
Malaysia have a higher level of sophistication than Imports from China at 
the destination markets, as shown in Figure 6.11 below.  
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Figure 6.11 Malaysia and China EXPY” for E&E Imports into Japan  
 
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
 
The competitive analysis disaggregated by sophistication level reveals that 
Japan’s E&E imports from Malaysia reflect the upgrading of the latter’s E&E 
value chain from 2002 to 2012, as shown in Table 6.12 below. This is based 
on the share of the second quartile to the Malaysia’s total E&E imports into 
Japan declining from 43.9% in 2002 to 29.4% in 2012 and those of the first 
quartile correspondingly increasing from 9.3% to 29.6% of total E&E 
imports. The share of the third quartile also declines to a lesser degree 
from 2002 to 2012, while the fourth quartile remains the same. Overall, the 
level of sophistication of Malaysian imports to the Japanese market is 
growing.  
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Table 6.12 Competitive Analysis of Malaysia and China’s Imports to Japan based 
on Level of Sophistication 
  2002 2012 
  
No. of 
products 
% of 
total 
imports 
% of E&E 
No. of 
products 
% of 
total 
imports 
% of E&E 
export 
1st Quartile             
Competitive 12 0.6 1.5 25 2.3 13.2 
M. Expansion 32 3.3 7.8 25 2.8 16.3 
R. Competition 5 0.01 0.01 5 0.0 0.0 
M. Withdrawal  1 0.0 0.0 3 0.0 0.0 
N.A. 34 0.0 0.0 26 0.0 0.0 
Total 84 3.9 9.3 84 5.1 29.6 
2nd Quartile             
Competitive 19 1.3 3.2 40 3.6 20.8 
M. Expansion 47 17.0 40.6 18 1.2 7.2 
R. Competition 1 0.0 0.1 3 0.2 1.4 
M. Withdrawal  0 0.0 0.0 6 0.0 0.0 
N.A. 17 0.0 0.0 17 0.0 0.0 
Total 84 18.4 43.9 84 5.1 29.4 
3rd Quartile             
Competitive 21 2.9 6.8 34 2.5 14.7 
M. Expansion 36 8.5 20.3 16 0.8 4.4 
R. Competition 1 0.5 1.2 4 0.7 3.9 
M. Withdrawal  1 0.0 0.1 9 0.0 0.0 
N.A. 25 0.0 0.0 21 0.0 0.0 
Total 84 11.9 28.5 84 4.0 22.9 
4th Quartile             
Competitive 27 1.1 2.7 29 2.1 12.1 
M. Expansion 21 6.1 14.7 11 0.5 3.1 
R. Competition 4 0.4 1.0 2 0.5 2.9 
M. Withdrawal  1 0.0 0.0 13 0.0 0.0 
N.A. 31 0.0 0.0 29 0.0 0.0 
Total 84 7.7 18.3 84 3.1 18.1 
Grand Total  336 41.8 100.0 336 17.3 100.0 
Note: M.=Mutual, R.=Reverse  
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
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The majority of Malaysian imports face competition from Chinese imports 
across all levels of sophistication except for Quartile 1. The top item in the 
Mutual Expansion category in Quartile 1 is telegraphic apparatus (HS 
851730 and HS 851782). However, within Quartile 1 in 2012, the share of 
products categorised as Competitive stood at 13.2% of total E&E imports, 
not far behind the 16.3% share categorised as Mutual Expansion. 
Conversely, competition in the Japanese market for the second quartile is 
mainly due to competition from China for Monolithic Digital and Non-
digital ICs (HS 854211 and HS 854219).  
 
Based on the competitive analysis disaggregated by level of sophistication 
for the Japanese market, E&E imports from Malaysia upgrade from 2002 to 
2012. The majority of Malaysian’ imports compete with Chinese exports at 
all levels of sophistication except the most sophisticated segment. It is also 
notable that in the Mutual Expansion category the majority shares at all 
levels of sophistication are in Quartile 1, at 16.3% out of the 31.0% of total 
imports from Malaysia categorised as Mutual Expansion. This reinforces 
the finding that imports from Malaysia to Japan are being upgraded.  
 
Next I present findings of the competitiveness analysis disaggregated by 
type of goods in the Japan market. The analysis found that unlike the US 
and EU market trends the Japanese structure is unique: first, Malaysian 
imports of Parts and Accessories to Japan decline as a share of the total, 
and secondly, Malaysia retains a sizeable share of Japan’s durable imports, 
which contains household electrical goods from 2002 to 2012. As shown in 
Table 6.13 below, shares of total E&E imports of Parts and Accessories 
declined from 41.3% in 2002 to 35.8% in 2012 and the share of durables 
remains sizeable and largely unchanged at around 22.0%.  
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Table 6.13 Competitive Analysis by BEC Categorisation: Japanese Market 
      2002   2012     
Product Code Results 
No. of 
Prod. 
% of 
total 
Import 
% of 
E&E 
No. of 
Prod. 
% of  
total 
Import 
% of 
E&E 
41 Capital  Competitive 26 3.6 8.5 44 3.4 19.5 
 goods M. Expansion 47 9.8 23.5 27 3.3 19.0 
 (except for R. Competition 6 0.5 1.2 8 0.3 1.6 
 transport M. Withdrawal  2 0.1 0.1 9 0.0 0.0 
 equipment) N.A. 50 0.0 0.0 43 0.0 0.0 
  Total 131 14.0 33.4 131 6.9 40.0 
42 Parts & Competitive 24 1.9 4.5 38 4.8 27.8 
 accessories M. Expansion 41 15.1 36.1 17 1.4 8.0 
  R. Competition 1 0.3 0.8 3 0.0 0.0 
  M. Withdrawal  1 0.0 0.0 9 0.0 0.0 
  N.A. 14 0.0 0.0 14 0.0 0.0 
  Total 81 17.3 41.3 81 6.2 35.8 
61 Durable Competitive 13 0.4 0.9 20 2.1 12.2 
  M. Expansion 21 8.9 21.3 10 0.6 3.4 
  R. Competition 4 0.1 0.3 2 1.1 6.6 
  M. Withd 0 0.0 0.0 8 0.0 0.0 
  N.A. 28 0.0 0.0 26 0.0 0.0 
  Total 66 9.4 22.4 66 3.8 22.2 
  Grand Total  278 40.6 97.1 278 16.9 98.1 
Note: M.=Mutual, R.=Reverse  
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
 
The relationship between Japan’s Malaysian and Chinese E&E imports of 
capital goods is almost equally split between Competitive (19.5% of total 
imports) and Mutual Expansion (19.0% of total imports) in 2012.  However, 
the degree of competition has increased in the capital goods category, with 
only 8.5% of total imports in 2002 facing competition from China, rising to 
19.5% by 2012. At the product level, Malaysia loses in the computer 
industry with four out of ten items in the Competitive category with the 
largest decline in share of Malaysian imports related to the computer 
industry (HS 8471). The top category is again telegraphic products and 
apparatus (HS 851730 and HS 851782), rising from 1.1% to 12.4% of 
Malaysia’s total E&E imports in Japan.  
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Looking at parts and accessories, the top import is again computer 
industry-related. The combined share of Malaysian E&E imports to Japan of 
HS 854211 and HS 854219, Integrated Circuits, notably drops from 22.0% in 
2002 to 12.6% in 2012, with the highest loss of share in Parts and 
Accessories. Parts and accessories of automatic data process (HS 847330) 
also declined from 5.5% in 2002 to 2.1% of E&E imports in 2012. 
Conversely, as in the US and EU markets, Photosensitive semiconductor 
devices, photovoltaic (HS 854140) rise from 1.8% in 2002 to 5.3% in 2012 as 
product gaining the biggest share of total E&E imports. Interestingly, 
Malaysia’s imports of Parts for radio/tv transmit/receive equipment, nes 
(HS 852990) in the Japanese import market also grow from 2.5% to 4.1%, 
reflecting the presence of Japanese FDI in Malaysia in the form of Sharp 
and Panasonic’s television manufacturing facilities and Panasonic’s has a 
solar module manufacturing facility in Kulim Hi-Tech Park in Kedah.   
The fall from 41.3% in 2002 to 35.8% of Malaysia’s E&E imports of Parts 
and Accessories in 2012, diverges from the common understanding within 
the regional production network literature, where Malaysia increasingly 
specialises more in parts and components exports while relinquishing more 
of its final goods trade. The decline in Japan’s demand for Parts and 
Accessories can be explained by the shift of its manufacturing base to 
China. The fall in Monolithic Digital ICs imports to Japan are counteracted 
by increasing digital IC exports from Malaysia to China, driven by user 
industries such as mobile phones, tablets, and household electrical 
production capacity, which are increasingly moving to China from around 
the world. For example, Malaysian exports to China of HS Monolithic 
Integrated Circuits, Digital (HS 854211) in 2002 had a value of only US$0.6 
billion compared to US$5.5 billion in 2012. According to field interviews, 
Japanese E&E firm are going factory-light, no longer manufacturing but 
sourcing products from China. Secondly, Japanese E&E firms lost their 
market leader status to Korean giants such as Samsung and LG in the area 
195 
 
of consumer electronics in the late 1990s and therefore required fewer 
parts and components as they produce and sell less in the global market.  
 
Finally, as shown in Table 6.13, Malaysia’s share of the Japanese market for 
Durable Goods, remains at 22.2% in 2012 compared to 22.4% of total E&E 
imports to Japan in 2002. However, the relationship between Malaysian 
and Chinese durable goods imports into Japan switches from Mutual 
Expansion to Competitive from 2002 to 2012. Interestingly, the top 
products here are in the Reverse Competition category. Durables remain 
an important import to Japan for Malaysian companies. The product that 
increases its quantum of share to the total E&E imports in durable import is 
the same as in the US and EU markets, namely domestic vacuum cleaners 
(HS 850910). The domestic vacuum cleaner and audio products such as 
Radio receivers, portable, with sound recording or reproducing apparatus – 
commonly known as MP3 players (HS 852711) –gaining a share of 
Malaysia’s E&E imports to Japan from 2002 to 2012 and account for the 
bulk of the 6.6% of imports to Japan under Reverse Competition in the 
Durable category. This import from Malaysia is strong in the face of 
competition from China.  
 
Durable products’ resilience in the Japanese market is partly explained by 
FDI presence in Malaysia. Imports from Malaysia of domestic vacuum 
cleaners (HS 850910), are improved by the presence of the UK’s Dyson, 
which has a plant in Senai, Johor, and Panasonic also has a vacuum cleaner 
plant in Shah Alam, Selangor. 
 
Malaysia’s E&E imports to Japan face competition from China. Based on 
competitive analysis disaggregated by sophistication, Malaysia has 
upgraded its imports structure over time. The Japanese market is unique 
among the three destination markets in that about a fifth of its imports 
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from Malaysia are durable goods (finished goods). This again reflects 
Japanese FDI in Malaysia.  
 
6.5 Malaysia’s response to the loss of its durables market in the US 
and EU  
 
Apart from upgrading, taking the example of durable imports to the US 
such as colour televisions, Malaysia is diverting its exports to Middle East 
markets as a response to China’s rise. The top import item that saw its 
share to Malaysian E&E imports decline in the US is Colour television 
receivers/monitors/ projectors (HS 852810), which fell from US$1.3 billion 
or 6.6% of total E&E imports to US$ 18.4 million or 0.1% by 2012.  
 
In the EU, Malaysia’s imports of audio-visual equipment went into further 
decline.  Products such as Radio-telephony receiver, with sound 
reproduce/record (HS 852731) fell from 2.9% of E&E imports to the EU in 
2002 to 1.1% in 2012; Colour television receivers/monitors/ projectors (HS 
852810) declined from 1.1% to 0.6%, and Other sound reproducing 
apparatus (such as transcribing machines) (HS 851999) also declined from 
1.0% in 2002 to 0.4% in 2012.  
 
On the other hand, China has 28.1% of the US import market for Colour 
television receivers/monitors/projectors (HS 852810) by 2012, as shown in 
Table 6.14 below. In contrast to the decline in the US and EU market for 
durables, Colour television receivers/monitors/projectors (HS 852810) 
remain an important for Malaysian exports to Japan, maintaining at US$0.5 
billion (31.8%) in 2002 to US$0.5 billion (18.5% of total Japanese imports of 
colour television imports) in 2012. Despite this, colour television switches 
from Mutual Expansion in 2002 to a Competitive relationship with Chinese 
imports by 2012 based on competitiveness analysis in the previous section.   
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Table 6.14 Colour Television (HS 852810) Imports at Destination Markets: 
Comparison of China and Malaysia’s market shares 
 Destination China: share of total imports  Malaysia: share of total imports  
  1992 2002 2012 1992 2002 2012 
US  4.6% 7.8% 28.1% 7.7% 13.0% 0.1% 
EU  3.7% 1.7% 12.3% 3.2% 0.9% 0.3% 
Japan 4.7% 42.0% 62.5% 18.0% 31.8% 18.5% 
Source: Based on UNComtrade data 
 
Malaysia’s resilience in the Japanese television market is supported by 
Japanese FDI in Malaysia, notably Sharp and Panasonic televisions, which 
are produced in Malaysia. Sharp has moved much of its manufacturing 
facility from Japan to Batu Pahat, Johor (interviewee 4). Another possible 
explanation could be geographical distance, as Malaysia is closer to Japan 
than to the US and EU, and with televisions bulky items, the cost of 
transportation could also play a role in Japan’s continuing imports of colour 
televisions from Malaysia.  
 
This rest of this section discusses Malaysia’s withdrawal from importing 
Colour television receivers/monitors/projectors (HS 852810) to the US and 
EU, with reference to the household electrical sector in general. It 
discusses Malaysia’s firm-level response to China’s rise in E&E and answers 
the research question: How are Malaysia’s firms responding to the rise in 
China’s E&E trade and investment?84  
 
In this discussion of Malaysia’s withdrawal from the television industry at 
the destination markets, some export data is discussed in conjunction with 
the equivalent import data to give a fuller picture of the television industry. 
China is the world biggest exporter of colour televisions in 2012, as shown 
in Table 6.15 below. The high growth of China’s television exports data 
                                                 
84 Malaysian respond in investment aspects is in Chapter 8.  
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coincide with the rise of China’s electrical goods MNCs such as ChangHong, 
Haier and Skyworth. 
 
Table 6.15 World Exports of Colour Television (HS 852820) by country 
Country 
1992 
US$ 
bn 
WMS 
% Country 
2002 
US$ 
bn 
WMS 
% Country 
2012 
US$ 
bn 
WMS 
% 
Japan 2.4 20.5 Mexico 6.7 20.5 China 21.8 25.0 
S.Korea 1.4 12.7 Japan 3.7 11.3 Mexico 17.5 20.1 
Mexico 1.3 11.7 Malaysia 2.2 6.9 Slovak Republic 6.4 7.4 
Singapore 1.3 11.4 China 2.2 6.8 Poland 4.9 5.6 
Germany 1.0 8.7 Korea, Rep. 2.1 6.3 Hungary 3.8 4.4 
Malaysia 0.8 7.2 Turkey 1.5 5.1 Malaysia 3.7 4.3 
Thailand 0.7 5.8 France 1.4 4.5 Czech Republic 2.4 2.7 
US 0.6 5.0 Spain 1.2 4.2 Germany 2.3 2.6 
China 0.5 4.6 Thailand 1.1 3.8 Turkey 2.2 2.5 
Spain 0.4 3.8 Poland 1.1 3.3 Korea 1.8 2.1 
Others 1.0 8.5 Others 9.5 27.4 Others 20.4 23.4 
Total  11.4 100.0 Total  32.6 100.0 Total 87.2 100.0 
Source: Based on UNComtrade data  
 
Although Malaysia competes with China to export Colour television 
receivers/monitors /projectors (HS 852810) to destination markets 
especially in the US, Malaysia adapted to China’s rise by diverting its 
exports to Middle East markets. The importance of the Middle East for 
Malaysia’s electrical products was affirmed in field interviews. As shown by 
the export data in Table 6.16, Malaysia has switched its main exports of 
colour television from its traditional markets such as Singapore and the US 
to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) by 2012. UAE is host to the Jebel Ali Free 
Trade Zone, where major Middle East distributors are located. Moreover, 
by 2012 Malaysia sources at least half of the parts for its colour television 
production from China (see Table 6.17). Overall, Malaysia still manages to 
increase its exports of colour televisions from US$2.2 billion in 2002 to 
US$3.7 billion in 2012 in absolute terms. 
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Table 6.16 Exports of Malaysian Colour Televisions (HS 852810) by Destination, 
Malaysia as Reporter 
Destination 
1992 
US$ 
bn 
Share 
of 
tota l  
(%) 
Destination 
2002 
US$ 
bn 
Share 
of 
tota l  
(%) 
Destination 
2012 
US$ 
bn 
Share 
of 
tota l  
(%) 
Singapore 0.2 24.5 US 1.1 47.5 UAE 0.8 20.3 
US 0.1 15.2 Japan 0.5 22.1 Japan 0.5 13.4 
UAE 0.1 8.1 Singapore 0.2 8.6 Austra lia 0.5 13.0 
UK 0.1 7.4 UAE 0.1 6.2 India 0.3 8.3 
Germany 0.1 7.3 Austra lia 0.1 2.6 Saudi Arabia 0.3 7.7 
Japan 0.05 5.8 Belgium 0.04 1.6 Singapore 0.2 6.3 
HK 0.04 4.3 Finland 0.03 1.5 Vietnam 0.2 5.2 
Saudi Arabia 0.03 3.3 Saudi Arabia 0.03 1.4 Indonesia 0.2 4.8 
The Netherlands 0.03 3.2 Hong Kong 0.02 1.0 Thailand 0.2 4.6 
Chi le 0.02 2.9 Canada 0.02 0.8 New Zealand 0.1 2.6 
Others  0.1 17.9 Others  0.1 6.6 Others  0.5 13.8 
Tota l  0.8 100.0 Tota l  2.2 100.0 Tota l  3.7 100.0 
Source: Based on UNComtrade data 
 
 
Table 6.17 Imports of Parts for radio/tv transmit/receive equipment, nes (HS 
852990) from Trade Partners into Malaysia, Malaysia as Reporter 
Destination 
1992  
US$  
bn 
Share  
to  
Tota l   
(%) Destination 
2002  
US$  
bn  
Share  
to  
Tota l   
(%) Destination 
2012  
US$  
bn 
Share 
 to  
Tota l  
 (%) 
Japan 0.3 47.9 China  0.2 17.3 China  1.0 50.1 
Singapore 0.2 30.5 Japan 0.2 16.9 South Korea 0.3 13.5 
Other As ia 0.03 4.9 Sweden 0.1 9.7 Japan 0.2 10.4 
US 0.03 3.9 South Korea 0.1 9.5 Hong Kong 0.2 8.9 
Germany 0.03 3.8 US 0.1 8.4 Thailand 0.1 3.6 
South Korea 0.02 2.6 Singapore 0.1 7.1 Other As ia 0.1 3.5 
Hong Kong 0.01 1.9 Hong Kong 0.1 6.3 Singapore 0.1 2.6 
China  0.01 1.0 Thailand 0.1 5.1 US 0.04 2.0 
UK 0.01 0.8 Other As ia 0.1 4.6 Sweden 0.02 1.1 
Sweden 0.01 0.7 Indonesia 0.04 3.8 Phi l ippines 0.01 0.7 
Others  0.01 2.0 Others  0.1 11.4 Others  0.1 3.5 
Tota l  0.7 100.0 Tota l  1.1 100.0 Tota l  2.1 100.0 
Source: Based on UNComtrade data 
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Field interviews captured issues in the electrical sector not identified by 
quantitative analysis. For example for some local Malaysian companies in 
the electrical sector that do not manufacture all the things they sell, 
China’s impact is positive. A Penang-based electrical company, Pen1, out-
sources much of its manufacturing to China, but keeps the market 
information, trading, brand name and technology in Malaysian hands. The 
strategy is to take advantage of the competitive price of Chinese’ 
manufacturing while increasingly selling products under Malaysian brand 
names in ASEAN, with and forays into Middle East markets. In this sense, 
the rise of China is positive for this company in Malaysia. Interestingly, 
while Chinese products can compete with Pen1 in destination markets, but 
Pen1 works together with Chinese manufacturers for sourcing of supplies 
of its products. Therefore competition and complementary forces co-exist 
on the ground for industrialists. In a sectoral basis at the national level, 
some firms are negatively affected by competition from China, while others 
firms that benefit from its rise.85 Field interviews reveal it is not possible to 
decide whether China is purely a competitive or a complementary force; 
Pen1 finds it predominantly complementary to this Penang-based 
company. In game theory language, cooperative and compete strategies 
for the players are the solution to this game.    
  
When companies such as Pen1 source products from China the 
UNComtrade database records more exports from China, which tilts the 
bilateral trade balance towards deficit, but in reality Pen1 mentioned that 
at the company’s strategic level China helps medium-sized companies to 
manage risk. This is because in the E&E industry the fast rate of change in 
design and types of goods demanded involves investing in new 
                                                 
85 Smaller size Malaysian electrical firm such as Milux, which manufacture small electrical 
items such as fans, are reported to be negatively affected by Chinese competition 
(Euromonitor International, April  2013).  
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manufacturing lines, which cannot physically be changed fast and can be a 
risky investment.  
 
Apart from upgrading, Malaysian firms divert their exports to destinations 
other than their traditional markets such as the US, EU and Japan, such as 
the Middle East such as the colour TV exports. Finally, qualitative 
interviews in a Malaysian-owned company in the electrical sector revealed 
a complementary factor, namely managing investment risks.   
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
Malaysian E&E products face competition from China for imports to the US 
and Japan, while their relationship regarding EU markets is broadly one of 
mutual expansion. The structure of imports from Malaysia to these three 
markets shows consistency, with Malaysia upgrading its E&E exports. 
Malaysia changed from supplying finished goods to supplying more parts 
and accessories, except in Japan, showing its shifting role in the regional 
production network to be broadly consistent with the regional production 
network literature (Athukorala, 2009). In the Japanese market a sizeable 
proportion of imports from Malaysia remain durables, such as finished 
household electrical goods while the share of parts and accessories 
declines. In addition, Malaysia increasingly faces competition from China 
for IC chip imports to both the US and Japan. Consistent with the evolution 
of China’s E&E industry (see Chapter 4), this marks a change in Chinese 
exports from finished goods to more sophisticated parts and accessories 
such as IC chips.  The change may erode the complementary trade 
identified by scholars such as Athukorala and Kophaiboon (2014).  However, 
the case of China eroding the complementary trade simply by increasing its 
share of exports is not that straightforward, as discussed in Chapter 8 
(section 8.3).   
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This chapter has also found that while China competes for E&E imports, 
especially to the US and Japan, Malaysia has upgraded the sophistication of 
its imports to the three destination markets. Indeed the competition from 
Chinese for E&E imports is ‘a blessing in disguise, […] catalysing serious 
upgrading efforts’ Ernst (2004, pp. 113.) Competitiveness analysis 
disaggregated by sophistication also informs the debate between 
Shafaeddin (2004) and Lall and Albaladejo (2004) about whether China 
competes with its neighbours, since the level of the sophistication of their 
exports are different. This chapter has shown that China is competing in 
the most sophisticated parts and components. In the US and Japanese 
markets China’s ICs compete with those of Malaysia. Despite Malaysia 
upgrading its exports, it lacks clear winning products in the face of China’s 
competition.86 
 
A third major finding is that trade patterns are broadly in line with the FDI 
pattern that originates from the trade partner. This is more pronounced in 
the Japanese market than in any other.  Malaysia’s Imports of durables to 
Japan are resilient, despite the competitive pressure from Chinese imports 
in 1992-2012. This could be partly explained by the heavy Japanese MNC 
presence in Malaysia’s E&E sector (Edgington and Hayter, 2013).  Another 
example of trade patterns being reflective of FDI presence is the loss of PC 
manufacturing, which is further elaborated in Chapter 8 when the Dell 
Computers case is discussed.  
 
Apart from upgrading, Malaysia’s loss of its durable goods market share at 
destination markets, as demonstrated in the case of colour televisions, 
Malaysia has responded by diverting its exports to the Middle East, 
                                                 
86 Although in Japanese market, domestic vacuum cleaners are gaining shares and falls 
into Reverse Category (Malaysia imports share rising, China’s imports share declining) 
under Competitive Analysis but it is again FDI related.  
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importing parts and components from China. The sourcing of parts from 
China is inconsistent with (Athukorala and Kophaiboon, 2014), who stress 
that China is at the receiving end of the parts and components trade. Field 
interviews with a Malaysian firm added the perspective that China is 
complementary to this Malaysian-owned medium-sized electrical company 
as it helps it to manage its investment risks.  
 
Although the findings in Chapter 6 show that China competes with 
Malaysia for E&E exports, based on competitiveness analysis at the 
destination markets such as the US and Japan, Malaysia’s total world 
exports of E&E actually increased from US$54.3 billion in 2002 to US$ 77.0 
billion in 2012. This increase was achieved despite falling exports to US 
markets and slow growth in the EU and Japan. Therefore it is important not 
to lose sight of the fact that this slower growth and decline in export 
volume in the case of the US were supported by demand from China, and 
that China is Malaysia’s number-one trade partner with a major role in the 
production network.  
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7.0 Product Upgrading by Semiconductor Equipment 
Manufacturers in Malaysia   
 
This chapter analyses China’s effect on backward linkages in Malaysia’s E&E 
industry. Backward linkages refer to supporting industries , and in this 
chapter the focus is on semiconductor backward linkages, in particular 
those in the semiconductor equipment machinery (SEM) industry that are 
directly involved in manufacturing IC chips, such as processors, memories, 
and amplifiers, under HS code 8542. Malaysia’s SEM exports grew on 
average by 15.5% per annum from US$0.6 billion in 2002, representing 
0.6% of Malaysia’s total exports, to US$2.8 billion, or 1.2% of total exports, 
in 2013. Although the contribution to total exports remains small, SEM is 
growing rapidly and has the potential capitalise on the semiconductor 
industry presence in Malaysia. Detail export value is in Table 7.1 below.  
 
Table 7.1 Export Value of the SEM industry in Malaysia 
  Total in US$ 
bn 
Share of Total 
Exports (%) 
Share of Total Manufactured 
Exports (%) 
2002 0.6 0.6% 0.8% 
2003 0.7 0.7% 0.8% 
2004 1.0 0.8% 1.0% 
2005 1.3 0.9% 1.2% 
2006 1.4 0.9% 1.2% 
2007 1.5 0.8% 1.2% 
2008 1.3 0.7% 1.2% 
2009 1.3 0.8% 1.2% 
2010 2.4 1.2% 1.8% 
2011 2.6 1.1% 1.8% 
2012 3.7 1.6% 2.6% 
2013 2.8 1.2% 2.0% 
Note: For share of total manufactured exports  the denominator is obtained using 
summation of trade value of Chapter 5-8 of SITC Rev.3 nomenclature.  
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
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This chapter discusses the upgrading of Malaysia’s semiconductor value 
chain through the backward linkages. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
semiconductors are a major industry in the E&E sector, and here I provide 
a granular analysis of whether Malaysia has upgraded the backward 
linkages in its SEM segment, and whether China plays a role in in this 
upgrading. 87 
 
The upgrading of Malaysia’s SEM industry is related to the question of 
whether China’s rise has a competitive or a complementary effect on 
Malaysia’s semiconductor industry. This chapter finds that SEM has grown 
with China’s complementary effect, defined here as China creating new 
demand for Malaysian exports. This is significant, as Ernst (2004) has 
argued that China can still have a positive effect provided challenges 
caused by its rise spur Malaysia towards upgrading.  
 
This chapter also focuses on SEM because of the high technology and 
specialised skills used in its production. Sykes and Yinug (2006, p.3) 
describe how SEM ‘is used in perhaps the most complex and advanced 
manufacturing process in the world, the production of semiconductor 
devices’. Although much has been written about semiconductor industry in 
Malaysia, at present to the researcher’s best knowledge, scholars have yet 
to discuss Malaysia’s SEM industry in relation to the China’s rise in the 
region.  
 
Finally, it is important to establish whether China’s rise spurred Malaysia to 
upgrade. This question is answered by analysing trade data and a case 
study of Penang Vision Corporation (name changed) in Penang, a company 
that designs optical semiconductor inspection equipment.  
 
                                                 
87 Granular here simply means at a product level, in detail, as opposed to highly 
aggregated data such as in macro-economic level.  
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: the background to SEM in 
Malaysia is presented first, followed by the methodology, the data sources, 
and the findings. Towards the end of the chapter, various theoretical 
frameworks explaining the SEM industry in Malaysia are compared such as  
spin-off theory (Klepper, 2002) and spatial embeddedness. Finally the 
chapter concludes that China is complementary to the SEM segment, with 
special reference to semiconductor wafer test machines.  
 
7.1  Backward linkages of the semiconductor industry in Malaysia 
 
To provide a background, SEM can be divided according to the five major 
stages of semiconductor production as shown in Figure 7.1 below. 
Malaysia’s role in the semiconductor GVC, which specialises in assembly 
and testing, influences the country’s strength at producing machinery for 
this stage of processing in the semiconductor industry. The operations of 
semiconductor companies in Penang started with assembly and testing in 
the 1970s. As the semiconductor industry grew, the local supporting 
industry began to evolve from initially dominated by Japanese SMEs 
(Rietema and Velden, 2013). By the 1980s and 1990s a group of Malaysian-
owned companies, which began as SMEs, emerged from initially providing 
jigs and fixtures for semiconductor companies to building the machines 
themselves and become public-listed companies.  
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Figure 7.1 Semiconductor Equipment Manufacturing Industry Structure 
 
Source: US International Trade Commission (1991) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 maps the semiconductor industry in Malaysia. SEM is linked to 
the semiconductor industry especially in Penang State. 
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Figure 7.2 Map of Semiconductor Industry in Malaysia 
 
Source: MIDA 
 
Figure 7.3 Example of the Backward Linkage of Penang SEM to a Semiconductor 
Manufacturer (Inari Bhd)  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on interview data and Corporation B (2008) 
 
Ernst’s GPN framework (Chapter 2) encompasses the backward linkages of 
the semiconductor industry (Ernst, 2004). Thoburn (1973) defined a linkage 
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as ‘an investment opportunity offered by one industry to another’ and 
according to Hirschman (1958, in Thoburn 1973, pp. 91-92) ‘backward 
linkages’ is defined as ‘investment in industries the production of inputs for 
the industry in question’. For backward linkages definition, the input here 
specifically refers to the production machinery for the industry in question, 
namely the semiconductor industry.88 Figure 7.3 above illustrates an 
example of the link between semiconductor companies and Malaysian SEM 
players in Penang. SRM, Vitrox, and TT Vision supply test handler machines 
used to automate inspection of ICs packaged by Inari-Amertron Bhd in 
Penang. For simplicity, Inari-Amertron is referred as Inari Bhd in this 
chapter. 
 
Recall that Alavi (2002) argues that Malaysia’s export-oriented industries 
such as electronics and its import substitution industries such as steel and 
automobiles are not linked, creating dualism in its industrial structure. 
Alavi describes Malaysia’s E&E industry as ‘basically an assembling activity 
and therefore the imported input contents are very high, 98 per cent of 
total outputs’ (Alavi, 2002, pp. 55).89 This high imported content continues 
to feature, as found in field interviews about the present semiconductor 
industry in Penang. However, as this chapter unfolds, and once the 
backward linkages are considered, a picture emerges that is different from 
Alavi’s description of Malaysia’s E&E industry.  
 
Secondly, while Taiwan and South Korea quickly adapted to the 
manufacturing process and upgraded to advanced manufacturing 
techniques in the IC industry, Malaysia is still dependent on foreign MNCs 
in the IC chip value chain. There is limited upgrading activity in the 
                                                 
88 As a further i l lustration of backward linkages, Thoburn shows that the primary 
commodities boom in Malaysia created demand for indigenous light engineering for 
mining machinery, especially in the tin mining industry. Details in Thoburn (1973).  
89 A Central Bank of Malaysia Report quoted in Alavi (2002, p.55), puts imported inputs 
around 80-85%, which is considered high import content for the electronics industry.  
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semiconductor industry but the Malaysian workforce has manufactured 
more complex products since 2000, and R&D activities for MNCs based in 
Malaysia. Manufacturing higher specification products than previously is 
regarded as product upgrading, and R&D is regarded as functional 
upgrading in the GVC literature. Malaysia’s case is different, with its major 
upgrading found in the backward linkages instead, and specifically in the 
SEM segment for the testing and assembly of IC chips.  
 
This SEM value chain is important. Field interviews found it to be one of the 
most dynamic areas for Malaysian-owned firms, the success of which was 
linked (without claiming causality) to China.  Therefore the SEM segment 
merits a closer look in the form of a case study at firm level.  
 
7.2 Methodology and data sources 
 
The methodology used in this chapter is both quantitative and qualitative. 
There are some similarities in the quantitative methods to those used in 
Chapter 6 but the data coverage is different, hence the discussion of the 
methodology is located in this chapter instead. 
 
The quantitative methods include balance of trade and revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA). Briefly, the balance of trade at the product 
level reveals which Malaysian products are likely to be competitive if they 
are in surplus. These surplus products are further examined for evidence of 
upgrading to see whether Malaysia is riding on China’s rise in the 
semiconductor industry. Next, the RCA is used to identify in which out of 36 
SEM products Malaysia has a comparative advantage. Detailed RCA 
formulae are provided in Chapter 3 and a full list of the 36 products is 
available in Appendix 7.1. 
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The trade codes for this chapter is based on HS 2002 nomenclature for 
data period of 2002-2013 for 36 product codes and this differs from the 
HS1988/92 nomenclature that was used in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  
This is because the HS 2002 nomenclature is better suited to reflect the IC 
production process, which is explained in section 7.2.1. SEM products 
contain only 3 of the 338 E&E products discussed in Chapter 6.90 A full list 
of SEM products by stage of production is available in Appendix 7.2. The 
switch to the use of HS2002 rather than the HS1988/92 nomenclature is 
because the earlier nomenclature HS1988/92 does not disaggregate the 
use of machinery into semi-conductor and non-semiconductor use.  
 
As a result of this switch to HS 2002 nomenclature the data period for this 
chapter is 2002-2013. While the disadvantage that some product items are 
not disaggregated into semiconductor use and non-semiconductor use 
remains even when HS2002 nomenclature is adopted, this problem is now 
minimised and most importantly, the main subject of discussion in this 
chapter, namely optical machines for wafer inspection, is not affected.  
 
Result findings based on balance of trade and RCA are compared with data 
gathered from field interviews with Penang-based semiconductor players, 
SEM players and Malaysian government officials. The SEM companies 
selected for study are mostly public listed companies. Non-public listed 
companies are included in the chapter if they are linked to the local 
production network traced backwards from Inari Bhd, a back-end 
semiconductor player. Due to access issues I used purposive sampling for 
interviews and relied on secondary sources such annual corporate reports 
to verify the findings. The list is checked against InvestPenang ’s list of 
                                                 
90 With the exception of HS codes 854311, 854389, 854390, all  other product codes 
covered in this chapter are not covered in the previous trade chapter with its 338 product 
codes.  
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Design 
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wafer 
companies and Grunsven (2006) list of automation companies (which 
includes jigs and fixture or machining companies) in Penang.   
 
7.2.1 The IC production process 
 
Next, the semiconductor value chain is based on the IC production process , 
is shown in Figure 7.4 below. An understanding of the IC production 
process is essential to explaining the coverage of the SEM products in this 
chapter.  
 
Figure 7.4 Semiconductor Machines by Stages of Productions in IC Industry  
 
Source: Adapted from Silterra Corporation Malaysia  
Available at: http://www.silterra.com/supply_chain.html  
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Figure 7.4 shows an overview of the production of semiconductors.91 The 
IC value chain begins with the design of the IC and photo-mask making. At 
the end of the IC design phase the IC is sent for a process called ‘taping out’ 
(part of the photo-masking stage) or prototyping, where its design is 
adjusted before it moves into the mass production process.  
 
The semiconductor production process can be generally divided into front-
end and back-end activity. The front-end process refers to the fabrication 
of silicon wafers, while the back-end process involves the packaging of the 
IC, which completes the IC production process. The front end of the 
semiconductor industry is higher value than back end because of the 
complexity of its production process. The machines used to fabricate the 
silicon wafer have higher-technology specifications than those at the back 
end. A full explanation of each step in the IC production process is available 
in Appendix 7.3.  
 
The fabrication of semiconductors is referred as the front-end of the 
industry and includes processing and testing the wafer. Once the wafer is 
fabricated it is tested using of customised probing machines to weed out 
defective wafers.  
 
After this the fabricated wafers are shipped to another location and 
assembly and packaging process called the back-end process. The 
fabricated wafers are sawed into individual units (referred to as die from 
this point forward), packaged and connected to a gold wire with a lead 
frame. The encapsulated ICs are then trademarked using lasers. In the final 
stage of production the IC chips are visually checked and tested to see that 
they function as intended. The chips that pass the tests are now ready for 
                                                 
91 The semiconductor is an umbrella term that covers IC, memory and amplifiers chips. In 
this section the words IC and semiconductors are used interchangeably.  
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shipment in the form of either tape or a tray. A graphic representation of 
the back-end process is available in the findings section (Figure 7.5). 
 
Finally, a qualitative case study is informative and can provide much 
needed detail on how China’s rise affects a particular industry. Although 
arguably not every industry would be affected by China in the same way, 
the SEM industry, and especially the testing segment, is at the core of 
Malaysian-owned companies’ specialisation and as such merit a closer 
look. This is a young industry in Malaysia – Penang Vision started in 2000 
and Aemulus in 2004 – and it is unclear at this point in time whether the 
success of semiconductor test machines will spread to other segments of 
Malaysia’s E&E industry.  
 
7.3 Findings  
 
Malaysia’s strength in the semiconductor industry is in the back-end or 
‘test and assembly’ segment of the industry. This segment is central to the 
discussion in this section. At times it is called automation, referring to the 
automation of the IC test and assembly operation that was previously 
carried out manually on an assembly line following initial inward FDI into 
Malaysia by MNCs in the IC packaging activity taking advantage of the 
country’s low labour costs in the 1970s.  
 
By the late 1990s this Malaysian low cost model became untenable after 
countries such as China, Vietnam and Cambodia offered themselves as low-
cost manufacturing bases for MNCs. However, as an early starter Malaysia 
has developed capability in the automation of assembly and test 
operations Malaysia is no longer engages in low-technology manufactures 
such as manual IC testing and assembly in the semiconductor value chain.  
As this chapter will reveal, there is more to Malaysia’s semiconductor 
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achievements than the generalisation that it performs low-technology test 
and assembly activities. 
 
7.3.1 Upgrading of the Semiconductor Equipment Manufacture 
Value Chain in Malaysia 
 
This section discusses the upgrading of the SEM value chain. Field 
interviews in Penang revealed that local chip-making companies used 
locally built and supplied SEM machines together with imported ones on 
their production lines. Malaysian firms and the machinery used at the back-
end of the semiconductor process are as follows: SRM specialises in 
manufacturing semiconductor test handlers; Pentamaster builds its own 
test handler machines and offers an automation service bundle; Vitrox 
specialises in optical inspection machines; TTVision provides solutions for 
optical inspection machines in semiconductors and has branched out into 
solar photovoltaic module machine inspection, Aemulus specialises in 
designing semiconductor tester machines; and Exis designs and builds ‘pick 
and place’ semiconductor machines.92 All the companies mentioned here 
are based in Penang except Exis, which is based in Seremban, Malaysia.  
 
A graphical representation of the participation of Malaysian’ SEM players’ 
participation in the back-end stage of production is shown in Figure 7.5 
below:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
92 Automation service bundle includes consultation services of how to automate the 
production line and this goes beyond semiconductor industry, Pentamaster has 
automation solutions for rubber glove (for medical use) industry. 
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Figure 7.5 Stages of Production in the Back-end Stage of Semiconductor 
Stages of Production Malaysian 
Semiconductor 
Equipment 
Manufacturers 
 
 
Note: Depending on the layout of factory shop floor, the figure above shows where SEM is 
l ikely to be located. Variations on factory shop floors are expected, but most have a final 
inspection and testing of the packaged IC.  
* Aemulus has recently built Radio-Frequency (RF) probe testing machines for the front-
end of semiconductors, which require higher technology than back-end machines.   
Source: Adapted from Chen et al. (2010), field interviews and secondary sources  
 
As shown in Figure 7.5 above, Malaysia’s firms concentrated on machinery 
for testing at the back end of the semiconductor industry. At firm level, this  
strategy is good as firms should concentrate on what they do best, but at 
the national industry level it is better to diversify into other back-end 
activities in the industry. Nevertheless, this represents a good start (for 
inspection machines) for Malaysian firms. Malaysian policymakers should 
encourage SEM firms to make more complex machines for semiconductor 
manufacturing at other stages of production as well.  
 
Next, Table 7.2 tabulates the characteristics of major SEM players in 
Malaysia. 
 
Inspection
Marking
Moulding
Wire Bonding
Die Attaching
Wafer Sawing
Wafer Grinding
Test Handler 
Machines – SRM, 
Aemulus*, TT Vision, 
Pentamaster, Exis 
Tech and Vitrox.  
Pick and Place 
Machines  
– Exis Tech  
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Table 7.2 SEM players with selected characteristics 
Companies  Year 
Founded  
Revenue 
(RM m) – 
Reporting 
Year 
Revenue 
(US$ m) 
No. of 
Employees 
Front-
End/Back-
End 
Inspection  
Pentamaster 
Corporation Bhd.  
1991 81.0 -2014 24.75 
 
 
226 Back-end 
automation 
solutions for 
other 
industries 
SRM  1996 Private 
information 
N.A. N.A. Back end 
TT Vision  2001 12.0 -2007 3.49 N.A.  Back end and 
solar wafer 
inspection 
Aemulus  2004  23.0 -2014 7.03 50 Front end 
and back end 
EXIS Tech  2002 54.0 -2011 17.65 70 Back end and 
dental 
imaging 
equipment 
Penang Vision  2000 169.9-2014 51.91 270 Back-end and 
PCB boards 
MMS Ventures 
Bhd 
1997 36.7-2014 11.21 80 Back end and 
LED 
inspection 
machines 
      
Inari Bhd * 2005  793,655 -
2014 
242,496 
 
1,320 N.A. 
N.A.=not available from private companies such as Aemulus and EXIS Tech. Employment 
and revenue data obtained from various media sources.  
*Revenue figures and no. of employees based on Inari -Amertron, a merger of Inari and 
Amertron.  
Source: Various  
 
 The main market for SEM products is mainly for exports to the US and 
China. Aemulus’s the main markets are China and the US (TV3 Channel 
Malaysia, 2014). MMSV’s main market is in the US and US MNCs based in 
Asia (Tan, 2014c). SEM players in Penang are competing internationally and 
this necessitates their constant innovation in the competitive environment.  
 
Most SEM equipment makers in Malaysia perform their own R&D. 
However, SEM’s R&D efforts would be classified as achieving level 5 of 
Rasiah’s taxonomy of different levels of R&D, a level short of the frontier 
R&D, meaning it can create new nodes or branches of products (Rasiah, 
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2010). This finding is consistent with interviews with Inari Bhd that 
advanced inspection machines for high tech RF chips requires higher 
specification machines are still being imported from Europe because local 
companies has yet to produce them. However, when Malaysia’s firm do 
make the back end inspection machines; SRM test-handler machines are 
said to be on par with a well-known Swiss-made test handler machines 
called ISMECA. 
 
Going forward, there are potential spinoffs from Malaysia’s testing 
equipment in the SEM cluster, since some firms are diversifying into other 
sectors with their knowledge of SEM machinery (see Table 7.2).93 For 
example, Pentamaster is providing automation machines for rubber glove 
manufacturers while Exis Tech has branched out into building dental 
imaging machines.  
 
Despite the downside of being concentrated on the testing segment of 
SEM, these are high-technology machines. 94 Penang Vision Corporation 
Berhad (see Table 7.2), which designs high-technology optical inspection 
machines, has been selected as a case study as it has the highest revenue 
among Malaysian-owned SEM players in Malaysia. Penang Vision also 
designs Advanced Optical Inspection (AOI) machines for PCB inspection in 
the assembly process. An AOI machine carries an indicative price of about 
US$123,000.95 They are highly specialised and requires a skilled workforce 
to produce and maintain them. They have to be reliable, given that the 
tested IC chips or boards will be embedded in the latest smartphones and 
                                                 
93 Clusters are defined ’as sectoral and spatial concentrations of firms ’ (Schmitz and Nadvi, 
1999).  
94 On average 6 products (HS code 903082, 903090, 903141, 903149, 903180, 903190) 
that test equipment comprised 57.95% of total SEM from Malaysia to China and 51.65% of 
Malaysia’s total SEM exports in 2002-2013 (see Appendix 7.4).  
95 US$ conversion based on £80,000, price of AOI machines obtained at a trade show in 
Farnborough England, therefore the indicative price is not specifically priced for Penang 
Vision-made machines.  
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tablets. This is a high-growth sector, outpacing industrial average growth 
from 2002-2013.96   
 
As a corporate strategy, Penang Vision differs from typical Malaysian mid-
size firms found in Penang. Penang Vision is a R&D driven company, with 
15% of its revenue reinvested into R&D every year, and two-thirds of its 
employees in R&D. Penang Vision does not manufacture its own products 
and subcontracts the building of its machines. More details are provided in 
the later part of this section where I discuss the company’s production 
network.  
 
As an example of its upgrading of its products, Penang Vision has won 
multiple awards for its machine vision products (for advance x-ray 
inspection of PCBs) including international awards such as the EDN award 
for Best in Test in 2014 and the NPI97 award in the test inspection category 
for its V810 model which has a throughput of 50,000 boards per hour.98 
These international awards prove that Malaysia’s firms are producing 
world-class SEM products. In the 2014 EDN test machines category Penang 
Vision joined other winners such as Opticon, based in the Netherlands, and 
Mirtec, which is headquartered in Seoul (Rowe, 2013). Penang Vision 
exemplifies the upgrading of the E&E value chain’s backward linkages.  
 
Notwithstanding the above achievements, field interviews revealed that 
Malaysian-made semiconductor machines are still a step below European-
made semiconductor machines which are used to inspect radio-frequency 
(RF) chip in the back-end segment. RF chips require higher-technology 
                                                 
96 See Figure 7.7, item under HS code 903082.  
97 NPI awards stands for Circuits Assembly New Product Introduction Awards. Circuits 
Assembly is a US-based magazine that specialises in circuit boards.  
98 EDN’s original name is Electrical Design News. EDN is part of the UBM Tech Network 
online community for the electronics industry. UBM Tech is a global media tech company 
that specialises in providing events at which important industrial players can discuss and 
display latest machines. 
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machines, and these are still supplied by European makers. However 
Aemulus in Penang recently made its maiden forage into a RF-front end 
tester segment with the Amoeba 7600 machine.99 The company was 
founded in 2004 and has experienced 60% growth on average per year. A 
news report states that there are only two companies capable of building 
RF probe testers, both in China, that compete with Aemulus in the Asian 
region’ (Karamjit Singh, 2013). Aemulus’s success in producing RF probe 
testers for the front-end segment again shows that Malaysia is upgrading 
its SEM products.  
 
Given the ultra-competitive environment in the semiconductor industry 
proper, producing capital goods for the semiconductor industry is a wise 
strategy for Malaysia’s future industrial policy. According to Moore’s Law, 
the speed of the microprocessor will double every six months, which also 
means that the price of microprocessors will halve every six months. This 
strategy also avoids competing head-on with China’s ambitious assault on 
the semiconductor market.  
 
Finally, referring to the chip making industry, Ernst (2004) points out that 
the high imported content of Malaysian E&E exports, due to its 
dependence on North American MNCs located in Malaysia, means minimal 
benefits for Malaysian firms. This is not the case with semiconductor 
inspection machines. A Malaysian SEM player revealed that 30-40% of the 
value of the final product is provided by local inputs in contrast to the 
much lower local content in the semiconductor industry (interviewee 5).  
 
The case study of Penang Vision is presented to show its more extensive 
local linkages with SEM compared to the semiconductor industry to infer 
about higher local content within SEM products. As the discussion of 
                                                 
99 RF is Radio Frequency Wafer. These will  end up as RF-Chips that are used in 
smartphones or mobile tablets, for telecommunication purpose.  
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vendors and suppliers is sensitive due to the non-disclosure agreements 
amongst industry players in the E&E value chain, one way to track the 
suppliers is to trawl through the annual reports of a public listed company. 
Based on this method, three of the five vendors that list themselves as a 
vendor of Penang Vision are Malaysian companies, two of which are based 
in Penang. (Corporation B, 2008, pp.18-22.) The vendors in Penang supply 
opto-engineering and microscopy devices and the mechanical frame, 
including the laser-marking component, of the machine. The third known 
Malaysian company is based in Selangor and is a system integrator for 
production needs and a supplier of industrial computers. Although it 
cannot be generalised to the whole E&E industry in Penang, based on its 
annual reports Penang Vision displays a greater use of local vendors and 
content compare to the semiconductor industry. Triangulating this data 
with evidence from the qualitative interviews, it is likely that 30-40% local 
content in optical semiconductor testing devices  is a reasonable estimate. 
This is higher than the semiconductor (chip-making) industry national 
average, based on low value-adding figures. In the chip-making industry, 
the majority of inputs consist of wafers that are fabricated overseas and 
imported for further processing.  
 
Another important criterion for an industry that displays upgrading, as 
Ernst (2004) points out is the network of producers. Penang Vision supplies 
SRM, a major test handler manufacturer based in Penang and a major 
customer for Vitrox’s machine vision systems.100 A newspaper reports that 
SRM orders provide up to 65% of Vitrox’s revenue (Loong, 2007). To fulfil 
its orders Penang Vision outsources its manufacturing to its subcontractors. 
This allows it to focus on the design and development of new machines. 
Some of its suppliers include Penang-based MID mechatronics, which 
                                                 
100 Test handler machines l ift individual IC chips/die from a specially built tray and scan 
them using a machine vision for quality control. Then the machine arranges the chips on a 
tape or discards them. 
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supplies mechanical parts, metal machine frames and laser markers for IC 
production machines. Radiant Instruments, also based in Penang, supplies 
Penang Vision with vision light and optical and microscopy instruments, 
and Indelfe, a Selangor-based embedded systems manufacturer and 
industrial computers supplier that integrates systems and creates 
production-line solutions.   
 
Apart from this formal production network, field interviews revealed that 
informal networking is also crucial to the success of some successful 
companies in Penang. The Chairman of Penang Vision Corporation, Kiew 
Kwong Sen is also the CEO of Mini Circuits Technology Malaysia that is also 
based in Penang, is mentoring a group of Penang E&E entrepreneurs.  
There are also non-electronics industry mentors who play a part in SEM 
entrepreneurs’ success. Ng Sang Beng, the founder of Aemulus benefits 
from the advice and early-stage funding from Kwok Chok Bee, a venture 
capitalist based in Malaysia (Karamjit Singh, 2014). Finally, Penang Vision 
was founded by the a ex-Hewlett Packard (HP) employee, and when Agilent 
(an HP spin-off) wanted to sell off two business divisions, Advanced Optical 
Inspection (AOI) and Advanced X-Ray Division (AXI) in 2008, Penang Vision 
bought them both and re-hired the engineers from Agilent. The networking 
among E&E players in Penang beyond the firms that they worked in and of 
entrepreneurs networking with financiers shows the informal side of 
networking in Penang’s E&E industry.  
 
In conclusion, the case study of Penang Vision shows that SEM players are 
upgrading the value chain in Malaysia, although this has not been 
discussed in the literature. This upgrading conforms to Ernst (2004) criteria,  
which include higher use of local content and establishing a network in 
production.  
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7.3.2 Links to China?  
 
Having established SEM upgrading in Malaysia, the next question is 
whether Penang Vision’s upgrading is linked to China. To investigate this I 
use both primary data – interviews – and secondary data including trade 
statistics, press reports and annual corporate reports. 
 
 In Penang Vision’s 2008 Annual Report the managing director’s message 
specifically mentioned China: ‘Our improved AOI flagship products, 
Challenger HS1802 & VF-10 have been successfully accepted by our 
customers in China’ (Corporation B, 2008, pp.11.). Newspaper reports also 
present China as the main destination for Penang Vision’s exports 
products:‘[Penang Vision is] looking to appoint one agent in Taiwan, three 
in China and “one or two’’ in Malaysia’ (Loong, 2007). Logically, the number 
of agents in a geographical region can be indicative of the source and 
volume of business.  In addition, field interviews with Penang Vision’s co-
founder affirmed that demand from China aided the company’s expansion 
during the crucial years 2007-2008. 2007 is a high growth phase of Penang 
Vision, and 2008 saw Penang Vision acquires two divisions from HP to 
expand its product offering. China aided the rise of Penang Vision as a 
company through additional demand, as discussed later in this section.  
 
Although a bit of extension, TT Vision, based in Penang, which started with 
the manufacture of semiconductor test machines, branched out into 
designing tester machines for solar photovoltaic modules which it sells to 
Chinese solar module manufacturers.101 Although the photovoltaic module 
is not part of the IC industry it is relevant as it is within the E&E sector.   
 
                                                 
101 Based on interviews with policymakers in a government planning agency. 
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Quantitative analysis of the trade balance with China and the RCA index 
discussed in the next section finds that the trade data is consistent with the 
findings from the qualitative interviews as it reveals that semiconductor 
inspection machines are indeed Malaysian local firms’ strength. This 
section now looks at the foreign exchange rate and detailed trade data by 
destination to investigate China’s link to SEM demand at a case study level. 
I start with the trade balance.   
 
a) Trade Balance  
 
As shown in Figure 7.6 below, while the overall trade balance for SEM 
(based on 36 products) is negative (see Appendix 7.5), the SEM testing 
segment does not follow the overall trend. Testing machines reverted to 
trade surplus from 2010, and Optical instrument & appliances. for 
inspecting semiconductor wafers/devices/ for inspecting 
photomasks/reticles used in manufacturing semiconductor devices 
(HS903141) have been in trade surplus since 2008. These semiconductor 
testing machines are the bright side for Malaysia’s E&E impacted by the 
rise of China with rising Malaysia in destination markets like the US and 
Japan.  
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Figure 7.6 Malaysia’s Trade Balance with China for Selected Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Machines with Trade Surplus 
 
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
 
Table 7.3 HS Codes Description for Selected SEM Products 
HS codes Description 
903082 Instruments & apparatus for measuring or checking semiconductor 
wafers or devices 
903090 Parts & accessories of the instruments & apparatus of 90.30 
903141 Optical instr. & appliances. for inspecting semiconductor 
wafers/devices/for inspecting photomasks/reticles used in 
manufacturing semiconductor devices 
903149 Optical meas./checking instruments & appliances, n.e.s. in Ch.90 
903180 Measuring/checking instruments, apparatus. & machines, n.e.s. in Ch. 
90 
903190 Parts & accessories of the instruments, apparatus. & machines of 
90.31 
Source: Based on UNComtrade 
 
b) Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) 
 
The RCA calculates which of Malaysia’s 36 SEM products have a 
comparative advantage and finds seven products that are the most 
important for Malaysia (with RCA>1 score), six of which are used in wafer 
inspection/testing machines, as shown in Table 7.4 below. This includes 
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optical instruments for semiconductor inspection as discussed in the case 
study later in the chapter. Full RCA calculations are available in Appendix 
7.6.  
 
Table 7.4 Selected RCA Index (Products with most RCA>1) for Malaysia’s 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment 
 HS Product Code 
Year 901090 903082 903090 903141 903149 903180 903190 
2002 0.12 0.59 1.92 0.24 0.25 0.49 2.56 
2003 0.13 1.19 2.81 0.45 0.35 0.46 2.18 
2004 1.02 0.48 3.35 0.20 0.19 0.67 1.70 
2005 0.76 0.46 4.11 0.11 0.38 0.30 3.81 
2006 0.14 0.86 4.53 0.25 0.35 0.33 4.07 
2007 1.76 0.64 5.23 0.20 0.58 0.31 2.69 
2008 1.71 2.79 6.11 1.26 0.56 0.48 2.20 
2009 0.86 3.04 6.06 0.99 0.60 0.62 1.49 
2010 1.81 4.27 9.91 1.03 0.39 0.88 3.54 
2011 2.21 6.23 9.64 1.70 0.16 0.80 2.25 
2012 2.30 16.99 17.44 0.96 0.11 0.55 4.08 
 
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
 
Table 7.5 HS Codes Description of Selected Malaysia’s SEM products 
HS codes Description 
901090 Parts & accessories for apparatus of 90.10 (Direct Write on Wafers 
Machine) 
903082 Instruments & apparatus for measuring/checking semiconductor 
wafers/devices 
903090 Parts & accessories of the instruments & apparatus of 90.30 
(Oscilloscopes, spectrum analysers) 
903141 Optical instr. & appliances for inspecting semiconductor 
wafers/devices/for inspecting photomasks/reticles used in 
manufacturing semiconductor devices 
903149 Optical meas./checking instruments and appliances, n.e.s. in Ch.90 
903180 Measuring/checking instruments, apparatus & machines, n.e.s. in 
Ch. 90 
903190 Parts & accessories of the instruments, apparatus & machines of 
90.31 (Measuring or checking instruments, appliances and 
machines) 
Source: UNComtrade 
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Although Table 7.4 shows that Parts & accessories of the instr. & app. of 
90.30 (Oscilloscopes, spectrum analysers) (HS code 903090) has a 
consistent revealed comparative advantage (RCA>1) from 2002-2013, this 
is not the focus here, due to the presence of Agilent Technologies in 
Penang, a US-based MNC that designs and produces test and measurement 
machines. Instead, the items of interest are Instruments & app. for 
measuring/checking semiconductor wafers/devices (HS 903082) and 
Optical instruments. & appliances for inspecting semiconductor 
wafers/devices/for inspecting photomasks/reticles used in manufacturing 
semiconductor devices (HS903141), where most of the Malaysian-owned 
players are situated. 
 
The RCA score for these two product codes (HS 903082 and HS 903141) 
coincides with the rise of Malaysia’s SEM industry. For example, Penang 
Vision was incorporated in 2000 and Aemulus was started in 2004. 
Although HS code 903141 for optical vision for semiconductor inspection 
machines has an RCA score close to 1 for some years such as 2009 
(RCA=0.99) and 2013 (RCA=0.96), its contribution HS 903141 may be 
understated, as these machines are also incorporated into a test handler 
machine which falls under HS 903082 (Corporation B, 2008). Technical 
overlaps of product codes aside, the big picture is Malaysia ’s breakthrough 
with SEM machines under the HS 9030 and HS 9031 product category, 
confirming  interviewees’ statements that Malaysia has upgraded its 
semiconductor testing machine value chain.  
 
c) Case Study: Optical Instruments for Semiconductor Wafer Inspection 
Machine with Reference to Penang Vision Malaysia 
 
Next, I explore whether Malaysia’s SEM industry has been aided by China’s 
additional demand and whether other factors would have caused exports 
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of Malaysian semiconductor testing machines to rise anyway. Without 
claiming causality here, a case study is deployed in this chapter with trade 
statistics to see whether China has played a part in the rise of Malaysian 
SEM makers. Findings here are also verified against currency movements, 
and global demand for ICs.  
 
The scatter plot in Figure 7.7 below visualises the Malaysia’s 36 SEM 
products in terms of average value of exports per year (a size criterion), 
and growth rate (speed and potential of the product line).  Malaysia ’s 
exports of semiconductor testing machines stand out in terms of both their 
average value and the growth rate compared to other SEM segments. HS 
codes 903141, 903190, 903090, and 903082 all indicate semiconductor test 
machines. Of products under these codes, I managed to interview Penang 
Vision, which specialises in optical instruments for semiconductor wafer 
inspection (HS code 903141), one of the most important SEM products in 
the test segment.  
 
Figure 7.7 Scatter plot of Growth Rate and Average Value of Export per Year for 
Semiconductor Machinery Equipment 2002-2013 
 
Note: 903141 (red dot) denotes optical instruments used to inspect semiconductors, the 
subject of the case study  
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
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As shown in Figure 7.7, the export value of optical semiconductor 
inspection machines (HS code 903141) grew at 15.9% per annum from 
2002-2013, faster than the SEM industry as a whole, which averages at 
15.5% per annum. Penang Vision is in the optical machines for 
semiconductor inspection segment, whose products can be built into the 
semiconductor test handlers (HS 903082), and the trade data show rapid 
growth of optical instruments for semiconductor inspection products.  
 
The RCA results are another reason for choosing optical semiconductor 
inspection machines as a case study. As shown in Table 7.6 below, the RCA 
jumps from a mere 0.20 in 2007 to 1.26 in 2008, moving Malaysia from no 
comparative advantage to a comparative advantage in producing optical 
machines for semiconductor inspection in 2008 in just a year.  
 
Table 7.6 RCA of Optical instruments & appliances for inspecting semiconductor 
wafers/devices/for inspecting photomasks/reticles used in manufacturing 
semiconductor devices (HS 903141) 
HS code  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
903141 0.11 0.25 0.20 1.26 0.99 1.03 1.70 0.96 
Source: Own Calculations based on UNComtrade 
 
The period 2006-2008 coincides with China tightening the implementation 
of the minimum wage (Huang et al. (2014).  Huang et al. (2014) explain that 
legislation on the minimum wage was significantly tightened in 2004, with 
all provinces effectively setting their minimum wage and improving its 
enforcement by the end of 2007. China also restructured its minimum 
wage through its Labour Contract Law in 2008. However, with the global 
financial crisis in the same year, China relaxed the enforcement of the 
minimum wage in China (Huang et al., 2014) but firms had already placed 
orders for SEM in anticipation of the minimum wage rise.  The relaxation of 
the minimum wage in 2008 coincided with the fall of Malaysia’s RCA for 
optical semiconductor inspection machines to 0.99 in 2009.   
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The sudden surge in demand for SEM from China is linked to China’s move 
to increase the minimum wage for manufacturing workers in 2007. 
Manufacturers based in coastal areas in China, which had been used to 
cheap labour, suddenly faced increased labour costs. Some economic 
literature predicted that manufacturers would move inland in search of 
lower labour costs, but some manufacturers chose to automate the 
production line. So when labour costs rose in coastal areas of China SEM 
companies such as Malaysia’s Penang Vision, exported exponentially more 
machines to China to meet the new demand.  
 
Based on Huang et al.’s (2014) econometric results, employment in coastal 
area of China has an inverse relationship with the minimum wage: firms 
hire fewer employees as the minimum wage rises, and this relationship is 
statistically significant. Conversely, the minimum wage is positively 
correlated with fixed asset investment, with firms starting to buy more 
machinery as the minimum wage rises (Huang et al., 2014). This fixed asset 
investment purchase is also reflected in the data on Malaysia’s exports of 
optical machines for semiconductor inspection to China.  
 
Table 7.7 Malaysian Total Exports of Optical Instruments & Appliances for 
Inspecting Semiconductor Wafers/Devices/for Inspecting Photomasks/Reticles 
used in Manufacturing Semiconductor Devices (HS 903141)  
Product 
Code 
HS 
903141 
(US$ bn) 
2002 0.04 
2003 0.08 
2004 0.06 
2005 0.03 
2006 0.07 
2007 0.06 
2008 0.23 
2009 0.15 
2010 0.37 
2011 0.70 
2012 0.39 
2013 0.34 
Source: UNComtrade 
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The trade data patterns in Table 7.7 above are consistent with the 
minimum wage in China affecting demand for Malaysian-made SEM. There 
is exponential growth of 270.5% from 2007-2008 in exports of optical 
instruments for inspecting semiconductor wafers or devices. The next step 
is to dissect the data to see which country the demand comes from.  
 
Table 7.8 HS 903141 Malaysian Exports by Country (% to total exports) 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
China 0.1 6.4 32.9 30.6 47.7 19.8 29.8 33.0 
US 10.4 37.5 24.1 10.3 4.0 46.4 23.7 14.0 
Singapore 6.9 18.0 15.6 31.2 22.2 9.9 9.3 9.3 
Other Asia 44.4 2.2 9.1 0.7 4.0 11.5 15.7 15.6 
Mexico 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 2.4 1.6 0.4 8.9 
Hong Kong 9.4 8.6 1.3 0.0 8.9 2.6 3.0 6.5 
Thailand 0.3 4.8 1.4 6.8 8.6 2.0 0.5 2.3 
Philippines 0.4 6.4 2.6 1.3 0.2 0.5 7.1 5.7 
Korea, Rep. 20.1 0.9 2.0 14.5 0.5 1.9 3.2 0.8 
Japan 0.8 0.4 0.7 3.6 0.5 0.7 2.4 0.1 
Others 7.2 14.8 9.5 1.1 1.0 3.2 5.0 4.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
 
As shown in Table 7.8 above, China’s share of total Malaysian exports of 
optical machines for semiconductor inspection leaped from a mere 6.4% in 
2007 to 32.9% of total Malaysian exports in 2008, displacing the US, which 
was Malaysia’s top importer of these products just a year earlier. The full 
table is available in Appendix 7.7.  
 
The increase of demand from China does not replace demand from the US, 
and therefore it is unlikely to be caused by trade diversion. As Table 7.9 
below shows, it is likely to be the result of organic growth in China, whose 
import demand of Optical instr. & apps. for inspecting semiconductor 
wafers/devices/for inspecting photomasks/reticles used in manufacturing 
semiconductor devices (HS 903141) increases from US$0.4 million in 2007 
to US$7.6 million in 2008, while the US imports increases sharply from 
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US$2.4 million to US$5.6 million for the same product shows trade 
diversion is unlikely to be the reason for China’s increased demand.  
 
Table 7.9 Value of HS 903141 Malaysia’s Export by Country  
In US$ M 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
China 0.01 0.4 7.6 4.5 17.8 13.8 11.6 11.3 
United States 0.7 2.4 5.6 1.5 1.5 32.4 9.2 4.8 
Singapore 0.5 1.1 3.6 4.6 8.3 6.9 3.6 3.2 
Other Asia, nes 3.1 0.1 2.1 0.1 1.5 8.1 6.1 5.3 
Mexico 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.9 1.1 0.2 3.0 
Hong Kong, China 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.0 3.3 1.8 1.1 2.2 
Thailand 0.02 0.3 0.3 1.0 3.2 1.4 0.2 0.8 
Philippines 0.03 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.3 2.8 1.9 
Korea, Rep. 1.4 0.1 0.5 2.1 0.2 1.3 1.2 0.3 
Japan 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.03 
Brazil 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.5 
Others  0.5 0.9 2.1 0.2 0.4 1.4 1.9 0.9 
Total 7.0 6.3 23.3 14.8 37.4 69.9 38.9 34.2 
Source: UNComtrade 
 
To verify the results, a check of whether the currency movement biased 
the semiconductor test equipment trade results upwards was conducted. 
When the value of a country’s currency falls against the US dollar, its 
exports become cheaper relative to other countries, assuming other 
countries are holding the value of their currency. In Malaysia’s case, the 
year of interest to us in semiconductor equipment manufacturing is 2007-
2008, where there is a one-off huge jump in equipment sold to China.  
 
As shown in Table 7.10 below, 2008, when there is a sharp increase in 
exports of optical instruments for semiconductor wafer inspection to 
China, is a year when the value of the Malaysian Ringgit is stable. The 
average value of 1 Malaysian Ringgit against 1 USD is RM 3.44 in 2007, 
rising to RM 3.33 in 2008 (fewer Ringgits required to purchase US dollars). 
Therefore currency movement is an unlikely factor that biases Malaysia’s 
sales of semiconductor testing equipment upwards in 2008. This 
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strengthens the case that the increase in Malaysia’s semiconductor testing 
equipment export value is not biased upwards by currency movement. 
 
Table 7.10 Malaysian’ Ringgit vs. US Dollar Exchange Rate 2002-2013 
Year RM/USD 
2002 3.80 
2003 3.80 
2004 3.80 
2005 3.79 
2006 3.67 
2007 3.44 
2008 3.33 
2009 3.52 
2010 3.22 
2011 3.06 
2012 3.09 
2013 3.15 
Source: Economic Planning Unit, Malaysia 
 
In contrast, China’s Renminbi appreciated against Malaysia’s Ringgit by 
6.19% in 2008 compared to 2007. Table 7.11 below shows the RMB 
appreciating against Malaysia’s Ringgit from 0.45 in 2007 to 0.48 in 2008. 
The slight appreciation in the RMB means that Chinese producers can 
purchase SEM equipment relatively cheaper in 2008 than in 2007.  While 
the magnitude of change is not significant in ruling out rising demand from 
China helping to create new opportunities for Malaysia’s SEM due to the 
currency effect, a rising RMB nevertheless does help to make Malaysian 
SEM exports more accessible to producers in China in 2008.  
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Table 7.11 Ringgit vs. Renminbi Exchange Rate, 2002-2013 
Year Average  Rate of Change 
(%) 
2002 0.46 - 
2003 0.46 -0.02 
2004 0.46 0.02 
2005 0.46 0.68 
2006 0.46 -0.53 
2007 0.45 -1.73 
2008 0.48 6.19 
2009 0.52 7.51 
2010 0.48 -7.77 
2011 0.47 -0.50 
2012 0.49 3.37 
2013 0.51 3.97 
Source: www.oanda.com, Accessed on 1 September 2015 
 
Next, a check is made to ascertain whether overall demand in the global 
semiconductor delivery is responsible for the increase in Malaysia’s exports 
of optical instruments for semiconductor wafer inspection in 2008. If this is 
true, demand for optical instruments (HS 903141) used in semiconductor 
wafer inspection will increase anyway due to a global surge in demand, as 
chip makers need more testing equipment to cope with the surge in 
delivery.  
 
As shown in Figure 7.8  below, the sudden growth of Malaysia’s optical 
instruments for semiconductor wafer inspection is unlikely to be buoyed by 
global demand because the global semiconductor industry contracts in 
2007-2009. The semiconductor industry recorded negative growth in 2008 
at -8.2% and -11.0% for 2009 compared to the year before according to 
Electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies (HS 8542) export data 
from UNComtrade. As secondary verification, SEMI®, a global association of 
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silicon-based product manufacturers that tracks shipments of 
semiconductors confirms 2007-2009 as a period of decline.102 Therefore 
based on these data from UNComtrade and SEMI, the surge in demand 
from China for Malaysian-made optical instruments for semiconductor 
inspection is unlikely to be the result of rising demand for global 
semiconductors.103 
 
Figure 7.8 Global Export of Semiconductors HS8542 and Growth Rates 
 
Source: UNComtrade  
 
Finally, field interviews in Penang revealed that China had a direct positive 
impact on Penang Vision Malaysia’s export market. When China raised its 
minimum wage in coastal areas, where most of its semiconductor industry 
is located, Chinese firms automated their production lines in a massive 
way. As a result Penang Vision sold more optical inspection machines than 
before, with exponential growth in revenue from 2006 onwards, as shown 
in Table 7.12 below.  
 
 
                                                 
102 See full  SEMI table in Appendix 7.8. 
103 A widely accepted semiconductor industry report, supported by semiconductor players 
themselves.  
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Table 7.12 Penang Vision Corporation Berhad Consolidated Revenue 2005-2013 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Revenue 
RM mil 
9.1 24.0 36.2 26.4 18.1 87.6 79.2 88.9 106.1 
Revenue 
US$ mil 
2.4 6.5 10.5 7.9 5.2 27.2 25.9 28.8 33.7 
Mil= mill ion 
Source: Penang Vision Corporation Berhad Annual Report (multi -years) 
 
The case study confirms that China has a direct positive impact on Penang 
Vision Malaysia in its exports market demand. Penang Vision’s annual 
corporate reports show that China has created additional demand for 
Malaysian-made optical instruments semiconductor wafer inspection 
machine. This case study also presents the findings based on trade data 
and then elaborates on the reason for additional demand from China 
especially for semiconductor wafer inspection machines.  
 
7.3.3 Revisiting some of the theories with the Penang case 
 
Having shown that China’s effect on Malaysia’s SEM players is 
complementary, the Malaysian SEM players’ evolution can inform other 
branches of economics such as economic geography, spin-off theory and 
spatial embeddedness. I start to explain the formation and growth of SEM 
players in Penang through the lens of economic geography.  
 
Although the strength of SEM clusters in testing and assembly machines 
are explained by GVC in E&E extended to backward linkages, it is limited in 
its explanation of how the SEM players formed and upgraded. Rajah 
Rasiah, an authoritative commentator on Malaysia’s E&E industry, 
observes that GVC as a theory is limited in explaining South Korea and 
Taiwan’s upgrading of their IC chip production capacity to become world-
class leading manufacturers.   
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To address this gap, Grunsven (2006) argues that there is an evolutionary 
element to the second phase of Malaysia’s E&E industry growth, starting in 
2000, with the growth of Penang’s automation clusters, including non-E&E 
components, fitting spin-off theory. The paper refers to Klepper’s method 
of distinguishing between ‘branching’ companies compared to ‘De Novo’ 
companies, with De Novo companies outperforming branching companies 
in the long run (Klepper, 2002). Branching companies are companies that 
enter the industry through another related industry, such as a company 
already supplies jigs and fixtures and supplying high-precision parts to 
MNCs that decides to venture into building semiconductor test machines. 
De Novo companies are started by employees who learn about the 
industry working for MNCs and then leave to create spin-offs. As 
mentioned, a classic example of this is the founders of Intel, who were 
once employees of Fairchild Semiconductor, where they learnt about the 
industry and then decided to quit to formed Intel, creating a spin-off 
(Grunsven, 2006).  
 
Grunsven (2006) application of spin-off analysis to explain the growth of 
Penang’s SEM players is right to a certain extent. Table 7.13 below shows 
that most SEM companies are De Novo firms with founders who are ex-
MNC employees. This fits spin-off theory: that MNCs are agents for the 
diffusion of technology in the local economy.   
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Table 7.13 Entry Mode and Relationship of Founders with MNCs for SEM Players 
in Penang 
Companies  Year 
Founded  
Founder/Co-
founder  
Ex-employees of 
MNCs  
Entry Mode  
Pentamaster 
Corporation 
Bhd.  
1991 Chua Choon 
Bin 
Intel Technology 
(Penang) 
De Novo  
SRM  1996 Sim Ah Yoong  HP Penang De Novo 
TT Vision  2001 Goon Koon 
Yin 
Motorola 
Technology 
Malaysia 
(Penang) 
De Novo 
Aemulus  2004  Ng Sang Beng  Altera Penang De Novo 
EXIS 
Seremban  
2002 Lee Heng Lee An American 
MNC * 
De Novo: 
started by 
upgrading 
OEM machine 
and now 
manufactures 
own machines 
Penang Vision 
Corp Bhd.  
2000 Chu Jenn 
Weng 
HP Penang -  
MMS 
Ventures Bhd 
1997 Sia Teik Keat National 
Semiconductor 
Diversifier  
Inari Bhd ** 2005  Dr. Tan/PG Ho  HP Penang  - 
Note:* based on Exis Tech Sdn. Bhd. (2015). 
          **Inari Bhd. is an EMS, not a SEM player, but uses SEM machines.  
Source: Grunsven (2006) and various annual reports.  
 
As shown in Table 7.13, above, Michael Peterson and HL Lee, the co-
founders of Exis Tech in Seremban, started the company in 2002 after they 
were offered the Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS) by an American MNC. 
The Exis Tech case is an example of the economic down-cycle prompts local 
Malaysian to form local firms and this is further discussed in Chapter 8, 
when I discussed the founding of Inari Bhd.  
 
However, there is an exception to Grunsven (2006) conclusion that ‘spin-
offs’ aptly describes Penang’s second phase of development beginning in 
2000, especially in SEM, and this is the case of Penang Vision, the biggest 
player in SEM by revenue. An interview with the co-founder of Penang 
Vision, who previously worked for an MNC, found that his technical 
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knowledge of machine vision did not originate from the MNC, as he 
claimed to have had prior knowledge of programming machine vision, as it 
happened to be his final year project as an engineering undergraduate at 
Science University of Malaysia in Penang. Secondly, while working for HP 
he was offered a team to lead research into machine vision, but decided to 
quit and started his own company in 2000 with an ex-university colleague 
(interviewee 10). Therefore the technical knowledge did not flow from HP 
to its employee but the co-founder of Penang Vision already possesses the 
technical knowledge beforehand. This brings us to the next theory: spatial 
embeddedness.  
 
The Penang SEM players’ case demonstrates that spin-offs explain the path 
to development up to a certain point. For Penang Vision Corporation, 
spatial embeddedness does matter. The theory argues that location 
matters, as in the case of Silicon Valley which developed with its skilled 
workers and embedded computer industry know-how (B Asheim and M 
Gertler, 2005). Recently questions have been raised about whether spatial 
embeddedness is still relevant given the rise of GVCs, and other forms or 
‘organisational or relational proximity’ (as in GVC), challenging the 
relevance of physical location (Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2012, pp. 241.). 
Indeed, for Penang Vision spatial embeddedness seems more important 
than spin-offs or backward linkages in explaining the high growth company. 
With most SEM firms are clustered in Penang State, the SEM case 
reinforces the suggestion that  tacit knowledge is mostly grounded in one 
location, demonstrating that spatial embeddedness is still relevant in 
explaining the path to development.  
 
Spatial embeddedness theory, which is discussed in the regional innovation 
system group of literature, explains that the technology is ‘sticky’ because 
workers that have the ‘right’ skills normally converge in only a few places. 
Embeddedness also features as an important concept of GPN theory. While 
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it started as an outpost for outsourcing and subsidiaries of electronics 
MNCs, Penang began to display upgrading of its backward linkages, 
especially in SEM. For Inari Bhd, the ‘Penang Network’ concept cannot be 
replicated outside Penang. This suggests that spatial embeddedness is a 
suitable theory to explain the success of Penang’s locally-owned players 
upgrading. Location as a factor is further reinforced by the interview data: 
Avago Technologies Sdn. Bhd. mentioned that Inari had won the 
outsourcing job mainly because physical proximity mattered to the 
principal technology holder (more details in Chapter 8). 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of spatial embeddedness for explaining 
Penang Vision Corporation’s achievements, the spin-off element cannot be 
completely dismissed, given the fact that Penang Vision’s very first 
business order was related to the co-founder’s previous employment with 
an MNCs (Grunsven, 2006). Secondly, although the Penang Vision’s co-
founder did not acquire technical knowledge while working for an MNC, he 
could have gained non-technical knowledge such as management and 
operations knowledge of a MNC. Finally, the two divisions that HP exited in 
2008, Advanced Optical Inspection (AOI) and Advanced X-Ray Division 
(AXI), were bought by Penang Vision, which rehired the engineers working 
in this two divisions. This represents a transfer of knowledge and skills, 
aptly described as a spin-off, with ex-MNC employees joining a locally 
owned company. This shows that even within Penang Vision Corporation 
itself, different theoretical frameworks capture different stages of 
development of the company itself.  
 
In conclusion, no single theory can explain the formation and growth of the 
SEM cluster in Malaysia entirely. The GVC/GPN and backward linkages can 
explain the broad sectors on which SEM is focusing, namely the testing 
segment, due to traditional demand from MNCs in Penang in this particular 
segment of IC production. However, for the second stage, formation and 
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growth, spin-off theory can explain how a company obtained its technical 
know-how before entering the SEM cluster, but again becomes limited as a 
theory in explaining how the best performer in the semiconductor test 
segment grew. Penang Vision Corporation obtained its technical 
knowledge to design machine vision through its co-founders. Spatial 
embeddedness is the most suitable theory to explain, as Penang Vision 
started between two university colleagues in Penang. This, however, 
explains the beginnings of Penang Vision, as spin-off theory does help to 
explain the high growth of Penang Vision, given that it acquired the two 
divisions related to machine vision from HP, and the skilled engineers from 
the MNC.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed how according to findings on the SEM industry 
Malaysia’s role has shifted away from being just a low-cost centre for 
foreign MNCs’ IC packaging operations for in 1970s. Once the backward 
linkage to the semiconductor industry is considered, Malaysia has 
upgraded its SEM value chain with special reference to the testing segment 
of the back-end of semiconductor industry. This has been achieved despite 
various criticisms of the MNC-led development model, which argues that 
the presence of MNCs squeezes out locally-owned small and medium 
industries, preventing their access to quality engineers. Related to this, the 
next chapter further explores how China’s ‘diversion’ effect on investment 
has had the unintended consequence of creating a window of opportunity 
for local Malaysian start-ups.  
 
Secondly, China’s rise aided Malaysia’s semiconductor wafer inspection 
industry (seven products) in 2002-2013 while the rest of the SEM industry’s 
trade balance remained largely negative. The chapter then concentrated 
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on the semiconductor testing segment to detail the upgrading of an 
industry, and investigated how China’s pressure on implementation of the 
minimum wage in its coastal areas increased demand for Malaysian-made 
semiconductor wafer inspection machines.  
 
The shift in labour costs in China led many scholars to predict that firms 
would eventually move either to inland China or back to Southeast Asia in 
search of lower costs. The case study in this chapter has demonstrated that 
firms stationed in coastal areas of China also had another option: to reduce 
labour costs by investing in automation. As a result, Malaysia has benefited 
from selling its semiconductor wafer inspection machines to China.  
 
Apart from its backward linkages, the upgrading of Malaysia’s SEM value 
chain also informs other theories such as spin-off and spatial 
embeddedness, as no one theory can completely explain all the phases of 
growth in the Malaysian SEM cluster. Finally, it is interesting to note that 
the literature on spatial embeddedness, which preceded the GVC in 
explaining the path of development, remains relevant to Penang’s SEM 
development.  
 
This chapter forms a contrast to Kaplinsky (2010) value chain case study of 
Thai Cassava and Gabon timber which, although unrelated to the 
semiconductor industry, found that China’s increased demand for primary 
commodity exports actually downgraded the entire value chain in Thailand 
and Gabon. In contrast, China’s demand has helped Malaysian-owned SEM 
players to move up the value chain with its demand for high-technology 
capital goods. In this sense, the effect of China’s rise complements that of 
Malaysia.  
 
A final point on SEM relates to work by Malaysian scholars such as Alavi 
(2002), which states that export oriented industries (EOI) such as 
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electronics are not linked to the local industrial structure, creating a dual 
structure in the economy’s manufacturing sector in Malaysia  because 
there is little participation of local companies in the semiconductor value 
chain. Although the majority of direct semiconductor industry inputs are 
imported, the chapter has looked beyond direct inputs to consider SEM, 
elaborating on the spillover effect of EOIs locating in Malaysia, with their 
ex-employees leaving to create SEM spinoffs in Penang. Finally, Malaysian 
policymakers should note this SEM sector has the potential to help 
Malaysia ride on China’s semiconductor boom without competing with 
China head-on.  
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8.0 Malaysia’s E&E investment in China, Chinese operations in 
Malaysia and the ‘China Effect’ on Malaysia’s E&E investment 
 
As discussed in the literature review and trade chapters, Malaysia’s trade 
structure is closely linked to its FDI, and this trade-investment nexus is 
prevalent in Malaysia’s E&E industry (Wong and Tang, 2007). Chapter 6 
also revealed that China competes with Malaysia for exports to destination 
markets. It is crucial to weigh the loss of export with FDI flows to see if 
China is mitigating the competitive threat in trade by investing in 
Malaysia’s E&E industry. The objective of this chapter is to dissect the 
bilateral FDI flow between China and Malaysia, and then examine whether 
China has indeed diverted FDI from traditional sources such as the US, the 
EU and Japan away from Malaysia.  
 
As the literature review chapter showed, quantitative studies based on 
regression models such as Chantasasawat et al. (2004), Zhou and Lall 
(2005), Eichengreen and Tong (2007) and Salike (2010) differ in their 
findings on whether China is has diverted FDI inflow from its East Asian 
neighbours. Zhou and Lall (2005) reason that a running regression using 
total FDI figures does not take into account the fact that total FDI figures 
can be misleading because they do not distinguish between FDI in 
competing export-oriented industries such as electronics, and FDI in non-
competing areas such as markets and resource-seeking.   
 
This chapter presents findings on investment in Malaysia’s E&E industry in 
a more discernible way based on a combination of Asian Drivers literature 
and the GVC/GPN frameworks. The Asian Drivers literature (IDS, 2006) 
predicts that China will increasingly impacts the world in investment 
channels, and this chapter discusses the impact of China on a developing 
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country such as Malaysia for the E&E industry. The chapter incorporates 
the approach of GVC/GPN studies of the spread of the electronics industry 
from advanced nations to developing countries and the upgrading of the 
value chain. These frameworks are used to discuss China’s impact on 
Malaysia, Malaysia’s shifting role in the GVC/GPN chain, and its upgrading, 
amongst other issues. Semi-structured interviews were used to collect 
primary data, which was compared with a secondary database of 
production data.  
 
Based on the Asian Drivers literature and the GVC framework, and taking 
Malaysia as the reference point, there are three possible ways in which 
China can impact Malaysia’s investment channel: 
 China invests in Malaysia’s E&E industry (FDI inflow to Malaysia)  
 Malaysia invests in China’s E&E industry (outward investment from 
Malaysia)  
 China diverts investment from or encourages more investment in 
Malaysia from traditional FDI partners such as the US, EU and 
Japan. 
 
Based on the three possible impacts above, the research questions 
addressed in this chapter are:  
 Does the bilateral investment flow reflect complementary sub-
sector investment, and what are the drivers of Chinese FDI in 
Malaysia? Which sub-sectors are Malaysian E&E firms entering in 
China?  
 Which Malaysian E&E sub-sector is affected by China’s diversion of 
investment away from it, and what is the effect on the Malaysian 
E&E sector?   
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 How do Malaysia’s firms and public sector respond to China’s rise as 
an investment destination?104 
 
The rest of the chapter presents a discussion of Chinese investment in 
Malaysia’s E&E sector, followed by discussion of Malaysia’s outward FDI to 
China’s E&E, and whether China has diverted investment from Malaysia’s 
traditional sources such as the US, the EU and Japan.  The chapter ends 
with Malaysia’s response to China’s competition for investment in the 
region and concludes that China has both positive and negative effects on 
Malaysia via the investment channel and that its diversion of investment 
can also create opportunities for Malaysia.  
Figure 8.1 Malaysia’s Inward FDI for Manufacturing Sector by Type of Industry 
Approved Investment (1992-2013) 
 
Source: MIDA  
                                                 
104 Given the Malaysia trade-investment nexus, Malaysian government programmes 
discussed in this investment chapter also target increasing exports in the trade channel.  
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The chapter begins with descriptive Malaysian investment data for 1992-
2013. As shown in Figure 8.1 above, the E&E sector is a major source of FDI 
in Malaysia in 1992-2013, with an average share of 39.7% of total FDI 
inflow, based on approved investment data. Cumulatively, investment in 
E&E is recorded as US$48.5 billion for 1992-2013, with basic metal 
products a far second at US$15.7 billion and petroleum products third at 
US$15.1 billion. The E&E sector is the most important source of 
manufacturing-sector FDI in Malaysia.  
 
Foreign investment far exceeds domestic investment as a source of capital 
formation in the E&E sector. In 1992-2013 an average of 80.1% of total 
investment in manufacturing is from foreign sources, while the average 
share of domestic investment is 19.9%, as shown in Figure 8.2 below. 
Malaysia’s E&E industry is characterized by heavy foreign investment of 
both capital and technology. The investment structure by source observes 
that the development of Malaysia’s E&E industry is FDI-dependent (Ernst, 
2004) and (Siew-Yean, 2001). 
 
Figure 8.2 Share of Domestic AND Foreign Investment in Malaysian E&E 
 
Source: MIDA 
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Malaysia’s E&E industry is characterized by a heavy presence of foreign FDI 
consistent with the country’s role as host to many of MNC operations, as 
reflected in the trade chapter. As a result, E&E is heavily traded between 
China and Malaysia, and between Malaysia and its traditional markets such 
as the US, the EU and Japan.  
 
8.1 China’s investment in Malaysia’s E&E sector 
 
This section elaborates on the first aspect of China’s impact on Malaysia; 
namely FDI inflow from China. The section is organised as follows:  the 
volume of investment is presented next, followed by three cases of 
investment by China: services-related investment in Huawei, which is 
included despite being outside the scope of manufacturing as Huawei is a 
telecommunication equipment giant and mobile phone maker; in Comtec 
China in the manufacturing sector; and in trading of electrical products, 
Midea-Scott & English Electronics, with Midea of China enters into a JV 
with a Malaysian company to distribute its products in Malaysia. The 
section finds that Chinese investment in Malaysia’s E&E is limited, and that 
it is in its infancy.  
 
While China has been Malays ia’s main trade partner based on volume since 
2009, as discussed in the trade chapter, the scenario regarding investment 
is very different. As shown in Figure 8.3, below, total investment from 
China picks up from 2007 onwards, excluding the slump year in 2008. In 
2007 the inflow of FDI from China amounts to US$0.5 billion but is not 
related to the E&E industry. Investment in E&E only picks up from 2012 
onwards, and mainly in the electrical sector’s solar module value chain. 
China’s investment in Malaysia’s E&E sector only becomes sizeable from 
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2012 onwards: it invests US$0.4 billion or 60.7% of its total investment in 
Malaysia in 2012, and US$0.4 billion or 39.8% in 2013.  
 
Figure 8.3 E&E Share of Total Chinese FDI in Manufacturing Sector of Malaysia 
 
Source: MIDA 
 
The volume of China’s investment in Malaysia’s E&E sector is far behind 
that of Malaysia’s traditional sources of FDI such as the US and Japan. 
Chinese investment in E&E in Malaysia only inches up to US$0.4 billion in 
2012105 and 2013 having previously been close to zero (see Figure 8.4 
below). In contrast, the US invests on average US$ 0.8 billion a year and 
Japan invests on average US$ 0.4 billion a year in 1992-2013. However, 
China is still in the early stage of investing abroad and the increasing 
volume from 2012 may be a sign that Chinese firms are beginning to 
venture abroad.  
 
                                                 
105 Investment in 2012, based on US$0.39 bil l ion, is most probably from EQ Solar of China, 
but the project has not taken off. (Sarif, 2010) 
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Figure 8.4 FDI Inflows for Malaysia E&E Sector by Selected Country of Origin 
(Approved Investment) 
 
Source: MIDA 
 
As shown in Figure 8.4, The inflow of investment in Malaysia’s E&E from 
China is minimal compared to Malaysia’s traditional sources of FDI in E&E 
such as the US and Japan. For example, the US is the top investor in 
Malaysia across the entire period 1992-2013 at US$17.1 billion, followed by 
Japan, US$9.7 billion, and Singapore, US$5.2 billion. China’s cumulative 
approved investment in the E&E sector in Malaysia comes in far behind at 
US$0.8 billion, the volume of its investment only picking up in 2012. Based 
on volume of inward investment, China’s impact in Malaysia’s E&E sector 
via investment is minimal. 
 
Structurally, MIDA investment approval data also show that of the 
electronic and electrical sector, electronics is the main contributor to E&E 
sector. However, there is an upsurge after 2011 in the electrical sector, 
mainly driven by Malaysia entering the solar photovoltaic module value 
chain. Finally, when the electronics sector is broken down into sub-sectors, 
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namely components, consumer electronics, and industrial electronics, 
components prove to be the most important sector by volume of FDI 
inflow to the electronics sub-sector.106  The investment data is reflective of 
Malaysia’s specialisation in the parts and components market; the 
investment structure here is consistent with the trade specialisation. 
Details can be found in Appendix 8.1.  
 
As MIDA data is at E&E aggregate level and it is MIDA policy not to discuss 
the figures at the individual firm level, secondary data is triangulated using 
Malaysian news report to locate the sub-sector and stage of production in 
the E&E value chain in which China is investing. As MIDA investment data 
are based on approval data, there is a possibility that approved investment 
does not go on to the implementation stage due to various reasons. Data 
obtained from newspaper sources sometimes do not exactly match figures 
provided by MIDA, but because Chinese investment is relatively new and 
has gone to very few projects, and major FDI deals are publicised by MIDA, 
it is not hard to identify FDI project inflows from China.  
 
Based on triangulation of secondary sources with approved investment 
figures, of all the different E&E sub-sectors, Chinese investment matters 
most in the electrical sub-sector. MIDA’s Investment Performance Report 
reveals that  ‘In 2013, the most significant solar projects approved are all 
foreign-owned, including … a RM1.2 billion facility to manufacture solar 
silicon ingots and wafers.’ (MIDA Malaysia, 2013, p. 38) This matches news 
reports of E&E investment in Malaysia: there are two notable Chinese 
projects, Comtec China and Huawei China. Comtec produces silicon ingot 
and wafers for solar photovoltaic modules, while Huawei is a famous 
                                                 
106 Examples given by MIDA of its Electronics classification include components such as 
semiconductors, consumer electronics, such as TVs and radios  and industrial electronics 
such as computers.  
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telecommunications equipment supplier and manufacturer. Comtec 
invested approximately RM1.2 billion (US$ 0.39 billion) in the state of 
Sarawak to produce silicon ingots and wafers in 2012 (The Borneo Post, 
2012), while Huawei is reported to have invested RM430 million (US$ 136.5 
million) in a cloud data centre in Iskandar, in the Malaysian state of Johor 
in 2013. 107 (CIMB Research, 2015).  
 
Despite the fact that Huawei China’s investment in Johor State is in data 
services such as hosting servers and cloud services, which are not 
manufacturing activity, it is included in this research because it is related to 
a China’s telecommunications giant. Its data centre is expected to create 
600 managerial and technical jobs (Khazanah Nasional Malaysia). However, 
it is the next investment from Huawei, also outside the manufacturing 
sector, that may help Malaysia onto the technology ladder. Huawei’s first 
technical training centre outside China specializing in delivering sessions in 
English based in Cyberjaya, Malaysia for an undisclosed sum. It occupies 
30,000 sq. ft. of office space and employs about 150 trainers with the 
capacity for training 2-3,000 students from China per year in 2015 (Asohan, 
2012). Moreover, Huawei recently signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding between Huawei and Telekom Malaysia (TM), a 
government-owned telecom company, for joint R&D into copper 
connections and ZTE, another China’s telecommunication giant also signed 
an MOU with TM for joint R&D into photonic and optical network research. 
Although Huawei’s investment in Malaysia was initially only to host a data 
centre, it subsequently expanded into the creation of a training centre, 
which seems to fit Malaysia’s view of upgrading technical knowledge 
through FDI.  
                                                 
107 US$0.39 bil l ion are converted to US$ using 2012 exchange rate US$1=RM3.0888. 
US$136.5 mill ion is converted using conversion rate in 2013 is US$1=RM3.1509 provided 
by Malaysian central bank.  
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Moving back to the manufacturing sector, Chinese investment in 
Malaysia’s E&E sector is efficiency-seeking. John Zhang Yi, the CEO of 
Comtec China, saw Sarawak as suitable for Comtec’s plan because 
‘Although moving production lines to Malaysia is costly, … this will be offset 
by lower power prices in hydropower rich eastern Malaysia, where 
electricity costs less than half that of coal fired power in Jiangsu. Electricity 
accounts for just under 20 per cent of Comtec's total operating costs’ 
(Cave, 2014). The energy price factor, coupled with concern about US and 
EU imposition of countervailing duties on all Chinese- and Taiwanese-made 
solar PV modules has led Comtec to invest in Sarawak.  
 
Figure 8.5 Malaysia’s PV Value Chain 
 
Source: Rahman et al. (2012) 
 
Comtec is investing in Malaysia’s solar photovoltaic module value chain as 
an upstream player in the PV production chain, namely at the silicone ingot 
and wafer stage. At full operation, the Sarawak plant achieves a capacity of 
300 MW, and Comtec plans to achieve this by moving about 100 MW 
production capacity from China to Sarawak while the rest of the capacity is 
newly setup in Sarawak (Cave, 2014).  Based on stages of production in the 
Metallurgical 
Silicon
Poly-Silicon 
(ingots) 
Wafer Cell Module
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PV value chain as in Figure 8.5, investment from Comtec China is less 
primary than another Japanese operations (Tokuyama) in the vicinity as 
Tokuyama produces silicone ingots to be sent back to Japan for further 
processing (Tokuyama Corporation, 2012). Although Comtec’s investment 
produces high-efficiency mono-crystalline type solar wafers, which help 
Malaysia to further plug into the solar PV global value chain, the 
disadvantage of this investment is that it is still an upstream activity, with 
less spillover of technology, and R&D has not been mentioned in this 
investment.  
  
Comtec’s motivation is to use the clean energy generated by hydropower 
in Sarawak to produce silicone ingots and silicon wafers, underscoring how 
China’s investment in E&E is efficiency-seeking. However, it is premature to 
conclude that China is degrading the value chain by investing in something 
upstream, in contrast to the case Thai Cassava value chain by Kaplinsky 
(2010), where Chinese demand for cassava starch exports although 
increases investment in the starch processing facilities in Thailand, the type 
of starch demanded was at a more primary level. As a result, investment 
was directed into primary sectors within the cassava value chain, and thus 
downgrading it.  A Japanese investment in the state of Sarawak is running 
similar operations with production ending with the silicon ingots, which are 
sent back to Japan for further processing and added value. Based on this 
observation, firm-level operations from any country of origin could just 
possibly end up at the primary level, and this cannot be generalised to the 
whole of a single country’s investment.  
 
As Chinese investment is situated in the upstream stage of Malaysia’s E&E 
manufacturing sector value chain and is low in volume relative to that of 
the US and Japan, China’s impact on inward FDI to Malaysia is very limited.  
255 
 
Outside manufacturing sector investment, an international Chinese 
household electrical MNC has a joint venture with a Malaysian company 
that are principally involved in trading in household electrical products. 
Such a company are not known to receive any knowledge transfer from 
China and the investment is purely market-seeking. However, field 
interviews revealed that the Malaysian company benefits from working 
with a stable principal while the Chinese company is able to tap into the 
Malaysian company’s local knowledge and marketing plans. Malaysian 
managers benefit from going regional through this JV, with the CEO of the 
Malaysian company also serving as an advisor to Midea China on its 
marketing strategy in the ASEAN region. The JV relationship allows the 
Malaysian company to benefit from the revenue stream generated by sales 
of imported Chinese household electrical goods. In contrast, established 
Korean and Japanese MNCs do not agree to such JV arrangements. Chinese 
imports are cannibalising the Korean and Japanese shares of the market for 
household electrical items, especially home-based air-conditioning, 
consistent with the import penetration analysis section in Chapter 5.   
 
It is pertinent at this point to ask why Chinese firms do not invest heavily in 
Malaysian E&E. Respondents in China provided a view of Malaysia’s 
investment prospects from the other side, pointing out that the market for 
Chinese consumer goods is low volume in Malaysia, given its comparatively 
small population in the ASEAN region. Based on market size, Indonesia 
seems more suitable for investing in a manufacturing plant. Chinese 
companies are more likely to invest in Vietnam due to its labour costs, 
which are lower than in China’s coastal area and Malaysia. In addition, a 
Chinese firm’s member of staff noted that Malaysia lacks human capital, 
which Chinese firms tap occasionally from Europe for higher R&D or 
product design functions. 
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In conclusion, China’s investment in Malaysia’s E&E industry is minimal 
based on relatively low volume of investment compared to Malaysia’s 
traditional partners. China’s investment is efficiency seeking and market 
seeking in the electrical sector. The type of FDI inflow for producing silicone 
ingots and wafer or the data centre has not generated the kind of positive 
technology spillover that North American, EU and Japanese investment has 
generated in the past. In the trading sector, the China-Malaysia JV 
investment is clearly market-seeking with the aim of building a sales 
channel for their electrical products. However, it must be remembered that 
China is relatively new to FDI compared to Malaysia’s traditional sources.  
 
Going forward, China’s investment in Malaysia is starting to pick up. It is 
predominantly in the steel industry, reinvigorating unsuccessful state 
industrialisation projects such as Perwaja steel (Abilah, 2015), but this is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Through official channels, China also has a 
joint industrial park with Malaysia on the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia 
called the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park, with Malaysia seeking 
about US$10.0 billion of Chinese investment over a 10-year period and a 
similar joint industrial park in Qinzhou Industrial Park in China (Khor, 2013). 
Despite this ambitious target, China’s investment in Malaysia is still a long 
way behind its traditional sources of FDI in E&E, the US, Japan and 
Germany.  
 
8.2 Malaysian investment in China’s E&E sector 
 
Malaysia’s outward investment in China is higher than inward investment 
from China at total investment level.  A detailed breakdown of investment 
by the sector is not publicly available, but according to the Malaysian Trade 
Minister, the ratio of bilateral FDI Malaysia-China flow is 6:1 (Yi et al., 
257 
 
2014). As the Central Bank of Malaysia data in Table 8.1 below, shows, in 
2008 Malaysia’s inward FDI from China based on balance of payment data 
is US$0.3 billion vs. its outward FDI to China of US$1.3 billion. Malaysia’s 
investment in China rises to US$1.8 billion in 2013, but China’s investment 
into Malaysia remains relatively unchanged at US$0.3 billion in 2013. 
However, the true outflow from Malaysia to China, based on official 
statistics, can be understated, as some entrepreneurs prefer to channel 
their funds via Hong Kong to be safer from a legal standpoint (Khor, 2013). 
Results in Table 8.1 confirm the Malaysian Trade Minister’s observation 
that Malaysia invests more in China than the other way round. An 
alternative source of information is the UNCTAD’s World Investment 
Report (WIR), available in Appendix 8.2, which does not alter this 
conclusion. 
Table 8.1 Malaysia’s Total Direct Investment Abroad (DIA) vs. China’s Total FDI 
into Malaysia 
Year Malaysian DIA 
to China 
(US$ bn) 
Chinese FDI 
in Malaysia 
(US$ bn) 
Malaysian DIA 
over Chinese 
FDI ratio 
2008 1.3 0.3 4 
2009 1.3 0.2 7 
2010 1.3 0.3 4 
2011 1.9 0.4 5 
2012 1.8 0.2 7 
2013 1.8 0.3 5 
Source: Own Calculation based on Central Bank of Malaysia  Monthly Statistical Bulletin 
(May 2015) 
 
The official investment outflow data are sketchy and are only available 
from 2008 onwards for total outflow in all sectors, but give us an idea of 
the size of the outflow. When Malaysia’s Direct Investment Abroad (DIA) 
by sector is cross-checked, manufacturing is not the main sector in which 
Malaysian companies are investing abroad (at total level for all countries): 
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more volume is invested in mining and financial and retail. Furthermore 
Central Bank data is derived from the balance of payments and is thus 
more actual than MIDA’s approved investment data.  
 
There are currently no official data available about the number of 
Malaysian companies based in China. However, a 2003 survey carried out 
by Deloitte Kassim Chan, called the Malaysian Investment into China’s 
Fitness Survey, and quoted in the IDE - JETRO and SERI (2004) report puts 
the number of Malaysian companies already in China at approximately 34 
(21% of 160 firms surveyed in all sectors).108 
 
Moving away from the Deloitte Kassim Chan survey which covers all 
sectors, I narrow down Malaysia’s investment in China’s E&E sector using 
secondary sources such as corporate annual reports filed with the 
Malaysian stock exchange. These are the reports of Malaysian Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 suppliers to MNCs in the E&E value chain which have invested mainly 
in EMS service or contracting manufacturing services  in China. The 
Malaysian parent companies are medium-sized and publicly listed on the 
Malaysian bourse. The list of Malaysian companies, with geographical 
location in China with corresponding manufacturing activity is as follows:  
 
 VS Electronics  
- Qingdao (Electronics Plastics) - plastic part moulding, 
- Zhuhai, Guangdong (EMS) - contract assembly of E&E 
products including telecommunications products  
                                                 
108 IDE is Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO is Japan External Trade Organization, 
and SERI is Socio-Economic Research Institute, a research arm of Penang State 
Government.  
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 Carsem-Suzhou, China – IC testing and packaging109  
 Unisem –Chengdu, China- IC testing and assembly110 
 Inari-Amerton Kunshan, China- optoelectronics and fibre optics  
 
With the exception of Amertron-Kunshan, which was acquired by the Inari 
Group using Mergers and Acquisition (M&A), the mode of entry for the rest 
was the creation of a subsidiary. However, China is not the only location 
outside Malaysia for the Malaysian companies listed here. For example, 
Inari-Amertron has manufacturing facilities in the Philippines, and Unisem 
also has facilities in Batam, Indonesia. 
 
There are various reasons for Malaysian companies venturing into China. In 
the E&E industry, Malaysian investors in China are from the EMS segment, 
and the most plausible reasons are defensive market moves and efficiency-
seeking (IDE - JETRO and SERI, 2004, pp. 15) note: ‘Without doubt, some 
subcontractors are being “forced” by their customers, notably the 
multinational corporations (MNCs), to shift part of their production to 
China so that they could continue serving them’, and to achieve ‘tax 
savings and manoeuvrings around the Chinese government restrictions on 
licensing and distribution’ (IDE - JETRO and SERI, 2004, pp. 15.).  Other 
reasons include being able to tap into China’s lower labour costs in the 
initial period, and being close to its huge market.   
 
Although China’s market is huge and full of potential, it is not without its 
challenges. Those faced by Malaysians investing in China include the high 
                                                 
109 Carsem is a Top 20 semiconductor assembly and testing company with 1.4% of total 
market share by revenue, or US$0.34 bil l ion in 2014 (Gartner IC Insight Report 2014 in 
Nomura Research, 2014).  
110 Unisem is a Top 20 semiconductor assembly and testing company with 1.3% of total 
market share by revenue or US$ 0.31 bil l ion in 2014 (Ibid).  
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cost of doing business (mostly due to administrative and policy issues), a 
higher inflation rate in coastal cities, the high turnover of workers, lack of 
intellectual property protection, and Chinese managers inadequate skills 
and poor command of English (IDE - JETRO and SERI, 2004). Companies that 
overcome all these obstacles still face very competitive costs in China.  
 
Malaysian EMS players that overcome the challenges of operating in China 
benefit by diversifying into other areas of the E&E industry. VS Electronics, 
a world top 25 EMS provider that started operations in Shenzhen in 1997 
and listed its business on Hong Kong Stock Exchange111 in 2002, acquired 
Zhuhai Deyuan Energy Conservation Technology Co Ltd, a solar panel PV 
manufacturer in China, in 2015, which already has pre-orders for solar PV 
for buildings in China (Mahpar, 16 April 2015).112 VS, which started as a 
supplier of plastic mould components and assembly of communication 
products and higher-end multimedia products faced a challenging situation 
in the assembly business in China recently and decided to branch out into 
manufacturing solar modules. This purchase by VS Electronics in China is an 
example of an opportunity for Malaysian companies seeking to move from 
the thin profit margin of contract manufacturing into other areas.   
 
Conversely another Malaysian EMS, Globetronics, decided to pull out of 
China in 2009. Globetronics is a Penang-based contract manufacturer of ICs 
and LED. The reason it pulled is that most Malaysian E&E manufacturers 
are in the cost sensitive contract manufacturing business and the cost 
advantage in China has been eroded over the years.  The cost of producing 
products in China is already equal to or above the cost of producing in 
Malaysia, coupled with high labour turnover, a shortage of labour in China 
                                                 
111 VS Electronics main parent is l isted in Malaysian bourse in Kuala Lumpur, while VS 
International is a subsidiary of VS Electronics and listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  
112 EMS ranking is based on Manufacturing Market Insider 2014 report.  
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in coastal areas and frequent changes to China’s policy and customs 
controls, all of which impose additional costs on producers. Since exiting 
China Globetronics has been doing well and has expanded in 
Malaysia (BFM 89.9 The Business Station Malaysia, 2014).  
 
Complementarity factors due to China’s rise shift for Malaysian E&E players 
over time. When it was a low-cost production base Malaysian EMS 
benefited and invested in China to tap into the low-cost labour, but when 
labour costs, especially in coastal areas, increased this type of 
complementarity disappeared and a new type arrived, namely rapid 
demand for automation. Semiconductor equipment manufacturers (SEM) 
in Penang, especially those in optical semiconductor inspection machines , 
benefit from this surge in demand from China.  
 
In conclusion, China’s impacts on Malaysian companies that invest in China 
are generally complementary. The complementary aspect itself changes 
with China at different phases of development. It began as a base for low-
labour costs for EMS players, and recently offered opportunities for 
diversification with Malaysian companies acquiring Chinese companies in 
order to branch out into other E&E products. From 2008 onwards, when 
labour costs in coastal areas of China increased, Malaysian companies in 
backward linkages, such as SEM companies, benefited from the wave of 
automation in China’s coastal cities. Invariably, Malaysian companies ability 
to adapt and change their strategy in China’s very competitive market.  
8.3 China’s diversion of Investment in Malaysia from Malaysia’s 
traditional partners 
 
This section examines China’s diversion of Malaysia’s traditional partners’ 
investment to itself. It uncovers the impact of China on the Malaysian E&E 
sector based on the volume of inward investment, production and 
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employment data in Malaysia, the entry and exit of firms, and field 
interviews. The chapter then validates the findings with news report and 
government documents. As context the section presents case studies of 
Dell Computers’ shift of production from Penang to China and of an audio 
product company that I visited in Dongguan China that previously had 
production lines in Penang. It also looks at mitigating factors in the 
diversion of FDI from Malaysia. The chapter concludes that the China effect 
is complex, with short term loss of jobs a common effect when MNCs move 
to China. Malaysia is upgrading its E&E industry through efforts on the part 
of the public and private sectors as a respond to China’s rise.  
 
One weakness of presenting case studies and employment figures in this 
section is the inability to claim causality. As the section will show, the 
issues are complex: some senior E&E managers in Penang pointed out that 
cost can be another driver for firms to relocate their plants and 
investment. This chapter elaborates on China’s impact on Malaysia via the 
investment channel using sectoral labour data, matching it back to firms’ 
entry to and exit from Penang. The current literature is either highly 
aggregated in econometric studies or a fully qualitative based case study. 
This section brings this sectoral data together with the case studies, 
validating them with field interviews.  
 
Figure 8.6 and Table 8.2 present total FDI inflows for China and Malaysia to 
give an idea of the size of the inflow between Malaysia and China. ASEAN-6 
is an aggregate of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, 
and Brunei. Total investment inflow for Malaysia in 1992-2013 shows it 
lagging behind not only China but also ASEAN-6. FDI inflows into China 
grew on average by 16.9% per year, clearly outperforming Malaysia at 3.1% 
growth per year, while investment inflow into ASEAN-6 grows on average 
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by 11.2% per year. In terms of growth rate, Malaysia’s inward investment 
has underperformed compared to China and even ASEAN.  
 
Based on the China/Malaysian FDI ratio (see Figure 8.6), the gap between 
Malaysian and Chinese FDI inflows are the widest in 2001 and 2009. This is 
not to claim causality between the two FDI inflows, but to get a general 
trend to focus the discussion. Incidentally 2001 was the year that China 
became a member of the WTO, and this is discussed in detail during the 
labour data presentation and Dell case studies. 2009 is impacted by low 
demand as a result of the global financial crisis, which started in 2008.  
 
Figure 8.6 FDI Inflows into China, ASEAN-6 and Malaysia 
 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report   
 
Table 8.2 Malaysia and China FDI Inflow at Total Investment Level  
 US$ bn 
  1992 1997 2002 2008 2013 Average 
1992-
2013 
China 11.0 45.3 52.7 108.3 123.9 66.0 
Malaysia 5.1 6.3 3.2 7.2 12.3 5.8 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 
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Next, I present the findings for this section. The main finding is that the 
‘Chinese effect’ on Malaysia’s E&E sector is a loss of jobs in the short term 
in certain sub-sectors, but overall total employment in E&E remains stable, 
suggesting the shifting of labour between sub-sectors reflects Malaysia’s 
increasing specialisation in more sophisticated exports. Secondly, China 
complements the R&D structure of MNCs operating in multiple locations in 
East Asia. The chapter also elaborates on the impact on the supply chain of 
companies moving their production lines to China. This study finds that 
Malaysia is upgrading its E&E industry based on the pattern of entry and 
exit of firms in Penang and labour shifts across sub-sectors within the E&E 
industry. 
 
The firm interviewed provided insights into MNCs that have invested in and 
then left Malaysia and firms with plants in both Malaysia and China, but 
not firms that could have invested in Malaysia but decided to invest in 
China instead. These findings are important, as China is often blamed for 
diverting investment but this chapter will show, it can have positive effects 
when a developing country reacts appropriately.  
 
Most Malaysian managers interviewed concurred that the era of factories 
closing and moving from Malaysia to China around 2000-2005 has passed. 
This observation is consistent with Figure 8.6, which shows that Chinese, 
and Malaysian total FDI inflows increased the most in 2001. As data on 
how many E&E firms have left Malaysia or entered the E&E industry is not 
available at national level I used the Rietema and Velden (2013) database 
of firms’ entry and exit in Penang state instead. As manufacturing 
contributes close to 50% of Penang state’s GDP and is a major source of 
employment, Penang is a close representative of the E&E industry in 
Malaysia. 
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8.3.1 China’s diversion effects in E&E industry of Penang State 
 
This section aims to discuss the China’s diversion effects of investment in 
the Penang state, with the use of the Rietema and Velden (2013) database 
and draws on some employment data at national level where applicable. 
Rietema and Velden (2013) compiled a list of MNCs based on various 
sources including MIDA, JETRO, and InvestPenang to create a database on 
the E&E industry. The total number of MNCs in Penang in the database is 
119 in 1994 increasing to 175 in 2013. The database divides the MNCs into 
various E&E sub-segments such as semiconductors, domestic appliances 
etc. These categories are included in this research, except for medical 
devices, which are beyond its scope.  
 
The weakness of the database is that some entities have remained 
registered in Malaysia even after production had shifted away, as Rietema 
and Velden (2013) methods of recording their entry and exit is based on 
continuous registration of the business entity in Malaysia.  For example the 
Taiwanese audio equipment company that I visited in Dongguan, China 
moved its production line there from Malaysia in the early 2000s, but only 
officially left from Penang in 2014 and was delisted from the Malaysian 
stock exchange in 2013. As some companies continue to be registered in 
Malaysia but move their main operations to China or elsewhere, this 
understates the number of firms exiting from Penang.113   
 
The database is adjusted by adding the SEM players in Penang, and the 
results are shown in Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8 below. Local SEM players are 
included to see whether the period of MNCs leaving Malaysia coincides 
with Malaysian-owned SEM start-ups in Penang, which was the subject of 
the discussion on upgrading in Chapter 7. 
                                                 
113 This also partly explains why the number of firms is very different in Table 8.3. 
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Figure 8.7 Entry of E&E Firms in Penang 
 
Source: Adjusted from Rietema and Velden (2013) 
 
Figure 8.8 Exit of E&E Firms from Penang 
 
Source: Adjusted from Rietema and Velden (2013) 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
N
o
. 
o
f 
Fi
rm
s
Semiconductor Hardisk Drives
Solid State Drives LED
IT Equipment PCB
Computer Hardware Electronic testing & measurement eq.
Audio Semiconductor Test Equipment
Cable and Wires
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
N
o
. 
o
f 
Fi
rm
s
Semiconductor Hardisk Drives
Solid State Drives LED
IT Equipment PCB
Computer Hardware Electronic testing & measurement eq.
Audio Cable and Wires
267 
 
Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8 above show the peaks in MNCs leaving Penang in 
1998 during the Asian Financial Crisis and of the entry of new firms in 2000. 
Interestingly, 1998-2000, just prior to China’s entry into the WTO, sees an 
increase of firms leaving or beginning to shift their production lines to 
China in 2001. The number of firms exiting Penang in 2001-2002 is not 
significantly higher than in other years; and the number of firms entering 
Malaysia peaks a year before China joins the WTO, namely in 2000, and 
remains high in 2001.114  
 
Importantly, locally owned SEM manufacturers were mostly set up in 2001-
2002 and into the early decade of 2000, roughly during the period when 
firms were exiting Penang. Although some SEM players such as 
Pentamaster and SRM were started in 1991 and 1996 respectively, the 
majority of SEMs such as Penang Vision, TT Vision and Aemulus started in 
the early part of the decade of 2000. 115  The pattern of entry and exit of 
firms in Penang, particularly those entering after 2000, fit the view of a 
shift in industry with old assembly lines leaving Penang and a new industry 
being formed.  
 
Apart from having MNCs leaving Malaysia around 2000-2005, Penang’s 
economic census data in 2005 shows that branches of MNCs that 
commenced operations in Penang fell to a low of 23 firms in 2000-2004 
from a peak of 63 in 1990-94 as in Table 8.3 below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
114 Dell’s case study later in the chapter shows firms deciding to relocate even prior to 
China joining the WTO.  
115 Pentamaster manufactures semiconductor testing and inspection equipment and 
provides automation solutions for other manufacturing industries (Pentamaster, 2015).  
268 
 
Table 8.3 Branch Plants of Multinational Enterprises Operating in Penang, as at 
2005 
Commencement 
year 
No. of 
firms 
Gross output Employment 
  RM million % Headcount % 
Pre-1970  8  1,054  1.5  3,452  3.6  
1970-74  9  6,301  9.2  11,769  12.3  
1975-79  5  215  0.3  1,061  1.1  
1980-84  11  1,242  1.8  11,136  11.6  
1985-89  52  7,873  11.6  23,454  24.4  
1990-94  63  9,222  13.5  18,301  19.1  
1995-99  32  40,435  59.4  21,273  22.2  
2000-04  23  1,783  2.6  5,585  5.8  
Total  203  68,125  100.0  96,031  100.0  
Source: Malaysia Economic Census 2005, Unpublished Returns Compiled by Athukorala 
(2012, p. 26.) 
 
Although this section predominantly has discussed China’s effect on 
Penang State E&E industry via investment diversion, Table 8.4 show 
examples of major firms that have exited Malaysia at national level to 
further illustrate the types firms exiting from Malaysia. The majority of the 
firms listed in Table 8.4 are based in Penang prior to the exiting, except for 
JVC, Sanmina-SCI, STATs-ChipPAC and Panasonic TV.  
 
Table 8.4 Examples of Firms Exiting Malaysia  
Year Name  Segment No. of 
Empl. 
Aff’ted 
Country of 
Origin 
Notes 
1997 Philips Audio Audio 
Equipment 
1,500 NL Move to China 
1998 Nikko Electronics Consumer 
Electronics-
radio 
controlled 
toys.  
1,000 Malaysian Closed down 
2001 Seagate 
Technologies  
Hard Disk 
Drives 
4,000 US Internal 
restructuring 
2001 Aiwa Audio 
Equipment 
N.A. Japan  N.A. 
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Year Name  Segment No. of 
Empl. 
Aff’ted 
Country of 
Origin 
Notes 
2002 Sony Electronics in 
Penang 
(Formerly 3 
subsidiaries of 
Sony. One of the 
subsidiaries is Sony 
Audio before 1998 
restructuring, 
merge the 3 plants 
in Penang under 
one company. 
Audio 
Equipment 
l ike 
Walkman.  
N.A. Japan In 2002, VSS were to 
be offered to 
employees. Sony 
Malaysia is to focus 
on high value 
engineering 
products and move 
away from mass 
production.  
2002 Iomega  Zip Drives N.A.  
 
US Penang Plant sold to 
Ventures Group in 
Singapore, exit 
reason more 
towards change in 
technology, rather 
than China factor. 
2009 Dell Computers PC 700 US Slashing costs 
2009 NEC  PC  240  Japanese  Close due to low 
demand for its 
products 
2009 Intel Malaysia IC Chips 1000 Close test 
and 
assembly 
plant in 
Bayan Lepas 
Penang 
Workers are moved 
to Kulim Plant, and 
some are offered 
VSS. 
Retain R&D in 
Penang  
2012 Sanmina-SCI PCB Board  800 US  Move to Wuxi, China 
2013 Yahorng  Audio 
equipment 
N.A.  Taiwanese Move to Dongguan, 
China 
2013 STATS ChipPAC Leaded 
Wirebond 
Packaging & 
Testing IC 
1,100 Singapore Move to Qingpu, 
Shanghai  
2015 Panasonic TV Electrical  500 Japanese Closed as Panasonic 
is exiting TV  
manufacturing in 
Malaysia 
2015 JVC Kenwood Electrical  500 Japanese Closed due to 
industry shift; no 
demand for video 
recording cameras 
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Year Name  Segment No. of 
Empl. 
Aff’ted 
Country of 
Origin 
Notes 
2015 Fairchild Semicon.  Semicon. 1,000 US As part of global 
restructuring 
Fairchild disposing of 
old test and 
assembly l ine 
Note: NL= The Netherlands, Semicon. = semiconductor, Empl. Aff’ted = employees 
affected’ 
Not all  exits are due to competition with China: for JVC Kenwood, the exit is due more to a 
shift in the industry. The incorporation of a video-capturing function in mobile phones has 
drastically trimmed consumer demand for the dedicated video camera.  
Source: Own elaboration based on multiple sources  
 
Next, the type of firm entering and leaving Malaysia is reflective of the 
country’s changing trade patterns due to competition from China. Chapter 
6 discussed Malaysia’s loss of exports of audiovisual products such as 
radios and music players in 2002-2012 while China’s share of imports to 
the major destination markets increased for the same products. As shown 
in Table 8.4 above, at least four audio manufacturers left Penang in 1994-
2013, consistent with the decline in audiovisual exports from Malaysia. 
Most audio players had left by 2004, three years after China joined the 
WTO in 2001.  
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Figure 8.9 No. of Employees in Computer Industry and Peripherals (MSIC 30002) 
 
Source: Department of Statistics Malaysia, Monthly Manufacturing Bulletin, Various Issues  
 
From the E&E industry level, I now focus on Dell Computer, which has 
shifted its production of desktop computers from Penang to Xiamen. Dell 
Computer is a North-American MNC that manufactures PCs and has a 
Malaysian and a Chinese plant. The Malaysian plant was opened in 1996, 
while the plant in Xiamen, China was opened in 1998, with a second factory 
added in 2006 (Chang and Meidong, 2011). Initially, there was fear that 
Dell would leave Malaysia when the desktop PC manufacturing was moved 
from Penang to Xiamen in 2001, the year coinciding with declining 
employment in the computer industry across Malaysia as  
Figure 8.9 shows above. The lowest employment recorded is 28,318 
employees in 2002, falling from 38,082 employees in 2000 and recovering 
with 29,228 in 2003 to peak at 63,745 in 2010, driven by investment in 
computer peripheral manufacturing. Most notably, in the hard disk drive 
industry in 2010, Western Digital invests US$1.2 billion in Malaysia 
(Reuters, 18 May 2010) reportedly creating 10,000 jobs.116  
                                                 
116 2005-2008 saw computer peripherals expanding with higher employment as 
shown in  
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The worst fear, of Dell shutting down its Malaysian operations, has yet to 
materialise. Penang continues to manufacture for Dell (Dell Inc. , 2013, pp. 
8.), and now supplies its most sophisticated offering, Dell servers (Goh, 
2014).117  Malaysia is also a Global Command Centre, one of the five Dell 
centres in the world to provide assistance and technical support to 
customers and spares if needed (The Star Malaysia, 2014a). Dell has two 
other service centres in Malaysia, located on Penang Island and Cyberjaya 
located in Selangor state, apart from the Bukit Minyak manufacturing plant 
in Penang.  As Dell moves from the commoditised PC desktop market in 
response to a competitive global market to the marketing of services to 
enterprises as its key repositioning strategy, Penang remains relevant and 
has been given more sophisticated goods such as servers to manufacture 
within Dell’s supply chain.  
 
Dell’s moving its PC manufacturing from Malaysia to China demonstrates 
the difficulty of ascertaining the ‘China effect’ on Malaysia as the factors 
driving FDI are not mutually exclusive. As mentioned earlier, Zhou and Lall 
(2005) econometrics study argues that without discernible data on market-
seeking, efficiency-seeking or substitutable FDI it is not possible to arrive at 
a conclusion about this effect. 118 In Dell’s case, these three factors co-exist. 
Dell’s investment in China is market-seeking, its intention to serve the 
Japanese and Taiwanese markets by locating the production centre closer 
to the market while anticipating a boom in local Chinese demand for PCs. 
Charles Cheung, the managing director of Dell China, said ‘Having a 
production base in China is necessary to sell in the Chinese mainland 
market’ (Chang and Meidong, 2011).   
                                                                                                                            
Figure 8.9, consistent with entry of two additional solid state drive players (see Figure 8.7). 
117 Dell  last available annual report is for 2013 as Dell as was privatised at the end of 2013.  
118 Zhou and Lall  (2005) argues that production substitution can occur in efficiency seeking 
investment but is not l ikely to occur as part of resource-seeking or market-seeking 
investment, which, they argue, will  occur anyway.  
273 
 
 
Dell is also looking at the efficiency gained from both lower labour costs 
after relocating desktop production to Xiamen in 2001 and logistic gains 
from shipping PCs from Xiamen to Taiwan and Japan. Dell custom-built 
desktop PCs are time sensitive products and therefore being closer to the 
customer cuts the order to delivery time. Cheung of Dell China added that 
‘[m]ore importantly, there is a geographical advantage in its location 
between the Yangtze and Pearl River deltas. And it's very good for Dell to 
develop its logistic network and supply chain, as we rely mostly on the 
direct sales and build-to-order (business) model’ (Chang and Meidong, 
2011).  
 
Finally, the fact that Dell shifted the production of its desktop PCs from 
Penang to Xiamen shows that production is substitutable between the two 
locations, making it hard to classify FDI as market-seeking or efficiency-
seeking or substitutable production in a mutually-exclusive way.119 This 
makes it hard to judge whether the relocation of Dell’s desktop PC 
manufacture is truly ‛production substitution’. In contrast to the E&E 
sector, a foreign company buying into a mine somewhere in Malaysia is 
clearly a resource-seeking investment.  
 
Reverting to the sectoral-level discussion in Penang, the impact of 
competition from China as an FDI destination creates short-term job losses, 
but in the longer term, results in the upgrading of the industry and the 
workforce. During the slowdown in Malaysia in 2001 in the midst of E&E 
job losses the country keenly felt the competition from China, as a premier 
                                                 
119 Some types of production can be fragmented and substituted more easily than others. 
For example, in the chemical and paper industry the fragmentation of the production 
process is less l ikely due to the nature of the production of chemicals and paper (ibid). 
However, in the electronics industry production can be fragmented with multiple 
components produced in different locations, and assembled in a final location.  
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location for assembly trade. Business Weekly reports that in the first three 
quarters of 2001 Penang lost 12,000 jobs, or 10% of its manufacturing 
workforce, and including highly-skilled workers such as engineers, as MNCs 
moved to China (Balfour, 2001). This situation prompted the CEO of 
Penang Skills Development Centre (PSDC) in Penang to say ‘People at the 
grass roots don't realize how big a threat China is to us’ (Balfour, 2001).  
 
However, scholars such as Lüthje et al. (2013) and a Penang E&E veteran 
saw these jobs losses in 2001 as the beginning of the restructuring of E&E 
and the upgrading of facilities in Malaysia. With the assembly-line 
manufacturing leaving Penang, MNCs brought in more advanced 
manufacturing technology into Penang. For example, in the contract 
manufacturing segment a US MNC moved its low to mid-tech production 
processes to China and replaced its Penang plant: ‘The previously 
dominant-assembly line is complemented by cell based manufacturing, 
particularly in systems integration’ (Lüthje et al., 2013, pp. 119). Product-
wise, Solectron ‘refocused on server and networking products after 2003’, 
including bringing the most sophisticated network routers to Penang 
‘following the almost complete loss of printed circuit board assembly for 
PCs and hard disk drives’ (Lüthje et al., 2013). 
 
8.3.2 China’s diversion effects at Malaysia’s national level 
 
This section discusses the Chinese effect on Malaysia’s E&E sector via the 
investment channel using national production data. Sjoholm (2015) study 
tracing the determinants of Southeast Asia FDI argues that production data 
is a better tool to capture the presence of FDI as it reflects the type of FDI.  
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As a start, overall employment figures in the E&E sector in Malaysia have 
increased from 339,155 in 1997 to 408,745 in 2013, as shown in Figure 8.10 
below. Although the E&E employment growth rate is low at an average of 
1.2% per year in 1997-2013, overall employment in E&E did not decline. 
This can indicate the labour market shifting across the sub-sectors, but 
without panel data it is not possible to track whether former employees in 
Penang moved out of manufacturing to join other services in the Malaysian 
economy.  
 
Figure 8.10 Total Employment in E&E Sector 
 
Source: Data from Monthly Manufacturing Survey, Department of Statistics Malaysia 
 
 
The changes in Malaysia’s labour market by E&E sub-sector are presented 
in Figure 8.11 below. Employment by sub-industry in 1997-2013 shows that 
with the exception of domestic appliances n.e.c. employment in finished 
electrical goods declines. In contrast, employment in sub-industries such as 
semiconductors grows. Employment in ‘brown goods’ such as in the TV 
industry, in which China competes for exports (see Chapter 6), declines, as 
imports from Malaysia at the destination markets  decline. Employment in 
TV and Radio Receivers fell by 2.4% in 1997-2012. Similarly, consistent with 
the parts and components analysis in Chapter 6, employment in electronic 
valves and tubes, PCB Boards declined by -1.4% in the same period. See 
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Appendix 3.2 for the list of Malaysia Standard Industrial Classification 
(MSIC) codes.  
 
Figure 8.11 Employment in E&E sector by Sub-industries in Different Periods in 
Compounding Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) (%) 
 
Note: Industry categories other electronic and electric wires and cables; metal-forming 
machinery and machine tools; other special-purpose machinery n.e.c.; electricity 
distribution and control apparatus; batteries and accumulators; lamps & lighting 
equipment; other electrical equipment n.e.c.; machinery for textiles; apparel and leather 
production; and office and accounting machinery are omitted in the above due to non-
availability of data in 1997 to calculate the growth rate for the entire period of 1997 -2013.  
Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia  
-20% -15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
  elec. mtrs, generators & transformers
  tv & radio receivers sound/video
recording/reproducing apps
  electronic valves& tubes & PCB
  non-structural non-refractory ceramic ware
  air-conditioning, refrigerating & ventilating
machinery
  glass and glass products
  plastic injection moulded components
  instruments & appl. for measuring, checking,
testing, navigating
  other electronic components
  semi-conductor devices
  photographic equipment
  computers and computer peripherals
  tv & radio transmitters apps. for line
telephony
  telecommunication cables and wires
  medical and surgical equipment orthopaedic
apps
  domestic appliances n.e.c
1997-2013 1997-2001 2002-2008 2009-2013
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Figure 8.12 No. of Employees by MSIC Code Semiconductor Industry 
 
Source: Department of Statistics Malaysia, Monthly Manufacturing Bulletin, Various Issues 
 
 
The production data above indirectly verify the upgrading of the E&E 
industry, for instance in the case of Solectron in Penang. Figure 8.12 shows 
that Malaysia is shedding labour in Manufacture of electronic valves and 
tubes and printed circuit boards (MSIC 32102) while employment has 
increased in the semiconductor industry (MSIC 32101). Manufacture of 
electronic valves and tubes and printed circuit boards (MSIC 32102) lost 
13,524 jobs from 1997 to 2013 and there was a marked decline in PCB 
industry employment from 2005 (80,722 employees) to 2008 (55,858). 
While for 2008, the lower figure in 2008 was also a result of the global 
financial crisis, the decline is permanent, going beyond 2010. The decline 
although is in the employment aspects, reflecting the exit of PCB 
companies from Malaysia and in some cases, such as Solectron (later 
bought by Flextronics) in Penang, remaining in Malaysia but retool their 
factory lines by upgrading from the assembly line to more automated 
production (Lüthje et al., 2013).120  
                                                 
120  The employment data for PCB industry does fit the Inari story that 2005 was a bad year 
for the industry (see Section 8.4.1). Although, the Inari co-founder refers to 
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The data on the movement of labour in the electronics segment fit the 
story of upgrading and is consistent with the trade patterns discussed in 
Chapter 6, with Malaysia increasingly specialising in more sophisticated 
semiconductors and firms in the PCB segment exiting Malaysia and moving 
to China and Vietnam. Employment in Manufacture of semi-conductor 
devices (MSIC 32101) actually increased from 66,206 workers in 1997 to 
89,480 in 2013 during the time that the PCB industry was shedding 
employees, and the number of employees in Manufacture of other 
electronic components (MSIC 32109), which includes electronic displays 
from non-LED and other electronics increased marginally from 5,376 
workers in 1997 to 6,498 in 2013.  
 
Despite the passing of the period identified as China ‘diverting’ investment 
massively from Malaysia (2000-2005) where more MNCs exiting Malaysia’s 
manufacturing scene, China continues to have an impact on Malaysia’s 
electronics industry. One example is the PCB fabrication plant of Sanmina-
SCI, an EMS in Sarawak move to Wuxi in 2012. China short term effect 
resulted loss of 800 jobs in Sarawak (Lim et al., 2012). This event shows the 
terminal decline of PCB operations in Malaysia, as reflected in Figure 8.12 
above. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
semiconductor industry in 2005 of Penang, Figure 8.12 above shows that the PCB industry 
is hardest hit. 
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Figure 8.13 Labour Productivity in the Semiconductor and Electronics Industry 
 
Source: Monthly Manufacturing Survey, Department of Statistics 
 
This upgrading of the value chain is further supported with Figure 8.13 
above that shows labour productivity for the Manufacture of electronic 
valves and tubes and printed circuit boards (MSIC 32102) actually increase 
from US$114,400 in 2005, to US$151,900 in 2008, corresponding with the 
period of firms shedding employment in PCB factories.121  One could argue 
that the increase in productivity could be due to savings from shedding 
labour in the sector. However, as firms exit from Malaysia to move to China 
for PCB manufacturing and with other factors being held constant, labour 
productivity is expected to decline or stay constant as less firm means less 
revenue or sales figure too. However, in the Malaysia’s case, this did not 
happen, in fact the productivity increase most when labour are being shed 
in the PCB sector when a firm exits. Although shedding labour can have an 
impact on increase productivity but the steep increase especially from 
2004 onwards can be reflective of the upgrading within the value chain 
such as in the case of Solectron in Penang.  
                                                 
121 Labour productivity in Malaysia = Sales Value/no. of workers, while it is a much better 
to use Gross Value Added method, the intermediate inputs are not available at MSIC 5 
digit codes level. The weakness here is that if the industry that has high level of import 
content, which the E&E is one of them, there are potential issues with the labour 
productivity such as overestimating the level of labour productivity.  
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The data on annual wages per employee also show wage levels have been 
rising. As the wages data are affected with the cost of living (interview 
data), the data is deflated using the Malaysian Consumer Price Index. Next, 
the real annual wage per employee data are used to compare the most 
important sector in E&E, the semiconductor sector with one of the fastest 
growing sector, SEM. Specifically, I am comparing the real wages for the 
Instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating 
and other purposes, except industrial process control equipment (MSIC 
33120) with the semiconductor devices (MSIC 32101) sub-sector as in 
Figure 8.14 below. 
 
Figure 8.14 Comparing Real Annual Wages per employee in the Semiconductor 
Industry and Semiconductor Test Instruments (SEM) 
 
Note: Wages adjusted to Real Figures using CPI provided by DOS Malaysia, 1994=100  
Source: Own Calculations based Department of Statistics Mal aysia  
 
Based on annual real wages per employee analysis, it is hard to conclude 
whether the E&E sector has upgraded although the growth for average 
wage per E&E worker outpace the inflation rate. The average wage for an 
E&E worker (based on 24 MSIC codes) is US$3,066.8 in 1997 and grew to 
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US$5,909.3 in 2013 at annual pace of 4.2% against average inflation rates 
of 2.4%.  
 
Although semiconductor workers are paid higher than the average sector 
wide E&E workers, the relatively flat growth rate in wages, it is  unclear if 
average wage per workers captures the upgrading of the value chain within 
the semiconductor industry.  Based on annual wages calculations, the 
average wage per worker is the semiconductor industry only grew on 
average 0.6% per annum from 1997-2013 period, which is below the 
inflation rate. However, the semiconductor industry (MSIC 32101) wage 
per worker improves from 2005 onwards, with the average wage per 
worker rose from US$ 5909.69 in 2005 to US$ 7517.50 in 2013 at 3.5% per 
annum.  
 
Interestingly, SEM is the most dynamic sector for a wage earner rather 
than the semiconductor industry. From 1997-2013 period, real annual 
wage per worker grows at 7.6% per annum in the SEM sector actually 
outpace growth of wages of semiconductor at 0.6% per annum by a high 
margin. Although semiconductor still remains the one of the sub-sector 
that pays the highest (wage) among all sub-sectors, it is hardly the most 
dynamic sub-sector in terms of growth in wages. Around the year 2006, the 
average annual wage of workers found within semiconductor test 
equipment (MSIC 33120) surpasses the wages paid to an average worker 
within the semiconductor industry (MSIC 32101) as in Figure 8.14 above.  
 
This is a significant as the definition of Manufacture of semi-conductor 
devices (MSIC 32101) includes ‘diodes, transistors and similar semi-
conductor devices, photosensitive semi-conductor devices including photo-
voltaic cells, mounted piezo-electric crystals, electronic integrated circuits 
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and micro-assemblies of moulded module, micromodule or similar types.‘ 
(Department of Statistics of Malaysia, 2000); represents the industry that 
the Malaysian government has been targeting, namely LED industries, solar 
panel industry beginning from 2000, to counter the lower assembly line 
industry that is leaving Malaysia. Although MSIC codes is aggregated up to 
the extend it is hard to pin down the semiconductor sector progress by 
itself, MSIC 32101 code represents Malaysia’s targeted sector of 
semiconductor, photovoltaic module and LED industry. The result of 32101 
is that although it increases as a source of employment for the population, 
the annual wage per worker in the sector is relatively flat. The inclusion of 
the photovoltaic module in code MSIC 32101 partially explains why 
average wage data could not show the upgrading in the semiconductor 
industry.  
 
In contrast, instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, 
navigating and other purposes, except industrial process control 
equipment (MSIC Code 33120) real wages per worker in Figure 8.14 is 
increasing while employment is increasing at the same time as shown in 
Table 8-5 below.  
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Table 8-5 Number of persons employed comparing MSIC 32101 and MSIC 33120 
  no. of persons 
Year Semiconductor 
(MSIC 32101) 
Semiconductor 
test Instruments 
(MSIC 33120) 
1997  66,206  9,562  
1998 64,296  10,167  
1999 72,954  9,799  
2000 81,495  9,880  
2001 72,238  11,412  
2002 73,408  10,724  
2003 77,487  9,969  
2004 80,306  5,862  
2005 77,161  5,194  
2006 87,849  7,892  
2007 84,839  7,607  
2008 76,239  8,016  
2009 74,143  8,189  
2010 85,950  10,854  
2011 87,808  8,106  
2012 85,663  8,369  
2013 89,480  10,342  
Source: Department of Statistics Malaysia  
 
The number of employment for semi-conductor devices (MSIC Code 32101) 
is increasing and this has an impact on real average wage growth per 
worker. The real wage growth from 1997-2013 for MSIC Code 32101 was 
only 0.6%.  The increase in MSIC Code 33120 is consistent with an industry 
displaying its upgrading, with higher wages over a medium term (more 
than 5 years).122 
 
 
                                                 
122  MSIC 32101 does include oscilloscope, spectrometer, which means some of Agilent 
Technologies, an MNC based in Penang wages are also in the same category as SEM 
sector. However, this means Agilent has always been in Penang, the increase in annual 
wage per employee from 2005 onwards is not l ikely to be caused by Agilent ramping up 
wages for its workers.  
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8.3.3 Other findings 
 
The second main finding is that R&D managers regard China as an 
opportunity as the R&D can tap different areas for different skill sets, and 
create synergies among different locations. For example, an American 
MNCs operating in Penang, said that they rely on India operations to 
concentrate on software, Penang concentrates on the hardware design of 
their product, while, China R&D division help the MNC to localize their 
products to the Chinese market. These R&D Managers’ view is valid 
because, supposed a product is now manufactured in China, but the design 
is partly contributed by Malaysian engineers based in Penang but in a trade 
data analysis, Penang would have ‘lost out’ to China based on competitive 
analysis.  
 
Managers of E&E firms also observe the decision to relocate to China also 
includes costs competitiveness and potential sales on the location of the 
MNCs. Based on where cost including labour costs is competitive, then the 
MNC will choose to remain in current location or move to a new location. 
Recently, China’s labour cost especially in the coastal cities has increased, 
this trend also has contributed to the surge of enquiries from MNCs 
wishing to relocate to Malaysia in E&E industry (interviewee 11). For 
example, Sandisk, which already has a plant in China will invest 
approximately RM1.2 billion (US$366.7 million) plant in Batu Kawan, 
Penang in 2014, with the R&D centre to be located in Singapore.123  Sandisk 
is a North-American company that design and manufactures flash memory 
devices such as memory stick or thumb drives. (Tan, 2014a) Another 
example cited was the recent Intel moving its manufacturing facilities from 
Shanghai to Chengdu, Sichuan in China due to higher costs in Shanghai.  
Another one is HP, to manufacture printer heads with RM1 billion 
                                                 
123 Conversion rate US$1=RM3.2729 provided by Central Bank of Malaysia.  
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(US$305.5 Million) investment in Batu Kawan Penang (Tan, 2014b).124  The 
managers’ based in Malaysia observation further points to China’s costs 
competitiveness advantage is disappearing with more MNCs relocating 
back to Penang.    
 
Managers based in Penang who think China’s is competitive qualify the ir 
statement that for now, the impact is limited given that China is still 
targeting the high volume low price segment, but they also pointed out 
that this will eventually change in the near future. The managers then 
pointed out that how China will impact on Malaysia will depends on how 
fast Malaysia can leverage on existing assets and human capital, with rapid 
recall of highly skilled Malaysian human resources from abroad to respond 
to this challenge.  Based on a World Bank Report, highly educated 
Malaysians abroad are said to be reluctant to return to Malaysia, and 
majority prefer to live abroad in Singapore and Australia (Schellekens et al., 
2011).  This creates a massive skill gap and Penang is not able to make the 
leap into electronics in the way that South Koreans and Taiwanese were 
able to. Rasiah (2011) argues that the ethnic policy is partially slowing 
Malaysia upgrading by discouraging real entrepreneurs from emerging and 
dampening the ethnic Chinese business drive to move into high value-
added activities.  
 
For the third findings of China’s impact on Malaysia’s E&E sector, I travelled 
to visit a Taiwanese company that has left Malaysia, and moved its  plant to 
China. The company subcontracts manufacturing of low to mid 
sophistication products segment such as turntables, radio, and audio mixer 
products, audio products for MNCs. The company has a plant in Malaysia in 
1997 but shifted most of the manufacturing line to Dongguan, Guangdong 
                                                 
124 Ibid. 
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Province in China beginning from 2003. The company subsequently 
terminated the manufacturing plant in Penang and delisted from the 
Malaysian bourse in 2013 and shifted the entire manufacturing to 
Dongguan facility. The R&D function of the company is kept in Taiwan. The 
visit confirms the worst fear that once the main manufacturing lines, 
though not the entire firm relocated to China, the supply base will move 
entirely to China. Although initially some Malaysian suppliers still retain 
some orders, but eventually all Malaysian suppliers for the manufacturing 
company are terminated. On the flip side, some Malaysian key production 
employees at managerial level were brought in to help setup and run the 
production in China for the MNC, and in the process, Malaysian managers 
gain regional experience. The reason for the shifting of the entire supplier 
base is costs competitiveness as prices offered by Chinese suppliers are 
much lower than Malaysian suppliers.  
 
However, there are some factors that dampen the China diversion of 
investment from Malaysia. These factors include the segmentation of 
MNCs operations in different locations, the US legislation on dual use, and 
the lack of IP protection in the China market. These factors slow or 
indirectly mitigate the shifts or diversion of FDI from Malaysia to China. 
 
8.3.4 Mitigating factors on the Impact from China on Malaysia 
 
Despite some firm moving their investment from Malaysia to China, the 
impacts of China on Malaysia are mitigated by factors such as the 
segmentation of MNCs operations in different locations, the US legislation 
on dual use, and the lack of IP protection in the China.  
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Segmentation of production function by the MNCs in the E&E industry with 
Malaysia given higher sophistication product responsibility mitigates the 
impact of China on Malaysia. A North-American IC producer and a Germany 
semiconductor company have Penang to manufactures high margin 
products, while China plant production targets the lower segment of the 
electronics product. A German MNCs is opening a manufacturing plant (at 
the time of interview) for LED home lighting described as low margin and 
volume game in China; while LED headlamps for cars used in the 
automotive industry, described as high margin and cutting edge technology 
is currently manufactured in Penang. These MNCs allocate in different 
locations for different market segment rather than treating opening a new 
plant in China as automatically meaning ‘substituting’ the investment from 
Malaysia to China.  
 
The US legislation of ‘dual use’ prohibits the building of ‘state of the art 
production facilities for China and this constraints the transfer of 
technology from US to China. (Li and Yang, 2013) Dual use refers to 
products that can be used in civilian goods and in military hardware.  The IC 
chip is one of the main components in missiles and drones technology. This 
legislation restrictions means American IC chips producers  will be 
restrained from build their latest wafer fabrication plant in China. This US 
legislation indirectly helps the Malaysia FDI strategy of China+1 for the 
moment. China +1 strategy is a term used by E&E industry in Malaysia to 
persuade many of the MNC to retain the production in Penang as a hedge 
against risk of locating all production in one site (interviewee 8).  
 
Moreover, managers are concerned about moving their ‘state of the art’ 
design and production to China due to IP protection issues; fearing their 
technology will be copied in no time, resulting in the loss of 
competitiveness of the firm. Consequently, some high technology firms 
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have only sales offices in China, but R&D and production facilities are kept 
in Malaysia and other Southeast Asian locations. A North American flash 
memory manufacturer recently wrote in its annual report that IP issue 
including counterfeiting has a detrimental effect on its financial operations 
globally (Sandisk Corporation, 2014). 
 
Arising from the IP protection issue, an investment promotion agency in 
Malaysia reveals that foreign investors are looking to re-locate plants back 
from China to Malaysia (interview 11). Some other reasons cited are rising 
costs in coastal cities of China and other administrative difficulties in China.  
 
8.3.5 Interactions between Trade and Investment Channel of 
‘China effect’ on Malaysia 
 
Interestingly, export competition between indigenous Chinese companies 
with the MNCs based in Malaysia makes foreign MNCs less likely to re-
invest or expand their business in Malaysia as their profit margin is hit. 
Deducing from this and taking the solar module industry in Malaysia as an 
example; Bosch, a German company was cited as cancelling their 
investment in RM2.2 billion (US$ 712.3 million) plant in Batu Kawan, 
Penang (Tan, 2012), due to falling international prices of solar module 
(Mok, 25 March 2013).125  The falling prices are due to the competition 
from China in solar panel module. (Abhishek Shah, 2011). This Bosch 
example shows trade effect from China can affect Malaysia’s FDI prospects 
and in this case, constraining FDI from traditional sources.  
 
On the other hand, effects from China in the trade channel can also boost 
Malaysia’s FDI prospects, and in this  case, it happens to be solar module 
                                                 
125 Based on conversion rate US$1= RM3.0888. 
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industry as well. South Korean company Hanwha SolarOne, which controls 
Q-Cell of Germany recently announced ‘it would stop making solar cells in 
Germany and ship its factory to Malaysia to cut costs’ and to create size to 
compete with Chinese giants in solar module such as Yingli Solar (Martinez 
and Landberg, 22 January 2015). Although by chance, Malaysia lost and 
regains FDI opportunities by the China effect in the solar module case, it 
shows that trade and investment are not mutually exclusive channels, but 
impact from China can interact between the channels as well.  
 
8.3.6 Conclusion for Section 8.3 
 
Based on electronics firms’ movements into and out of Penang and job 
data, China’s rise has resulted in job losses and the exit of firms 
manufacturing E&E products of lower sophistication such as PCB 
operations. However, this has also spurred the upgrading of Malaysian E&E 
value chain, with MNCs replacing lower technology assembly operations 
with higher-value more sophisticated manufacturing techniques for higher 
specification goods.  
 
Data on annual wages per employee shows that the SEM segment has paid 
its workers more than the much-prized semiconductor (MSIC 32101) 
segment since 2006, further indicating that Malaysia’s SEM is upgrading.  
 
From R&D managers’ point of view, China is a complementary force for 
Malaysia as each country can tap into different research strengths in 
different locations. Finally, a field visit to a company that has shifted its 
production line from Malaysia to China revealed that when the supply 
chain moved to China Malaysian suppliers were cut out of the supply chain. 
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8.4 Malaysia’s response to competition from China 
 
A Malaysian public sector official observed that China’s effect on Malaysia 
will depend on how Malaysia reacts to China. A contrast between the 
reactions of the states of Penang and Sarawak brings out this point. Penang 
reacted with more upgrading on the part of MNCs based in Penang and the 
formation of SEM firms, while Sarawak responded by going upstream: after 
losing 800 jobs from Sanmina-SCI’s move to Wuxi China in 2012, Sarawak 
received investment from Tokuyama of Japan and Comtec of China.  126 In 
terms of position in the value chain Sanmina-SCI, a global EMS, is a 
downstream player, while Tokuyama is an upstream player that 
manufactures silicone ingots in Sarawak and ships them for further 
processing in Japan; Comtec of China is also a silicon ingot and wafer 
producer.  
 
The rest of the section discusses Malaysia’s response to China’s rise in the 
E&E value chain in both the private (firm) and the public sector. This 
section addresses the research question: How do Malaysia’s firms and 
public sector respond to China? 
 
This section addresses the research question of Malaysia’s response to 
China both at firm level and at public sector level to the rise of China in FDI 
attraction. The Malaysian public sector measures discussed here aim to 
attract more investment and increasing exports given the close link 
between trade and investment in Malaysia’s E&E sector.  
 
                                                 
126 Rietema and Velden, 2013 also concludes that between 1994 and 2013, Penang has 
upgraded its E&E industry. 
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8.4.1 Firms’ Response 
 
Malaysian firms are upgrading to remain relevant in the E&E value chain. 
This section focuses on MNCs operating in Malaysia and local firms, as 
Malaysian firms that have gone abroad to invest in China have been 
covered earlier in this chapter.  
 
Firms’ responses include upgrading, expanding horizontally rather vertically 
in the industry, and seeking partnerships. An example of vertical expansion 
in the IC industry is firms making smaller, thinner and faster ICs, while firms 
that expand horizontally try to match current ICs with new capability in 
other sectors such as the biological sector, namely in the creation of bio-
chips that can be embedded in plants for better crop yield.  
 
Malaysia’s E&E firms’ responses to China’s rise include products upgrading 
and processes upgrading. Malaysia is also starts to perform functional and 
intersectoral upgrading, but do not include chain upgrading.127 Product 
upgrading can be seen in the move of the manufacture of lower-margin 
products to China and Vietnam, with Penang concentrating on higher-
margin products as part of the segmentation of activities by MNCs 
operating in region. Process upgrading is the strength of MNCs based in 
Malaysia, as Malaysian plants constantly find ways to minimise the cost of 
producing electronic products. MNCs based in Malaysia carry out Research 
and Development (R&D), a form of functional upgrading, along the value 
chain. Interview data shows that R&D activity is also picking up among 
locally-owned entities in Penang.  
                                                 
127 Some scholars call this intersectoral upgrading, in which firms such as Pentamaster and 
TT Vision use existing knowledge to enter other related sectors but chain upgrading 
actually refers to discovery of a breakthrough that upgrades of the entire value cha in, l ike 
discovery of fibre-optics revolutionised the way electronics data is transmitted.  
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Penang-based firms are developing R&D capabilities, a functional 
upgrading reflecting a shift from previous manufacturing activity to 
research and design along the semiconductor value chain. Penang is one of 
Altera’s main R&D centres outside the US, while the next generation of 
another North American MNC microprocessor is also co-designed in 
Penang and will pass through technology development in Penang before 
going into production (interviewee 1). In 2006, Intel announced a US$40 
million R&D centre in Kulim, Kedah, to design ‘microprocessors, chipsets, 
motherboards, server boards and custom microchips for use in Intel's 
product lines’ (Hopfner, 2016) adding  900 designers to the 3,000 
workforce in Kulim plant.  
 
On Altera again, one of the two major companies competing in the field-
programmable gate array (FGPA)128 market has an R&D centre in Penang.  
Altera has no factories in Penang but coordinates global demand in Asia, 
Altera Penang gains a functional upgrading with functions resembling a 
Regional Headquarters for the East Asia region within the organisation. 
Although Altera Penang does a lot of tweaking of existing products, it is 
beginning to pick up some IC design activity for the design of the core of 
the ICs (interviewee 7) referring to the logic circuits units of the IC (die of 
the IC chip before it is packaged).  
 
Local firms are also upgrading functionally. For example Globetronics, an 
EMS that serves MNCs Penang’s semiconductor industry, is upgrading. It is 
now co-developing products with customers and expanding horizontally by 
acquiring capabilities in and synergising with other areas such as medical 
devices, using electronic sensors as a basis (BFM 89.9 The Business Station 
Malaysia, 2014). This horizontal strategy is also the way forward for a 
                                                 
128 In FGPA the IC is programmable, and typically commands a higher price than common 
microprocessors produced by Intel.  
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semiconductor front-end player in Malaysia going into fabricating niche 
chips such as bio-chips that can be used in agricultural cultivation. This 
horizontal strategy can also be read as inter-sectoral upgrading (Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 2004). 
 
The level of R&D performed by local firms in Penang, although 
commendable, is still far from the type of R&D performed by the MNCs 
(interviewee 8). Despite this, Malaysian companies such as Penang Vision, 
Aemulus and Ceedtech are the few bright sparks in Penang. Some MNCs 
interviewed in Penang said that some local companies do perform high-
technology R&D, but the details are confidential. Finally, to put the level of 
R&D at Penang firms such as Penang Vision, Aemulus and Ceedtech into 
perspective, it can be described as level 5 (an early stage of R&D) out of 6 
based on Rasiah (2010) taxonomy of R&D (see Appendix 8.3). These firms 
have not reached a level of research that can revolutionise the whole 
industry.  
 
A case study of the Inari-Avago partnership in Penang demonstrates the 
response of Malaysian firms to Chinese competition.129 Some FDI literature 
notes that the weakness of FDI as a model for development is that MNCs 
draw talent away from indigenous firms, as the former normally pay higher 
wages. With China drawing FDI away from Malaysia, the competition for 
talent between indigenous firms and MNCs based in Penang is less intense 
than before. In fact Inari has hired some ex-Avago engineers as Avago 
seeks to close its back-end manufacturing operations in Malaysia. An 
interview revealed that the combination of the down cycle in the 
semiconductor industry in 2006 and E&E firms relocating to China helped 
                                                 
129 Inari calls it a strategic partnership, with Avago initially holding 13% of the stake in of 
Inari during the start-up period but later the stake is was sold off (BERNAMA, 2011).  
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Inari to secure plant buildings at lower cost during its critical start-up 
period (Interviewee 9). 
 
The Inari case is an important lesson for a developing country upgrading in 
the E&E GVC, including product upgrading and process upgrading. This 
upgrading is reflective of broader efforts by Malaysian firms, including 
Penang-based SEM players. There is a need for more Malaysian firms to 
move towards functional upgrading, and possibly chain upgrading, which 
will result in radical changes that will see the country earning from 
licensing intellectual property with pools of highly skilled workers. Inari’s 
partners such as Avago have already attained this stage. Inari is also 
starting to invest in R&D in the back end of the semiconductor business, 
but details were not disclosed in the interviews.  
 
As an illustration of how China attracted E&E firms away from Penang 
created the opportunity for new local start-ups, I elaborate on Inari’s 
beginnings as a start-up company. In 2005, Dr. Tan, one of the co-founders 
of Inari Bhd, returned to Penang from Taiwan and China after spending 
years in the electronics industry abroad, to start manufacturing set-top 
boxes in Penang. Coincidentally, Avago Technologies, with a presence in 
Penang, a NASDAQ-listed company that designs and manufactures RF chips 
used in mobile telecommunications and fibre optics , was looking at 
outsourcing the back-end manufacturing of its RF chips. Tan and PG Ho, 
both having the financial resources, met up with Edward Mai and John Tan 
of Macronian, which had the system-in-package capability) that Avago 
needed to package its RF chips. 130 These four co-founders decided to 
jointly bid for Avago’s outsourcing of its manufacturing operation as the 
new firm Inari Technology (Ali, 2011). Dr. Tan remarked that ‘In 2005 and 
                                                 
130 A system-in-package is contains more than one ICs packaged within one hous ing 
forming a system (PC Mag (b), 2015). 
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2006, Penang semiconductor players were rushing to China. About 30% to 
35% of the factories on [Penang] and Prai had closed down’(Ali, 2011). 131 
Crucially, this gave Inari a head start because it was easy to source a cheap 
factory and the required machinery building in Bayan Lepas, Penang 
(interviewee 9). Against this backdrop, Inari began in 2006 as an EMS 
performing back-end manufacturing for Avago.  
 
Beyond the Inari-Avago partnership, Inari was supported by a Penang 
Network, which was crucial during the start-up phase. ‘Penang Network’ is 
a loose term describing the informal networking among Penang ’s E&E 
players. When Inari first started, many SEM vendors supported it to give it 
a head start. In short, to ‘get machines, get suppliers and get clients all 
within Penang ... Penang has the eco-system to do this’.132  There was 
goodwill was because the co-founders of Inari are Penang-based people 
who had been known in the local E&E community for many years. Had Inari 
started elsewhere it might not have been able to tap into such a network. 
The Penang Network exemplifies how spatial embeddedness remains a 
                                                 
131 There is no central database on firms leaving Penang, but using data 
from newspaper reports and referring to Figure 8.12 in p. 338, the PCB 
sector marks the start of the decline in the number of employees in 2005. 
Although this section predominantly has discussed China’s effect on 
Penang State E&E industry via investment diversion, Table 8.4 show 
examples of major firms that have exited Malaysia at national level to 
further illustrate the types firms exiting from Malaysia. The majority of the 
firms listed in Table 8.4 are based in Penang prior to the exiting, except for 
JVC, Sanmina-SCI, STATs-ChipPAC and Panasonic TV.  
 
Table 8.4 in p. 328 shows that even firms that have not formally exited Penang can 
restructure by offering a voluntary separation scheme (VSS), which is basically another 
form of layoffs. Prai Industrial Area: the mainland part of Penang Sta te 
132 Field interviews.  
296 
 
relevant concept, and in this case it helped Inari to succeed and claws back 
some of the semiconductor businesses that had gone to China.  
 
Another point related to China is that Malaysia has specialised more in 
components away from the final assembly of products, as discussed in the 
trade chapter. This coincides with Inari’s preparation to go into the back 
end of the semiconductor business. Interviews revealed that Macronian 
staff that later co-founded Inari had specialised technical knowledge of flip-
chip technology in the assembly of semiconductors, and this was a key 
criterion in winning the job from Avago, and with the trade structure 
geared towards components it prepared Malaysia’s workforce to take the 
opportunity when it arises. 133 Inari was formed with the technical 
knowledge of people from Macronian and the financial backing of Dr. Tan 
and MR. PG Ho. 134 
 
Inari is a success story and the company was selected as one of Asia’s best 
for Forbes Magazine’s (Forbes Magazine, 2015) Under a Billion List. Its 
growth has been exponential, thanks to the strategic partnership with 
Avago Technologies and supported by the Penang Network. Inari has 
grown to the extent that it can acquire local and overseas companies , 
broadening its portfolio to include optoelectronics, electronics test and 
measurement machines. In 2012, Inari acquired Amertron Kunshan for 
US$32 million in order to enter the optoelectronics and fibre-optics 
segment of the global electronics manufacturing service market. (Inari-
Amertron Bhd., 2013, pp. 10.) Inari’s competitors today are companies  
                                                 
133 Fl ip-chip packages have the sil icon die face down and connected to the packaging by 
ball  joints melted and under-fi l led with epoxy, as opposed to the usual lead soldered 
package that connects the die to the lead frames of the packaging, which are typically face 
up (PC Mag(a), 2015).  
134 Macronian is a company name based in Penang. 
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such as ASE from Korea, and Ambit, which is related to Foxconn. Inari’s 
journey is summed up in Box 8.1: 
 
Box 8.1 Inari-Amertron Bhd Time Line 
Year Events 
2006 Inari Berhad founded  
Contract Manufacturing with Avago Technologies  
2009 Inari opens its 3rd plant in Penang, increasing floor space to 
100,000 sq. ft.  
2011 Inari listed on ACE Market in Bursa Malaysia (ACE Market is 
for smaller size companies). IPO was oversubscribed by up to 
10 times.  
2012 Inari acquired Amertron Kunshan of China, to enter fibre-
optics and optoelectronics market at US$32 Million. 
Amertron serves to provide LED display for washing 
machines of American companies such as Whirpool.  
Inari acquired Ceedtech at approximately US$1.30 million 
(RM4 million). Ceedtech has served MNCs such as Agilent in 
Penang for test and measurement instruments market.   
2013 Change of name to Inari-Amertron 
2014 Inari-Amertron transfer to main bourse of Bursa Malaysia 
2015 Revenue now hits approx. US$62.2 Million (RM228.3 Million)  
Source: Inari-Amertron Bhd. (2015) 
 
While collaboration and the Penang Network helped to make Inari 
successful, factors were identified during field interviews. From Avago’s 
point of view these include cost considerations. Avago chose Inari to be 
one of its suppliers due to its location. From experience, physical proximity 
reduces the cost of resolving production problems, especially for complex 
products; it involves sending engineers from the principal holder of the 
technology to resolve technical issues. Therefore it is economical in terms 
of both time and cost to have suppliers located close to the technology 
partner. Secondly, Avago’s top management correctly predicted that 
China’s coastal area cost of production would be more expensive as a 
location than Penang in a matter of a few years. Therefore using Penang as 
a base was a natural choice. In other words, Inari’s success is due to a 
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mixture of factors and not to collaboration alone, although this has been 
pivotal.  
 
Inari is an exception in Malaysia, as pointed out by a veteran of Penang’s 
E&E industry. (Interviewee 8) There is no incentive for other MNCs to 
create this kind of strategic partnership due to the competitive operating 
environment. However, the Inari case serves to illustrate Penang E&E 
players’ response to China’s rise by increasing collaboration both among 
the individual cofounders of Inari and at firm level (Inari-Avago), 
demonstrating that Malaysia can be a sizeable player rather than stuck in 
second-tier SME mode in the E&E value chain. Malaysia needs more 
success stories such as Inari to neutralize the negative effects of 
competition from China for FDI.  
 
Based on the Inari-Avago case study, China’s diversion of FDI created a 
window of opportunity for start-ups such as Inari because buildings and 
other inputs became cheaper in Penang when many industrialists left in 
2005, making start-up costs cheaper and giving Inari a head start. Inari’s 
case also fits well with the view of restructuring in the E&E industry with 
more advanced manufacturing. In other words, upgrading involved 
transitional costs such as temporary job losses in Penang, but some players 
in Penang responded by accelerating their upgrading in partnership with an 
MNC. MNCs in general upgraded products and processes while picking up 
R&D activity in response to China’s rise.  
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8.4.2 Public Sector Response 
 
Some interview respondents recommended that Malaysia should focus on 
its internal science and innovation administrative setup and facilities, and 
its industrial policy on the development of its E&E industry rather than 
looking outwards such as to competition from China, and this brings me to 
the public sector’s response. This section lists programmes for upgrading 
the Malaysian E&E value chain.  The programme generally seeks to 
upgrade Malaysia’s E&E, with China a major factor in this. The Performance 
Management Delivery Unit (PEMANDU), under the Prime Minister’s 
Department of Malaysia, recognized E&E as a priority sector of Malaysia’s 
economy for development and at the same time identified ‘increasing 
competition from China and other Asian sites’ as a case for change in 
Malaysia (PEMANDU, 2012, slide no. 2.). 
 
This section discusses the main programmes of MIDA, CREST and 
TalentCorp, as revealed in field interviews. MIDA has restructured itself 
from the Malaysia Industrial Development Authority to the Malaysia 
Investment Development Authority to include investment in the service 
industry investment. Beyond the name change, MIDA also launched a RM1 
billion (US$324 million) Domestic Strategic Industry Fund in 2012 to 
‘accelerate the participation of Malaysian-owned companies in the global 
supply chain, namely, high value-added, high-technology, knowledge-
intensive and innovation-based industries’ (The Star Malaysia, 2014b).135 
This strategic fund covers the electronics sector among other high 
technology industries such as aerospace, and provides 1:1 grants for R&D 
and training for Malaysians. Inari Bhd also received R&D grants and training 
grants from this MIDA programme in 2014.  
 
                                                 
135  Figure converted using foreign exchange rate in 2012, 1US$=RM3.0888. 
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Targeting the E&E industry specifically, Collaborative Research in 
Engineering, Science & Technology (CREST) was launched in 2012 to bring 
about more R&D in the field of electronic engineering among E&E players 
in Malaysia. Based in Penang, CREST brings together academia, the 
industry and the government to help Malaysia move from volume-based 
towards knowledge-based advanced manufacturing in the E&E industry. 
The goal is to have firms earning from new inventions and patents, and a 
talent pool able to perform high-value R&D.   
 
CREST’s three major objectives are increasing R&D, talent management, 
and industry engagement. It provides grants to individuals to perform R&D 
in line with industrial needs and to create a platform for collaborative 
research among E&E players in Penang, something that has been missing in 
Penang despite many years of E&E industry experience. In terms of talent 
management, CREST is working in partnership with TalentCorp to bridge 
the gap between universities and industry needs by providing training in 
line with industrial requirements. Finally, to encourage industry 
engagement CREST brings the E&E industry in Penang together in 
workshops, activities and design solutions that can be commercialised. For 
this, CREST provides office space in Penang for industry employees to 
converge. CREST differs from previous Malaysian government approaches 
as this is industry-led research with most members from Penang based 
MNCs (MIDA Malaysia, 2014). In 2004, CREST introduced grants targeted at 
optoelectronics industries, the Internet of Things (IoT) and IC design, and 
set up strategic collaboration on LED research between a Malaysian 
educational institution and the University of California Santa Barbara. 
(MIDA Malaysia, 2014) 
 
TalentCorp is a Malaysian government unit formed to attract foreigners 
and Malaysians abroad back to Malaysia to help with the upgrading of the 
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Malaysian economy. TalentCorp’s mandate goes beyond E&E industry, but 
since E&E is a major industry in Penang, TalentCorp programmes naturally 
have included development of human capital for the E&E industry. At 
national level, TalentCorp has Returning Expert Programme (REP) that 
extends income tax concessions and tax breaks for car purchase in 
Malaysia for returning Malaysians that qualifies.  
 
One of the major constraints in Penang is the shortage of highly skilled R&D 
engineers in the E&E sector such as IC, LED, and SEM subsectors. 
(interviewee 10). To address this FASTRACK, which is essentially an up-
skilling programme launched by TalentCorp which places engineering 
graduates with MNCs for training to ensure that the talent pipeline is 
industry-ready. FASTRACK’s E&E training partner is the PSDC.  This differs 
from the previous approach in which graduates were trained before being 
placed, a strategy that led to mismatched skills between the training and 
the industry need. By placing the best graduates in E&E firms first, the skills 
that the companies impart are aligned with their needs. Since its launch in 
2011 about 364 engineers have been through the FASTRACK programme 
with the aim of performing R&D for E&E firms in Penang once absorbed 
into the companies after finishing the programme (TalentCorp Malaysia, 
2013).  
 
The Graduate Employability Management (GEM) programme targets 
students who have been out of work for more than six months after 
graduation. TalentCorp, local universities and private start-up firms such as 
Penang’s Dreamcatcher provide the technical training for E&E-related 
technical courses. Based on Rasiah’s argument that ethnic policies in 
Malaysia dissuade highly-skilled Malaysians from returning abroad to help 
upgrade the industry (Rasiah, 2011), TalentCorp would perhaps have more 
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success by training Malaysians still in Malaysia, assuming that they do leave 
to seek jobs in neighbouring Singapore after training.  
 
Although not a formal strategy, the China + 1 strategy is used to market 
Malaysia as a location to MNCs as a form of risk management. The China 
+1 strategy is used to persuade investors to co-locate production facilities 
in Malaysia to reduce the risk of locating all their production facilities in 
one place. This strategy is aided by the fact that intellectual property is less 
secure in China due to intense copying, helping to market Malaysia as a 
safer location for investors.  
 
Toh (2013) explains the weakness of the current public sector response as 
public sector institutions being too centralized to respond effectively to 
support innovation within the industry; the public sector lacking the 
expertise to make strategic decisions to move the industry; MNCs in 
Malaysia not using public research institutes in Malaysia; and interlinkages 
between firms in Malaysia generally being weak.  The Malaysian 
government, aware of these weaknesses, set up the Domestic Strategic 
Investment Fund, CREST, and TalentCorp to improve the current innovation 
system. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
There are three aspects to China’s impact on Malaysia in the investment 
channel: the ‘China effect’ created short-term labour market losses; 
spurred Malaysia to upgrade its E&E value chain in the long term, and, as 
demonstrated by the Inari-Avago case, diverted FDI from Malaysia, 
creating an opportunity for sizeable Malaysian technology start-ups. 
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Malaysia is only getting receiving minimal FDI inflow from China in its E&E 
industry relative to its traditional investor countries. Moreover, China is 
investing in the E&E upstream and seeks efficiency. Based on the GVC 
framework this upstream investment hardly stimulates upgrading in the 
E&E industry, although China is still at an early stage of investing abroad. At 
this point Chinese investment in Malaysia is minimal, and therefore China 
does not ‘compensate’ Malaysia for its losses in the finished goods sector 
with more FDI inflows from China.  
 
At the total investment level, Malaysian firms invest more in China than it 
receives in return. For Malaysian E&E sector firms that have invested in 
China the impact is generally positive. Malaysian EMS firms capitalised on 
low labour costs in China in the early stages to build up volume, and one 
Malaysian firm is a global EMS player today as a result. However, China 
does not suit all Malaysian firms as an FDI location and some have left 
China due to rising labour costs in coastal areas. A new form of 
complementarity has emerged, with SEM players in Malaysia benefiting 
from additional demand from China as E&E firms in China automate in 
response to rising labour costs.  
 
The answer to the question of whether China has diverted investment 
away from Malaysia is not straightforward. Malaysia has been affected by 
the rise of China nevertheless, with short-term job losses in the domestic 
labour market, but overall Malaysia is upgrading, as shown by comparing 
the entry and exit of new firms. The entry of new firms, especially in the 
SEM segment, when MNCs exit Penang or shift their production line to 
China, signals the long awaited arrival of sizeable technology-based 
Malaysian firms. Secondly, R&D managers see China as a complementary 
force, as MNCs draw strength from multiple locations for designing new 
products. Finally, when a company shifts its production line from Malaysia 
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to China the entire supply chain shifts with it, although this point cannot be 
generalized across the whole E&E industry.  
 
Malaysia has responded to the Chinese challenge by upgrading its E&E 
value chains for both product and process upgrading. MNCs based in 
Malaysia are also increasingly performing R&D, signalling a step up into 
functional upgrading. Local Malaysian firms are also upgrading, some 
starting in collaboration with MNCs, such as in the case of Inari-Avago.  
 
The public sector supports upgrading in the value chain by setting up CREST 
in Penang to promote collaborative research among the E&E players  there. 
In addition, MIDA has set up the strategic industry fund to help local firms 
grow into sizeable players and to promote R&D. Finally, TalentCorp is 
tasked with increasing and upgrading the E&E industry’s talent pool in 
Malaysia. However, Malaysia’s track record for public intervention via such 
projects as MIMOS and the MSC project in Cyberjaya in the 1990s and 
2000s has not lifted the country into the international league or created 
technology heavyweights with household international brand names. Given 
the challenge from China, the Malaysian government exhibited signs of 
changing strategy in 2012 by giving R&D incentives directly to local private 
firms, which has been far more effective with companies such as Inari and 
others in SEM equipment, which have been growing more steadily as a 
result.  
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9.0 Conclusions 
 
The re-emergence of China has created both challenges and opportunities 
for developing countries such as Malaysia.136 This research investigates the 
impact of China’s rise on Malaysia’s E&E sector through trade and 
investment channels, following the Asian Drivers framework. The study 
also examines China’s impact on the backward linkages of the IC industry in 
the semiconductor test machines segment.  
 
This chapter concludes the findings from this research, starting with the 
empirical findings and how these inform the theoretical framework and 
impact on policy, followed by recommendations for future research and 
closing remarks.  
 
9.1  Empirical Findings 
 
The bilateral trade figures reveal that Malaysia’s export structure is now 
relatively more integrated with imports from China than with any of its  
other traditional main partners trading in E&E products. While Malaysia is 
benefiting from a higher volume of exports of semiconductors and parts 
and components, it also faces competition from China for electrical 
products and other final goods. The Malaysia-China bilateral trade balance, 
disaggregated by type of goods (in Broad Economic Categories), shows that 
China is no longer just a centre for assembly trade as it is increasingly 
capable of producing parts and components. Malaysia is importing these 
parts and components, especially those of lower sophistication. Malaysia is 
also experiencing higher import penetration of household electrical goods 
                                                 
136 China is a significant player in terms of manufacturing for the World GDP in sixteen 
century (IDS, 2006). China’s opening its door to economic reform in 1979 marks the 
beginning of China’s re-emergence on the world stage. 
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compared to a decade ago. This signifies the entry of big MNCs from China 
into the Malaysian household electrical goods market.  
 
Although Malaysia has a trade deficit in parts and components in its trade 
with China, this is not necessarily a bad thing as it uses these parts and 
components as inputs into its final assembly and exports the finished goods 
to Middle Eastern markets, as demonstrated in the example of Colour TVs 
products in Chapter 6.  
 
Based on a competitive analysis of trade at the destination markets for 
1992-2002 and 2002-2012, E&E imports from China compete with 
Malaysia’s exports to the US and Japan, but remain in a situation of mutual 
expansion with imports from Malaysia in EU markets in 2002-2012. In 
terms of sophistication, exports from Malaysia have been upgraded. There 
is competition for the most sophisticated products imported by the US. For 
products in the second quartile of sophistication (see Table 6.5 in p.173 
and Table 6.12 in p.190), the US and Japan imports from China compete 
with those imports from Malaysia. This means that even exports of 
Malaysia’s prized specialisations, such as IC chips, which fall under the 
second quartile of sophistication, are competing with Chinese IC chips. 
However, this threat is tempered by the rise in Malaysia’s exports of IC 
chips to China.  
 
The analysis of trade by type of goods finds that Malaysia has almost 
withdrawn from the US and EU markets for final goods such as durables as 
imports from Malaysia at destination market falls significantly by 2012. The 
Japan imports more durables from Malaysia than the two other 
destinations in 2012 consonant with the presence of Japanese FDI in 
Malaysia. During 2002-2012, Malaysia’s export structure has largely 
switched to parts and components and faces competition from China for 
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products at the first and third levels of sophistication in the destination 
markets.  
 
Taking the case of audiovisual goods at destination markets, while the 
China is competitive and Malaysia has withdrawn from the US market the 
net effect is that Malaysia has diverted its exports  of TV products to the 
Middle East. Secondly, Malaysia imports TV parts and components from 
China to assemble into final goods. Therefore, not all China’s competitive 
forces are not entirely negative. 
 
China does not make up for its diversion of investment from Malaysia’s 
traditional sources of FDI in the E&E sector or for its loss of exports in the 
US and Japan market. However, it provides a platform for Malaysian 
companies to invest in China, although this is mainly confined to the 
electronic manufacturing services (EMS) segment. On the issue of the FDI 
diverted from Malaysia to China, this research has focused on the impact 
of firms leaving Malaysia, and the entry of new firms and the resulting 
short-term job losses. Finally, China has spurred Malaysia’s efforts to 
upgrade its private E&E firms, aided by public sector programmes, 
including its backward linkage industry, the SEM segment.  
 
9.2  Theoretical Impacts 
 
Going back to theoretical frameworks, the findings of this research can 
inform studies based on the Asian Drivers. Altenburg et al. (2006) 
speculates that China’s rise will pose entry obstacles to developing 
countries  entering the technology based exports market given China’s 
formidably low prices and exports of highly innovative products. However,  
this research on the high-technology E&E industry of a developing country 
such as Malaysia, collating findings for the E&E backward linkages industry, 
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has found that contrary to Altenburg et al. (2006), China has helped 
Malaysia – although unintentionally, by increasing the minimum wage in its 
coastal industrial areas – to upgrade its E&E industry to meet the demand 
for automation machines for the semiconductor industry.  
 
China competes with Malaysia’s E&E exports, but it also spurs Malaysia to 
upgrade its E&E industry. This answers Ernst (2004) critical question 
whether China is a blessing in disguise for Malaysia. The mainly 
econometric-based studies, such as Athukorala (2009), which force the 
discourse into a binary yes or no, argue that China’s role is mainly 
complementary as it absorbs Malaysia’s parts and components for final 
assembly and exports to the US, EU and Japan (ibid). While this is true to a 
certain extent, especially for ICs, a competitiveness analysis disaggregated 
by sophistication level has shown that China competes with Malaysia’s E&E 
exports in the first and third most sophisticated E&E export segments. At 
the destination markets China competes with Malaysia’s prized 
specialization in the production of ICs, the main item it exports under parts 
and components.  
 
Malaysia has upgraded its E&E value chain through products and process 
upgrading in response to China’s challenges. Other than offering more 
sophisticated E&E exports, it has also included R&D and functions as the 
regional headquarters of some of the major MNCs operating in Malaysia. 
 
There is some intersectoral upgrading in the backward linkages of SEM, 
with new generations of entrepreneurs, particularly based in Penang, who 
have worked for MNCs in Penang and have used the knowledge gained 
there to create spin-off companies designing semiconductor inspection 
machines. From there, some SEM players have also branched out into 
other sectors to design automation solution and machines for manufacture 
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lines for other industry such as rubber glove inspection machines and 
medical devices.  
 
One of the central issues discussed within the GVC/GPN theoretical 
framework is that trust matters more than spatial proximity among the 
members of the value chain, given the increasing geographical dispersion 
of production arrangements aided by advances in telecommunications 
(Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2012). However in the case of Penang’s 
semiconductor clusters spatial proximity is a core consideration which in 
turn affects costs and trust (being located together increases trust and 
networking amongst the players).  
  
9.3  Policy Impacts 
 
Kaplinsky and Morris (2009) argue that in the textile industry the removal 
of preferential treatment for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries has had a 
deleterious effect on their exports due to direct competition from China 
and Vietnam. This gives rise to the question of whether a level playing field 
is good for the low-technology industries such as textiles in developing 
countries which have long been considered a stepping stone to broader 
industrialization of the economy. However, in this research based on 
relatively high technology and a mid-technology country such as Malaysia, 
the competition has had an upgrading effect of the industry. Chapter 6 
discussed how Malaysia faces the most competition for the US market 
from Chinese E&E exports; and Malaysia’s exports face the greatest 
competition in the most sophisticated segment. The competition has led 
Malaysia to offer more sophisticated exports. This is something for 
international development agencies to take into consideration when 
framing policy on using trade as a tool for development for countries with a 
medium level of technology.  
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Moving from international to national policy, Malaysia should aggressively 
pursue the development of its SEM segment, which is being upgraded and, 
most importantly, it includes the Malaysian-owned firms. This is the goal of 
the Malaysian government in its Industrial Master Plan III (2006-2020) to 
reduce foreign dependence in its industrial development (Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry Malaysia, 2006). More importantly, the 
SEM segment avoids competing head-to-head with China, which is 
aggressively pursuing the development of its semiconductor industry and 
exports. 
 
Malaysia’s investment policymakers should note that current Chinese 
investment in Malaysia is not going into segments with the potential to 
generate positive spillovers, with the exception of Huawei of China’s 
training centre (although this does not come under E&E). Therefore some 
of incentives should be packaged to attract Chinese investment, especially 
involving joint research into or design of IC chips, as China now has  a 
sizeable IC sector in its semi-conductor industry.  
 
Some of Malaysia’s key structural issues remain unresolved and potentially 
limit Malaysia’s upgrading capability, including its lack of a distinguished 
university department of physics and chemistry which would give Malaysia 
an edge in producing scientists to support upgrading and perform research 
at a more fundamental level. Although unrelated at first sight, some 
surprising factors that frequently came up in the interviews included the 
deteriorating standard of English amongst Malaysian workers, the shortage 
of highly-skilled engineers capable of performing R&D, and the 
questionable quality of education and training standards overall.  
 
 
 
311 
 
9.4  Recommendations for Future Research 
 
This research has aimed to deepen understanding of the effect of China’s 
rise on Malaysia’s E&E sector in the trade and investment channel. Future 
research to further enhance understanding and improve policy 
recommendations should cover the following:  
 
 Cultural factors when China’s MNCs decide to invest. This was in the 
back of the researcher’s  mind: when Chinese investors consider an 
investment do cultural factors such as language and ethnicity affect 
their decisions? This research could inform our understanding of 
how network production spreads from China to potential sites in 
Southeast Asia.  
 
 Methodologically, future research could look into the impact of 
non-disclosure agreements (NDA) on E&E industry research 
compared to another industry that is not tied by such an 
agreement. Comparing the responses from interviewees from 
industry bound by NDA with another unbounded by NDA to similar 
questions, could reveal biases in respondents’ responses to 
questions, the type of biases introduced where they occur.  
 
 A comparative study of China’s impact on another ASEAN country 
such as Thailand would be interesting, especially in the automotive 
sector, as Thailand is the hub of the automotive industry for many 
MNCs in the ASEAN region.  
 
 Research could focus on the movement of specialised Malaysian 
labour following MNCs relocating from Malaysia to China to see 
whether this helps them to upgrade their skills and whether this 
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labour force eventually returns to contribute to Malaysia’s move up 
the value chain.  
 
 Research could investigate trade friction between Malaysia and 
China; while this has mainly eluded the E&E sector it does not mean 
that other sectors, such as the steel industry, do not experience it.  
 
9.5  Closing Remarks 
 
This study fills a gap in the literature, where the findings of research 
involving simulation models and econometric studies are largely based on 
highly aggregated data. Based on the Asian Drivers theoretical framework 
and competitiveness analysis, this study finds that China is competing with 
Malaysia’s E&E exports in the trade channel in the major destination 
markets such as the US and Japan. However, China mitigates this 
competitive threat with a greater volume of Malaysian exports of parts and 
components into China. Although China does not compensate Malaysia for 
diverting FDI from Malaysia’s traditional sources this diversion has aided 
Malaysia’s efforts to upgrade its  E&E industry in response to the challenge 
that China poses. 
 
Going forward, Malaysia can potentially leverage China’s ambitious assault 
in the global semiconductor market by focusing on the SEM sector, which 
supports China’s demand for the automation of semiconductor production 
and inspection. This however depends on how Malaysia addresses its 
internal structural issues in the industry, and factors outside the industry 
such as education and training standards. With the price of oil below 
US$40 per barrel at the point of writing, Malaysia appears to have little 
choice but to buttress its E&E industry as a bulwark against the volatility of 
the global commodities market.       
313 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
  
314 
 
Appendix 2.1 Trade Channel – Formulas Based on Market-share Analysis 
Approach Detail Formula Source 
RCA index See Balassa Index below 
Compare RCA of 1997/98 over 1992-93 
between China and competitor country. A 
total of 50 products were compared 
based on China’s top 50 products item.  
Shafaeddin (2004) 
Competitiveness 
Decomposed 
ΔXij = ΔQi.sij + sij.Qi* ( Δsij/sij - Δsik/sik) + 
Δsik/sik. sij.Qi 
 
“where X is exports and Δ is the absolute 
change in, Qi is total imports of i in the 
market concerned (at the end of the 
period), sij is the initial market share of 
country j in imports of i and with 
competitor country k, sik is k’s market 
share for product i.” A positive result 
indicates market share gains, while a 
negative results shows loss of market 
share. 
Roland-Holst and Weiss 
(2004) 
Further explanation is 
available in Weiss and 
Gao (2003) 
   
Simultaneous 
equations  
AFDIit = α + βPRC_FDIt + λxit + μi + eit (1) 
PRC FDIt = γ + δAFDIit + ρzt + v + wt    (2) 
Here subscripts i and t refer to country i at 
time t; xit is the set of determinants of FDI 
to the Asian economies covered, 
so for country i its FDI inflow is AFDIi; zt is 
the set of determinants for FDI to PRC 
(PRC_FDI); ui and v are country specific 
terms; and ei and w are error terms. 
Roland-Holst and Weiss 
(2005) 
   
Balassa index RCAij = (Xij/Xi) / (Xwj/Xw) 
 
“where Xij = value of country i’s export of 
commodity j  
Xi =value of country i’s total exports  
Xwj =value of world exports of commodity 
j 
Xw= value of world exports” 
Abidin and Loke (2008) 
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Appendix 2.2 The Gereffi-Humphrey-Sturgeon Theory of Value Chain 
Governance  
Type 
Complexity of 
transactions 
Codification 
of 
transactions 
Competence 
of suppliers 
Learning 
mechanisms within 
GVC 
Market  Low High High  Knowledge spill 
overs 
 Imitation 
Modular High High High  Learning through 
pressure to 
accomplish 
international 
standards 
 Transfer of 
knowledge 
embodied in 
standards, codes, 
technical 
definition 
Relational  High  Low High  Mutual learning 
from face-to-face 
interactions 
Captive High  High Low  Learning via 
deliberate 
knowledge 
transfer from lead 
firms confined to 
a narrow range of 
tasks –e.g. simple 
assembly 
Hierarchy  High  Low  Low  Imitation 
 Turnover of skilled 
managers and 
workers 
 Training by foreign 
leader/owner 
 Knowledge spill 
overs 
Source: Pietrobelli  and Rabellotti (2012, pp. 231.) 
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Appendix 3.1 List of E&E Product Codes under HS 1988/92 Nomenclature 
No.  Product 
Code Product Description 
1 630110 Electric blankets 
2 841451 Fans: table, roof etc. with a self-cont. electric motor 
3 841460 Hoods having a maximum horizontal side not exceeding 
4 841510 Air conditioning machines window or wall types, 
5 841581 Air cond. Mach. Nes inc a ref unit and a valve for 
6 841582 Air cond. Mach. Nes, inc a refrigerating unit 
7 841583 Air cond. Mach. Nes, not incorporating refrigeration 
8 841590 Parts of air conditioning machines 
9 841810 Combined refrigerator-freezers, fitted with separate 
10 841821 Refrigerators, household type, compression-type 
11 841822 Refrigerators, household type, absorption-type, 
12 841829 Refrigerators, household type, nes 
13 841830 Freezers of the chest type, not exceeding 800 l 
14 841840 Freezers of the upright type, not exceeding 900 
15 841850 Other refrigerating or freezing chests, cabinets  
16 841899 Parts of refrigerating or freezing equipment, n 
17 841911 Instantaneous gas water heaters 
18 841919 Instantaneous or storage water heaters, non-element 
19 842112 Clothes-dryers, centrifugal 
20 842211 Dish washing machines of the HH type 
21 845011 Automatic washing machines, of a dry capacity < 10 kg 
22 845012 Washing machines of a dry linen capacity =<10kg 
23 845019 Household/laundry-type washing machines <10 kg, nes 
24 845020 Household or laundry-type washing machines, cap >10kg 
25 845090 Parts of household or laundry-type washing machine 
26 845110 Dry-cleaning machines o/t hdg No 84.50 
27 845121 Drying machines (o/t hdg No 84.50) each of a drum 
28 845129 Drying machines (o/t No 84.50) nes 
29 845210 Household type sewing machines 
30 846910 Automatic typewriters and word-processing machine 
31 846921 Typewriters, electric, weighing not more than 1 
32 846929 Typewriters, electric, nes 
33 847010 Electronic calculators operable with internal power 
34 847021 Electronic calculators, printing, external power 
35 847029 Electronic calculating machines, nes 
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No.  Product 
Code Product Description 
36 847030 Calculating machines, nes 
37 847040 Accounting machines 
38 847050 Cash registers 
39 847090 Postage franking mchy ticket-issuing mchy etc  
40 847110 Analogue or hybrid automatic data processing machine 
41 847120 Digital auto data process machine 
42 847191 Digital process units whether or not presented 
43 847192 Computer input or output units 
44 847193 Computer data storage units 
45 847199 Automatic data processing machines and units, nes 
46 847210 Office duplicating machines 
47 847220 Addressing machines and address plate embossing 
48 847230 Mchy for sorting or folding mail etc & mchy  
49 847290 Office machines, nes 
50 847310 Parts and accessories of typewriters and word-processing 
51 847321 Parts and accessories of electronic calculating 
52 847329 Parts and accessories of calculating & accounting 
53 847330 Parts and accessories of automatic data process  
54 847340 Parts and accessories of other office machines, 
55 847611 Automatic goods-vending mach incorporating heating 
56 847619 Automatic goods-vending machines, nes 
57 847690 Parts of automatic goods-vending machine 
58 850110 Electric motors of an output not exceeding 37.5 
59 850120 Universal AC/DC motors of an output exceeding 3 
60 850131 DC motors, DC generators, of an output < 750 watts 
61 850132 DC motors, DC generators, of an output 0.75-75 kW 
62 850133 DC motors, DC generators, of an output 75-375 kW 
63 850134 DC motors, DC generators, of an output >375 kW 
64 850140 AC motors, single-phase, nes 
65 850151 AC motors, multi-phase, of an output < 750 Watts 
66 850152 AC motors, multi-phase, of an output 0.75-75 kW 
67 850153 AC motors, multi-phase, of an output > 75 kW 
68 850161 AC generators (alternators), of an output < 75 kVA 
69 850162 AC generators, of an output exceeding 75 KVA  
70 850163 AC generators, of an output exceeding 375 KVA  
71 850164 AC generators, of an output exceeding 750 KVA 
72 850410 Ballasts for discharge lamps or tubes 
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No.  Product 
Code Product Description 
73 850421 Liquid dielectric transformers < 650 KVA 
74 850422 Liquid dielectric transformers 650-10,000KVA 
75 850423 Liquid dielectric transformers > 10,000 KVA 
76 850431 Transformers electric, power capacity < 1 KVA, nes 
77 850432 Transformers electric, power capacity 1-16 KVA, nes 
78 850433 Transformers electric, power capacity 16-500 KVA 
79 850434 Transformers electric, power capacity > 500 KVA, nes  
80 850440 Static converters, nes 
81 850450 Inductors, electric 
82 850490 Parts of electrical transformers, static converter 
83 850511 Metal permanent magnets, articles intended as magnets  
84 850519 Permanent magnets & articles intended as magnets, nes  
85 850520 Electro-magnetic couplings, clutches and brakes 
86 850530 Electro-magnetic lifting heads 
87 850590 Electro-magnets nes and parts of heading No 85. 
88 850611 Manganese dioxide primary cell/battery volume < 300 c 
89 850612 Mercuric oxide primary cell, battery, volume < 300 cc 
90 850613 Silver oxide primary cells, batteries volume < 300 cc 
91 850619 Primary cells, primary batteries nes, volume < 300 cc 
92 850620 Primary cells, primary batteries nes, volume > 300 cc 
93 850690 Parts of primary cells and primary batteries 
94 850710 Lead-acid electric accumulators of a kind used 
95 850720 Lead-acid electric accumulators nes 
96 850730 Nickel-cadmium electric accumulators 
97 850740 Nickel-iron electric accumulators 
98 850780 Electric accumulators, nes 
99 850790 Parts of electric accumulators, including separators 
100 850810 Drills, hand-held, with self-contained electric 
101 850820 Saws, hand-held, with self-contained electric motor 
102 850880 Tools, nes, hand-held, with self-contained electric 
103 850890 Parts of hand tools with self-contained electric 
104 850910 Domestic vacuum cleaners 
105 850920 Domestic floor polishers 
106 850930 Domestic kitchen waste disposers 
107 850940 Domestic food grinders and mixers; fruit or veg 
108 850980 Domestic appliances, with electric motor, nes 
109 850990 Parts of electro-mech. Domestic appliances  
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No.  Product 
Code Product Description 
110 851010 Shavers, with self-contained electric motor 
111 851020 Hair clippers, with self-contained electric mot 
112 851090 Parts of shavers and hair clippers, with self-contained 
113 851110 Spark plugs 
114 851120 Ignition magnetos, magneto-generators and magnet 
115 851130 Distributors and ignition coils 
116 851140 Starter motors 
117 851150 Generators and alternators 
118 851180 Glow plugs and other ignition or starting equip 
119 851190 Parts of electrical ignition or starting equipment 
120 851210 Lighting or 319nodized319 equipment of a kind used 
121 851220 Lighting or visual 319nodized319 equipment nes 
122 851230 Sound 319nodized319 equipment 
123 851240 Windscreen wipes, defrosters and demisters 
124 851290 Parts of electrical lighting, 319nodized319 and de 
125 851310 Portable electric lamps designed to function by 
126 851390 Parts of portable elect lamps designed to function 
127 851610 Electric instantaneous or storage water heaters  
128 851621 Electric space heating apparatus, having storage 
129 851629 Electric space heating apparatus and electric s  
130 851631 Electro-thermic hair dryers 
131 851632 Electro-thermic hair-dressing apparatus, nes 
132 851633 Electro-thermic hand-drying apparatus 
133 851640 Electric smoothing irons 
134 851650 Microwave ovens 
135 851660 Ovens; cookers, cooking plates, boiling rings 
136 851671 Electro-thermic coffee or tea makers, domestic, 
137 851672 Electro-thermic toasters, domestic 
138 851679 Electro-thermic appliances, domestic, nes 
139 851680 Electric heating resistors 
140 851690 Parts of electro-thermic apparatus, domestic, etc 
141 851710 Telephone sets 
142 851720 Teleprinters 
143 851730 Telephonic or telegraphic switching apparatus 
144 851740 Apparatus, for carrier-current line systems, ne 
145 851781 Telephonic apparatus, nes 
146 851782 Telegraphic apparatus, nes 
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No.  Product 
Code Product Description 
147 851790 Parts of electrical apparatus for line telephone 
148 851810 Microphones and stands therefor 
149 851821 Single loudspeakers, mounted in the same enclosure 
150 851822 Multiple loudspeakers, mounted in the same enclosure 
151 851829 Loudspeakers, nes 
152 851830 Headphones, earphones and combined microphone/s 
153 851840 Audio-frequency electric amplifiers 
154 851850 Electric sound amplifier sets 
155 851890 Parts of microphones, loudspeakers, headphones, 
earphones 
156 851910 Coin or disc-operated record-players 
157 851921 Record-players without loudspeaker, nes 
158 851929 Record-players, nes 
159 851931 Turntables with automatic record changing mechanism 
160 851939 Turntables, nes 
161 851940 Transcribing machines 
162 851991 Sound reproducing apparatus, cassette type 
163 851999 Sound reproducing apparatus, not incorporating  
164 852010 Dictating mach not capable of operating without 
165 852020 Telephone answering machines 
166 852031 Magnetic tape rec incorporating sound reproducing 
167 852039 Magnetic tape recorders incorporating sound rep 
168 852090 Magnetic tape recorders and other sound recording 
169 852110 Video recording or reproducing apparatus magnet 
170 852190 Video recording or reproducing apparatus nes 
171 852210 Pick-up cartridges 
172 852290 Parts and accessories of apparatus of heading N 
173 852510 Transmission apparatus for radio-teleph. Radio-broadcast 
174 852520 Transmission apparatus, for radioteleph. Incorporating 
175 852530 Television cameras 
176 852610 Radar apparatus 
177 852691 Radio navigational aid apparatus 
178 852692 Radio remote control apparatus 
179 852711 Radio receivers, portable, with sound 
reproduce/recording 
180 852719 Radio broad receiver capable of op w/o an external 
181 852721 Radio receiver not capable of op w/o ext source of 
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No.  Product 
Code Product Description 
182 852729 Radio receiver not capable of op w/o ext source of 
183 852731 Radio broad receiver combined with sound record/rep 
184 852732 Radio broad receiver not combined with sound recording 
185 852739 Radio-broadcast receivers nes 
186 852790 Radio reception apparatus nes 
187 852810 Colour television receivers/monitors/projectors 
188 852820 Television receivers an including video monitor 
189 852910 Aerials and aerial reflectors of all kinds; par 
190 852990 Parts for radio/tv transmit/receive equipment, nes 
191 853010 Electrical 321nodized321, safety or traffic control 
192 853080 Electrical 321nodized321, safety or traffic control 
193 853090 Parts of electrical 321nodized321, safety or traffic 
194 853110 Burglar or fire alarms and similar apparatus 
195 853120 Indicator panels incorporating liquid crystal d 
196 853180 Electric sound or visual 321nodized321 apparatus, 
197 853190 Parts of electric sound or visual 321nodized321 apparatus 
198 853210 Fixed capacitors designed for use in 50/60 Hz c 
199 853221 Electrical capacitors, fixed, tantalum, nes 
200 853222 Electrical capacitors, fixed, aluminium electro 
201 853223 Electrical capacitors, fixed, ceramic dielectric 
202 853224 Electrical capacitors, fixed, ceramic dielectric 
203 853225 Electrical capacitors, fixed, dielectric of pap 
204 853229 Electrical capacitors, fixed, nes 
205 853230 Electrical capacitors, variable or adjustable ( 
206 853290 Parts of electrical capacitors 
207 853310 Electrical resistors, fixed carbon, composition 
208 853321 Electrical resistors fixed for a power handling 
209 853329 Electrical resistors, fixed, other than heating 
210 853331 Wirewound variable resistors, including rheostat 
211 853339 Wirewound variable resistors, including rheostat 
212 853340 Variable resistors, including rheostats and potentiometers 
213 853390 Variable resistors, rheostats and potentiometers, nes  
214 853400 Printed circuits 
215 853510 Electrical fuses, for a voltage exceeding 1,000 
216 853521 Automatic circuit breakers for a voltage exceeding 
217 853529 Automatic circuit breakers, for a voltage exceeding 
218 853530 Isolating switches and make-and-break switches, 
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No.  Product 
Code Product Description 
219 853540 Lightning arresters, voltage limiters and surge 
220 853590 Electrical app for switching or protect electric circuits 
221 853610 Electrical fuses, for a voltage not exceeding 1 
222 853620 Automatic circuit breakers for a voltage not ex 
223 853630 Electrical app for protecting electric circuits  
224 853641 Electrical relays for a voltage not exceeding 6 
225 853649 Electrical relays for a voltage exceed 60 V but 
226 853650 Electrical switches for a voltage not exceeding 
227 853661 Electrical lamp-holders, for a voltage not exceeding 
228 853669 Electrical plugs and sockets, for a voltage not 
229 853690 Electrical app for switching or protect electric circuits 
230 853710 Boards, panels, including numerical control pan 
231 853720 Boards, panels, including numerical control pan 
232 853810 Boards, panels, etc for goods of heading 85.37 
233 853890 Parts for use with the apparatus of heading no. 
234 853910 Sealed beam lamp units 
235 853921 Filament lamps, tungsten halogen 
236 853922 Filament lamps, of a power not exceed 200 W and 
237 853929 Filament lamps, excluding ultraviolet or infra- 
238 853931 Fluorescent lamps, hot cathode 
239 853939 Discharge lamps, other than ultra-violet lamps, 
240 853940 Ultra-violet or infra-red lamps; arc lamps 
241 853990 Parts of electric filament or discharge lamps 
242 854011 Cathode-ray television picture tubes, including 
243 854012 Cathode-ray TV picture tubes incl. video monitor 
244 854020 Television camera tubes, image converter and other 
245 854030 Cathode-ray tubes, nes 
246 854041 Magnetron tubes 
247 854042 Klystron tubes 
248 854049 Microwave tubes, nes 
249 854081 Receiver or amplifier valves and tubes 
250 854089 Valve and tubes, nes 
251 854091 Parts of cathode-ray tubes 
252 854099 Parts of valve and tubes, nes 
253 854110 Diodes, other than photosensitive or light emit 
254 854121 Transistors, except photosensitive, < 1 watt 
255 854129 Transistors, other than photosensitive transistor 
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No.  Product 
Code Product Description 
256 854130 Thyristors, diacs and triacs, other than photos 
257 854140 Photosensitive semiconductor devices, photovoltaic 
258 854150 Semiconductor devices, nes 
259 854160 Mounted piezo-electric crystals 
260 854190 Parts of mounted piezo-electric crystals and se 
261 854211 Monolithic integrated circuits, digital 
262 854219 Monolithic integrated circuits, nes 
263 854220 Hybrid integrated circuits 
264 854280 Electronic integrated circuits and microassemble 
265 854290 Parts of electronic integrated circuits and mic 
266 854310 Particle accelerators 
267 854320 Signal generators 
268 854330 Machines & apparatus for electroplating, electric 
269 854380 Electrical machines and apparatus, having individual 
270 854390 Parts of electrical machines & apparatus having 
271 854411 Insulated (including 323nodized or 323nodized) win 
272 854419 Insulated (including 323nodized or 323nodized) win 
273 854420 Co-axial cable and other co-axial electric conductor 
274 854430 Ignition wiring sets & oth. Wiring sets of a kind 
275 854441 Electric conductors, for a voltage not exceeding 
276 854449 Electric conductors, for a voltage not exceeding 
277 854451 Electric conductors, for a voltage >80V but=<1,0 
278 854459 Electric conductors, for a voltage >80V but not 
279 854460 Electric conductors, for a voltage exceeding 1, 
280 854470 Optical fibre cables, made up of individually  
281 854511 Carbon or graphite electrodes, of a kind used  
282 854519 Carbon or graphite electrodes, of a kind used  
283 854520 Carbon or graphite brushes 
284 854590 Art. Of carbon or graphite, of a kind used  
285 854610 Electrical insulators of glass 
286 854620 Electrical insulators of ceramics 
287 854690 Electrical insulators, nes 
288 854710 Insulating fittings of ceramics for elec. Machine 
289 854720 Insulating fittings of plastics for elec. Machine 
290 854790 Insulating fittings for electrical mach appliance 
291 854800 Electrical parts of machinery and apparatus, nes 
292 900610 Cameras of a kind used for preparing printing p 
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No.  Product 
Code Product Description 
293 900620 Cameras of a kind used for recording doc on mic 
294 900630 Cameras designed for special use, underwater 
295 900640 Instant print cameras 
296 900651 Cameras, single lens reflex, for roll film of a 
297 900652 Cameras for roll film of a width less than 35 m 
298 900653 Cameras for roll film of a width of 35 mm, nes 
299 900659 Photographic, other than cinematographic camera 
300 900661 Photographic discharge lamp (electronic) flashlight 
301 900662 Flashbulbs, flashcubes and the like 
302 900669 Photographic flashlight apparatus, nes 
303 900691 Parts and accessories for photographic cameras 
304 900699 Parts and accessories for photographic flashlight 
305 900711 Cinematographic cameras for film of < 16 mm wide 
306 900719 Cinematographic cameras, nes 
307 900721 Cinematographic projectors for film of less that 
308 900729 Cinematographic projectors, nes 
309 900791 Parts and accessories for cinematographic camera 
310 900792 Parts and accessories for cinematographic projector 
311 900810 Slide projectors 
312 900820 Microfilm, microfiche or other microform reader 
313 900830 Image projectors, nes 
314 900840 Photographic enlargers and reducers 
315 900890 Parts and access of image projectors, enlargers 
316 900911 Electrostatic photo-copying apparatus, direct  
317 900912 Electrostatic photo-copying apparatus, indirect 
318 900921 Photo-copying apparatus, incorporating an optic 
319 900922 Contact type photo-copying apparatus, nes 
320 900930 Thermo-copying apparatus 
321 900990 Parts and accessories for photo-copying apparatus 
322 901010 Apparatus and equip for automatically developing 
323 901020 Apparatus and equipment for photographic  
324 901030 Projection screens 
325 901090 Parts and accessories for apparatus and equipment 
326 901811 Electro-cardiographs 
327 901819 Electro-diagnostic apparatus, nes 
328 901820 Ultra-violet or infra-red ray apparatus 
329 902211 Medical X-ray apparatus 
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No.  Product 
Code Product Description 
330 902219 Apparatus based on the use of X-rays for other 
331 902221 Apparatus based on the use of alpha beta or gam 
332 902229 Apparatus based on the use of alpha beta or gam 
333 902230 X-ray tubes 
334 902290 Parts and accessories for app based on the use 
335 902710 Gas or smoke analysis apparatus 
336 902720 Chromatographs and electrophoresis instruments 
337 902730 Spectrometers, spectrophotometers and spectrograph 
338 903020 Cathode-ray oscilloscopes and cathode-ray oscilloscopes 
Source: UNComtrade  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
326 
 
Appendix 3.2 List of MSIC Codes for E&E Sector in Malaysia 
MSIC Description 
25206 Manufacture of plastic injection moulded components 
26100 Manufacture of glass and glass products 
26910 Manufacture of non-structural non-refractory ceramic ware 
29191 
Manufacture of air-conditioning, refrigerating and ventilating 
machinery 
29220 Manufacture of metal-forming machinery and machine tools 
29290 Manufacture of other special-purpose machinery n.e.c. 
29300 Manufacture of domestic appliances n.e.c 
30001 Manufacture of office and accounting machinery 
30002 Manufacture of computers and computer peripherals  
31100 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers  
31200 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus  
31301 Manufacture of telecommunication cables and wires  
27320 Manufacture of other electronic and electric wires and cables  
31400 Manufacture of batteries and accumulators 
31500 Manufacture of lamps & lighting equipment 
31900 Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c. 
32101 Manufacture of semi-conductor devices 
32102 
Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and printed circuit 
boards 
32109 Manufacture of other electronic components 
32200 
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus 
for line telephony and line telegraphy 
32300 
Manufacture of television and radio receivers sound or video 
recording or reproducing apparatus, and associated goods  
33110 
Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment orthopaedic 
appliances 
33120 
Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, 
checking, testing, navigating and other purposes, except 
industrial process control equipment 
33202 Manufacture of photographic equipment 
Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia 
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Appendix 3.3 List of E&E Products in 4-digit level of HS 1988/92 Nomenclature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNComtrade  
Product Code 
8415 8517 8538 
8450 8518 8539 
8470 8519 8540 
8471 8520 8541 
8472 8521 8542 
8473 8522 8543 
8476 8525 8544 
8501 8526 8545 
8504 8527 8546 
8505 8528 8547 
8506 8529 8548 
8507 8530 9006 
8508 8531 9007 
8509 8532 9008 
8510 8533 9009 
8511 8534 9010 
8512 8535 9022 
8513 8536   
8516 8537   
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Appendix 3.4 Guided Interview Schedule for MNC 
Name of Interviewee : Date :  
Title : Place of Interview : 
Organisation :  Department :  
 
1. Basic Information  
What products do you make?  
Date established in Malaysia? What are the sales per year? No. of Employees? 
2. Direct relationship with China 
Do you import inputs from China? How much from China vs. local inputs?  
Price difference (per unit) between local inputs vs. Chinese inputs? Quality of 
Chinese inputs, comparable to local/US/Japan/Korea? 
Do you export to China? What products? What proportion of total sales coming 
from China vs. Europe/Japan/US/Local?  
What kind of relationship do you have with China vendors? Contractual (buying 
when you need) or Networked (work together), hierarchical (get technical 
assistance from you, to deliver the right goods)?  
If you sell to China, do you have a contractual relationship, based on arm’s length 
(tender each time for lowest price), or do you sell to someone you know most of 
the time, or do you sell through a subsidiary in China? 
3. GVC/GPN question 
If you have a subsidiary in China, who is reporting to whom? China report to 
Malaysia or Malaysia report to China? Of both Malaysia and China office report to 
Singapore/US/Japan HQ?  
What kind of functions the Malaysia plant performs? (assembly and testing, 
regional HQ, finance, R&D?) ask for evidence – what product development? 
What kind of functions the China office perform (assembly and testing, regional 
HQ, finance, R&D) – ask for evidence – what product development? 
Have you collaborated on any joint project, Malaysian plant with Chinese plant? 
When? How? What? Was it successful?  
If function includes R&D, ask for more details, what kind of R&D chip design or 
process technology, or some minor R&D.  
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Do you face pressure to move your Malaysian plant in relation to China? What 
kind of pressure? (Price/Cost or Capability (HR) or Location or Eco-system 
(Innovation)  
What are the strengths of Chinese colleagues compared to Malaysian plant? What 
are Malaysian operations’ strengths? 
What are the weaknesses/limitations of Chinese colleagues compare to Malaysian 
plant? What is Malaysian operations weakness/limitation? 
How does China affect your operations? (ask for positive and negative) What do 
you see the future of China plant vs. Malaysia plant in the medium term (5 years)?  
What is your strategy for adaptation/survive, when faced with competition from 
China? 
4. Competition in 3rd Market 
If you do not have a subsidiary in China, do you face competition from Chinese 
products in your export market (to US, Europe or Japan)?  
If yes, which product? In which market destination?  
What do you think about your competitors in China? (quality, price, marketing) 
How to adjust to Chinese competition? – Ask for evidence, e.g. programme, 
expenditure.  
 
 
5. Import Penetration (small electrical appliances) 
For the Malaysian market, who are your main competitors for the products that 
you make and sell? (are they from China?) 
Which product is especially affected?  
How does China affects your firm? In medium and long term? (upgrading 
prospects) 
6. Policy 
Are they anything you think the Government to help you mitigate the 
impact? Past programme that works? Suggest programmes?  
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Appendix 3.5 Guided Interview Schedule for Tier1/Tier 2 Suppliers to MNC 
Name of Interviewee : Date :  
Title : Place of Interview : 
Organisation :  Department :  
 
1. Basic Information  
What products do you make?  
Date established in Malaysia? What are the sales per year? No. of Employees?  
2. Direct relationship with MNC 
What percentage of your sales is attributable to the MNC? 
Other than this MNC, do you sell to other buyers? Where they are from?  
For the MNC, do they provide technical assistance to you on how improve your 
technology in production? (Ask for evidence-programme/funding) 
How would you describe your relationship with the MNC? Equal 
footing/dependent/networked 
Do you provide ideas for new product development of your MNC client? 
3. Question on China (in Malaysia operations) 
Do you face competition from China, where the MNC you are working with now 
source the parts you have been supplying from China?  
What is the competitiveness of China’s suppliers? Price or quality or both?  
What is your counter strategy?  
Do you import inputs from China/elsewhere? How much from China vs. local 
inputs?  
Price difference between local inputs vs. Chinese inputs? Qual ity of inputs? 
Do you export to China? What product? What proportion of total sales coming 
from China vs. Europe/Japan/US/Local?  
 
What kind of relationship do you have with China vendors? Contractual (buying 
when you need) or Networked (work together), hierarchical (get technical 
assistance from you, to deliver the right goods)?  
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4. Competition in 3rd Market (beyond Malaysian operations) 
Do you supply to markets beyond Malaysia, do you face competition from China 
products in your export market (for intermediate goods to China, US, Europe or 
Japan)?  
If yes, which product? In which market destination?  
What do you think about your competitors in China? (quality, price, marketing) 
How do you adjust to China’s competition? – Ask for evidence, e.g. programme, 
expenditure.  
5. GVC/GPN 
How that China does affect you? In medium and long term. (upgrading prospects) 
6. Policy 
Are they anything you think the Government can do to help you mitigate the 
impact? Past programme that works? Suggest programmes? 
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Appendix 3.6 Guided Interview Schedule for Government Agencies 
Name of Interviewee : Date :  
Title : Place of Interview : 
Organisation :  Department :  
 
1. Basic Information  
How do you view China’s impact on Malaysian manufacturing as a whole?  
Your view on specifically for E&E? 
Is China a significant factor when you plan the industry development/ or is China 
factor not significant? 
2. Policy 
What is the policy? To counter China’s impact?  
Is there any programme? How much is the spending?  
[For MIDA] Is there any other programme specifically tailored for China, like 
Malaysia China Kuantan Industrial Park?  
Any measurement on the progress?  
3. Future 
How do you see China’s impacting your industries? On MNCs? On SMEs in 
Malaysia in 5 years’ time?  
Note: Look out for interviewees if they mention “upgrading”/ “up-scaling”. 
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Appendix 3.7 Guided Interview Schedule for China Electronics Players (Non-
Western/Japanese/NiC MNC) 
 
Name of Interviewee:  
 
Date :           2014 
 
Title :  
 
Place of Interview: 
Organisation :  
 
Department :  
 
Companies Information 
1. What are the main functions your plant? Manufacturing/R&D/HQ Functions?  
2. Number of employees in your plant/office? Out of total headcount, how many 
R&D staff?  
3. Where is your source of inputs? Local or Overseas? % of local inputs in total 
inputs for one output. What are the local inputs like (what kind of material)? 
(Minor or major) 
4. If overseas, which component is from overseas? Where do you source them? 
Malaysia/ASEAN-4, or Taiwan, Japan/USA/Europe? How do you buy them, 
purchase when you need by contract (arms-length transaction), by long-term 
relationship (repeat order) like a partner, buy from subsidiary. 
5. If you import from Malaysia, what product, how it changes over time?  
6. If you currently do not buy from Malaysia? Why?  
7. Is there anything the Malaysian side can do to make you consider purchasing 
from Malaysia? What are the factors you consider? Price/Delivery/Quality/ 
More Information about Malaysia.  
8. Do you produce just for local markets or you export? If exports, where do you 
ship your products? If too many destinations, focus on the top 3 main 
products that you do by revenue? To the US/EU directly or to China first 
before re-exporting? Any figures that you can share, revenue or units of 
shipment?  
9. What is your main activity in production? Assembly and packaging only or 
includes design new products?  
10. Which product is the main revenue earner at company level? If includes 
design, where is it being designed and produced? (China or overseas)  
Continue to Q11 to Q14 if respondents answer YES to product design 
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11. Does your company import technology from any companies as technology 
partners?  What kind of relationship you have with technology partners? 
Equal partnership/hierarchical/contractual (only when needed-purchase the 
technology) Mainly from which country? Anyone from Malaysia?  
12. Does your company do its own complete design work until a product is 
launched? (the whole chain –design, prototyping- mass production). All done 
in-house or you cooperate with some other companies to bring new products 
to the market?  Can you give some example of the products roll out from your 
company/plant?  
13. Alternatively (how much spending on R&D) How much % of revenue is plough 
back into R&D?  
14. If you do R&D, what kind of IP is coming out from centre, processing 
technology or fundamental design of chips/equipment?  
Continue here if respondent answer No to Design Works in Q10 
15. Is there any plan to upgrade, how do you plan to upgrade your technology in 
the market you are producing?  
16. Which product space your company will be moving into the future? How can 
Malaysia capture some of the action in the next big wave (inflexion point), 
knowing the capability here?  
17. At your firm level, why do you think China as an industry move so fast up the 
value chain in global electronics industry?  What is the critical success factor? 
18. What are the challenges your company is facing? 
19. How is your company responding to those challenges? 
Question on Malaysia/South-east Asia 
20. For trade, how does your company handle competition at the exports 
markets? And in which product specifically?  
 
21. Who are your main competitors (at export markets) or (local markets) with 
some reference to geographical location? 
22. Do you see any synergies that can be tapped between China, with Malaysia in 
terms of Electronics industry operations that are ongoing? If yes, can you give 
some detail example?  
23. How do you view country like Malaysia from your organisation? Threat 
(competitor) or opportunity or something else that you think is relevant? 
Investment Questions 
24. What is your view on Malaysia as an investment destination? If you are not 
familiar with Malaysia, what is your view on Southeast Asia?  
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25. [Question for Chinese MNCs]For organizational dynamics, what is the role 
your overseas operations in the scheme of things? What are their functions 
within your family of plants/offices. How are the plants ranked? Which is the 
centre of reporting in East Asia for your company? 
26. Can your overseas offices(if any) make decisions with regards to innovation or 
they have to seek approval from HQ?  
27. Which unit/manager decides where to invest in overseas destination? What is 
your main motivation when you invest overseas? Cheaper labour/costs of 
production/ expand your market for your products/ purchase technology?  
 
  
-------- end of interview------- 
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Appendix 4.1 Unit Value for Monolithic Digital Circuits, Non-Digital (HS 854219) 
Year Malaysia 
Unit Value 
(US$) 
China  
Unit Value 
(US$) 
Price 
Diff 
1992 0.80 0.42 0.38 
1993 0.84 0.10 0.74 
1994 0.82 0.09 0.73 
1995 0.94 0.40 0.54 
1996 0.89 0.31 0.58 
1997 2.34 0.28 2.07 
1998 0.61 0.30 0.31 
1999 0.75 0.33 0.42 
2000 0.68 0.41 0.27 
2001 0.76 0.36 0.40 
2002 0.79 0.27 0.52 
2003 0.92 0.18 0.74 
2004 0.80 0.18 0.63 
2005 0.85 0.16 0.69 
2006 1.06 0.18 0.88 
2007 0.62 0.16 0.46 
2008 0.58 0.13 0.45 
2009 1.14 0.12 1.02 
2010 0.66 0.11 0.55 
2011 0.77 0.45 0.32 
2012 0.86 0.61 0.25 
2013 - - - 
Note: Price/Quantity not available as quantity data is not available for year 2013 
 
Source: Own Calculations based on UNComtrade 
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Appendix 4.2 Unit Value for Parts for Integrated Circuit (HS 854290) 
Year Malaysia 
Unit Value 
(US$) 
China 
Unit Value 
(US$) 
Difference 
1992 0.12 - - 
1993 0.09 - - 
1994 0.06 17.88 -17.81 
1995 0.05 34.11 -34.06 
1996 0.10 38.23 -38.13 
1997 70.98 122.36 -51.37 
1998 35.58 121.68 -86.10 
1999 1.52 55.26 -53.74 
2000 9.50 34.87 -25.36 
2001 1.69 39.84 -38.15 
2002 52.72 29.70 23.03 
2003 73.68 26.89 46.80 
2004 20.53 36.24 -15.71 
2005 27.40 29.62 -2.22 
2006 1.76 30.22 -28.46 
2007 76.92 37.46 39.46 
2008 119.23 43.35 75.88 
2009 17.71 41.63 -23.92 
2010 3.10 42.89 -39.79 
2011 114.19 49.89 64.30 
2012 112.83 50.95 61.88 
2013 - 52.41 - 
 Source: Own Calculations based on UNComtrade 
 
  
338 
 
Appendix 4.3 Statistical Results of Two Means Hypothesis Testing of 
Price/Quantity Ratio for Monolithic Digital Circuits (HS8542) 
 
 
t-Test: Two-Sample  t-Test: Two-Sample 
854211 (Monolithic integrated circuits,  digital) 
at 0.05 significant level at 0.01 significant level 
  
M’sia 
P/Q 
Chn 
P/Q   
M’sia 
P/Q 
Chn 
P/Q 
Mean 0.8157 0.5685 Mean 0.8157 0.5685 
Variance 0.1295 0.0746 Variance 0.1295 0.0746 
Observations 21 21 Observations 21 21 
Pooled Variance 0.1021 
 
Pooled Variance 0.1021   
Hypothesized 
Mean Difference 0 
 
Hypothesized 
Mean Difference 0   
df 40 
 
df 40   
t Stat 2.5073 
 
t Stat 2.5073   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0082 
 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0082   
t Critical one-tail 1.6839 
 
t Critical one-tail 2.4233   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0163 
 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0163   
t Critical two-tail 2.0211  t Critical two-tail 2.7045 
 
854219 (Monolithic  integrated circuits,  except digital) 
t-Test: Two-Sample  t-Test: Two-Sample  
at 0.05 significant level at 0.01 significant level 
  
M’sia 
P/Q 
Chn 
P/Q   
M’siaP/
Q 
Chn 
P/Q 
Mean 0.8800 0.2636 Mean 0.8800 0.2636 
Variance 0.1320 0.0199 Variance 0.1320 0.0199 
Observations 21 21 Observations 21 21 
Pooled Variance 
0.0759
6 
 
Pooled Variance 
0.0759
6   
Hypothesized 
Mean Difference 0 
 
Hypothesized 
Mean Difference 0   
df 40 
 
df 40   
t Stat 7.2469 
 
t Stat 7.2469   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0000 
 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0000   
t Critical one-tail 1.6839 
 
t Critical one-tail 2.4233   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0000 
 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0000   
t Critical two-tail 2.0211  t Critical two-tail 2.7045 
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854290 (Parts of Electronic  Integrated Circuits) 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming 
Unequal Variances  
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming 
Unequal Variances  
at 0.05 significant level at 0.01 significant level 
  
M’sia 
P/Q 
Chn 
P/Q   
M’sia 
P/Q 
Chn 
P/Q 
Mean 35.23 46.77 Mean 35.23 46.77 
Variance 
1797.4
3 748.40 Variance 
1797.4
3 748.40 
Observations 21 20 Observations 21 20 
Hypothesized 
Mean Difference 0 
 
Hypothesized 
Mean Difference 0   
df 34 
 
df 34   
t Stat -1.041 
 
t Stat -1.041   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.153 
 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.153   
t Critical one-tail 1.691 
 
t Critical one-tail 2.441   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.305 
 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.305   
t Critical two-tail 2.032  t Critical two-tail 2.728   
Source: Own Calculations based on UNComtrade 
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Appendix 4.4 Share of the products at 6 digits level to the Malaysian Total Exports 
of Integrated Circuits (HS8542)  
 
 
Note: HS Code 854280 and HS Code 854220 become unavailable from 2008 onwards.  
Source: Own Calculations based on UNComtrade  
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Appendix 4.5 Wafer Fabrication Plants in Malaysia (Front-end Players) 
Company  Country of 
Origin 
State  Capacity  No.  of 
Worker 
Target Market 
Silterra Malaysian–
State-
owned 
Kedah  Approximately 
40,000 wafers 
per month 
N.A. CMOS, Mixed 
signal RF chips, 
High Voltage, 
MEMS Chips, 
200mm wafer 
chips facility.  
Infineon  German Kedah  Approx. 
100,000 wafers 
per month, 
announced 
plan to double 
capacity in 
2012, with 
additional 
investment of 
RM350million 
in Kulim 
1,500  Automotive IC 
and power 
plant IC 
X-fab  Germany Sarawak  Approx. 72,000 
eight inch 
equivalent 
wafer starts per 
month 
N.A.  1.0 to 0.13 µm 
mixed-signal, 
CMOS and 
BiCMOS and 
special SOI and 
MEMS long 
lifetime 
processes for 
automotive, 
industrial and 
medical 
applications 
N.A. = Not available  
Source: Multiple Sources based on corporate webpages  
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Appendix 4.6 Ownership structure of manufacturing firms in Penang, as of August 
2008 
 
 Firms (%) Sales (%) Employment (%) 
Foreign-owned  22.9  85.6  72.3  
Large 11.3  82.0  68.3  
SMEs  11.6  3.6  3.9  
Local  77.1  14.4  27.7  
Large 9.7  9.3  12.6  
SMEs  67.4  5.1  15.2  
 100 100 100 
A large firm is defined as having annual sales revenue of RM25 mill ion and employ more 
than 150 people. SMEs are defined as having sales below RM25 mill ion and employ less 
than 150 people.  
N=629 
Source: Athukorala (2012, pp. 26. Citing Penang Industrial Survey 2007 conducted by 
Invest Penang) 
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Appendix 4.7 Merchandise exports from Penang: value, composition and share of 
total Malaysian exports 
 
 1990-
1* 
1995-
6* 
2000-
1* 
2005-
6* 
2007 2008 2009 
Exports, US$ bn 18.7 58.0 75.5 113.4 127.2 110.8 111.3 
Composition (%)  
Manufacturing  88.9 93.8 96.6 96.2 95.8 95.8 96.8 
Others  11.1 6.2 3.4 3.8 4.8 4.2 3.2 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Share of Penang in total Malaysian exports (%)  
Primary products  9.2 9.1 8.2 9.5 8.1 5.8 5.5 
Food beverages and 
tobacco  
14.6 10.8 10.3 11.4 11.9 9.4 10.1 
Crude materials  6.7 10.4 11.8 16.9 15.3 14.4 13.0 
Animal and vegetable 
oils and fats  
10.7 7.2 4.4 4.0 3.6 1.8 1.3 
Manufacturing  31.4 28.5 33.9 37.4 37.4 39.6 38.5 
Chemicals  15.5 14.8 16.1 12.2 12.7 10.6 12.0 
Resource-based 
manufactured goods  
29.0 18.0 16.1 15.0 15.5 14.8 14.1 
Machinery and 
transport equipment  
30.6 31.4 38.1 44.0 44.8 53.0 47.4 
Miscellaneous 
manufacturing 
articles  
40.4 29.1 29.5 34.6 36.2 34.2 35.7 
Source: Adapted from Athukorala (2012, pp. 30.)  
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Appendix 4.8 Top 25 foreign enterprises in Penang (as at August 2008) 
 Company1 Home 
country 
Employment Years in 
operation 
Activities in 
Penang 
1  Intel 
Technologies  
USA  10,304 (incl. 
employees 
in Kulim) 
>35  Motherboards  
2  Flextronics 
Technology  
Singapore  7,000  15-20  PCBA and 
system 
integration, 
failure Analysis, 
supply chain 
solution  
3  Motorola 
Technologies  
USA  4,811  25-30  2-way radios, 
wireless 
broadband 
communication 
equipment and 
accessories  
4  B Braun 
Medical 
Industries  
Germany  4,700  25-30  Medical and 
surgical 
equipment and 
related services  
5  WD Media 
(formerly 
Komag)  
USA  4,569  15-20  Thin fi lm 
magnetic disks 
and plated 
polished 
substrates  
6  Dell  USA  4,500  12-15  Computer 
assembly and 
world-wide 
customer 
service  
7  Jabil  Circuit  USA  4,207  20-25  Electronic 
manufacturing 
services  
8  Canon 
Electronics  
Japan  3,805  5-10  Magnetic heads 
and component 
cameras  
9  Sony  Japan  3,750  20-25  Consumer 
electronics  
 
10  Renesas 
Semiconductor  
(formerly 
Hitachi 
Semiconductor) 
Japan  3,700  >35  Linear and 
digital 
integrated 
circuits, power 
transistors and 
transistor 
diodes  
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 Company1 Home 
country 
Employment Years in 
operation 
Activities in 
Penang 
11  Plexus 
Manufacturing  
USA  3,389  10-15  Computer 
peripherals and 
PCBs  
12  Agilent 
Technologies  
(formerly 
Hewlett 
Packard) 
USA  3,358  >35  Microwave 
devices, test 
accessories, 
amplifiers, 
transceivers 
and test  
 
13  Fairchild 
Semiconductor 
(formerly 
National 
Semiconductor) 
- To be sold-
announced in 
2015 
USA  2,980  >35  Semiconductor 
back-end 
manufacturing 
and admin. and 
engineering 
services  
14  Kobe Precision  Japan  2,740  15-20  Ground 
aluminium 
substrate  
 
15  Seagate Penang  USA  2,733  20-25  Hard disk 
drives  
16  Osram Opto 
Semiconductors  
Germany  2,731  >35  l ight emitting 
diodes  
17  ASE Electronics  Taiwan  2,530  20-25  Integrated 
circuit 
packaging, 
testing, and 
turnkey 
services  
18  Sanyo 
Automedia  
Japan  2,080  20-25  Car radios and 
CD-changers  
19  Robert Bosch  Germany  2,000  >35  Car parts and 
automotive 
semiconductors  
20  Philips Lumileds Netherlands  1,600  10-15  High-power 
LED lighting 
and solid state 
l ighting 
solutions  
21  Sanmina 
Science 
Systems  
USA  1,203  10-15  PCBA and 
system 
integration  
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 Company1 Home 
country 
Employment Years in 
operation 
Activities in 
Penang 
22  Linear 
Semiconductor  
USA  1,167  10-15  Integrated 
circuits  
23  Avago 
Technologies 
USA  961  >35  Analogue, 
mixed-signal 
and 
optoelectronic 
components 
and wafer 
fabrication  
 
 
24  Altera  USA  950  15-20  R&D relating to 
VLSI design, 
layout, test and 
software 
development  
25  Advanced 
Micro Devices  
USA  896  >35  Integrated 
circuits  
Source: Athukorala (2012, pp. 27 and pp. 28.) 
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Appendix 4.9 Major Electrical Manufacturer in Malaysia by Domestic Market 
Share in- Japanese and Korean Electrical MNCs 
 
Company  Year 
Established in 
Malaysia 
Location  Major Products 
Multinationals    
Japanese    
Panasonic 
Malaysia* 
1988 Selangor  TV, Air Condition, Kitchen 
Appliances 
Sony ECMS 1980s  Selangor  TVs 
Sanyo PT 
Malaysia  
1987 Johor Hi Technology Mobile Phones 
Sharp Electronics  1989 Johor  TV 
 1985 Selangor  Marketing Arm for Sharp 
products in Malaysia 
 1995  Selangor International Procurement 
Centre 
 2009 Selangor  Sharp Electronics Malaysia 
established to undertake 
R&D jobs in Malaysia.  
Mitsubishi 
Electric  
1989 Johor DVD recorders, printers 
JVC Video 
Malaysia* 
1988 Selangor  Digital Camcorder 
Hitachi Electric 
Products 
Malaysia  
1988 Selangor Optical data storage device  
Korean    
Samsung SDI  1989 Selangor  Cathode tube, microwave 
tube production 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Samsung 
Electron Devices, 
Samsung Corning 
and Samsung 
Electronic Display  
1997 Negeri 
Sembilan  
LCD, TFT display, batteries  
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Company  Year 
Established in 
Malaysia 
Location  Major Products 
Malaysian-
owned  
   
Pensonic  1994 Penang  Wide range of small 
appliances including small 
radios, blenders, microwave 
ovens and some major 
appliances like washing 
machines 
Khind    Rice Cooker 
Alpha 1990 Selangor Water Heater 
Joven  1990 Selangor Water Heater 
Milux  2006 Klang Gas cookers, ceiling fans, 
water heaters, oven toasters.  
Note: * Announced exit of manufacturing in 2015, Panasonic to streamline 
TV manufacturing to China, JVC announced exit of the camcorder business.  
While LG is a significant player at retail market of Malaysian electrical 
scene for TV and air-condition but does not have manufacturing facility in 
Malaysia.  
Source: Edgington and Hayter (2013) and various sources 
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Appendix 5.1 Balance of Trade between Malaysia and China for Semiconductors (HS 8542) – Malaysia as Reporter 
 Values in US$ Bn 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total 
Exp 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.5 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.6 4.1 0.9 7.0 5.9 8.0 8.0 8.4 
Total 
Import 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.8 2.2 1.1 2.0 1.6 1.9 3.9 4.8 
Balance 
for 
8542 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.9 -0.2 5.0 4.4 6.0 4.1 3.7 
Note: the value for all  cells from 1992-1995 is not zero, but because the numbers here are shown in US$ Bill ion, the initial years volume is too low when denominated  in 
bil l ion dollars.  
Source: Own Calculation based on UNComtrade 
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Appendix 5.2 Malaysia Bilateral Exports and Imports with China by BEC 
Classification, Malaysia as Reporter 
 
 
Source: UNComtrade 
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Appendix 5.3 Differences of Sum of HS Codes under BEC 42 Code with Total BEC 42 Code (Malaysia as reporter) 
 Values are in US$ Bn 
Export 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
HS Code 
Total  
0.01 0.02 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.7 3.2 4.0 5.9 2.5 8.6 9.7 10.1 9.9 10.2 
BEC Total  0.01 0.02 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.6 2.1 2.4 2.9 3.3 4.3 6.1 2.7 8.9 10.1 10.5 10.4 10.6 
Difference 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 
Import 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
HS Code 
Total 
0.03 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.3 2.4 3.1 4.4 5.5 6.7 7.5 5.8 6.2 5.6 5.9 7.9 8.7 
BEC Total  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.3 2.5 3.3 4.7 5.9 7.0 7.9 6.4 6.8 6.4 7.0 9.1 10.2 
Difference -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.1 -0.1 -0.04 -0.04 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.8 -1.1 -1.1 -1.4 
Source: Own Calculation based on UNComtrade 
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Appendix 5.4 List of Parts and Components in HS Codes Classified as Parts and 
Components (except transport equipment) (BEC code 42) 
 
Product Code 
841590 853310 853661 854129 900792 
841899 853321 853669 854130 900990 
845090 853329 853690 854140   
847310 853331 853710 854150   
847321 853339 853720 854160   
847329 853340 853810 854190   
847330 853390 853890 854211   
847340 853400 854011 854219   
847690 853510 854012 854220   
850490 853521 854020 854280   
850890 853529 854030 854290   
851790 853530 854041 854390   
851890 853540 854042 854511   
852210 853590 854049 854519   
852290 853610 854081 854520   
852910 853620 854089 854590   
852990 853630 854091 854610   
853090 853641 854099 854620   
853190 853649 854110 854800   
853290 853650 854121 900791   
Source: UNComtrade 
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Appendix 5.5 Malaysian E&E Trade Balance with China, Malaysia as Reporter 
 
 US $ Bn 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Trade 
Balance 
-0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 
 
 US$ Bn 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Trade Balance -0.2 -1.3 -1.7 -3.0 -4.3 -4.6 -3.5 -5.0 
 
 US$ Bn 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Trade Balance 0.8 2.8 2.6 -0.7 -2.2 
Source: Own Calculation based on UNComtrade 
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Appendix 5.6 Manual Matching of Codes for Import and Export Component of 
MSIC Code 32101 and 32102 
HS 
Codes  MSIC  
HS 
Codes  MSIC  
HS 
Codes  MSIC  
853210   853310       
853221   853321       
853222   853329       
853223   853331       
853224   853339       
853225   853340       
853229   853390       
853230   853400       
853290   854011       
854110 32101 854012 32102   32109* 
854121   854020       
854129   854030       
854130   854041       
854140   854042       
854150   854049       
854160   854081       
854190   854089       
854211   854091       
854219   854099       
854220   
 
      
854280   
 
      
854290          
 
Note: 32109 MSIC Code are not assigned the HS Codes trade data due to 
very minimal share (7% of total MSIC 3210 at 4 digit level for entire 1997-
2013 period) in the product code HS8542 code at 4-digit level. The HS 2002 
to ISIC Rev.3 Code Concordance table provides concordance up to 4-digit 
level of ISIC, whereas Malaysian MSIC codes, goes up to 5-digit. Most MSIC 
codes 5 digit codes are achieved just by adding an extra digit of 0 at the 
back of ISIC code. For semiconductors, however, this is not the case, 
therefore some manual judgement is exercised.  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Concordance Table HS 2002 Nomenclature to ISIC Code 
Rev. 3 provided by Worldbank WITS Database 
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Appendix 6.1 Top Malaysian E&E Products in Competitive, Mutual Expansion and 
Reverse Competitive Relationship with Chinese E&E Exports by 2012 for US 
Market 
 
Top 10 Products in 2002 that turns Competitive by 2012 
    2002 2012 
% Diff Product 
Code 
 Products Description 
US$  
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
US$ 
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
847120 Digital computers with 
cpu and input-output 
units 
2.9 14.7 0.3 1.5 -13.2 
847192 Input or output units, 
whether or not 
presented 
1.7 8.7 0.2 1.2 -7.5 
852810 Colour television 
receivers/monitors/pr
ojectors 
1.3 6.6 0.02 0.1 -6.5 
847330 Parts and accessories 
of automatic data 
process 
2.2 11.0 1.0 6.2 -4.9 
847193 Computer data 
storage units 
2.0 10.0 1.0 6.1 -3.9 
851710 Telephone sets 0.4 2.0 0.1 0.8 -1.2 
852110 Video recording or 
reproducing 
apparatus magnet 
0.4 1.8 0.1 0.9 -1.0 
851740 Apparatus, for carrier-
current line systems, 
ne 
0.2 0.8 0.01 0.04 -0.8 
852739 Radio-broadcast 
receivers nes 
0.2 1.1 0.1 0.4 -0.7 
847199 Automatic data 
processing machines 
and units, nes 
0.3 1.4 0.2 0.9 -0.5 
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Top 10 Products in 2002 that turns Mutual Expansion by 2012 
    2002 2012 % Diff 
Product 
Code 
 Products Description 
US$  
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
US$ 
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
854140 Photosensitive 
semiconductor 
devices, photovoltaic 0.1 0.7 1.8 10.8 10.1 
850910 Domestic vacuum 
cleaners 0.01 0.03 0.3 1.7 1.7 
853710 Boards, panels, 
including numerical 
control pan 0.1 0.3 0.3 1.6 1.3 
901819 Electro-diagnostic 
apparatus, nes 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.7 
852691 Radio navigational aid 
apparatus 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.7 
853669 Electrical plugs and 
sockets, for a voltage 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.5 
853120 Indicator panels 
incorporating liquid 
crystal d 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 
852990 Parts for radio/tv 
transmit/receive 
equipment, nes 0.2 0.8 0.2 1.1 0.4 
851650 Microwave ovens 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.8 0.3 
847050 Cash registers 0.01 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 
Products in 2002 that turns Reverse Competitive by 2012 
    2002 2012 % Diff 
Product 
Code 
 Products Description 
US$  
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
US$ 
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
852610 Radar apparatus 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.05 
854030 Cathode-ray tubes 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 
846921 Typewriters, electric, 
weighing not >1 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 
850134 DC motors, DC 
generators, of an 
output >375 kW 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
900630 Cameras designed for 
special use, 
underwater, a 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
852190 Video recording or 
reproducing 
apparatus nes 
0.26 1.33 0.21 1.27 -0.06 
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade  
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Appendix 6.2 Top Malaysian E&E Products in Competitive, Mutual Expansion and 
Reverse Competitive Relationship with Chinese E&E Exports by 2012 for EU 
Market 
 
Top 10 Products in 2002 that turns Competitive by 2012 
 
Product 
Code 
  
 Products Description 
2002 2012 
% 
Diff 
US$  
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
US$ 
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
847192 Input or output units, whether 
or not presented 
0.8 7.9 0.4 2.7 -0.1 
851740 Apparatus, for carrier-current 
line systems, nes 
0.2 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
852520 Transmit-receive apparatus for 
radio, TV, etc. 
0.4 3.5 0.3 1.9 0.0 
852110 Video recording or 
reproducing apparatus magnet 
0.3 2.7 0.2 1.4 0.0 
854110 Diodes, other than 
photosensitive or light emit 
0.2 1.6 0.1 0.7 0.0 
851999 Sound reproducing apparatus, 
not incorporating 
0.1 1.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 
841581 Air conditioning equipment, 
machinery 
0.1 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 
852290 Parts and accessories of 
apparatus of heading  
0.1 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.0 
852810 Colour television 
receivers/monitors/projectors 
0.1 1.1 0.1 0.6 0.0 
852739 Radio-broadcast receivers nes 0.1 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.0 
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Top 10 Products in 2002 that turns Mutual Expansion by 2012 
 
Product 
Code 
  
 Products Description 
2002 2012 
% 
Diff 
US$  
Bn 
 % of 
E&E 
US$ 
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
851783 Telegraphic apparatus, nes 0.1 1.1 2.3 16.6 15.5 
847330 Parts and accessories of 
automatic data process 
1.0 10.2 2.3 16.5 6.3 
850910 Domestic vacuum cleaners 0.1 0.6 0.3 2.0 1.4 
853710 Boards, panels, including 
numerical control pan 
0.0 0.2 0.2 1.4 1.2 
854129 Transistors, except 
photosensitive, > 1 watt 
0.1 0.9 0.3 2.0 1.1 
850880 Tools, hand-held, with 
electric motor, not drills/saw 
0.0 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.9 
841590 Parts of air conditioning 
mach. 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.7 
851790 Parts of line 
telephone/telegraph 
equipment, nes 
0.1 0.9 0.2 1.5 0.6 
847120 Digital computers with cpu 
and input-output units 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.6 
852691 Radio navigational aid 
apparatus 
0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.4 
Products in 2002 that turns Reverse Competitive by 2012 
 
Product 
Code 
  
 Products Description 
2002 2012 
% 
Diff 
US$ 
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
US$ 
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
841451 Fans: table, roof etc. with a 
self-contained electric motor 
0.0 0.0 0.01 0.1 0.0 
850790 Parts of electric accumulators, 
including separators 
0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 
854419 Insulated (including enamelled 
or anodised) win 
0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 
850422 Liquid dielectric transformers 
650-10,000KVA 
0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 
854099 Parts of valve and tubes, nes 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 
841829 Refrigerators, household type 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 
853661 Electrical lamp-holders, for < 
1,000 volts 
0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Note: Manual Adjustment, HS 854211 move to Mutual Expansion and combined with HS 
854219. HS 851730 combined with HS 851782 to become HS 851783.   
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
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Appendix 6.3 Distribution of Competitive Analysis Outcomes in 2012 to 2002 
according to E&E Product Codes (EU Market) 
Results 2002 
No. of 
Prod 
USD 
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
Results 2012 
No. 
of 
Prod 
USD 
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
Competitive 21 0.4 4.0 Competitive 122 2.9 20.7 
M. Expansion 99 3.1 31.1 
   
  
M. Withd. 2 0.1 1.1 
   
  
Total 122 3.7 36.2         
        
Competitive 27 0.1 1.4 M. Expansion 131 10.9 78.1 
M. Expansion 93 5.3 52.4 
   
  
M. Withd. 1 0.0 0.0 
   
  
N.A. 10 0.0 0.0 
   
  
Total 131 5.4 53.8         
        
Competitive 3 0.0 0.0 R.Competition 7 0.0 0.1 
M. Expansion 3 0.0 0.0 
   
  
N.A. 1 0.0 0.0 
   
  
Total 7 0.0 0.0         
        
Competitive 11 0.1 0.9 M. Withd. 51 0.2 1.2 
M. Expansion 39 0.9 9.1 
   
  
R.Competition 1 0.0 0.0 
   
  
Total 51 1.0 10.0         
        
Competitive 3 0.0 0.0 N.A. 25 0.0 0.0 
M.Withd. 2 0.0 0.0 
   
  
N.A. 20 0.0 0.0 
   
  
Total 25 0.0 0.0         
        
Grand Total 336 10.1 100.0 Grand Total 336 14.0 100.0 
Note: M.Expansion = Mutual Expansion, R. Competition= Reverse Competition and M. 
Withd.=Mutual Withdrawal  
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
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Appendix 6.4 Top Malaysian E&E Products in Competitive, Mutual Expansion and 
Reverse Competitive Relationship with Chinese E&E Exports by 2012 for Japan 
Market 
Top 10 Products  in 2002 that turns Competitive by 2012 
    2002 2012 
% 
Diff 
Product 
Code 
 Products Description 
US$ 
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
US$ 
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
Combine 
854211+ 
854219* 
Monolithic integrated 
circuits, digital & Non-
Digital 
1.0 22.0 0.68 12.6 -9.5 
847191 Digital process units 
whether or not presented 
0.2 3.8 0.01 0.2 -3.6 
847330 Parts and accessories of 
automatic data process 
0.3 5.5 0.11 2.1 -3.4 
852731 Radio broad receiver 
combined with sound 
record/reproducing 
0.2 4.1 0.04 0.7 -3.4 
847199 Automatic data processing 
machines and units, nes 
0.1 3.1 0.01 0.2 -2.8 
851999 Sound reproducing 
apparatus, not 
incorporating 
0.1 2.7 0.01 0.1 -2.6 
852110 Video recording or 
reproducing apparatus 
magnet 
0.2 4.5 0.12 2.2 -2.3 
847193 Computer data storage 
units 
0.3 5.8 0.24 4.3 -1.5 
900691 Parts and accessories for 
photographic cameras 
0.1 1.4 0 0.0 -1.4 
854380 Electrical machines and 
apparatus, nes 
0.1 2.3 0.06 1.1 -1.2 
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Top 10 Products  in 2002 that turns Mutual Expansion by 2012 
    2002 2012 
% 
Diff Product  Products Description 
US$ 
Bn 
2002 
% of 
E&E 
US$ 
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
851783 Combined telegraph 
apparatus and nes 
0.05 1.0 0.67 12.4 11.3 
850440 Static converters, nes 0.05 1.0 0.13 2.4 1.4 
847290 Office machines, nes 0.01 0.3 0.07 1.3 1.0 
854160 Mounted piezo-electric 
crystals 
0.04 0.8 0.09 1.7 1.0 
850980 Domestic appliances, with 
electric motor, nes 
0.00 0.0 0.05 0.9 0.9 
854129 Transistors, other than 
photosensitive transistor 
0.02 0.4 0.07 1.3 0.9 
853690 Electrical switch, 
protector, connecter < 1kV  
0.03 0.7 0.09 1.6 0.9 
851629 Electric space heating 
apparatus and electric s 
0.02 0.5 0.07 1.3 0.8 
841451 Fans: table, roof etc. with 
a self-contain electric mtr 
0.01 0.2 0.05 0.9 0.7 
903020 Cathode-ray oscilloscopes, 
oscillographs 
0.01 0.2 0.03 0.6 0.5 
Products in 2002 that turns Reverse Competitive by 2012 
    2002 2012 
% 
Diff 
Product 
Code 
 Products Description 
US$ 
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
US$ 
Bn 
% of 
E&E 
850910 Domestic vacuum cleaners 0.00 0.1 0.2 3.68 3.58 
852711 Radio receivers, portable, 
with sound reproduce/ rec 
0.03 0.75 0.16 2.91 2.16 
850511 Permanent magnets and 
art. intended to become p 
0.00 0.1 0.06 1.02 0.92 
853225 Electrical capacitors, fixed,  0.00 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.16 
854511 Carbon or graphite electr 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.02 0.02 
853649 Electrical relays for a 
voltage exceed 60 V but 
0.00 0.0 0.0 0.02 0.02 
852610 Radar apparatus 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
854330 App. for electro-plating. 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
847230 Machinery for mail proc. 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
851130 Distributors& ignition coils 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note: Manual Adjustment, HS 854211 move to Mutual Expansion and combined with HS 
854219. HS 851730 combined with HS 851782 to become HS 851783. 
 Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade  
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Appendix 7.1 List of Products in HS Codes 
HS Code Description 
842119 Centrifuges, incl. centrifugal dryers, other than cream separators & 
clothes-dryers  
842489 Mechanical appls. (excl. of 8424.10-8424.30), whether or not hand-
operated, for projecting/dispersing/spraying liquids/powders other 
than agricultural/horticultural  
845610 Operated by laser or other light or photon beam processes 
845691 Machine-tools for working any mat. by removal of mat., by electro-
chemical/electron beam/ionic-beam/plasma arc processes, for dry-
etching patterns on semiconductor mats.  
845699 Machine-tools for working any mat. by removal of mat., by electro-
chemical/electron beam/ionic-beam/plasma arc processes, n.e.s. in 
84.56  
846221 Numerically controlled 
846229 Bending/folding/straightening/flattening machines (incl. presses) for 
working metal other than numerically controlled  
846420 Grinding or polishing machines 
846490 Machine-tools for working stone/ceramics/concrete/asbestos-
cement/like min. mats./for cold working glass (excl. of 8464.10 & 
8464.20)  
846599 Machine-tools (incl. machines for nailing/stapling/glueing/othw. 
assembling) for working wood/cork/bone/hard rubber/hard 
plastics/sim. hard mats., n.e.s. in 84.65  
846610 Tool holders and self-opening die heads 
846620 Work holders 
846630 Dividing heads and other special attachments for machine tools 
846693 For machines of headings 84.56 to 84.61 
846694 For machines of heading 84.62 or 84.63 
847710 Injection moulding machines 
847740 Vacuum moulding machines and other thermoforming machines 
847759 Machinery for moulding/othw. forming rubber/plastics (excl. of 
8477.51)  
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HS Code Description 
847790 Marts for the machines of 84.77  
847989 Machines & mech. appls. having individual functions, n.e.s./incl. in 
Ch.84  
848071 Injection or compression types 
851430 Other furnaces and ovens 
851590 Parts of the machines & app. of 85.15  
854311 Ion implanters for doping semiconductor mats.  
854389 Other electrical machines & app., having individual functions, n.e.s. in 
Ch.85  
854390 Parts of the mach. & app. of 85.43  
901041 Direct write-on-wafer app. for the projection/drawing of circuit 
patterns on sensitised semiconductor mats.  
901042 Step & repeat aligners for the projection/drawing of circuit patterns 
on sensitised semiconductor mats.  
901049 Apparatus for the projection/drawing of circuit patterns on sensitised 
semiconductor mats. (excl. of 9010.41 & 9010.42)  
901090 Parts & accessories of the app. of 90.10  
903082 For measuring or checking semiconductor wafers or devices 
903090 Parts & accessories of the instr. & app. of 90.30  
903141 Optical instr. & appls. for inspecting semiconductor 
wafers/devices/for inspecting photomasks/reticles used in 
manufacturing semiconductor devices 
903149 Optical meas./checking instr. & appls., n.e.s. in Ch.90  
903180 Measuring/checking instr., app.& machines, n.e.s. in Ch. 90  
903190 Parts & accessories of the instr., app. & machines of 90.31  
Source: UNComtrade 
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Appendix 7.2 Integrated Circuits SEM Value Chain with Corresponding HS Codes of 
Machinery Used in Production 
Stages of 
Production  
HS Codes 
Rev. 2002  
HS Code Description  
Silicon wafer  846420 Grinding or polishing machines 
  847989* Machines For Manufacture Of Boules Or 
Wafers  
(HS 848610 in HS 2007)  
Wafer Processing 842119 Centrifuges, incl. centrifugal dryers, other than 
cream separators & clothes-dryers 
  842489 Mechanical appls. (excl. of 8424.10-8424.30), 
whether or not hand-operated, for 
projecting/dispersing/spraying liquids/powders 
other than agricultural/horticultural 
  845610 Operated by laser or other light or photon 
beam processes 
  845691 Machine-tools for working any mat. by 
removal of mat., by electro-chemical/electron 
beam/ionic-beam/plasma arc processes, for 
dry-etching patterns on semiconductor mats. 
  845699 Machine-tools for working any mat. by 
removal of mat., by electro-chemical/electron 
beam/ionic-beam/plasma arc processes, n.e.s. 
in 84.56  
  846221 Bending/folding/straightening/flattening 
machines (incl. presses) for working metal, 
numerically controlled 
  846229 Bending/folding/straightening/flattening 
machines (incl. presses) for working metal 
other than numerically controlled 
  846490 Machine-tools for working 
stone/ceramics/concrete/asbestos-
cement/like min. mats./for cold working glass 
(excl. of 8464.10 & 8464.20)  
  846599 Machine-tools (incl. machines for 
nailing/stapling/glueing/othw. assembling) for 
working wood/cork/bone/hard rubber/hard 
plastics/sim. hard mats., n.e.s. in 84.65 
  846610 Tool holders and selfopening dieheads 
  846620 Work holders 
  846630 Dividing heads and other special attachments 
for machinetools 
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Stages of 
Production  
HS Codes 
Rev. 2002  
HS Code Description  
  846693 For machines of headings 84.56 to 84.61 
  846694 For machines of heading 84.62 or 84.63 
  851430 Other furnaces and ovens 
  854311 Ion implanters for doping semiconductor mats. 
  854389 Other electrical machines & app., having 
individual functions, n.e.s. in Ch.85 (contains 
HS 848620 Machines For The Manufacture Of 
Semiconductors Or ICs) 
  854390 Parts of the mach. & app. of 85.43  
  901041** Direct write-on-wafer app. for the 
projection/drawing of circuit patterns on 
sensitised semiconductor mats.  
  901042 Step & repeat aligners for the 
projection/drawing of circuit patterns on 
sensitised semiconductor mats.  
  901049 Apparatus for the projection/drawing of circuit 
patterns on sensitised semiconductor mats. 
(excl. of 9010.41 & 9010.42)  
  901090 Parts & accessories of the app. of 90.10  
  903082** Instruments & apparatus for measuring or 
checking semiconductor wafers or devices 
  903090 Parts & accessories of the instr. & app. of 90.30  
Wafer Test 903141** Optical instr. & appls. for inspecting 
semiconductor wafers/devices/for inspecting 
photomasks/reticles used in manufacturing 
semiconductor devices (excl. of 9030.82) 
  847710 Injection moulding machines 
  847740 Vacuum moulding machines and other 
thermoforming machines 
Assembly  847759 Machinery for moulding/othw. forming 
rubber/plastics (excl. of 8477.51)  
(Chip Packaging) 847790 Marts for the machines of 84.77 (contains 
848690 Parts Of Machines Used In 
Manufacturing Of Semiconductors, FPD) 
  847989 Machines & mech. appls. having individual 
functions, n.e.s./incl. in Ch.84  
  848071 Injection or compression types 
  851590 Parts of the machines & app. of 85.15  
  903082** Instruments & apparatus for 
measuring/checking semiconductor 
wafers/devices 
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Stages of 
Production  
HS Codes 
Rev. 2002  
HS Code Description  
  903141** Optical instr. & appliances for inspecting 
semiconductor wafers/devices/for inspecting 
photomasks/reticles used in manufacturing 
semiconductor devices (excl. of 9030.82) 
Final Test  903149 Optical meas./checking instr. & appls., n.e.s. in 
Ch.90  
(Package Level) 903180 Measuring/checking instr., app.& machines, 
n.e.s. in Ch. 90  
  903190 Parts & accessories of the instr., app. & 
machines of 90.31  
Note:  
1) Items marked * are items, which are traced backwards using HS 2007 Nomenclature to 
HS 2002 Nomenclature concordance table for semiconductor machine items.  
2) Items marked ** are duplicates and can be used in Wafer test processing stage and 
wafer testing stage. The above table is general guide of machines used in the different 
stages of production of ICs. Machines l ike Direct write-on-wafer app. for the 
projection/drawing of circuit patterns on sensitised semiconductor mats.  (HS 901041) 
though listed in Wafer Processing stage, can be used in Wafer Test stage, to repair the 
sil icon circuit diagram.  
 
Source: Own Elaboration based on IC Supply Chain diagram  
from Silterra Malaysia and Sykes and Yinug (2006)  
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Appendix 7.3 Detail Steps of IC Production  
 
Source: Adopted from Silterra Corporation Malaysia  
Available at: http://www.silterra.com/supply_chain.html  
 
Fabrication of the semiconductor industry is referred as the front-end of 
the industry and this includes the wafer processing and wafer test. 
Fabrication of the silicon wafer is a combination of physics and chemistry 
processes. The production process starts with the deposit of a material, 
usually it is silicon oxide on silicon wafers. A silicon wafer has multiple 
layers of photomask being printed on it. In between the printing of the 
silicon mask, which essential forms the circuit diagram of the IC, the 
fabrication process also deposits chemicals and implant ions into the silicon 
wafer. After that, the machines remove any excess chemical from the 
silicon wafer after each print. This process of printing of the silicon wafer is 
called photo-masking. Depending on the literature, the process of photo-
masking is also referred as photolithography.  
 
Final Product
PCBA & Testing
Final Test (Package Level)
Assembly (Chip Packaging)
Wafer Test
Wafer Processing
Photo Mask Making
IC Des ign
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Due to advancement of technology, printing of the circuits is done at 
extremely fine level and layers of printing are done repeatedly based on 
the IC design. To give an idea of how fine this process is, the nodes or the 
length between ‘the physical gates’ inside the semiconductor is currently at 
around 30 nanometres, (Pangrle, 2014) and a human hair diameter ranges 
from 58 to 100 microns) (Lo'real, (n.d)). 137Generally, the smaller the nodes 
size, it means more transistors can be fitted into the IC within the same 
surface area and therefore, it translate into a higher computing power. 138 
As the fabrication of IC on silicon wafers are done at a very fine level, this 
production stage takes place in a clean room, with the air in the production 
room being regularly filtered at extremely fine level to remove any 
particles that can potentially disrupt the fabrication process. Access to the 
clean room requires workers to don the ‘bunny’ suits as seen in the Intel 
advertisement in the 1990s.  
 
Once the wafer is fabricated, it is tested with the use of customised 
probing machines to weed out defective wafers. The added thickness of 
the fabricated wafers is hardly noticeable by the naked eye, but the circuits 
embedded on the wafer are visible if lights are shone on the wafer.  
 
After that, the fabricated wafers are shipped to another location and from 
this point forward, the process is referred by the IC industry as the back-
end process. The fabricated wafers are ground to make them thinner and 
then sawed into individual units (referred as die from this point forward). 
The die are then glued to its packaging using special formulated liquids, 
then gold wires are soldered to the lead frames to connect the silicon chip 
                                                 
137 1 nanometres =0.001 microns  
138 Technical understanding of semiconductor can be complex. A CEO of a semiconductor 
company explains for beginners, si l icon IC fabrication is drawn to its similarities with a 
building a tall  multi -storey building. In fabrication of the IC, layers or the number of floors 
are being added to the ‘building’, with each floor, having a specific function for the whole 
building, such as controlling and monitoring power for the IC chips, some floors are 
specifically build to process certain signals, etc.  
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with the packaging. IC Packaging comes in different forms and sizes but the 
typical ones are made of plastics, metal or glass with pins protruding. These 
pins make the connection from the silicon part of the IC with other 
electrical devices. 139 Next, the chips are moulded using a mould injection 
technique where advanced material are melted and then cured to form the 
encapsulation of the IC. The encapsulated ICs are then marked with lasers 
with information of the batch no. and trademarks. In the final stage of the 
production, the IC chips are checked and tested to see if they are 
functioning as intended. The IC chips that pass the tests are now ready for 
shipment either in the form of tape or tray.  
 
 
                                                 
139 Depending on type of packaging, for Ball  Grid Arrays (BGA), the metal balls are 
positioned into tiny holes between the board and the IC package, and then electrical 
connects are made when the metal balls are melted onto the electrical board.  
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Appendix 7.4 Share of Testing Machines to Total Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment (Malaysia as Reporter) 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
(2002-
2013) 
% of testing to SME Export 
to China 
38.20% 38.68% 68.70% 51.31% 77.97% 45.10% 63.34% 45.68% 71.23% 64.89% 69.88% 60.38% 57.95% 
% of testing products to 
SME Total Export (World) 
48.77% 50.00% 45.94% 44.88% 50.57% 43.79% 53.12% 45.29% 59.40% 55.57% 66.07% 56.59% 51.67% 
Note: HS code 903082, 903090, 903141, 903149, 903180, 903190 are semiconductor testing equipment.  
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
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Appendix 7.5 Balance of Trade for Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment Malaysia and China 
 HS Code 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
842119 -  0.00     0.01     0.00      0.00  -0.00  -   0.00  -  0.03      0.01  -   0.02  -  0.01  - 0.03  -  0.04  
842489    0.00  - 0.00  - 0.02  -   0.01  -0.05  -   0.06  -  0.11  -   0.13  -   0.12  -  0.15  - 0.22  -  0.05  
845610    0.00  - 0.00  - 0.00  -   0.00  -0.02  -   0.01  -  0.01  -   0.01  -   0.02  -  0.01  - 0.02  -  0.12  
845691         -       0.00          -        0.00  -0.01  -   0.00  -  0.00           -             -            -           -            -    
845699    0.00     0.07     0.00  -   0.00  -0.01      0.00      0.01       0.00  -   0.00     0.00  - 0.01  -  0.01  
846221 -  0.00     0.00  - 0.00  -   0.00  -0.01  -   0.01  -  0.00  -   0.01  -   0.00  -  0.02  - 0.01  -  0.01  
846229 -  0.01     0.02  - 0.01      0.14  -0.03  -   0.04  -  0.04  -   0.04  -   0.45  -  0.11  - 0.29  -  0.10  
846420 -  0.00  - 0.00  - 0.00  -   0.02  -0.01  -   0.02  -  0.02  -   0.02  -   0.01  -  0.03  - 0.01  -  0.02  
846490 -  0.00  - 0.00  - 0.00  -   0.02  -0.03  -   0.03  -  0.04  -   0.04  -   0.06  -  0.04  - 0.03  -  0.04  
846599 -  0.03     0.05  - 0.04  -   0.10  -0.18  -   0.12  -  0.07  -   0.07  -   0.11  -  0.14  - 0.13  -  0.07  
846610 -  0.00  - 0.00  - 0.00  -   0.00  -0.00  -   0.00      0.02  -   0.00  -   0.00  -  0.01  - 0.02  -  0.04  
846620    0.00     0.00  - 0.00  -   0.00  -0.01      0.00  -  0.01  -   0.00      0.00  -  0.00  - 0.08  -  0.06  
846630 -  0.01  - 0.00  - 0.00      0.00    0.00  -   0.00  -  0.00       0.02  -   0.00  -  0.00  - 0.00  -  0.00  
846693    0.00     0.00  - 0.03      0.01    0.01  -   0.01  -  0.01       0.01      0.03  -  0.02  - 0.04      0.00  
846694    0.02     0.00  - 0.01  -   0.00    0.03      0.04      0.03       0.01      0.08     0.06  - 0.10  -  0.00  
847710 -  0.01  - 0.04  - 0.11  -   0.15  -0.12  -   0.19  -  0.16  -   0.17  -   0.32  -  0.41  - 0.32  -  0.33  
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 HS Code 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
847740    0.00     0.00     0.01  -   0.00  -0.01  -   0.01      0.01  -   0.00  -   0.01  -  0.02  - 0.01  -  0.03  
847759    0.00     0.01  - 0.01  -   0.02  -0.03  -   0.02  -  0.03  -   0.03  -   0.04  -  0.03  - 0.03  -  0.01  
847790 -  0.00     0.01  - 0.04  -   0.03  -0.05  -   0.06  -  0.01       0.00  -   0.08  -  0.08  - 0.08  -  0.14  
847989    0.11     0.08  - 0.02  -   0.13  -0.12      0.16  -  0.13       0.04  -   0.06  -  1.44  - 0.24  -  0.49  
848071 -  0.01  - 0.04  - 0.02  -   0.03  -0.18  -   0.19  -  0.13  -   0.09  -   0.06  -  0.13  - 0.18  -  0.20  
851430    0.02     0.00  - 0.01  -   0.02  -0.03  -   0.04  -  0.18  -   1.12  -   0.29  -  0.22  - 2.50  -  0.47  
851590 -  0.01  - 0.00  - 0.02  -   0.01  -0.03  -   0.03  -  0.04  -   0.04  -   0.04  -  0.08  - 0.08  -  0.06  
854311         -            -            -             -    -0.00  -   0.00  -  0.00           -             -            -           -            -    
854389 -  0.03  - 0.01  - 0.04      0.23  -0.07  -   0.03  -  0.05  -   0.10  -   0.13  -  0.13  - 0.05  -  0.19  
854390 -  0.01  - 0.03  - 0.04  -   0.03    0.00      0.02  -  0.04  -   0.03  -   0.08  -  0.15  - 0.17  -  0.09  
901041         -            -            -             -           -             -            -             -             -            -           -            -    
901042         -            -            -             -           -             -            -             -             -            -           -            -    
901049         -       0.06          -             -    -0.00  -   0.00          -             -             -            -           -            -    
901090 -  0.00  - 0.01     0.00  -   0.00  -0.00  -   0.00  -  0.00  -   0.00  -   0.00  -  0.05  - 0.00  -  0.00  
903082    0.01     0.01  - 0.05      0.04  -0.05      0.03  -  0.01       0.02  -   0.23     0.08    0.35      0.11  
903090    0.03  - 0.13  - 0.12  -   0.21  -0.17  -   0.17  -  0.09  -   0.07      0.49     0.32    0.76      0.37  
903141    0.03  - 0.00     0.03      0.00  -0.08  -   0.02      0.05       0.02      0.13     0.12    0.10      0.06  
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 HS Code 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
903149    0.01    0.00    0.01 -   0.02 -0.26 -   0.19     0.00 -   0.03     0.05    0.01 - 0.01     0.06 
903180    0.02     0.03     0.08      0.13  -0.12  -   0.01  -  0.16      0.01      0.27     0.23    0.07  -  0.20  
903190    0.00     0.09     0.02      0.03    0.81  -   0.09      0.17  -   0.19      0.89     0.06  - 0.30  -  0.12  
Balance    0.13     0.17  - 0.45  -   0.24  -0.81  -   1.12  -  1.06  -   2.04  -   0.19  -  2.41  - 3.67  -  2.29  
                Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
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Appendix 7.6 Revealed Comparative Advantage for Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Equipment (Malaysia) 
HS Code  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
842119 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 
842489 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 
845610 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 
845691 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 62.9 67.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
845699 2.8 2.2 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.7 
846221 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
846229 0.3 0.5 0.4 1.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 
846420 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 
846490 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.1 
846599 0.6 1.3 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.3 1.0 0.3 
846610 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.4 
846620 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 
846630 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 1.2 
846693 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.5 
846694 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.3 1.6 0.6 
847710 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.5 
847740 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 
847759 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.4 
847790 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.5 
847989 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.8 
848071 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
851430 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.2 0.9 1.2 
851590 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.2 
854311 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 32.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
854389 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.1 0.7 1.3 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.9 
854390 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.5 1.3 1.5 
901041 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
901042 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
901049 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.4 8.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
901090 0.1 0.1 1.0 0.8 0.1 1.8 1.7 0.9 1.8 2.2 2.3 
903082 0.6 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.6 2.8 3.0 4.3 6.2 17.0 
903090 1.9 2.8 3.4 4.1 4.5 5.2 6.1 6.1 9.9 9.6 17.4 
903141 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.0 
903149 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.1 
903180 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.6 
903190 2.6 2.2 1.7 3.8 4.1 2.7 2.2 1.5 3.5 2.3 4.1 
Note: Numbers shaded are RCA>1                                    
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
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Appendix 7.7 Share of Exports by Trading Partners for Optical instruments. & 
appliances. for inspecting semiconductor wafers/devices/for inspecting 
photomasks/reticles used in manufacturing semiconductor devices (HS Code 
903141) 
 
      %   
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
China 63.6 6.6 46.6 30.4 0.1 6.4 32.9 30.6 
USA 6.1 2.8 4.9 7.7 10.4 37.5 24.1 10.3 
Singapore 10.6 30.2 37.1 39.9 6.9 18.0 15.6 31.2 
Other Asia 2.6 17.5 0.3 4.1 44.4 2.2 9.1 0.7 
Mexico 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 
Hong Kong 0.0 0.5 3.0 4.2 9.4 8.6 1.3 0.0 
Thailand 0.0 1.4 0.4 0.0 0.3 4.8 1.4 6.8 
Philippines 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.4 6.4 2.6 1.3 
S. Korea 2.2 0.4 0.1 1.3 20.1 0.9 2.0 14.5 
Japan 10.0 35.5 2.5 1.6 0.8 0.4 0.7 3.6 
Others 4.6 5.2 5.2 8.8 7.2 14.8 9.5 1.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
     
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 
China 47.7 19.8 29.8 33.0 
USA 4.0 46.4 23.7 14.0 
Singapore 22.2 9.9 9.3 9.3 
Other Asia 4.0 11.5 15.7 15.6 
Mexico 2.4 1.6 0.4 8.9 
Hong Kong 8.9 2.6 3.0 6.5 
Thailand 8.6 2.0 0.5 2.3 
Philippines 0.2 0.5 7.1 5.7 
S. Korea 0.5 1.9 3.2 0.8 
Japan 0.5 0.7 2.4 0.1 
Others 1.0 3.2 5.0 4.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on UNComtrade 
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Appendix 7.8 Annual Silicon Shipment Statistics from SEMI (Global Association for 
Silicon-based products shipment)  
 
Worldwide Silicon 
Data  
2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  
Area Shipments (MSI)  6,645  7,996  8,661  8,137  6,707  9,370  
Revenues ($B)  7.9  10.0  12.1  11.4  6.7  9.7  
*Shipments are for semiconductor applications only and do not include solar applications   
Source: SEMI® (2011) 
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Appendix 8.1 FDI for E&E sector by Sub-sector 
 
Source: MIDA 
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Appendix 8.2 Investment inflow and outflow to Malaysia, China as Reporter 
Inflows  (US$ Millions) 
Region / economy 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Malaysia 
 
 263  368  251  385  361  393  397  247  429 ..  358 .. 
Outflows (US$ Millions) 
Region / economy 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Malaysia 
 
.. .. 1.97 8.12 56.72 7.51 -32.82 34.43 53.78 163.54 95.13 199.04 
              Inflows/ Outflows 0 0 127 47 6 52 0* 7 8 0 4 0 
* Adjusted due to negatives.  
Note: Due to countries definition of what constitutes as FDI might differ between countries, for example, one country might treat reinvested earnings as FDI, but another 
might not, and different accounting practice across countries also has an effect on the FDI numbers in bilateral settings.  
Source: UNCTAD WIR Website  
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Appendix 8.3 Rajah Rasiah’s Taxonomy of Level of R&D 
Level Knowledge 
depth 
Human 
Resources 
Process Product 
1 Simple 
activities  
On the job and 
in-house 
training  
Dated machinery 
with simple 
inventory and 
control 
techniques 
Assembly or 
processing of 
component, 
CKD and CBU 
using foreign 
technology  
2 Minor 
Improvements 
In-house 
training and 
performance 
rewards  
Advanced 
machinery, 
layouts and 
problem solving 
 
 Precision 
engineering 
3 Major 
Improvements 
Extensive focus 
on training and 
retraining; staff 
with training 
responsibility 
Cutting-edge 
inventory control 
techniques, SPC, 
TQM, TPM 
Cutting-edge 
quality control 
systems (QCC 
and TQC) with 
OEM capability  
 
4 Engineering  Hiring engineers 
for adaptation 
activities; 
separate 
training 
departments  
Process 
adaptation: 
layouts, 
equipment and 
techniques 
Product 
adaptation  
5 Early R&D  Hiring engineers 
for product 
development 
activities, 
separate 
specialised 
training 
activities  
 
Process 
development: 
layouts and 
machinery and 
equipment, 
materials and 
processes 
Product 
development 
capability. 
Some firms take 
on ODM 
capability 
6 Mature R&D  Hiring 
specialised R&D 
scientists and 
engineers 
wholly engaged 
in new product 
research  
Process R&D to 
devise new 
layouts, 
machinery and 
equipment 
prototypes, 
materials and 
processes 
New product 
development 
capability, with 
some taking on 
OBM capability 
Note: CKD: Complete knock-down, CBU: Complete Built Unit; SPC: Statistical process 
control, TQM: Total quality management, TPM: Total preventive maintenance, QCC: 
Quality Control Circles, TQC: Total Quality Control, OEM: Original equipment 
manufacturing; ODM: original design manufacturing, OBM original brand manufacturing.  
Source: Rasiah (2010)  
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